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This work will argue that Mahāyāna philosophy need not result in endorsement of some cosmic 
Absolute in the vein of the Advaitin ātman-Brahman.  Scholars such as Bhattacharya, Albahari 
and Murti argue that the Buddha at no point denied the existence of a cosmic ātman, and instead 
only denied a localised, individual ātman (what amounts to a jīva).  The idea behind this, then, is 
that the Buddha was in effect an Advaitin, analysing experience and advocating liberation in an 
Advaitin sense: through a rejection of the individual ātman and knowledge (jñāna) of and 
immersion into the universal ātman-Brahman.    
I will explore how different religious traditions define and shape the Absolute according to their 
own religious convictions, illustrating a divergence in conception from the very start, before 
exploring key differences between the Advaitin conception of the Absolute as put forth by 
Śaṅkara and as defended by Bhattacharya in The Ātman-Brahman in Ancient Buddhism.  I then 
challenge Bhattacharya’s claims that prajñāpāramitā literature necessarily endorses the ātman-
Brahman and that Mahāyāna philosophies reorientate Buddhists towards the truth of the ātman-
Brahman.  
I do this by arguing that there are viable interpretations of Vasubandhu’s Yogācāra and 
Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka that do not advocate such a belief, that prajñāpāramitā literature can 
be viewed as a project in episteme rather than ontology, and that we need not find a ground of 
the same sort as the ātman-Brahman in the Buddhist flux of experience.  I conclude by showing 
that whilst Absolutism is a theme in some schools of Buddhism, it need not be – contra 
Bhattacharya – the conclusion of two major Mahāyāna philosophies. 
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Introduction  
This work is primarily an attempt to defend Mahāyāna philosophy broadly construed 
against the claim that it ought to result in absolutism, understood here and throughout this thesis 
as the belief that there is an Absolute or unconditioned Being that is the foundation of 
conditioned existences.  There are, of course no shortage of examples of absolutist thinking 
within the wide range of Mahāyāna thought, and scholars such as Kamaleswar Bhattacharya have 
seized upon such examples in an attempt to argue that Buddhist thought is, at its heart, focused 
on bringing its practitioners to knowledge of the absolute ātman-Brahman; the ultimate identity 
of souls and the foundational principle, as understood by adherents of the Advaita or non-dualist 
form of Vedānta.   Indeed, Bhattacharya’s Ātman-Brahman in Ancient Buddhism caused quite a 
stir for advancing precisely this claim.  Its central thesis is that the Buddha did not deny the cosmic 
ātman-Brahman, instead only denying the ultimate reality of the individual ātman, or jīva (2015: 
7; 13; 23; 32).  This would make the anātman doctrine that has become synonymous with 
Buddhism as understood today either a non-original feature added later by Buddhist scholastics, 
or an original feature that has been misinterpreted and misunderstood.1  It would also mean that 
Buddhism is at its heart a variant of Vedānta.   
I will not spend much time discussing the ways in which some Buddhist schools of thought 
do indeed endorse absolutism: Bhattacharya already makes clear that this is sometimes the case.  
Instead, I will focus my efforts on explaining why it does not need to be the case.  This work is 
                                                        
1 Bhattacharya seems to think that the second applies, though there is some disagreement in recent scholarship as 
to whether the Buddha advocated anātman at all.  See Wynne (2009) for more. 
P a g e  | 2 
 
thus a response to a subtle claim made in Bhattacharya’s book, namely that it is the Mahāyāna 
schools ‘which put things right’ (2015: 39) in returning the Buddhist focus away from a doctrine 
of selflessness (anātmavāda) to the absolutism of the ātman-Brahman.  I will defend the thesis 
that absolutism need not be a conclusion of Mahāyāna philosophy, and I intend to argue for this 
thesis as follows. 
First, I assess some conceptions of the Absolute according to different religious and 
philosophical traditions, arguing that there is no single account of an Absolute that fully coheres 
across multiple religious traditions, and so we ought to be clear precisely what sort of absolute 
we are advocating (or not!) when discussing the Absolute.  I argue that whilst ineffability is 
common to mystical accounts of the Absolute (insofar as a mystic can give an account of an 
ineffable Absolute), there are nevertheless many metaphysical assumptions and assignations 
that vary wildly dependent on the tradition under examination.  Consequently, it is not enough 
to assume that it is the very same Absolute that is being experienced in each case simply because 
mystics report some sort of ineffable experience.  It could be the case, for example, that mystics 
have simply achieved a psychological state that needs no attribution of metaphysical priority, or 
indeed any metaphysical import at all.  My overarching argument in this section is twofold: first, 
that there are so many differences that are brought up so frequently when discussing the 
Absolute according to different traditions that it barely makes sense to assume that they are all 
talking about the same phenomenon or set of phenomena.  Second, that the Buddha would deny 
all such ‘accounts’ of the Absolute.  Consequently, we ought to exercise caution when attempting 
to draw parallels across traditions. 
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Section 2 sees me address the question of ātman-Brahman in Buddhism in three ways.  
First, I give a survey of Bhattacharya’s argument, offering some alternative readings of his sources 
and referring to such Mahāyāna titans as Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu in an attempt to delineate 
what Bhattacharya sees as a necessarily monistic interpretation from what could be, if read with 
some degree of nuance and awareness of the wider context, simple examples of upāya.  I argue 
that Bhattacharya overstates his case and that in choosing to leave ātman untranslated in some 
key passages, he obscures the meaning therein.  It is here that I introduce Vasubandhu for the 
first time and use his conception of the three natures (trisvabhāva) to explain an apparently 
absolutist extract.  I further argue that more instances interpreted by Bhattacharya to support 
an Absolute can be interpreted alternatively to support the Buddhist doctrine of anātman.  I end 
by outlining Bhattacharya’s position that anātman is actually synonymous with paramātman, and 
that because the Buddha knows the nature of all dharmas (phenomena) to be anātman, he has 
in reality arrived at the pinnacle of understanding: anātman is the ātman-Brahman. 
From here, I give an outline of Abhidharmic dharma theory and explain that I think that 
Bhattacharya is mistaken to equate the emptiness of dharmas with the ātman-Brahman.  
Bhattacharya’s position seems to be that if dharmas are impersonal, then it is precisely this 
impersonality that constitutes their true intrinsic nature.  In such an instance, emptiness 
(śūnyatā) would effectively be the svabhāva of all phenomena.  I then ask if this is a feasible 
position to take and conclude it might be, depending on how Bhattacharya understands a dharma 
to function.  I argue that he must follow Nāgārjuna in asserting their emptiness in order to avoid 
issues around there being many svabhāvas instead of just one: the impersonal ātman-Brahman.  
The problems with this position will provide the basis for sections 5 and 6. 
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Section 2 ends with a discussion around a potential early Buddhist rejection of the 
Brahman.  Reading the Brahmanimantanika Sutta in a certain way sees some strong parallels 
appear between the Upaniṣadic Brahman and the world of Baka-Brahmā that is visited by the 
Buddha.  I argue that the Buddha purposely eschews all ideas of immersion into a state of being 
where existence is permanent and there is no aging, no death or rebirth.  The Buddha 
demonstrates that his mind is more powerful than that of Baka-Brahmā, and employs his superior 
mental powers to disappear from the powerful deity, demonstrating that the realm of Baka-
Brahmā – which relies on a specific mental state to enter – is actually transient and subject to all 
of the mundane dissatisfactions that Baka-Brahmā thinks do not apply.  This reading ties in, I 
argue, with a sermon detailed in the Mūlapariyāya Sutta, where the Buddha explicitly denies that 
anything comes forth from ’unbinding’, which can be understood as the liberated state.  If this 
liberated state is to be the ātman-Brahman, we would be at a loss to account for the existence 
of the world if, as the Buddha argues, nothing comes from it or it is not immanent in the way that 
the ātman-Brahman is required to be. 
Section 3 addresses the ways in which it might be claimed that we can know this elusive 
ātman-Brahman.  I begin by examining how the Upaniṣads talk about the transcendent ātman-
Brahman and why scriptural descriptions of it are valuable despite being ultimately inapplicable.  
The position of Śaṅkara is that scripture is unique in its ability to assert the existence of the 
ātman-Brahman; without this, we would not know to search for it.  This is because, thinks 
Śaṅkara, the ātman-Brahman is not an object to be discovered by empirical means.  This raises 
the question, then, how we might ‘know’ the ātman-Brahman at all given that its existence is so 
radically other: we might even say that it is ‘radically inaccessible’ (Tillemans, 1999: 29), and so 
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cannot ever be discovered through empirical experience alone or indeed through reason alone.  
Śaṅkara attempts to deal with this issue by prioritising the authority of the scriptures themselves 
(śruti) and their verbalisation (by a guru/teacher; śabda).  I then compare the Buddhist recourse 
to scripture, which I conclude is much weaker than that of the Advaitin, with thinkers such as 
Dharmakīrti acknowledging that scriptural inferences always carry some risk of uncertainty and 
should be avoided wherever possible: this is not a position that appears to be shared by Śaṅkara.   
The focus then moves onto the significance of the pramāṇas to both Śaṅkara and 
Nāgārjuna, discussing some superficial similarities and accounting for the significant differences 
in the role of pramāṇa and scriptural authority (a type of pramāṇa for Śaṅkara).  I go on to 
conclude that Nāgārjuna has no use at all for any pramāṇas, developing this argument with 
recourse to the Vigrahavyāvartani, explaining why I believe it to be the case that for Nāgārjuna, 
anti-essentialism and anti-foundationalism are paramount: he believes that such things render 
liberation impossible.  This logic should extend to any notions of Brahman.  I then argue that 
whilst both Śaṅkara and Nāgārjuna ought to agree that if the pramāṇas have any use at all, it is 
only in terms of the conventional, the fundamental Advaitin reliance on scriptural establishment 
of the ātman-Brahman means that they in effect do make some sort of ultimate point: the ātman-
Brahman is ultimately existent.  It is the only existent.  This is something that Nāgārjuna believes 
to be impossible. 
The section concludes with the introduction of a discussion of emptiness (śūnyatā).  I 
argue that the point of this concept is to remove all conceptual constructions/proliferations 
(prapañca) and metaphysical views/positions (dṛṣṭi) – including those of ‘ultimate’ realities or 
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truths.  The aim here is purely soteriological: Nāgārjuna is not particularly concerned with 
providing some account of the makeup of the world.  He is instead concerned with adapting the 
way in which we look upon the world so that we may stem our various dissatisfactions (duḥkha). 
In section 4, some similarities are introduced between Advaitin doctrine and that of the 
Mādhyamikas, leaning on Frank Whaling’s (1979) account of Śaṅkara’s relationship with the 
Buddhist doctrines of his time.  I spend some time examining the close similarities between both 
Śaṅkara and Nāgārjuna’s conceptions of conventional and ultimate, a distinction that seems to 
have been absent from Vedānta until the time of Śaṅkara (Nicholson, 2007:531), before moving 
on to a survey of Śaṅkara’s understanding of some other Buddhist doctrines.  I note that there is 
either a wilful or an accidental conflation of divergent doctrines belonging to separate Buddhist 
schools.  I suggest that this conflation may well have been an intentional attempt to portray the 
Buddha as confused and inconsistent by showing him to propound three separate, incompatible 
doctrines (Śaṅkara, 2011: 428).  
The section continues with the introduction of some Buddhist doctrinal positions, a move 
that I hope will demonstrate why Śaṅkara thought these Buddhists to propound theories 
incompatible with his own (a point with which Bhattacharya must disagree).  In order to do this, 
I discuss the Vaibhāṣika doctrine of possession, noting that their belief in ultimately existent 
atoms (dharmas), each possessing a svabhāva, precludes Śaṅkara from identifying with them in 
any way.  It also precludes the Vaibhāṣikas themselves from endorsing an ātman-Brahman, for 
they already have an atomic account of the fundamentals of existence.  The next step is to discuss 
the Sautrāntika response to the doctrine of possession, which hinges upon a rejection of the 
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Vaibhāṣika belief that a svabhāva is ultimately existent in the past, present, and future.  The 
Sautrāntika response – devised by Vasubandhu – posits radical momentariness of dharmas, 
whereby their existence is wholly constituted by their causal activity (svalakṣaṇa).  In this case, 
the dharma is no longer basic, but rather its causal efficacy is basic.  A svalakṣaṇa can only 
manifest in the present, and so this in theory dispenses with the problematic endorsement of 
dharmas that exist eternally.  I explain why Vasubandhu thinks that this account solves some 
fundamental Vaibhāṣika problems and provides a deliberate rejection of a fundamental ground 
of experience, accounting for ‘direct and indirect causal efficacy in the face of momentariness 
and the absence of a unifying substratum’ (Cox, 1995: 96).  I go on to argue that Vasubandhu – 
like Nāgārjuna – is concerned with denying that there are immutable ultimate entities, explaining 
how he recharacterises svabhāva from immutable essence denoting ultimacy to a useful fiction 
that is ultimately unreal: a svabhāva is no more than an appearance or mental construction 
(parikalpita), and so lacks ultimacy.   
Next, I extrapolate Vasubandhu’s use of svabhāva and introduce his ideas surrounding 
change and the denial of ātman.  Here I continue the claim made earlier that although 
Vasubandhu uses the term ‘svabhāva’, he does so in a specific way, viz. in a manner that does 
not bestow it with ultimate reality.  Thus, his trisvabhāva doctrine does not endorse a trilogy of 
ultimately real entities, but accounts for a tripartite way of seeing phenomena, each of which can 
be understood to be conventional rather than ultimate.  I proceed to give accounts of the 
similarities in method of the Yogācāra and the Madhyamaka, noting that whilst some differences 
can be noted in the ways in which words such as ‘śūnyatā’ are used, both traditions aim at an 
epistemological realisation; the realisation that there are no permanent, immutable, ultimate 
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entities.  The argument hinges on my interpretation of Nāgārjuna as utterly unconcerned with 
propagating a metaphysics by which the world can be explained.  I argue, then, that both 
Yogācāra philosophy and Madhyamaka philosophy deny that there can be a super-real ultimate 
substratum, despite consciousness being a type of ground in Yogācāra.  Importantly, this ground 
is not of the same sort as the ātman-Brahman, viz. as the material and efficient cause of the 
universe, immanent in all things, as a ground of Being.  Instead, it is a ground of experience, which 
is to say that it provides the basis for all of our experience and cognition.   Our consciousness 
does this without recourse to one single ultimate substance.  Consciousness is intersubjective, 
and each consciousness is to be understood as distinct, not as a misapprehended plurality 
imposed over a single entity.  In other words, consciousness ought not to be understood in the 
way that the jīva is understood by Bhattacharya.  I specifically refer to Lusthaus’ (2002: 489) 
argument that the Yogācāra acknowledges multiple distinct consciousnesses, not simply the 
misapprehension of consciousnesses that all have their nexus in a Brahman-like substratum.  This 
is a claim quite different to that advanced by Bhattacharya in support of the ātman-Brahman!  
Further, I argue that as a ‘real’ entity as understood by Vasubandhu requires an entity be 
momentary and not eternal, the ātman-Brahman cannot be considered a candidate for ‘reality’ 
in the Yogācāra tradition, much less be considered the only reality. 
Following this, the discussion moves to the Advaitin doctrine of māyā and its 
(im)plausibility as an account of the appearance of plurality and action in the world (we 
misapprehend the true nature of ātman-Brahman owing to māyā).  I then measure this against 
the Buddhist account of delusion, which has its roots in measured analysis and reason.  I conclude 
that any Buddhist that takes seriously dependent origination, reason, and analysis simply cannot 
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accept the doctrine of māyā as the answer to problematic questions regarding Brahman, action 
and difference. 
The final part of section 4 focuses on a discussion of Yogācāra as idealism.  If it is the case 
that Yogācāra is idealistic and endorses only one consciousness, then the claim that this 
Mahāyāna school outright endorses absolutism might well be warranted.  I borrow heavily from 
Lusthaus and argue that should his characterisation of Yogācāra be correct, then we cannot 
reasonably state that Yogācāra is idealism, or at least not as we commonly understand the term.  
I contrast Lusthaus’ argument that Yogācāra is not idealism with divergent views, including the 
position of Trivedi (2005), who argues that Yogācāra might best be understood as a type of 
‘epistemic idealism’, whereby it would not make any ontological claims.  It would then instead 
‘claim that we know things not as they really are, as claim epistemic realists, but rather as they 
are given to us by our ideas, our concepts, and categories’ (2005: 232).  That is to say that we 
cannot know things in themselves, only as they are represented to us.  Trivedi, like Lusthaus, does 
not think that consciousness somehow manufactures a mind-dependent world (2005: 236), and 
so eschews the idea that Vasubandhu’s thought and the Yogācāra more generally can be 
classified as metaphysical idealism.  Following this line of thought, I argue that Vasubandhu is, 
like Nāgārjuna, concerned not with building a metaphysical system, but instead with providing 
some sort of roadmap to deconstructing our mistaken views.  I suggest that the point of the 
Yogācārin method is nirvikalpaka-jnā͂na, or non-discriminating cognition, a type of awareness 
that does not impose onto the world or grasp out at it.  The section is concluded with a brief 
discussion of an excerpt from the Ch'eng wei-shih lun (translated by Lusthaus) which appears to 
P a g e  | 10 
 
deny that to assert a paramātman in the name of the Yogācāra is to spectacularly misunderstand 
both the aim of Yogācāra and the method it employs. 
Section 5 involves some examinations of tricky Pāli/Sanskrit terminology, beginning with 
dhammakāya/dharmakāya.  This is a word that has many connotations in the Buddhist corpus, 
and in my experience, the favoured meaning imparted to it generally depends on who is asked.  
There is a trend in some Buddhist literature and some Buddhist schools to interpret the 
dharmakāya as an absolute; it is on this view a realm in which the Buddha always exists, an 
unconditioned, pure, metaphysically privileged realm not unlike that of the ātman-Brahman.  
Entry to this realm, it is thought, is liberation.  Surely, though, this would be unsatisfactory to 
somebody like Nāgārjuna, who expended so much time and effort denying the possibility of 
ultimate entities (and so realms)?  I suggest that Nāgārjuna might opt to interpret dharmakāya 
in an alternative manner, perhaps as an attribute of the Buddha rather than the Buddha’s Being.  
I then cite Harrison’s (1992) argument that (limited) uses of dharmakāya in the 
Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra ought to be interpreted adjectivally, and so as some attribute 
possessed by the Buddha rather than as some external thing in itself.   
There follows a contextual discussion of the potential absolutist interpretations of 
buddha-body and saṅgha-body, which are both mentioned in the same context as the dharma-
body in the AsPP.  It is difficult to understand how the saṅgha might be thought of as a 
transcendental entity.  It makes more sense to think of the saṅgha-body as the ‘collected qualities 
of the saṅgha’, or the totality of qualities possessed by monastics – the principles of the wider 
religious family, if you will.  Similarly, if buddha-body is to be understood transcendentally, then 
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what separates it from the dharmakāya?  Thus buddha-body might simply refer to the collected 
qualities of all buddhas as ‘revealed’ in the Perfection of Wisdom.  These are not necessarily 
equivalent with the Dharma, but exemplify the personal qualities of those enlightened minds 
that have fully understood and eventually come to ‘live’ the Dharma.   
I then spend some time with Xing (2005), who argues that if we claim that the 
dharmakāya of all buddhas is identical, all we are really claiming is that every buddha manifests 
or embodies the Dharma in the same way, presumably because they have all acquired the same 
qualities and the same insight into the world.  I conclude by surmising that we can avoid 
absolutism if we interpret such tricky words with some nuance and an awareness of their uses in 
early Buddhist literature.  For a Mādhyamika seeking to avoid absolutism, then, my contention is 
that the dharmakāya refers to little more than the qualities exemplified, taught, and lived out by 
the Buddha.  There is no transcendental aspect required. 
Next, I spend a short amount of time discussing how we might understand words like 
brahmakāya in a similar vein to dharmakāya.  I follow Xing in arguing that brahmakāya can be 
understood as a synonym for dharmakāya (Xing, 2005: 71), likely for pedagogical reasons.  I argue 
that Bhattacharya’s assertion that brahmakāya, brahmabhūta and so on are always intended to 
be taken transcendentally does not stand up to scrutiny because each word can be understood 
in simpler, more mundane ways that still cohere with wider Buddhist doctrine. 
There is then a short discussion about how a Buddhist concerned with denying ultimacy 
and absolutism might want to interpret ‘tathāgata’ and tathāgatagarbha.  The thrust of this 
subsection is to provide an alternative interpretation of the tathāgata that does not rely on the 
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idea of an essential principle underpinning all existence (akin to the ātman-Brahman).  I discuss 
pertinent extracts in the MMK that appear to refute any ultimate difference between saṃsāra 
and nirvāṇa, and advance the argument that Nāgārjuna cannot and does not endorse the 
existence of an ultimate substratum like the ātman-Brahman.  The tathāgatagarbha literature 
should not then be taken at face value; we need to read carefully and closely in order to 
determine if there are any absolutist connotations, or if the literature is simply aimed at swaying 
those who might already hold a substance-view over to the Buddhist cause.  It is well known that 
the Buddha ‘knew his audience’ and often talked in ways appropriate to them rather than fully 
appropriate to his teachings – that part would come later.  It is my contention that it is at least 
plausible that the tathāgatagarbha literature occupies this sort of space within the Mahāyāna 
corpus. 
The section continues with the argument that the point of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra 
praxis is not to cling to ideas of existence or nonexistence, but rather to jettison these thought 
process to begin with.  The idea is not to arrive at knowledge of some ultimately existent 
substratum akin to the ātman-Brahman, but to arrive at a point where we no longer impose any 
conceptualisations whatsoever on our experience.  Finally, I add that the tathāgatagarbha 
literature might be understood in the same way as the prajñāpāramitā literature; as an episteme.  
This is to say that it does not want to build a prescriptive metaphysics, but instead aims at a 
‘gradual’, progressional epistemic unfolding of Buddhist teachings.  For essentialists, it seems 
that liberation is ontological.  It involves entry into some ultimate realm or knowledge of some 
ready-made ultimate substratum (like the ātman-Brahman).  For progressionalists, liberation is 
epistemological.  Prajñā is that which brings about a mental change, and this change informs how 
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we interact with the world.  If we interact without grasping, without imposition and 
appropriation, we might be said to be awakened.  Taken this way, the tathāgatagarbha is not an 
Absolute, but is simply the active unfolding of this potential in a progressive manner.  To talk of 
a person having tathāgatagarbha is then simply to talk of their having the potential to awaken.   
The final section of this work focuses exclusively on how Nāgārjuna deals with the 
problem of absolute existence.  I discuss those positions that take śūnyatā to be either an 
ultimate truth or an ultimate reality, arguing that Nāgārjuna is not attempting to give an account 
of reality – ultimate or otherwise – but rather an account of how we experience reality.  He is 
thus developing a soteriological method that changes how we interact with the world in order to 
quell duḥkha.  Consequently, I argue that the criticisms advanced by Burton (1999) are 
wrongheaded insofar as they attempt to deal metaphysically with a method that seeks to eschew 
all metaphysics.  This theme continues in the next subsection, where I give an account of 
Nāgārjuna’s ‘use’ of metaphysics.  I go on to argue that Nāgārjuna toys around with the 
metaphysical positions of his opponents only to illustrate their futility in the soteriological 
scheme that he advocates.  He is simply talking to his audience in terms they understand before 
imploring them to abandon these concepts for the sake of their liberation. 
If I am correct, then we ought to understand the ‘ultimate’ referred to by Nāgārjuna in 
conventional terms.  Ultimacy then becomes a concept under which nothing really falls.  It has a 
pragmatic use, allowing Nāgārjuna to delineate the highest conventional teachings from the 
mundane.  The highest teachings are ‘ultimate’ insofar as they are the highest set of a wholly 
contingent bunch of teachings.  It is with this in mind that I go on to argue that all Buddhist 
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teachings are contingent, and Nāgārjuna is, after all, putting forth Buddhist teachings relating to 
soteriology, not teachings relating to the nature of the universe.  Even if he were, these teachings 
too would be contingent!  I then demonstrate why it is the case that the Four Noble Truths are 
contingent, arguing that they could not arise without deluded minds and dissatisfaction.  I borrow 
from Candrakīrti, Siderits and Katsura in accounting for conventionality as normal, everyday 
relations between semantic and cognitive aspects, an uncritical and mistaken way of interacting 
with the world.  The next step is accounting for the value of referring to an ultimate that is itself 
not ultimately existent.  On this, I argue that the ultimate truth so conceived by Nāgārjuna is a 
type of upāya: a useful way to think about things, but one that is ultimately to be abandoned as 
mere concept.  The result of this path is, I suggest, the abandonment of metaphysics in favour of 
the experience of liberation: Nāgārjuna writes at MMK 25.24 that ‘the extinguishing of all 
cognition, the extinguishing of reification, is blissful’.  This extinguishing of cognition must include 
notions of ultimacy. 
In the final subsection, I conclude that given what has gone before, an ultimate 
designation is for Nāgārjuna actually a conventional designation.  It is communicated within a 
necessarily conventional linguistic system and has no reality of its own.  Its use is also distinctly 
conventional, viz. to designate dependent concepts.  I cite and discuss various passages from the 
MMK to demonstrate that for Nāgārjuna, the denial of ultimacy holds from the top down and in 
every circumstance.  There is simply no room for ultimate entities, ultimate realities or ultimate 
truths.  In the majority of cases, even asking the question regarding ultimacy is mistaken and 
serves only to distract from the Buddhist path.  The notion of ultimacy is then narrowly useful to 
Buddhists because it allows stark lines to be drawn regarding which teachings are useful and 
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which teachings are very useful.  What is declared to be ultimate is rather the highest of the 
conventional teachings, but it cannot be ultimate in any sense that Nāgārjuna would recognise.  
Simply put, there is no place for ultimacy when we reach the summit of Madhyamaka praxis.  It 
is yet another prapañca; another concept reified and to which we wrongly cling.  Liberation, then, 
must consist in the abandonment of ultimates and the halting of conceptual cognition.  It cannot 
consist in knowing the reality of the ātman-Brahman.  As Nāgārjuna writes, ‘those who proclaim 
the real nature of the ātman and separate entities we do not consider experts in the Buddha’s 
teaching’ (MMK 10.16).  It is my contention, then, that absolutism need not be a conclusion of 
Mahāyāna philosophy.  
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§1: Defining the Absolute 
The notion of an Absolute is common to all of the world’s major religions in one way or 
another, be it Islam’s tawḥīd, the Hindu Brahman, mystical Christianity’s transcendent God,2 the 
Jewish elohút, or the Buddhist dharmakāya.3  Most scholars agree that we in the West have the 
influence of Neoplatonism to thank for this development; such was its focus on mysticism, gnosis 
and the One (i.e. the Absolute).  It is with the advent of Neoplatonism that we begin to see the 
primacy of a unitary principle underpinning all of reality.  This unitary principle (the Good, the 
One, the First, or in a more modern vernacular, the Absolute) is assumed to be ontologically prior 
to the world which depends on it, and so it is a higher reality than that which is immediately 
available to us.  Little wonder, then, that this idea crept into religion and divinity!4  The immediate 
                                                        
2 Take, for example, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite’s via negativa characterisation of the transcendent God: 
 
We therefore maintain that the universal and transcendent Cause of all things is 
neither without being nor without life, nor without reason or intelligence; nor is 
He a body, nor has He form or shape, quality, quantity or weight; nor has He 
any localized, visible or tangible existence; He is not sensible or perceptible; nor 
is He subject to any disorder or inordination nor influenced by any earthly 
passion; neither is He rendered impotent through the effects of material causes 
and events; He needs no light; He suffers no change, corruption, division, 
privation or flux; none of these things can either be identified with or attributed 
unto Him.  
(MT 4: 15) 
3 The exact meaning of dharmakāya is contentious, and will be covered in more detail later (§5.1).  However, one 
popular and enduring way to interpret it is as a necessary and primary underlying substrate that has been defiled 
and can be uncovered through diligent practice and meditation.  Such an interpretation sees the dharmakāya as – 
if not technically a godhead – then as a similarly transcendent ultimate reality that can be accessed through prajñā 
(wisdom; insight into reality). 
4 The Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy provides an overview of the development of Neoplatonism and its 
ensuing influence on the theological and philosophical tapestries of various religions (Wildberg, 2016). 
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question is whether all these characterisations refer to the exact same thing, or whether there is 
some genuine variation.  If there is difference and variation, how might this be accounted for?  If 
it is the case that every religious tradition has the same conception of the Absolute, then why are 
there differing religious doctrines in the first place?  The overarching question I want to address, 
though, is ‘what type of absolute did the Buddha deny?’, and so this section will examine some 
ways in which an absolute has been conceived across religious traditions. 
  In one sense, it seems relatively easy to answer at least parts of these questions: there 
are strong traditions of apophasis in relation to the Absolute (ultimate truth, the godhead, and 
so on) within each of the world’s major religions.5  This simply means that each religious tradition 
holds within itself schools of thought that hold the Absolute (godhead) to be ineffable; we cannot 
know the essence of it, or its ‘substance’ (Maimonides, G 1.58, p83) and so instead speak only of 
what the Absolute is not.6  This can be taken further still with the claim that the Absolute does 
not ‘exist’ in a meaningful sense.  Whilst we exist and the objects that populate the world exist, 
the Absolute is so radically other that to speak of its ‘existence’ would be mistaken.  As Fideler 
                                                        
5 Negative theology (lahoot salbi) has historically been a feature of the Islamic theological tapestry. Though not 
mystics (they were, in fact, rationalists), the al-muʿtazilah are one example, believing that God ‘is not merely 
numerically one but also that he is a simple essence’, and so argue against the notion ‘that he has a body or any of 
the characteristics of bodies such as colour, form, movement and localization in space; hence he cannot be seen, in 
this world or the next’ (Robinson, 1998).  Similarly, Schimel refers to Bāyezīd, a Sufi mystic that adhered to ‘austere 
via negationis and constant mortification, by emptying himself of himself, until he had reached, at least for a 
moment, the world of absolute unity where, as he said, lover, beloved, and love are one’ (1975: 49).  This is a clear 
example of the use of the negative method to achieve knowledge (gnosis) of or communion with the godhead. 
6 Maimonides argues that ‘[i]n the contemplation of His essence, our comprehension and knowledge prove 
insufficient; in the examination of His works, how they necessarily result from His will, our knowledge proves to be 
ignorance, and in the endeavour to extol Him in words, all our efforts in speech are mere weakness and failure’ (G 
58, p83). 
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puts it, ‘God is above entity’ (2002: 119, note 57).  In this sense, we can say that most of the 
thinkers that utilise the negative method believe that there are transcendent truths, but that 
they lie beyond both existence (as we know it) and the intellect.  This outlook typically qualifies 
such adherents as ‘mystics’.7  We can find examples of the via negativa approach in Judaism 
through thinkers such as Maimonides, Christianity through such adherents as Pseudo-Dionysius 
the Areopagite,8 Islam via sects like the Muʿtazilites, in the Kabbalah,9 Advaita Vedānta,10 and 
                                                        
7 The OED defines ‘mystic’ as ‘any person who seeks by contemplation and self-surrender to obtain union with or 
absorption into God, or who believes in the spiritual apprehension of truths which are beyond the intellect; a 
person who has or seeks mystical experiences’ (‘mystic, n. and adj.’ OED Online. Oxford University Press).  This 
does not strictly apply to the Muʿtazilites, who tactically deployed the negative method in some circumstances, but 
were nevertheless fully committed to rationalism (and not mysticism). 
8 Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite differs from other mystics insofar as where some mystics call for gnosis of the 
Absolute (jñāna is cognate with gnosis in the Indian religious traditions, but usually has a more limited scope), he 
refers to the ‘Divine Darkness’, an agnosia.  The Shrine of Wisdom editors define as ‘a transcendent unknowing — 
a super-knowledge not obtained by means of the discursive reason’ (MT 1, p9).  On this, Dionysius the Areopagite 
writes: 
 
…in the diligent exercise of mystical contemplation, leave behind the senses and 
the operations of the intellect, and all things sensible and intellectual, and all 
things in the world of being and non-being, that thou mayest arise by 
unknowing towards the union, as far as is attainable, "with Him who transcends 
all being and all knowledge. For by the unceasing and absolute renunqatiop [sic: 
renunciation?] of thyself and of all things thou mayest be borne on high, 
through pure and entire self-abnegation, into the superessential Radiance of 
the Divine Darkness.  
(MT 1: 9) 
9 Wolfson (1994: VII) cites Azriel, a famed Jewish mystic, on the nature of Ein Sof (eternity, the unending), the 
Kabbalistic conception of God prior to any self-manifestation.  Although using some positive predicates to describe 
Ein Sof, Azriel goes on to say that any comprehension of Ein Sof is achieved purely ‘through the negative way’.  He 
would likely argue, as do Śaṅkara and countless other mystics, that these positive predicate do not ultimately  say 
anything of the Absolute, but instead serve to simply orient our minds toward it so that we may be placed on the 
right path, so to speak.  Once on this path, it is the negative method declaring that which the Absolute is not that 
can (perhaps counter-intuitively) furnish us with knowledge of the Absolute. 
10 In his commentary to Brahmasūtra 1.1.3, Swami Vireswarananda writes that ‘Brahman has no form etc. and so 
cannot be cognised by direct perception.  Again in the absence of inseparable characteristics, as smoke is of fire, it 
cannot be established by inference or analogy (Upamāṇa)’ (Vireswarananda, 2014: 24).  He also cites Śaṅkara as 
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indeed Buddhism.11  Though of vastly different religious traditions with different methods of 
worship, different metaphysical conceptions and assumptions, and even different conceptions of 
‘God’, each tradition nevertheless contains adherents that – to some degree or another – 
advocate the via negativa as a means by which to ‘know’ God.  I will spend some time looking at 
how thinkers from each tradition do this in the hope that we can flesh out some similarities and 
indeed some differences in how conceptualisations of the godhead are dealt with. 
Maimonides puts the ineffability of the Absolute in no uncertain terms: 
I would observe that,--as has already been shown--God's existence 
is absolute, that it includes no composition, as will be proved, and 
that we comprehend only the fact that He exists, not His essence. 
Consequently it is a false assumption to hold that He has any 
                                                        
referring to the Kena Upaniṣad (either 1.3 or 1.4 depending on which version is used) when arguing that Brahman 
cannot be an object of thought or indeed of the act of knowing (Vireswarananda, 2014: 28).  So Kena Upaniṣad 
1.3/1.4 (my translation): 
na tatra cakṣur gacchati na vā gacchati no mano / 
na vidmo na vijānimo yathaitadanuśiṣyāt // 
anyadeva tad viditādatho aviditādadhi / 
iti śuśruma purveṣāṃ ye nastad vyācacakṣire // 
Not there goes the eye, nor goes speech, nor the mind; we do not know It, we 
do not know how one might teach This. 
It is distinct from the known; It is above the unknown.  Thus we have heard 
from the ancients who explained It to us. 
Vireswarananda goes further still, arguing in the commentary to Brahmasūtra 1.1.4 that knowledge (specifically 
‘knowledge of Brahman’) cannot be said to depend on an activity of the mind because ‘the result of action is either 
creation, modification, purification or attainment.  None of these is applicable to the knowledge of Brahman, 
which is the same thing as Liberation’ (Vireswarananda, 2014: 29).  For Śaṅkara, if liberation were something that 
could be created or modified, it could not be permanent (Vireswarananda, 2014: 29).  As liberation is synonymous 
with knowledge of Brahman, this is an unacceptable conclusion for Śaṅkara as it first undermines the very point of 
Advaitin praxis (why spend time and effort reaching liberation only for it to have the same result as saṃsāra?), and 
second undermines the idea of Brahman as the permanent, unchanging efficient cause of the universe. 
11 Murti writes of the dharmakāya: ‘The Cosmical body is [the Buddha’s] essential nature; it is one with the 
Absolute’ before asserting that ‘[a]s the Dharmakāya, Buddha fully realises his identity with the Absolute 
(dharmatā, śūnyatā) and unity (samatā) with all beings’  (2016: 284).  This is important and will be developed in 
detail later.  
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positive attribute: for He does not possess existence in addition to 
His essence.  
(G 1.58: 82) 
This ineffability of the Absolute seems to be a consistent feature occurring at various 
points across different religious traditions, and it is no different here for Maimonides.  We can 
see that he spends considerable effort detailing why it must be the case that God has no 
attributes.  Simply put, for a being to possess an attribute of any kind, Maimonides thinks that 
there must be a duality involved, viz. that of the attribute itself and the attribute bearer.  In order 
to speak of attributes, we need to speak of something that has those attributes rather than 
something that simply is.  Maimonides’ opposition to this is simple: if it is the case that God has 
attributes, then God has parts; having parts means that God is not a simple unity.12   The question 
of attributes and their relation to the divine (godhead) is a theme that is a consistent feature of 
many religious systems, most of which posit their own answers.  Not content with denying 
positive attributes to God, Maimonides goes further still, explaining why it is the case that we 
must not predicate any attribute whatsoever of God.  Arguing against such predications, 
Maimonides (G 1.58, p83) writes that 
Those who read the present work are aware that, notwithstanding 
all the efforts of the mind, we can obtain no knowledge of the 
essence of the heavens--a revolving substance which has been 
measured by us in spans and cubits, and examined even as regards 
the proportions of the several spheres to each other and respecting 
most of their motions--although we know that they must consist of 
matter and form; but the matter not being the same as sublunary 
matter, we can only describe the heavens in terms expressing 
negative properties, but not in terms denoting positive qualities.  
                                                        
12 ‘God’ here – and in the following discussion – is synonymous with ‘Absolute’. 
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In this instance, it is clear that like other mystics, Maimonides thinks that ultimately, to 
assign any attribute to God – positive or negative – is to get it wrong.  This is very simply ‘because 
we do not know [God’s] substance’ (G 1.58), and we cannot make true statements about that 
which we do not know.  However, given that we somehow need to orientate ourselves toward 
God, using negative attributes to do this is generally better than our using (and inevitably reifying) 
positive attributes.  After all, how might one orientate himself or herself toward the divine if 
nobody could ever describe that which they are orientating towards?  Communication of divinity 
is vital to religious praxis even if we cannot ultimately rely on the things said in such 
communications.  The fact remains however, that in the final analysis nothing at all can be 
attributed to God: God transcends language and linguistic designation.  Indeed, ‘in the endeavour 
to extol Him in words, all our efforts in speech are mere weakness and failure’ (G 58, p83).  This 
is a position that exists elsewhere in the religious landscape – it is, in fact, common across 
traditions, though its significance and impact varies in each different religious framework.   
In his commentary to the Brahmasūtra (also known as the Vedāntasūtra), Swami 
Vireswarananda13 – an Advaitin and interpreter of Śaṅkara – writes: 
The scriptures, therefore, never describe Brahman as this or that, 
but only negate manifoldness which is false, in texts like, “There is 
no manifoldness in It” (Ka. 2.4.11), and “He who sees manifoldness 
in It goes from death to death” (Ibid. 2.4.10). 
(Vireswarananda, 2014: 28) 
                                                        
13 Vireswarananda was the tenth president of the Ramakrishna Math. A student of Brahmananda, who was himself 
a direct disciple of Ramakrishna, Vireswarananda was a prolific writer and translator of Sanskrit texts, including the 
commentaries of both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja on the Brahmasūtra.  
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We can understand Brahman as the godhead or the ultimately existent Absolute that 
underpins all of reality (and so to this degree we can say that it is analogous to the idea of God 
held by Maimonides).  Vireswarananda is very clearly mirroring the thoughts of Maimonides: 
ultimately, ascribing any sort of attribute onto the Absolute is mistaken.  Rather, to know the 
Absolute is to negate ‘manifoldness which is false’, viz. to realise a unity and simplicity in the 
Brahman.  
Śaṅkara also denies the appropriateness of ascribing properties to the Absolute, but 
acknowledges the requirement to speak around it in order to orientate people inwards as 
opposed to outwards.  In his commentary to Brahmasūtra 1.1.4, he writes: 
But what then, it will be asked, is the purport of these sentences 
which, at any rate have the appearance of injunctions; such as, ‘The 
Self is to be seen, to be heard about?’– They have the purport, we 
reply, of diverting (men) from the objects of natural activity.  For 
when a man acts intent on external things, and only anxious to 
attain the objects of his desire and eschew the objects of his 
aversion, and does not thereby reach the highest aim of man 
although desirous of attaining it; such texts as the one quoted divert 
him from the objects of natural activity and turn the stream of his 
thoughts on the inward (the highest) Self. 
(Śaṅkara, 2011: 35-36) 
Here we can see that for Śaṅkara, the significance of the scriptures when referring to 
Brahman’s attributes is not so much to describe the Brahman, but to elicit enough of an interest 
from the reader or listener that they decide to eschew material things and pursue their own 
knowledge of Brahman.  This is primarily because knowledge of the material world does not 
translate to knowledge of Brahman, and like Maimonides, Śaṅkara recognises that despite the 
godhead being ultimately beyond attribution and description, people still need to be able to say 
something about it in order to orient themselves toward it in a meaningful (and hopefully 
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successful) manner.  The point is really that knowing the empirical world is not sufficient to know 
the Absolute.  It is nevertheless the case that knowing the Absolute endows one with the 
knowledge that the empirical world that relies upon it is an illusory manifestation14 (māyā), 
clouding the true nature of the Absolute (in this case, Brahman).  Śaṅkara elaborates on this point 
in his commentary to Brahmasūtra 1.1.2, writing that 
Brahman is not an object of the senses, it has no connection with 
those other means of knowledge.  For the senses have, according 
to their nature, only external things for their objects, not Brahman.  
If Brahman were an object of the senses, we might perceive that 
the world is connected with Brahman as its effect; but as the effect 
only (i.e. the world) is perceived, it is impossible to decide (through 
perception) whether it is connected with Brahman or something 
else.  Therefore the Sūtra under discussion is not meant to 
propound inference (as the means of knowing Brahman), but rather 
to set forth a Vedānta-text. 
(Śaṅkara, 2011: 19) 
I hope that some recurrent themes are becoming obvious.  Despite their drastically 
different religious frameworks and traditions, both Maimonides and Śaṅkara believe that a 
negative or apophatic approach to the divine is the only one that can make sense in the created 
world.  Some knowledge of the Absolute is possible, but not through the usual means of 
interaction with the empirical world or the concepts it engenders.  For Śaṅkara, it is in a complete 
knowledge of the absolute that liberation consists: we fundamentally are the Absolute, and once 
we uncover this latent knowledge – a form of self-knowledge – we gain knowledge of our 
                                                        
14 This is not to say that the empirical world is ‘unreal’ as such, but rather that its true essential character, the 
Brahman, is obscured within it. 
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fundamental identity as Brahman.15  This experience of a transcendental (ultimate) intuition of 
Brahman – brahmānubhava – can be categorised as a mystical experience precisely because it is 
transcendental knowledge of (and so experience of) divinity that is said to be incomprehensible 
when viewed through the empirical lens of the conventional world of māyā (Preti, 2014: 724).  
But what of a thinker like Maimonides?  Can Maimonides ‘know’ the divine in the way that 
Śaṅkara can (at least in principle)?  Such questions are relevant to the wider question here, 
because it is not enough for each religious discipline to conceive of a godhead, or an absolute 
divinity: their characters might be radically different; we might not be able to know their 
characters at all.   
These differentiations might then suggest that despite each religious tradition having 
some idea of an absolute, the ideas are not identical.  Even if every tradition agrees that there is 
some ineffable Absolute, we are not at all justified in arguing that this shared quality (of 
ineffability) means that each conception of the Absolute is identical in nature.  More to the point, 
for the Buddhist, we are not at all justified in taking as a matter of faith that there is an Absolute.  
This is very simply because we do not know that this is the case; indeed, we cannot know that 
this is the case.  In the case of Maimonides, there is at least some disagreement over whether or 
                                                        
15 For Śaṅkara we always were the Brahman, we just did not quite know it.  Upon realising the transcendent 
intuitive self-knowledge that we are Brahman (brahmānubhava), we become liberated because we finally know – 
really know – that we are one with Brahman.  There are no more delusions, illusions and so on; we settle in the 
‘bliss’ (ānanda) of the Brahman.  In this sense, it is a process of becoming. 
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not his philosophy allows us to ‘know’ the Absolute.16  On the face of things, Maimonides is 
committed to a position that must always deny that the essence of the Absolute is in any sense 
knowable.  This position is prima facie contrary to somebody like Śaṅkara that thinks that we can 
know the Absolute (because, ultimately, we are the Absolute); we just cannot speak of it 
accurately in normal linguistic terms.  Maimonides, then, thinks that whilst we can see the effects 
of God’s existence – the ‘back’ of God17 – we cannot know God’s essence.  In the exchange at 
Exodus 33, God does not deign to tell us why we cannot know his essence (‘face’), only that 
nobody may do so and live.   
Maimonides stands in agreement with Śaṅkara on the one hand: both agree that there is 
an Absolute from which all existence stems.  This is a significant point of agreement.  The points 
of disagreement, though, are so stark as to seem insurmountable.  First, Maimonides appears to 
                                                        
16 Blumenthal (2009: VII) laments that Maimonides has been codified in Jewish thought as a sort of ‘Jewish Kant’, a 
rationalist that in many ways pre-empted modern rationalism and ‘modern scientific spirit’.  This is mistaken, 
argues Blumenthal, because Maimonides expends considerable time and effort utilising mystical language.  On 
this, Blumenthal writes that ‘[i]t cannot be happenstance that Maimonides uses them; rather, he clearly intends to 
allude to a spiritual experience and reality which, though rooted in previous intellectual activity, transcends that 
realm’ (2009: XII).  Further to this, Blumenthal opines that Maimonides advocates three stages of ‘true spirituality’, 
the third of which culminates in ‘a condition in which a person is in extended bliss’ that is ‘not a fleeting moment in 
human spiritual life but an ongoing state of mystical consciousness’ (2009: XII-XIII).  I do not presume to address 
the merits of Blumenthal’s arguments here, rather I mention this only to illustrate that there is some deviation 
from the consensus that Maimonides was primarily concerned with reconciling rationalism with Jewish philosophy. 
17 Maimonides takes this view from Exodus 33.19-23 (NKJV): 
Then He said, “I will make all My goodness pass before you, and I will proclaim 
the name of the Lord before you. I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, 
and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion.” But He said, “You 
cannot see My face; for no man shall see Me, and live.” And the Lord said, 
“Here is a place by Me, and you shall stand on the rock. So it shall be, while My 
glory passes by, that I will put you in the cleft of the rock, and will cover you 
with My hand while I pass by. Then I will take away My hand, and you shall see 
My back; but My face shall not be seen.” 
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be committed to the maxim that we cannot know the Absolute – we can only know its effects.  
Perhaps this speaks to his characterisation as the ‘Jewish Kant’.  Second, Maimonides certainly 
does not think that we – that is, humanity – are microcosms of the Absolute.  We have already 
seen that for Śaṅkara, we are all the Brahman and our individual existence as jīva is nothing but 
illusion.  It would be a sacrilege to Maimonides to suggest that we are God.  Clearly, then, we 
have a situation where both Śaṅkara and Maimonides agree that there is an Absolute.  And yet 
this is not sufficient for both to agree that they are talking about the very same thing: each one’s 
version of this Absolute is fundamentally different.   
I am inclined to think, then, that whilst variant religious traditions might agree in abstracto 
that there is an Absolute Being, they fundamentally differ on the character of said Absolute.  An 
ever-present conception seems to be that of grounding (i.e. the Absolute Being is, in some way, 
the grounds of reality), but this still tells us relatively little.  How is this Absolute Being a grounding 
principle?  What does it mean for this principle to be a grounds for reality, and in what way does 
it exist?  I expect that in terms of Maimonides and Śaṅkara, neither would acknowledge the 
other’s ‘Absolute’ as a true representation of what the Absolute is: Śaṅkara because he thinks we 
can know exactly what the Absolute is (with a bit of work), and Maimonides because he thinks it 
is simply impossible for us to ever know what is so radically other than  us.18  I think that these 
fundamental distinctions would also hold in some significant ways between Islamic, Christian and 
Kabbalistic conceptions of the Absolute.  The common thread seems to be that even when 
                                                        
18 At least, he is generally understood to think this way. 
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traditions agree that we can have some type of mystical gnosis of the Absolute, we still cannot 
say what the Absolute is or what knowledge of it specifically involves.  A quirk of the necessary 
inadequacy of language this might be, but the consequence is that we cannot actually know 
whether mystics of all religious bents are referring to the same thing. 
What is it, then, that mystics claim to experience?  Is every mystic – even when of 
divergent traditions – experiencing the same thing?  It might be (as the religious pluralists claim) 
that mystics talk in the same way about the Absolute because they are experiencing the same 
existing thing in similar ways.  Might it be the case, though, that there is another reason for their 
reporting of similar experiences of the same thing?  William James hints at this in Varieties of 
Religious Experience, suggesting that mystical experiences appear to have some pathological 
context, but quickly dismisses this citing lack of reliable evidence (1917: 387,note 230).  James 
spends some time talking around physical causes whilst simultaneously failing to acknowledge 
them.  He argues that substance use (specifically alcohol and nitrous oxide, but we can easily 
apply his reasoning to psychoactive substances and so on) can ‘stimulate the mystical faculties of 
human nature’ allowing ‘genuine metaphysical revelation’ (1917: 387).  It might turn out to be 
the case that such substances do indeed unlock some hidden level of mystical consciousness, but 
it might equally be the case that such substances simply increase our propensity to reify concepts 
that do not capture anything real.  Indeed, this is the very reason why the Buddhist monastic 
code cautions against ingesting any mind-altering substances.   That is not to say that a person 
cannot come by such ecstasy without the help of mind-altering substances: such realisations 
might be spontaneous and entirely ‘natural’.  James notes, though, that they generally assume a 
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certain character and that this character can be actively cultivated: the most concerted efforts to 
do this have been made by the Indian meditative traditions (1917: 400).  
Yet I think it the case that there remains too much divergence between mystics of 
different religious loyalties for it to be the case that each of them is reporting an experience of 
the same Absolute.  I have already outlined some distinctive differences between the Advaitin 
mysticism of Śaṅkara and the type of mysticism alluded to by Maimonides, for example.  For his 
part, James (1917: 424-425) eventually concedes that  
[t]he classic religious mysticism, it now must be confessed, is only a 
“privileged case.” It is an extract, kept true to type by the selection 
of the fittest specimens and their preservation in “schools.” It is 
carved out from a much larger mass; and if we take the larger mass 
as seriously as religious mysticism has historically taken itself, we 
find that the supposed unanimity largely disappears. 
James goes on to illustrate some of these stark differences, noting that for some 
traditions, the Absolute is dualistic, for others it is a monism; for some it is pantheistic, for others 
monotheistic and for still others, beyond any such categorisation (1917: 425).  As we have seen, 
the cases of mystical experience held up by each tradition are, according to James, the ones that 
best fit their worldview.  Should an Advaitin mystic have some experience that contradicts key 
Advaitin doctrines (by, for example, gaining gnosis of a dualism and not a monism), it is a sure 
bet that it would not be recorded and recounted by subsequent Advaitins as proof of the efficacy 
of their method.  Furthermore, there are such ‘mystical states’ which are pathological – they are, 
as James puts it, ‘characteristic symptoms of enfeebled or deluded states of mind’ (1917: 426).  
Such a ‘mysticism’ is destructive, causing real issues both for the person experiencing whatever 
delusion plagues them and for the people that must deal with the effects of the behaviour that 
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such delusions might facilitate.  It thus appears that ‘mysticism’ has two sides: a positive and a 
negative.  James, it seems to me, regards the former as mysticism proper, and the latter as not 
really mysticism at all.  It is not immediately clear to me why this distinction ought to be 
maintained with any fervour: if one is possible, then so, presumably, is the other.  If one is the 
sign of an ‘enfeebled mind’, then why not the other?  James agrees that we non-mystics are not 
obliged to ‘acknowledge in mystical states a superior authority conferred on them by their 
intrinsic nature’ (1917: 427).19   Instead, he writes that we ought to consider such states to be 
‘inroads from the subconscious life, of the cerebral activity correlative to which we as yet know 
nothing’ (1917: 427).  In other words, such states are indicative of something in the 
‘subconscious’, but of precisely what, we do not know.20   
We see, then, that the concept of the Absolute can be shaped according to whichever 
religious or mystical tradition espouses it.  In short, it seems to be a concept deployed by thinkers 
                                                        
19 James’ use of ‘intrinsic nature’ is interesting.  As we will soon see, for Buddhists such as Nāgārjuna, ‘intrinsic 
nature’ denotes a very specific sort of existence, viz. that which is ultimately real.  Given that James clearly believes 
that mystical experiences transfer to the experiencer a noetic quality, I suspect that he also believes that such a 
knowledge is indeed ‘ultimately true’.  On noesis, he has the following to say (1917: 380-381): 
Although so similar to states of feeling, mystical states seem to those who 
experience them to be also states of knowledge. They are states of insight into 
depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect. They are illuminations, 
revelations, full of significance and importance, all inarticulate though they 
remain; and as a rule they carry with them a curious sense of authority for 
after-time. 
It is important to note that this ‘authority’ carried by the noetic experience holds only for the experiencer and not 
for anybody outside of that experience. 
20 This has since been discussed at some length in philosophical, psychological and biological literature.  Newberg 
& D’Aquili provide a useful account of how brain processes and manipulation of them through ritual and so on 
might give rise to a ‘mystical’ state of consciousness (2000: 260).  Miller (2009) offers a thoughtful position relating 
to Newberg & D’Aquili’s stance regarding the discussion of transcendental reality (namely that they are not 
entitled to discuss it at all). 
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of certain biases and loyalties that has then been reified according to those very biases and 
loyalties.  Miller conceives of a situation whereby the ‘Absolute’ is actually numerically identical 
to ‘baseline reality’ (viz. reality as experienced normally, outside of mystical or enlightened 
experience).  This is a position to which I am immediately drawn precisely because I think that it 
might have some degree of correlation with the position of Nāgārjuna to be discussed in later 
sections.  Miller’s thesis is that baseline reality and the Absolute are the same thing but 
experienced in a different manner (2009: 48).  He expands thus: 
For example, there may be one sense in which the world is 
fundamentally united (as appears to be the case in experiences of 
AUB [Absolute Unitary Being]), and another sense in which the 
objects of the world can be differentiated. To state just one 
example of the way in which this could be so: perhaps the world is 
united in the sense that it is a single physical system (with 
conservation of energy and so on), but that it is not united in the 
sense that there are local variations in the kinds or amounts of 
energy in different parts of the system. These parts, though, might 
not be fundamentally metaphysically distinct, if they are all causally 
interconnected with one another. If a person had this kind of belief, 
then the experience of AUB could conform to the criterion of 
intersubjective coherence. If a person believed that either the 
experience of AUB or the experience of baseline reality is an 
illusion, however, then the experience of AUB would fail the 
criterion of intersubjective coherence. 
(2009: 48) 
There are some parallels to be drawn with Buddhist thought here.  Miller suggests that 
the parts of a whole need not be fundamentally distinct if they are all causally interconnected: 
this is the principal tenet of the Buddhist conception of dependent origination 
(pratītyasamutpāda).  According to this doctrine, there are no fundamental, metaphysically 
distinct ‘simples’; rather, there is simply an infinite web of interconnections between all psycho-
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physical phenomena.21  A potential issue comes when we think about Miller’s final criterion in 
relation to Buddhism broadly construed.  If Buddhists think that ‘the experience of baseline 
reality is an illusion’, then they cannot be said to think of baseline reality and the Absolute (AUB) 
as the same thing experienced in a different way (viz. upon an epistemological shift).  There are 
indeed Buddhists that believe this to be the case, and so Miller’s ‘intersubjective experience’ is 
not an explanation open to those particular Buddhists.  The majority of this work will, though, be 
assessing such things through a Madhyamaka lens, and it is clear to me that Nāgārjuna’s 
insistence on denying all difference between saṃsāra (in Miller’s terms, baseline reality) and 
nirvāṇa (in Miller’s terms, Absolute Unitary Being) – coupled with his insistence that we should 
jettison notions of ‘ultimacy’ (metaphysical primacy) – means that his view might well fit Miller’s 
criteria.22  Of course, Nāgārjuna would not denounce Buddhist sūtras that speak of the ‘delusion’ 
of sentient beings, and so there would need to be some account of this apparent incongruence.  
This need not be a major issue, for I think that we can interpret the Buddhist focus on ‘delusion’ 
in a specific way, viz. one in which to be ‘deluded’ is to hold only a partial view of reality.  In 
                                                        
21 The details of dependent origination are further discussed in the next section. 
22 MMK 25.19-20 (my translation): 
na saṃsārasya nirvāṇāt kiṃ cid asti viśeṣaṇam / 
na nirvāṇasya saṃsārāt kiṃ cid asti viśeṣaṇam //19// 
nirvāṇasya ca yā koṭiḥ koṭiḥ saṃsaraṇasya ca / 
na tayor antaraṃ kiṃ cit susūkṣmam api vidyante //20// 
There exists no difference whatsoever between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa / 
There exists no difference whatsoever between nirvāṇa and saṃsāra //19//  
The limit of nirvāṇa [is the] limit of saṃsāra / 
There is not even the subtlest difference between them //20// 
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Miller’s terms, I think that this could work in two ways: first, one delusion would be to hold that 
‘baseline reality’ is all there is to the world.  Second, the other delusion would be to hold that 
AUB is all there is to the world (and thus impart the metaphysical priority that Miller warns 
against (2009: 42)).  Those without delusion would simply see the totality of reality. 
There is also a potential parallel with Advaita Vedānta: Bhattacharya – following the lead 
of Śaṅkara – asserts that Advaitins too see the change as epistemic rather than metaphysical.  For 
example, Bhattacharya writes that one who knows Brahman ‘looks upon the world with new 
eyes’ (2015: 13); ‘[w]e consider as entirely authentic the Mahāyānic doctrine according to which 
there is, in the transcendent sense, no distinction between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa’ (2015: 137); 
‘the difference between them is our way of looking at them; it is epistemic not metaphysical’ 
(2015: 137).  Such a position would, on the face of things, seem to tally with what Miller calls the 
‘intersubjective experience’.  Miller notices the immediate problem with this position, however, 
writing that some Hindu mystics do not, in fact, accept that both the baseline reality and AUB are 
real.  Instead, they hold that the AUB is real whereas the baseline reality is not: ‘[o]ne example 
of this view is the claim of Hindu mystics that the world of sense experience is an illusion (māyā) 
and that only the transcendent reality Brahman is real’ (Miller, 2009: 48).   We might think that 
such a position is incompatible with the above comments from Bhattacharya, but this is not quite 
the case.  Bhattacharya is right that liberation for the Advaitin consists in an epistemological 
change – in seeing the world differently – but this does not change the fact that all Advaitins think 
Brahman to be metaphysically prior to this world of māyā.  It is in fact fundamental to the 
Advaitin system that this is the case.  Bhattacharya endorses Murti’s view that the ‘empirical’ 
(baseline reality) is the ‘veiled form or false appearance of the Absolute’ (Bhattacharya, 2015: 
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137-138; Murti, 2016: 232).  Further, Bhattacharya presumably endorses Murti’s contention that 
if both the empirical and the Absolute were real, then the Absolute ‘lacking determinations and 
without any recognisable content, would even be less real than the empirical’ (Bhattacharya, 
2015: 138; Murti, 2016: 232-233).  This is unambiguous and clearly assigns metaphysical priority 
to the AUB (Brahman).  As we will see, I do not believe that Nāgārjuna makes this same sort of 
jump. 
All this considered, it seems that there is no consensus – indeed there can be no 
consensus – on what constitutes the Absolute; if all religions are ultimately talking about the 
same thing, we might expect a stronger consensus than ‘there is a unifying principle, we can know 
it’.  This maxim is really quite vague.  Madhyamaka Buddhism – as we have briefly seen – has a 
still different approach to the Absolute.  We find within Buddhism’s rich tapestry both 
affirmations of an Absolute (sometimes very close to that of the Advaitins) and outright rejections 
of it.  It is with the latter that I am concerned, as I intend to demonstrate that contrary to 
Bhattacharya’s thesis, Buddhists of the ilk of Nāgārjuna and his Mādhyamika followers ought not 
to support any conception of a permanent Absolute.  This includes – as I shall later demonstrate 
– the conception of the Absolute as some fundamentum absolutum inconcussum veritatis, as the 
unshakeable ground of truth. 
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§2: The Question of Ātman in Early Buddhism 
Buddhism in its richly developed modern form has a famously deep-seated aversion to 
ātmavāda (self-theory or doctrine of self), and so by extension, an aversion to endorsements of 
an Absolute.  This is for good reason: Buddhists – overall – think that any sort of belief in 
permanence serves only to prolong and propagate dissatisfaction (duḥkha), namely via a belief 
in an enduring immutable ‘self’ (ātman).  The reasoning behind this is relatively straightforward:  
Buddhism is at its heart a doctrine and praxis of change; change from deluded and unawakened 
to awakened and liberated.  The idea of an immutable essence is then anathema to this doctrine: 
how might a person that is essentially (and thus permanently) unawakened ever have a chance 
at dissatisfaction’s cessation?  The Buddhist line is simply that an immutable essence precludes 
– by definition – any hope of liberation.  It is the clinging to the effects entailed by a belief in a 
permanent self that constitute the most insidious forms of dissatisfaction.  This in turn makes the 
very idea of ātman the most insidious cause of dissatisfaction.  The general idea is that self-
interest and attachment to both ‘I’ and things that we surmise as belonging to the ‘I’ drive anxiety 
and so dissatisfaction.   
Strong notions of ‘I’ mean that we become attached to transient things, but more 
significantly, it means that we have strong attachment to ourselves.  A strong ‘I’ notion means 
that we suffer anxieties relating to ourselves; we are concerned about the possibility of being 
sick, of ageing, and of the possibility (and eventual certainty) of death.  More trivially, we have 
anxieties about those things that we construe as ‘ours’, and even nice, initially pleasurable things 
end up as dissatisfying.  A pleasurable experience (hearing one’s favourite record, for example) 
P a g e  | 35 
 
gives us a sense of satisfaction (sukha) for a characteristically short period of time (are any of us 
in a permanent state of satisfaction after enjoying only once something that pleases us?).  
Therefore, when I take great pleasure in hearing my favourite record, I am cultivating attachment 
and grasping on multiple levels.  I initially enjoy the temporary feeling that hearing the record 
elicits within me.  I can then be said to grasp at three things in regards to pleasure: the record 
itself (as deliverer of pleasure), the feeling of pleasure, and the ability to feel the pleasure.  More 
specifically, I suppose we become attached to the ability to sate a desire as and when it arises, 
thus reinforcing the idea of self – of me both doing the action required and feeling the benefit of 
its result.23  I then feel the urge to replicate this feeling of satisfaction/contentedness and so 
spend time and effort on reproducing the pleasurable effect by whichever means we came by it 
(in this case, hearing our favourite record).  The result is a temporary sense of satisfaction, but a 
stronger attachment to the ‘I’ that we think is being satisfied.  It is this latter point against which 
the Buddhist project attempts to work. 
Of course, the counterpart to cultivation of attachment to pleasure is varying degrees of 
dissatisfaction.  On the Buddhist worldview, such dissatisfaction arises in virtue of our attachment 
to the specific phenomenon (the record) and the circumstances that might prevent us from 
actualising the feeling of satisfaction to which we are attached (playing the record).  This only 
                                                        
23 It seems as though any attachment to a feeling must contain some symmetrical attachment (perhaps ‘grasping’ 
might be a more suitable term here) to the ‘I’ that experiences the feeling.  In other words, the feeling serves to 
reinforce what Buddhists ultimately take to be a mistaken belief in this immutable ‘I’.  If we were told that we were 
to be in a position whereby we could not physically feel this (or, more starkly, any) pleasure, it would cause some 
anxiety. 
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ceases – and then only temporarily – when we find ourselves in a situation whereby we can once 
again play our favourite record.  We might find ourselves in the unfortunate situation whereby 
we can no longer feel a given (or indeed any) pleasure whatsoever – this would, I expect, cause 
great anxiety: nobody wants to be in a position whereby they never again feel pleasure (or 
perhaps more accurately, where they cannot sate a desire and feel the (temporary) result).24  We 
find ourselves, then, trapped in an endless circle of temporary, fleeting desire-satiation, all of 
which is ultimately doomed to inadequacy, and all of which serves to simply reinforce the very ‘I’ 
notions that fuel the cycle to begin with. 
                                                        
24 Interestingly (and undoubtedly factoring into Bhattacharya’s thought), both Advaita and Buddhism talk of 
liberation in some very similar ways.  Advaita talks of the ‘bliss’ (ānanda) of Brahman, so called because all desire is 
removed and so there is wanting for nothing.  Buddhist sources generally stop short of using words analogous to 
ānanda (though not always!) and instead speak of the ‘extinction’ of desire.  This amounts, I think, to broadly the 
same thing.  The difference is then a matter of what this extinction of desire consists in, if anything at all.  The 
Buddhists would usually claim that there is a sort of unconditioned awareness but that this does not imply an 
immersion into a further immutable substantial whole.  The Advaitins would claim that this unconditioned 
awareness is itself a substantial Reality (Brahman), and our awareness of it is a result of us finally knowing our true 
nature (i.e. we are no more than the ātman-Brahman). 
To this end, the Saṃyutta Nikāya (II Book IX.1.2; PTS p359) has the following to say (my translation):   
Kataman͂ca bikkhave asaṅkhataṃ / Yo bikkhave rāgakkhayo dosakkhayo 
mohakkhayo idaṃ vuccati bikkhave asaṅkhataṃ // 
O bhikkhus, what is the unconditioned [Absolute] (asaṅkhatam)? It is, O 
bhikkhus, the extinction of desire [lust; greed] (rāgakkhaya) the extinction of 
hatred (dosakkhaya), the extinction of confusion [illusion] (mohakkhaya). This, 
O bhikkhus, is called the unconditioned. 
Here we have a clear account of the liberated experience: the removal (extinction) of desire, hatred, and illusion.  
This experience must be blissful precisely because all desires are not just temporarily sated, but fully dissolved, 
much like the accounts of ānanda for the Advaitin.  There is, however, an important privation in the account from 
the Saṃyutta Nikāya – there is no mention of this being the substantial, eternal reality that Brahman is purported 
to be. 
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This being the case, the Buddhists argue, we ought not to ascribe any permanent nature 
to either the circumstances, the feelings or the objects involved; all of which come about as a 
result of pratītyasamutpāda (dependent origination).  This is a complex inter-dependent web of 
connections between every experienced phenomenon, all of which combine in innumerable 
ways in order to affect everything else.  Insofar as Buddhism has an ontological principle, it is this; 
there are no phenomena which are unconditioned by the process of dependent origination, and 
so this causal principle dictates that everything in the experienced world is intimately and 
inextricably related to everything else.25  There is, on the face of things, no first cause and no 
permanent substratum.26   
Buddhists are usually understood to deny any underlying unchanging identity to the 
experiencer (me; you), the circumstances that present themselves in the world, or to the feelings 
that present themselves to us.  In fact, it is usually taken to be the case that Buddhists deny 
underlying, unchanging identity in the world in toto.27  So, for many, the defining characteristic 
                                                        
25 Some Buddhist schools have a nuanced take on this, which I shall here sketch briefly.  It is true that a number of 
Buddhist schools hold that the state of nirvāṇa is unconditioned by dependent origination.  Indeed, it is the only 
state that is untouched by dependent origination.  On this understanding, we might be tempted to accept such a 
nirvāṇa as an Absolute.  Nāgārjuna and his followers in the Madhyamaka school eschew this idea, explicitly arguing 
that there is (and can be) no difference at all between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa (MMK 25.19).  The reasons for this 
conclusion will be covered in detail later. 
26 It must be noted that if some Buddhist schools and interpreters do indeed follow the analysis that we will shortly 
see put forth by Bhattacharya, then they might reasonably be said to endorse some sort of first cause (namely the 
ātman-Brahman).   
27 There is a nuance here, namely that for some Buddhists, the basic constituents which combine via 
pratītyasamutpāda to manifest as all psycho-physical phenomena do indeed have permanent, unchanging 
identities (svabhāva).  Such Buddhists still hold that the world as experienced lack such a grounding because all 
experience is a conglomeration of dharmas combining in different ways via dependent origination.  According to 
such a position, the role of dependent origination is preserved insofar as all experienced phenomena are indeed 
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of Buddhism – in contradistinction to other Indian religions such as Jainism and the various 
schools of Hinduism – is precisely that it advances the position that there is no enduring 
substantial self (anātman) and largely bases its soteriological methodology on the realisation of 
this truth.  Speaking of truth, it would be appropriate to interject briefly with a note on ‘truth’ in 
Buddhism and in Advaita.  In both Buddhist and Advaitin literature, we see reference to 
saṃvṛtisatya (conventional truth/reality) and paramārthasatya (ultimate truth/reality) in 
relation to both their respective teachings and end goals.  It looks as though the two truths were 
devised as a means by which to navigate seemingly contradictory or inconsistent scripture.  Such 
a process would allow a commentator or adherent to make sense of things that initially look to 
be in conflict, for example the Buddha’s referring to the ‘self as refuge’28 whilst also appearing to 
                                                        
conditioned by these intrinsically existent dharmas.  The Madhyamaka school of Nāgārjuna holds, however, that 
anātman should apply from the top down, and so even dharmas cannot hold an immutable identity of any sort.  
For the Mādhyamika, then, for dependent origination to hold at all, it must hold in all circumstances, and this 
necessarily means that dharmas could not possess svabhāva. 
28 Pérez-Remón (1980: 20) translates the following section of the Mahāparinibbāṇa Sutta: 
Tasmātihānanda, attadīpā viharatha attasaraṇā anaññasaraṇā, dhammadīpā dhammasaraṇā 
anaññasaraṇā 
Therefore, Ānanda, stay as those who have the self as island, as those who have the self as 
refuge, as those who have no other refuge; as those who have dhamma as island, as those who 
have dhamma as refuge, as those who have no other refuge. 
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deny the self.29,30  Conventional truths are, according to Siderits and Katsura truths for which 
‘acceptance reliably leads to successful practice.  Our commonsense convictions concerning 
                                                        
29 Thanissaro Bhikkhu (1997) translates the following passage from the Samanupassanā Sutta: 
Sāvatthinidānaṃ. “Ye hi keci, bhikkhave, samaṇā vā brāhmaṇā vā anekavihitaṃ 
attānaṃ samanupassamānā samanupassanti, sabbete pañcupādānakkhandhe 
samanupassanti, etesaṃ vā aññataraṃ. Katame pañca? Idha, bhikkhave, 
assutavā puthujjano ariyānaṃ adassāvī ariyadhammassa akovido ariyadhamme 
avinīto, sappurisānaṃ adassāvī sappurisadhammassa akovido sappurisa-
dhamme avinīto rūpaṃ attato samanupassati, rūpavantaṃ vā attānaṃ; attani 
vā rūpaṃ, rūpasmiṃ vā attānaṃ. Vedanaṃ … saññaṃ … saṅkhāre … viññāṇaṃ 
attato samanupassati, viññāṇavantaṃ vā attānaṃ; attani vā viññāṇaṃ, 
viññāṇasmiṃ vā attānaṃ. 
At Savatthi. There the Blessed One said, "Monks, whatever contemplatives or 
brahmans who assume in various ways when assuming a self, all assume the 
five clinging-aggregates, or a certain one of them. Which five? There is the case 
where an uninstructed, run-of-the-mill person — who has no regard for noble 
ones, is not well-versed or disciplined in their Dhamma; who has no regard for 
men of integrity, is not well-versed or disciplined in their Dhamma — assumes 
form (the body) to be the self, or the self as possessing form, or form as in the 
self, or the self as in form. 
30 It can be argued that these two positions are not actually incompatible with each other when understood a 
certain way.  Bhattacharya references these sorts of canonical examples (see 2015: 31, 38 for examples of this) to 
illustrate that the Buddha was at all times endorsing a transcendental self, viz. the ātman-Brahman.  This reading, 
though, depends on a very specific reading of ‘ātman’- one that always translates it as a substantial, ultimate self.  
However, in some cases, we need not make this jump, and in exercising this self-control, we change the force of 
the sentence quite significantly.  It should always be borne in mind that some uses of ātman in Sanskrit literature 
and attā in the Pāli literature – be they Buddhist sources or otherwise – are simply as a reflexive pronoun.  In the 
example given in note 98, this realisation changes things in an important way.  Instead of encouraging the 
practitioner to ‘take refuge in the Self’, where ‘Self’ has an initial capital letter and means the sort of subtle 
essence present inside of us that Bhattacharya endorses, we have ‘take oneself as refuge’ in a much weaker sense, 
meaning something more along the lines of ‘do not look to anybody else for your liberation’.   
This line from the Mahāparinibbāṇa Sutta then no longer endorses the idea that we ought to delve inside our 
essential ātman to realise the ultimate truth and become one with Brahman.  It very simply means that nobody 
else is responsible for our liberation, and we should take refuge in ourselves and take personal responsibility for 
living the dhamma.  This is a huge change in meaning.  In the case given above (and other cases like it), it looks as 
though Bhattacharya and his fellow Advaitins have, from a Buddhist perspective, fallen foul of a reification: taking 
a simple reflexive pronoun to represent an enduring, ultimately existent entity! 
This interpretation can be applied with equal force, I think, when Bhattacharya cites Dhammapada 160 (2015: 31): 
‘attā hi attanō nāthō kō hi nāthō parō siyā /attanā hi sudanténa nāthaṃ labhati dullabhaṃ’.  We can interpret this 
as something like ‘one is indeed one’s own refuge.  How can another be a refuge to you [one]?  With oneself 
properly controlled, one attains a refuge that is difficult to attain’.  Does this read as though we ought to be 
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ourselves and the world are for the most part conventionally true, since they reflect conventions 
that have been found to be useful in everyday practice’ (2013: 4).  We can add to this definition 
all linguistic designations naming objects and events.  Names represent entities that are 
conventionally real, which is to say objects that do not possess an intrinsic nature (svabhāva) and 
so are not basic, substantial and immutable.  We will see that for Nāgārjuna, this characterisation 
will come to account for all entities.  For the Advaitins, it accounts for entities mistakenly assumed 
to be intrinsically real when one has not realised the unity of the world in Brahman.   In 
comparison, ‘[t]o say of a statement that it is ultimately true is to say that it corresponds to the 
nature of reality and neither asserts nor presupposes the existence of any mere conceptual 
fiction’ (2013: 4).31  This is true for both Buddhists and Advaitins.  For somebody like Śaṅkara, the 
Brahman is the only ultimate truth and ultimate reality.  It is the only reality that exists, and 
everything is a manifestation of it.  For many Buddhists, it is an ultimate truth that there is no 
substantial self: this conforms to how things ultimately are from an enlightened Olympian 
                                                        
meditating on the permanence of our essential ātman, or as though we ought to take responsibility for our own 
liberation?  I am inclined to read this in the same way as the line from the Mahāparinibbāṇa Sutta: reference to 
atta (ātman) is as a simple reflexive pronoun, used in a conventional manner.  That is to say that there are no 
essential or ultimate connotations to its use.  In both cases, then, we need not appeal to some essential feature or 
principle called ātman, we simply have two distinct examples of the Buddha’s imploring practitioners to take 
responsibility for their own spiritual journey instead of investing heavily in other people (and, ultimately, in him!). 
31 A ‘conceptual fiction’ is something that is ‘thought to exist only because of facts about us as concept-users and 
the concepts that we happen to employ’ (2013: 4).  In other words, a conceptual fiction is something that we 
impose onto the world, not something that exists independently of us as concept-users. The stock example is that 
of a chariot: a chariot is nothing over and above the collection of part assembled in a specific way (‘chariot-wise’, if 
you will).  The chariot does not exist as an entity over and above or outside of this collection of so-arranged parts, 
but it is a convenient shorthand for us to refer to ‘the chariot’ (or ‘the car’ or ‘the house’, for example). 
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perspective. 32   What then can we say about the Buddhist ultimate truth that there is no 
permanent ātman? 
Kamaleswar Bhattacharya (1928-2014) 33  argued in his Ātman-Brahman in Ancient 
Buddhism that Buddhism’s famed ultimate truth has, in fact, been routinely mischaracterised 
over the course of a rich Buddhist history.  For Bhattacharya, the ātman denied by Buddhism is 
that mistakenly associated with the jīva34 and not the ātman-Brahman of Advaita.  Bhattacharya 
contends that the Buddha was concerned with continuing the Upaniṣadic tradition and leading 
his followers to knowledge of the transcendent ātman-Brahman: a theory that stands at stark 
odds with the modern understanding of Buddhism as a denial of a permanent self.  To this end, 
Bhattacharya’s principal argument is that ‘[t]he Buddha certainly denied the ātman’, but with the 
caveat that the ātman denied ’is not the Upaniṣadic ātman’ (2015: 207).  What Bhattacharya 
means here is as yet obscured by his apparent unwillingness to translate ātman.  He elsewhere 
writes that ‘[b]efore stating that Buddhism has denied the ātman, modern authors should, 
therefore, have been precise as to which ātman is meant’ (2015: 34).  This strikes me as a good 
idea, and so I will briefly outline what ātman could mean. 
                                                        
32 There will be much more to say on this as we continue, and in much more detail, but for now, this rudimentary 
understanding of conventional and ultimate should suffice for navigation of this work until such a point that more 
detail is required.   
33 Among Bhattacharya’s many publications are Brahmanic religions in ancient Cambodia, from epigraphy and 
iconography; The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna (Vigrahavyāvartani); Some thoughts on Early Buddhism with 
special reference to its Relation to the Upaniṣads. 
34 Jīva is here taken to mean ‘individual self’ in the Advaitin sense rather than ‘immortal individual essence’ in a 
Jaina sense: the Jaina understanding would have jīva equivalent with the ātman-Brahman without any monistic 
import, whereas it is clear in Advaitin literature that this is not what is meant. 
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Lipner characterises the ātman as the ‘innermost reality [identity] of the individual, the 
subtle essence’ (2010: 53), and the Chāndogya Upaniṣad (VIII.7.1) describes a nature (ātman) 
that  ‘is free from sin, free from old age, free from death, free from grief, free from hunger, free  
from thirst, whose desires come true and whose thoughts come true’.  Bhattacharya writes that 
‘it is not outside of ourselves that we grasp the Real’ (2015: 10), but what does this actually mean?  
Bhattacharya distinguishes between two senses of ātman – one which is real, and one which is 
mistakenly taken by the unenlightened to be real, but which actually is not.  The two senses of 
ātman to which Bhattacharya is referring are the ultimately real paramātman of the ātman-
Brahman, and the reified vijñāna-ātman (commonly translated as individual consciousness; 
analogous to the jīva).  Bhattacharya thinks that Buddhist doctrine of anātman explicitly negates 
the latter in order to promote knowledge of the former.  This distinction will prove to be the 
bedrock for his thesis that Buddhism does not deny the spiritual ātman-Brahman, and instead 
only negates a sort of personal ātman that is analogous with the human ego.  He writes that 
‘[t]he ātman is not the individual ego, but rather “the super-reality of the jīva, the individual ego”’ 
(2015: 5); ‘neither the Upaniṣads nor Buddhism deny the empirical reality of the individual.  They 
only deny its ontological substantiality’ (2015: 17)35; ‘when they [the Upaniṣads] state that the 
ātman-brahman is the sole Reality, [they] are in fact denying that psycho-social being which men, 
too often, consider as the ātman’ (2015: 34).  It is clear that Bhattacharya thinks that people 
                                                        
35 I suppose that ‘empirical reality of the individual’ might mean a sense of self or the existence of this thing ‘an 
individual human’ walking, talking and interacting with the world.  Here, Bhattacharya’s point is that whilst both 
the Upaniṣads and Buddhism acknowledge this sort of ‘individual’ conventionally, they do not acknowledge its 
ultimate existence.  A ‘conventional’ acknowledgement is simply to allow use of the term ‘individual’ as a type of 
useful fiction with some instrumental value insofar as we have to navigate the ‘empirical’ (read: conventional, not 
ultimately real) world.  A conventional truth, entity etc. cannot ever have ‘ultimate’ status. 
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simply misapply the label ātman to that which it is not.  In other words, the ‘psycho-social being’ 
referred to is actually anātman in the simplest sense – it is not the ātman.  What, then, is the 
ātman to which Bhattacharya is referring?  How might we access it?  In words not dissimilar from 
those religious thinkers covered in §1, Bhattacharya (2015: 6) writes that 
The ātman is the ‘inner ruler’ (antaryāmin) which resides in the 
Universe but is distinct from and Unknown to the Universe.  All our 
activities derive from it; there is no other seer than it, no other 
hearer, no other thinker and no other knower.  Even so, it remains 
invisible itself, inaudible, unthinkable, unknowable.  The ātman is 
the “inner light” (antarjyotis) of man. 
The corporeal (saśarīra) ātman is mortal; it experiences pleasure 
and pain.  But the incorporeal (aśarīra) ātman, the authentic ātman, 
is immortal; it is exempt from all pleasure and from all suffering.  
We can see here that Bhattacharya thinks that the embodied (saśarīra) ātman, that 
ātman which we directly experience, that we take as the ‘I’, is a mortal entity.  It is the super-
reality behind this individual ātman, the ātman-Brahman, which is the true Reality.  It certainly 
sounds as though Bhattacharya is operating on a similar plane to those of the mystics discussed 
in the previous section.  He talks of an ultimate principle ātman (Brahman) in very similar terms 
to Maimonides’ discussion of God: unknowable, unthinkable, somehow beyond this world.  There 
is a caveat, however, that separates Bhattacharya from thinkers such as Maimonides – this state 
of ignorance need not be the case.  We can come to know the ātman-Brahman, just not by 
conventional means. 
In the Ātmabodha, attributed to Śaṅkara, we read 
dṛśyate śrūyate yadya brahmaṇonyanna tadbhavet / 
tattvajn͂ānācca tadbrahma saccidānandamadvayam //64// 
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Whatever is seen, [whatever] is heard, is not other than Brahman. 
[Through] clear knowledge of reality, [one sees] the Brahman; 
Being, pure thought, bliss, unity.36 
Knowing the ātman-Brahman, then, is a matter of ‘clear knowledge of reality’.  For 
Śaṅkara, it seems we can know ‘God’ (the Absolute, the Brahman), but we have to gain this 
knowledge in a very specific way, alien to our usual means of knowledge.  Swami Nikhilānanda 
asserts in the commentary to the above śloka that it is via the attainment of ‘Right Knowledge’ 
that one knows the Brahman, and even the state of unknowing is necessarily Brahman; ‘[f]rom 
the standpoint of Brahman even ignorance and its products, names and forms, are nothing but 
Brahman’ (1962: 227-228).   Nikhilānanda also reiterates the stock Advaitin view that ‘what 
appears as the manifold universe to the ignorant is realised by the illumined to be indivisible and 
non-dual Brahman’ (1962: 226).  The implications are, I think, clear.  Indeed, Bhattacharya (2015: 
5) asks ‘[w]hat is the Upaniṣadic ātman?’  He writes that it is  
neither the body nor the totality of the psycho-physical elements 
which make up the empirical individual.  The ‘body’ is no more than 
a ‘support’ (adhiṣṭhāna) of the incorporeal (aśarīra) ātman – of the 
ātman ‘without ātman’ (anātmya, nirātman, nirātmaka).  “Just as 
the best is yoked to the cart, so the prāṇa (that is, the ātman) is 
yoked to this body.”  The ātman is the ‘inner ruler’ (antaryāmin) 
which resides in the Universe but is distinct from and unknown to 
the Universe.  All our activities derive from it; there is no other seer 
than it, no other hearer, no other thinker and no other knower.  
Even so, it remains invisible itself, inaudible, unthinkable, 
unknowable. 
(Bhattacharya, 2015: 5-6) 
                                                        
36 Unless otherwise indicated, translations from Pāli and Sanskrit sources are my own. 
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He continues that the ātman actually is Brahman: ‘[o]ur essence is the ātman which is 
beyond all these elements [psycho-physical components]’ (2015: 7), and it is ‘beyond the relation 
implied by all thought’ (2015: 8).  It is this Absolute which ‘opens to us on completion of our 
evolution, comprises life, will and consciousness, although it goes beyond them’ (2015: 10).  Thus 
the ātman-Brahman is the cause of and substratum of everything despite being radically other 
than all that it causes and supports. 
All of this is orthodox Advaitin doctrine.  For Śaṅkara, the world as it seems to us is not to 
be taken at face value: true reality inheres only in the ‘infinite, eternal, unchanging, pure bliss 
consciousness that is Brahman, or Paramātman’ (Betty, 2010: 216).37  Śaṅkara is here explicitly 
equating the ātman with the Brahman: the two share an intimate connection that cannot be 
overstated; Brahman is the entirety of the cosmos, and this has direct influence over how we are 
to understand ātman as an essential principle.  To this end, Katha Upaniṣad 6:2-4 says: 
yadidaṃ kiṃca jagatsarvaṃ prāṇa ejati niḥsṛtam / 
mahadbhayaṃ vajramudyataṃ ya etadviduramṛtāste bhavanti 
//2// 
bhayādasyāgnistapati bhayāttapati sūryaḥ / 
bhayādindraśca vāyuśca mṛtyurdhāvati pañcamaḥ //3// 
iha cedaśakadboddhuṃ prākśarīrasya visrasaḥ / 
tataḥ sargeṣu lokeṣu śarīratvāya kalpate //4// 
All the universe emanates from this breath [prāṇa; breath of life, 
Brahman] and moves [in Brahman]. 
[That Brahman] causes great fear, like a poised thunderbolt. Those 
that know this [Brahman] become immortal //2// 
                                                        
37 Paramātman is perhaps best rendered as ‘supreme reality’.  The idea for Śaṅkara is that the Brahman is the 
‘supreme reality’, and realising it – becoming it – is the highest possible attainment. 
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From fear of Him, fire burns; from fear [of Him], the sun gives 
heat. 
From fear [of him], Indra [lord of the gods] and Vāya [god of the 
winds], and Death, the fifth, speed [on their way]. //3// 
 
If, here and now, one is able to know [the Brahman] before the 
disintegration of the body, 
Then one is fit for embodiment in the created world. //4//38 
Here, the Brahman is shown to be the universal essential principle from which all things 
emanate, including individual selves.  We can also clearly see that the principal spiritual project 
for humans is to realise or know Brahman.   
                                                        
38 Readers might notice that there is an incongruity in the Sanskrit text of 6.4.  My translation above illustrates that 
the Sanskrit reads ambiguously, for it seems to be suggesting that if a person does gain knowledge of the Brahman, 
they will nevertheless be reborn (embodied; śarīratva) into the created worlds (sargeṣu lokeṣu).  This, though, 
seems to fly in the face of established Advaitin soteriological doctrine, viz. that knowledge of the Brahman is the 
key to liberation.  Indeed, it seems to be contradicted only two verses earlier, where it is stated that ‘[t]hose that 
know this [Brahman] become immortal’.   
How, then, to solve this quandary?  One possible route would be to amend sargeṣu to svargeṣu.  In so doing, the 
locative plurals ‘svargeṣu lokeṣu’ would then translate as ‘in the heavenly realms’ rather than the previous ‘in the 
created world/realms’.  This is a position that has been suggested by numerous scholars across the years, not least 
by Robert Ernest Hume in translation of the Upaniṣads.  Here, Hume provides a brief but useful discussion of the 
issue at hand when he writes that  
[t]he reading svargeṣu instead of sargeṣu would yield the more suitable 
meaning ‘in the heavenly worlds.’ At best, the stanza contradicts the general 
theory that perception of the Ātman produces release from reincarnation 
immediately after death. Consequently Śaṅkara supplies an ellipsis which 
changes the meaning entirely, and Max Muller hesitatingly inserts a ‘not' in the 
first line. The present translation interprets the meaning that the degree of 
perception of the Ātman in the present world determines one's reincarnate 
status. 
(Hume, 1921: 359) 
We might remain confused as to how one might become ‘embodied’ in the ‘heavenly realms’ (realms which, I 
think, we need to understand as Brahman in its totality as understood from a liberated viewpoint) when the thrust 
of Advaitin philosophy is – as we shall see – focussed on turning inward.  Advaitins following Śaṅkara’s lead think 
that we should concern ourselves with knowing the Brahman rather than concerning ourselves with material 
things in the material world.  To this end, Vasu suggests that we should understand ‘embodiment In the heavenly 
realms’ as meaning something like residing in a spiritual body which ‘is immaterial and consists of the bliss and 
intelligence’ rather than thinking that it means we are ‘reborn’ in the conventional saṃsāric sense (Vasu, 1905: 
175). . 
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What does this mean in terms of ātman and Brahman?  Chris Bartley puts it succinctly 
when he says that ‘[t]he cosmos is thought of as a single whole that has essence and this is what 
is called the Brahman.  Individual selves, microcosm[ic] versions of the cosmos, too have essence 
and this is what is called ātman.  If essence is indivisible, the Brahman equates to ātman’ (Bartley, 
2011: 10).  This reading is further strengthened by the Upaniṣad’s assertion that those that fail 
to reach liberation through knowledge of Brahman are doomed to return and ‘put on’ a body – 
further driving home the notion that we are not identical with our bodies, but with the essential 
principle contained inside them. 
We might think that this is far removed from the ‘traditional’ views of Buddhism, and on 
the face of things, we would be right.  One might reasonably assume that Buddhism must at least 
have been sufficiently different to its Brahminical contemporaries; else, it would not have 
developed as a separate tradition to the Vedic schools at all.  Thomas Wood has previously stated 
that ’a full reconciliation of the Vedānta and Buddhism was manifestly impossible’, and that ‘no 
orthodox Buddhist could have upheld the doctrine of an Absolute which is unchanging, pure 
consciousness’ (1992: 73). 
It is surprising, then, that several scholars find textual justification to support the thesis 
that the Buddha tacitly endorsed the ātman.  According to Bhattacharya, the Buddha ‘simply said, 
in speaking of the skandha/khandhas, ephemeral and painful, which constitute the psycho-
physical being of a man: n’ etaṃ mama, n’ eso ‘ham asmi, na m’ eso attā, “This is not mine, I am 
not this, this is not my ātman”’ (Bhattacharya, 2015: 6).  In other words, whilst the Buddha did 
indeed deny that the interaction of the skandhas amounted to the ātman, by negating what is 
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not ātman, he tacitly endorsed – in virtue of this negation – a type of ultimate, spiritual ātman: 
the Brahman.  The upshot of this is that Buddhism is in fact some sort of revised Brahmanism, or 
more specifically, as Bhattacharya eventually implies, a type of early Advaita Vedānta later 
inherited by Śaṅkara.  This reading is anathema to the developed Buddhist understanding of 
anātman with which we are familiar today, which is usually taken as denying any and all forms of 
‘self’, whether the self is understood as the reification of interactions between the skandhas, or 
a more permanent transcendent ‘Brahman’ as attested in the Upaniṣads.  It is again worth 
mentioning that Bhattacharya here leaves ātman untranslated.  It is possible that this is because 
it is an ambiguous word that derives its precise meaning (insofar as one can be determined) from 
the context in which it is used – it can be tricky to translate accurately.  It might also be the case, 
though, that Bhattacharya leaves ātman untranslated because when he uses the word he has a 
very specific context in mind, namely the blissful, ultimate nature described in the Upaniṣads.  
However, this context need not be shared by the utterances of the Buddha.  A possibility that 
Bhattacharya is loath to consider is that the Buddha is simply stating ‘this is not my nature’ 
without implying that there actually is a different, blissful nature.   
For Bhattacharya, then, it is specifically the transcendent Brahman of the Upaniṣads that 
the Buddha is indirectly affirming, and achieving nirvāṇa thus amounts to realising this Brahman.  
His arguments for this are numerous and include some choice readings of Mahāyāna sūtras; a 
specific use and understanding of svabhāva in Madhyamaka thought; presupposing the ātman 
as (although transcendental!) an existent thing, and a very specific interpretation of the negative 
method.  All of these factors and more will be addressed in what follows, but first I will give some 
preliminary remarks on Bhattacharya’s opening gambit: the thesis that the Buddha, through 
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denying the ātman in one sense, actually endorses a more fundamental sort of ātman in another 
sense. 
The starting point of Bhattacharya’s argument here is the idea that the negative method 
necessarily implies a positive existent.  In discussing the negative method that is employed by the 
Buddha, Bhattacharya specifies that for something to be negated – in this instance, things to be 
identified with the ātman – there must be an ultimately real ground underpinning that which is 
negated.  This sort of objection is particularly familiar to the Mādhyamika, and has enjoyed a 
resurgence in popularity via such philosophers as Giuseppe Ferraro in recent years (Ferraro, 
2013).  Throughout, I will assess the merits of Bhattacharya’s claim in light of his various 
arguments supporting it, taking a specifically Mādhyamika tack throughout.  There are several 
reasons for this.  First, though Bhattacharya is at pains to point out that various interpretations 
of parts of Pāli Buddhism (and so the canonical Tripiṭaka (Pāli: Tipiṭaka)) support his conclusion 
that the Buddha affirms by negation what he calls the ātman-Brahman (effectively making the 
Buddha an early Advaitin - more on this later).  Consequently, he thinks that the established 
schools of the Abhidharma are mistaken in how they address essence (and thus ātman) (2015: 
38-39).  Second, Bhattacharya thinks that it is the Mahāyāna schools ‘which put things right’ 
(2015: 39), and so argues that it is the Mahāyāna that provides the real scope for his 
interpretation to flourish.  I intend to examine this contention and show why I think there is at 
least one Mahāyāna school – Madhyamaka – which should not, if it is to remain true to its own 
foundations, take such a view.  Third, Bhattacharya endorses Ramanan’s position equating 
svabhāva (own-being), svarūpa (own-form; own-nature) and ātman as ‘the essential nature…of 
the individual as well as of all things’ (Bhattacharya, 2015: 144, note 249).  It is at this same point 
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that Bhattacharya claims (via Venkata Ramanan) that Madhyamaka accepts ātman as svabhāva 
on the proviso that this svabhāva is not a ‘separate, substantial entity inhabiting the body of each 
individual’ (2015: 144, note 249).  There are, prima facie, some problems with this stance when 
examined from a Buddhist perspective, especially in light of the anātman doctrine, and especially 
from the Madhyamaka viewpoint.  It appears as though Bhattacharya has reified the notion of 
svabhāva (as a ‘separate substantial entity’ which somehow inhabits a body) only to claim that 
this reified sort of svabhāva is not what is accepted by Mādhyamikas.  It is not immediately 
obvious to me that this is at all what anybody claims – entities either have or lack a svabhāva, 
they do not have or lack types of svabhāva, and so the distinction is redundant.  In any case, how 
these notions are dealt with by the relevant Buddhist and Advaitin traditions will have great 
influence over how we should understand notions of truth; notions of truth that are integral to 
understanding how both the soteriological methods and goals of each school operate. 
For these reasons then, I will emphasise why I think that Madhyamaka Buddhists would 
not – or at the very least should not – endorse an ātman-Brahman of the same sort as the 
Upaniṣads.  This inevitably means that I will dispute Bhattacharya’s argument that for both 
Advaitins and Buddhists, the ultimate truth is identical (viz. the ultimate truth is the ātman-
Brahman).  I will also examine how and why the Mahāyāna leaves itself open to such comparisons 
by paying some attention to the various ideas connected to essence or the Absolute at play in 
the background to its philosophy (svarūpa; svabhāva; dharmakāya and tathāgatagarbha; 
śūnyatā).  The sum of these efforts will be, I hope, a refutation of the thesis that the Buddha was 
a proto-Advaitin who tacitly endorsed the ātman-Brahman and further a refutation that the 
ultimate truth (and thus the ultimate destination) is identical in both Advaita Vedānta and 
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Buddhism.  I will, then, take the Mādhyamika approach to this issue and argue that Nāgārjuna 
could not have (and would not have) under any circumstances endorsed a notion of an Absolute, 
ultimate reality.  I will do this by extrapolating key Madhyamaka principles and illustrating that 
accepting an Absolute of any sort is necessarily contrary to the Middle Way as Nāgārjuna 
designed it, and that śūnyatā as devised and elaborated by Nāgārjuna cannot provide the 
ultimate grounding of existence that commentators such as Bhattacharya suppose it can.  
2.1 Bhattacharya’s Argument 
Let us start, then, at the beginning.  Bhattacharya opens by citing a Cambodian inscription 
that curiously appears to both acknowledge that impersonality (given here as nairātmya) is 
incompatible with supreme-selfhood (paramātman), but nevertheless claim that the Buddha 
taught insubstantiality as a means to achieve realisation of supreme-selfhood (Bhattacharya, 
2015: 1).39   The idea presented here is the linchpin that holds together Bhattacharya’s entire 
thesis: using no-self to deny what the ātman is not necessarily leaves to one side that which the 
ātman really is.  The inscription, it is worth bearing in mind, is attributed to the reign of 
Rājendravarman, and so is thought to be dated somewhere between 944 and 968 CE: a 
considerable amount of time after the advent of the Mahāyāna, and, importantly, centuries after 
                                                        
39 I think that interpretations such as Bhattacharya’s are to a large degree a result of the tendency to translate all 
instances and variations of ātman as ‘self’.  Being a multi-faceted term, we can sometimes translate ātman as ‘I’ in 
the sense of a simple reflexive pronoun, as ‘self’, or as ‘essence’ or ‘nature’.  If, for example, we use ‘nature’ 
instead of ‘self’, we have something along the lines of insubstantiality is taught as the supreme nature of 
phenomena.  Another way to put this would be to say that the nature of things is to lack svabhāva.  The Buddhist 
might still be uncomfortable with talk of a ‘supreme nature’, but its occurrence can be accounted for by 
distinguishing between conventional and ultimate truths and the limitations of, aims of and usefulness of language 
in relation to this distinction.  It might refer only to a concept intended to prove a point but itself empty of any 
substantial existence.  
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the dissemination of important Mahāyānist texts such as Nāgārjuna’s seminal 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK).40   Supporting Bhattacharya’s reading is a citation from the 
Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāra translated by S. Lévi (and slightly modified by Bhattacharya) as 
In utterly pure Emptiness, the Buddhas have attained to the summit 
of the ātman, which consists in Impersonality.  Since they have 
found, thus, the pure ātman, they have reached the heights of 
ātman.  
(Bhattacharya, 2015: 2) 
The translation goes on to include a commentary,41 specifying that the ātman of the 
Buddhas ‘consists in the essential Impersonality’, which is in turn ‘absolute Thus-ness’, and is also 
‘ātman in the sense of the own-nature of the Buddhas’ (2015: 2).42   
The Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāra itself is a Yogācāra text attributed to Asaṅga (himself a 
Yogācārin), and so is a later development of (or deviation from) earlier Mahāyāna thought.  As 
Conze writes, despite the Mādhyamikas and Yogācārins being ‘quite distinct in their interests and  
intentions’, the Yogācārins nevertheless ‘regarded the Mādhyamika doctrine as a preliminary 
stage of their own, which however missed the true and esoteric core of the Buddha’s teachings’ 
                                                        
40 There are notorious difficulties with dating ancient texts and their authors.  I do not intend to cover these 
controversies here, but will rather adhere to the generally accepted – if speculative – timeframes generally used by 
scholars of Buddhism. 
41 Precisely whose commentary this is, we do not know.  Bhattacharya states in his notes that ‘We do not touch 
here on the much discussed question of the author or authors of this text and of its commentary’.  Other 
translations, like the recent 2014 Ornament of the Great Vehicle Sutras, claim to make use of Vasubandhu’s 
commentary, but in this case, do so from the Tibetan rather than the Sanskrit.  There are disagreements as to the 
authorship, and it is by no means clear that Vasubandhu did write the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhasya.  For the 
sake of argument, I will assume that he did write it, and that we can interpret it in the same vein as his other texts. 
42 Following the spirit of this translation, Bhattacharya, in note 249 (via n.7), endorses K. Venkata Ramanan’s bold 
claim that not only do Mādhyamikas accept ātman as an ‘essential nature’, but they also equate it with the 
svabhāva and svarūpa ‘of the individual as well as of all things’ (2015: 114).  . 
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(Conze, 1993: 38-39).  Conze also notes that, for their part, the Mādhyamikas regarded the 
Yogācārin project as ‘a quite incomprehensible perversity’ (1993: 39), presumably owing to the 
supposedly idealist position occupied by later Yogācārins.  This also speaks to the variation of 
thought between schools loosely united under the ‘Mahāyāna’ banner, and serves as a 
preliminary warning against prematurely lumping together doctrinally divergent Mahāyāna 
schools.  There are just as many points of disagreement as there are points of agreement!  I here 
tentatively suggest that this could prove to be a reason why Bhattacharya’s contention that it 
was the Mahāyāna which ‘put things right’ regarding the nature of reality might be too broad a 
stroke.  
Regarding the translation given by Bhattacharya, I note with some interest that ātman 
again remains untranslated.  This is most likely because Bhattacharya wants ātman to be taken 
in the Advaitin sense, viz. as an instantiation of the Brahman.  The Brahman is, of course, 
necessarily impersonal: it is not embodied.  Ultimately, Brahman is beyond substance-attribute 
distinctions (Nirguṇa Brahman).  On the other hand, Brahman is the only substance in the world: 
the cause of the universe, and the very reality that underpins it (Saguṇa Brahman).  The apparent 
distinction (Nirguṇa-Saguṇa) is not a real distinction within Brahman, it is simply illustrative of 
the ‘limits of conventional language in describing brahman’ (Rambachan, 2006: 89).  Rambachan 
elsewhere adds regarding the Brahman that ‘[i]ts nature transcends all definitions that are based 
on distinctions’ (2006: 89).  Nevertheless, insofar as Brahman is the sole reality responsible for 
all existence, we might describe it as ‘substantial’.  Indeed, as Rambachan points out, despite 
Brahman transcending all definitions and so on, ‘there is no object that enjoys a separate 
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ontological existence and nature from brahman’ (2006: 88).43  This speaks to the tension inherent 
in discussions of entities (though Brahman is technically beyond the concept ‘entity’) that 
allegedly transcend linguistic designations: nothing we say will ever capture anything about them 
from an ultimate perspective (and consequently, we cannot communicate any ‘truths’).  
However, if Brahman is pure Being, then it must necessarily exist, and so whilst an Advaitin might 
be perturbed by the idea of imposing any such label onto the Brahman, I think it relatively 
uncontroversial to assert that according to Advaita, the Brahman is necessarily existent, and so 
is in an important respect, substantial.44 
I think that because Bhattacharya is beginning from an Advaitin position, he is always 
inclined to understand ātman in the Advaitin context.  It is clear enough from is argument that 
he wants his readers to understand ātman in this way, too.  It is possible, however, to understand 
this specific ātman in a weaker sense.  Bearing in mind that the Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāra is, after 
all, a Buddhist text, I feel vindicated in taking this small step.  If we choose to translate ātman as 
‘nature’ in a weak sense rather than ‘self’ in the strong sense of a permanent, immutable essence, 
then the meaning of the extract changes a little.  We now have a meaning more like  
In utterly pure Emptiness, the Buddhas have attained to the summit 
of their nature, which consists in impersonality.  Since they have 
                                                        
43 To this end, Anderson also writes that ‘it should be noted that Advaita Vedanta takes it for granted that there is 
‘being’. Its project, ontologically, is to clarify what this ‘being’ entails. By definition ‘being’ is not only that which 
cannot be subrated [sublated], but also cannot come into or go out of existence’ (2012: 276).  ‘Being’ is 
synonymous with ‘Brahman’, and thus is substantial insofar as it is the only existing thing.  All experienced 
phenomena enjoy reality only because they are Brahman. 
44 I feel it important to note that an incorporeal entity can still be substantial. 
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found, thus, their pure nature, they have reached the heights of 
their nature.  
Or: 
In pure emptiness, the Buddhas have achieved the pinnacle of their 
nature: a state of impersonality.  Having discovered their pure 
nature, they have arrived at their supreme nature.45  
 
Leaving ātman untranslated leaves the door open to understanding it in the Advaitin 
sense advanced and preferred by Bhattacharya.  Replacing ātman with nature, though, adds 
another possibility.  No doubt an Advaitin would simply object that the ātman-Brahman simply 
is the nature of the world (and so of all that are within it).  My slight change to the extract can, 
after all, still be read in such a manner.  It can, however, also be read differently.  In line with the 
orthodox Buddhist aversion to asserting ‘self’, we might understand the extract as using ‘nature’ 
in a conventional sense (and thus not necessarily implying any ultimate existence), then what we 
have is the Buddhist text simply using an empty concept (that is empty of svabhāva) to 
demonstrate a point.46  What the Buddhists have realised in emptiness (śūnyatā) is thus that the 
nature of things is insubstantiality/impersonality, and this is the highest realisation regarding the 
nature of things.  In other words, the greatest realisation about the nature of things is that all 
things lack intrinsic existence (svabhāva).  This need not, and indeed does not imply that the 
‘nature’ realised has a substantial existence behind it (and so can avoid recourse to something 
like the Brahman).  Instead, it can simply be a concept, referred to for the sake of ease and 
                                                        
45 śūnyatāyāṃ viśuddhāyāṃ nairātmyātmāgralābhataḥ / buddhāḥ suddhātmalābhitvād gatā ātmamahātmatām // 
46 Again, something is conventionally existent according to Buddhist terminology when it lacks an intrinsic 
existence (i.e. svabhāva).  Something is ultimately existent when it possesses intrinsic existence (svabhāva).  
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communicability, without really referring to anything substantial.  This could, I think, begin to 
form the basis of a coherent Madhyamaka interpretation. 
I also note with some interest that translations of the commentary to the Mahāyāna-
Sūtrālaṃkāra do not tend to specify whether or not their talk of paramātman – the ‘great self’ – 
is in a saṃvṛti or paramārtha sense.  I think that we can deduce from Vasubandhu’s explication 
of the trisvabhāva doctrine that both the verse and commentary are saṃvṛti and so nothing but 
conventional designations. 47   This means that any talk of own-nature of the buddhas is a 
conceptual construct that is ultimately unreal.  The phrasing is the way it is to allow an 
unenlightened mind to comprehend the splendour of the awakened in a sort of metaphor.  The 
buddhas have not actually climbed to the summit of the great ātman, because in the final analysis 
– the empty perfected aspect – such a thing is unreal.  We can explain the use of ‘own-nature’ 
and ‘supreme self’ as used in both Thurman’s translation and the translation of the 
Dharmachakra Translation Committee in a more nuanced way.  The own-nature referred to is – 
according to Vasubandhu’s trisvabhāva – subject to the interplay of the three natures.  The first 
                                                        
47 Explaining the trisvabhāva, Gold (2015: 149) writes that 
[t]he first nature is the fabricated nature, which is the thing as it appears to be, 
as it is erroneously fabricated.  Of course, to use this term (“fabricated”) is to 
indicate the acceptance that things do not really exist the way they appear.  
This is a thing’s nature as it might be defined and explained in ordinary 
Abhidharma philosophy – its traditional svabhāva, but with the added proviso 
that we all know that this is not really how things work. . . The second nature is 
the dependent nature, which Vasubandhu defines as the causal process of the 
thing’s fabrication, the causal story that brings about the thing’s apparent 
nature.  The third nature, finally, is the emptiness of the first nature – the fact 
that it is unreal, that the appearance does not exist as it appears. 
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aspect of the three natures, parikalpita, is the fabricated nature or fabricated aspect.  This is the 
thing as it appears to exist and is usually associated with svabhāva.  The appearance is not real, 
as the Yogācārin knows.  Therefore, the own-nature referred to in the commentary to IX.23 of 
the Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāra is an appearance, but it is not ultimately real.  The second aspect is 
paratantra, or dependent nature or aspect.  This is, as Gold (2015: 149) writes, the causal story 
that brings about the parikalpita nature.  In the case of the own-nature of buddhas, we might say 
that the paratantra is the culmination of events, actions and personality traits that lead us to 
view them as having achieved the ‘great ātman’.  It is the causal story that leads us to impose 
conceptual constructions onto the world.  The final aspect, the pariniṣpanna, or created nature 
or aspect, is the emptiness (śūnyatā) of the fabricated nature: the knowledge that it is not 
intrinsically real and is an imposition resulting from a causal flux.  In the case of the own-nature 
of the buddhas described at both Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāra IX.23 and in the corresponding 
commentary, we must now see that such an own-nature is unreal. 
What we are left with, then, is a description that reifies emptiness as some sort of 
substantial entity.  Asaṅga writes that it is within śūnyatā that the buddhas climb to the summit 
of the great self, implying that emptiness and selflessness (anātman) are paramātman.  But by 
Vasubandhu’s own methodology, this conclusion cannot be left standing.  The very fact that the 
own nature described is empty of intrinsic existence means that it is mischaracterised: a 
svabhāva is for Vasubandhu always parikalpita.  When we apply Vasubandhu’s analysis, the 
passage actually alludes not to an Upaniṣadic ātman-Brahman as asserted by Bhattacharya above 
and suggested by Thurman in his footnotes to the 2004 translation of the 
Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya (2004: 82, note 36), but to a denial of the ultimate existence of 
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that nature.  The passage is saṃvṛti and so discusses and lauds the attributes of the buddhas in 
conventional, worldly language.  What it does not do is give an ultimate account, at least if we 
use Vasubandhu’s own arguments as a yardstick by which to measure the nature of phenomena.  
Reifying the emptiness of phenomena as a self, then, is anathema to Vasubandhu.48  Applying his 
own account of trisvabhāva, we ought to come to the conclusion that the buddhas have achieved 
a great feat in realising that the nature of things is that there is not a nature of things.  That is to 
say that they have seen that all phenomena lack svabhāva and no longer view the world in 
svabhāvic terms. 
This is supported, I contend, by the subsequent verse’s commentary, which provides 
arguments as to why Buddhahood is said to neither exist nor not exist.  This is precisely because 
a buddha is selfless given that ‘suchness’ (thusness, relating to the tathāgata) is characterised 
‘by the (ultimate) nonexistence of persons and things’ (Thurman, 2004: 82).  A nature (svabhāva) 
is a thing, and so ultimately does not exist.  It is also worth noting that part of the Sanskrit 
compound pudgaladharmābhāvalakṣaṇatvāt (‘given that it is characterised by the nonexistence 
of dharmas and persons’) uses the Sanskrit word for person, pudgala.  This is not an interesting 
observation until we realise that for Vasubandhu, ‘pudgala’ is a synonym for ātman.  In the 
Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (1991: 1327), Vasubandhu spends considerable time attacking Brahmin 
monks for contemplating the ātman.  He writes that there is no ātman, no pudgala, over and 
above the skandhas.  Talk of ātman and pudgala, thinks Vasubandhu, is simply a reification of 
impermanent impersonal interactions between the five skandhas. It is a mistake of 
                                                        
48 Vasubandhu’s attitudes to ‘self’, svabhāva, will be discussed in §4. 
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consciousness, which is itself causally conditioned by interactions between the mind (manas) and 
the dharmas that constitute the psycho-physical world (1991: 1326).  Like all Buddhists, 
Vasubandhu thinks that ultimately, this mistaken reification can be addressed.   
For Vasubandhu, then, buddhahood is characterised by the absence of ultimate entities, 
namely persons (substantial selves) and ‘things’ (bhāva: also ‘being’, ‘existing’).  Natures 
(svabhāva) fall under the latter categorisation, and so ultimately, they cannot exist.  There can 
be conventional ‘characteristics’ (lakṣaṇa) that describe a lack of something, and so there is no 
obvious problem here in arguing that a characteristic of Buddhahood is that there are no natures.  
We know that a characteristic can describe a privation because Vasubandhu uses the example of 
fading shadows in vision, claiming that a fading shadow cannot be said to be (ultimately) existent 
because ‘its characteristic is the nonexistence of heat or shadows’ (Thurman, 2004: 83). 49  
Similarly, it cannot be said to be (ultimately) nonexistent either, because we experience the 
fading of shadows.  The point is that a fading shadow does not exist as it appears (2004: 83). 
With all that said, it is relatively easy to see how Bhattacharya might reach his conclusion 
that the Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāra supports his thesis that Buddhism aims at knowledge of the 
true ātman-Brahman.  If we were to read the quotation only slightly differently, we could replace 
the idea of ātman with that of a specific understanding of dharmakāya and have next to no 
practical difference in meaning.  Of course, dharmakāya is itself a troublesome notion that is 
often interpreted in radically different ways, and to some degree, this sort of difficulty is par for 
                                                        
49 We might also say that a vegetarian foodstuff is characterised by a lack of meat.  Anarchy is characterised by a 
lack of government, and so on.  In the above cases, the designation ‘thusness’ and ‘buddhahood’ are characterised 
by a lack of permanent immutable phenomena. 
P a g e  | 60 
 
the course when translating from Sanskrit.50  The term itself loosely translates as truth-body (and 
was in its earliest forms most likely rendered as something like the body of teachings [of the 
Buddha]) but is understood differently depending on where we care to look.  It is not unusual, 
for example, for dharmakāya to be understood as reality-body; the basis of reality, the 
underpinning substrate from which all must stem, the knowledge of which brings liberation.  This 
is a normal, common theme in some Mahāyāna literature.  It is not some fringe idea that operates 
outside of accepted Buddhist doctrine; it is accepted Buddhist doctrine for numerous Mahāyāna 
schools.  Indeed, Tillemans writes that dharmakāya can be understood as ‘the Buddha's 
omniscient mind or the buddhas' omniscient minds (=jñānātmakadharmakāya, ye shes chos sku) 
or the absolute and unitary nature of those minds (=svābhāvikakāya, ngo bo nyid sku)’ 
(forthcoming: 6).   
This talk of an essential, unconditioned substratum is the starting point for Bhattacharya’s 
thesis, and we can see that it is not without precedent.  A featureless ultimate substratum from 
which the totality of the experienced world emanates could just as easily be the ātman-Brahman 
as it could be the Mahāyāna dharmakāya.  This will be covered in detail in section 5.  Before I get 
to any of that, though, I will proceed in fleshing out Bhattacharya’s own reasoning for his 
conclusion that the Buddha actually tacitly endorsed a sort of supreme ātman.  Bhattacharya 
cites the commentary to the Ratnagotravibhāga – another Yogācāra text – at some length in both 
Sanskrit and in translation, in what I assume is an attempt to prove two things: first, that the 
                                                        
50 I discuss in some detail how a Mādhyamika might opt to interpret a word and concept as troublesome as 
dharmakāya in §5. 
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‘fourfold misapprehension’ illustrates that there is an ātman to be discovered, and second that 
the concept of nairātmya is not, in fact, incompatible with that of paramātman.  It is worth 
looking at both of these two points in some more detail.  The fourfold misapprehension in 
particular is given significant attention.  The translation given by Bhattacharya states that 
The idea of the permanent in what is impermanent, of happiness in 
what is sorrowful, of the ātman in what is non-ātman, of the pure 
in what is impure, that is to say, in such things as corporeal form, 
etc., that is what is called the fourfold misapprehension.  
(Bhattacharya, 2015: 3) 
Again, Bhattacharya leaves ātman untranslated.  If we were to translate it in the spirit of 
the paragraph, the relevant misapprehension would look something like ‘nature in what is not 
nature’, which is to say that it is a misapprehension to impose the idea of an essential nature 
onto something that lacks an essential nature.  This is not necessarily to say that there are other 
things that possess or constitute an essential nature, but might simply mean that it is mistaken 
to reify natures when no natures can exist.  This interpretation would be in line with the wider 
Buddhist doctrine of anātman and particularly in line with the Madhyamaka doctrine of śūnyatā.  
In the latter case, to seek nature in what is not nature is analogous to reifying svabhāva when 
none can be found: for the Mādhyamika, what is empty (śūnya) of svabhāva is necessarily 
without a nature or a self (anātman).  As Bhattacharya elsewhere notes (2015: 144), possession 
of svabhāva is possession of an ātman, and so to lack svabhāva is to lack an ātman.  In other 
words, it is not about seeking ātman in the wrong place with the implication that there is a right 
place to look, but about reifying ātman where there is no possibility of its existing. 
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Nevertheless, for Bhattacharya, that the ātman is being sought in what is non-ātman 
necessarily means that there must be something that is ātman.  In other words, any negated 
object requires a real existent that is to be negated.  On this point, Murti has this to say:  
Negation itself is significant because there is an underlying reality – 
the subjacent ground.  If there were no transcendent ground, how 
could any view be condemned as false?  A view is false because it 
falsifies the real, makes the thing appear other than what it is in 
itself.  Falsity implies the real that is falsified.  
(Murti, 2016: 234-235)51 
This view supports Bhattacharya’s contention that in order for the Buddha to say what is 
not ātman, there must be something else that actually is ātman.  It is an oft-repeated line, 
especially when talking about the conventional world of conditioned phenomena in Buddhism.52  
In 2013, Giuseppe Ferraro, in criticism of the semantic interpretation of emptiness put forth by 
Mark Siderits, wrote that 
A first evident logical weakness of semantic interpretation is that 
concepts such as ‘conventionality’ or ‘conceptual being’ are 
inconceivable without admitting some idea of reality or 
independent being.  Therefore, the phrase “ultimate reality (PO) 
does not exist and everything is only conceptual reality (SO)” is 
                                                        
51 Also cited in Bhattacharya (2015: 36). 
52 The significance of the difference between the two truths of ‘conventional’ and ‘ultimate’ is mentioned in MMK 
24.8-9:  
dve satye samupāśritya buddhānāṃ dharmadeśanā / 
lokasaṃvṛtisatyaṃ ca satyaṃ ca paramārthataḥ //8// 
ye ‘nayor vijānti vibhāgaṃ satyayor dvayoḥ / 
te tattvaṃ na vijānanti gambhīre buddhaśāsane //9// 
The Dharma-instruction of the Buddha rests on two truths: 
conventional truth and ultimate truth. 
[Those] who do not know the distinction between the two truths, 
they do not understand the Buddha’s profound teaching. 
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inconsistent from a logical point of view.  Indeed, if we exclude that 
‘real’ might exist beyond the conceptual, we are not ‘eliminating 
reality’ but are rather saying that the conceptual is the only ‘real’.   
(Ferraro, 2013: 211) 
Ferraro is really disputing the efficiency of dealing with the two-truths through the lens 
of the semantic interpretation and so his immediate focus is slightly different to that of 
Bhattacharya, but the underlying point is the same: we can only negate something in virtue of its 
actual existence.  Where Bhattacharya thinks that we can only deny what is not ātman in virtue 
of there being something else that is ātman, Ferraro thinks that we can only make sense of 
conventional (conditioned) existents in virtue of there being ultimate (unconditioned) existents 
that transcend the conventional: the ātman-Brahman is one such existent.  The ātman-Brahman 
is, according to Bhattacharya, entirely compatible with the Buddhist doctrine of insubstantiality 
(2015: 11) in virtue of its own incorporeality (2015: 5-6).  On such a reading, scholars of Buddhism 
like Ferraro appear to support Bhattacharya’s overarching thesis: there simply must be some 
ultimately real hyper-reality that grounds existing beings. 
We have, though, compelling reason to question the way in which ‘real’ is used by both 
Ferraro and Bhattacharya.53  Contained within such uses of ‘real’ is – unsurprisingly – the idea of 
a deeper reality with a privileged ontology, and this is, at least on the surface of things, 
particularly un-Buddhist.  Indeed, whilst Ferraro manages to stop short of claiming that the real 
is incorporeal (instead arguing that the real is simply a mind-independent existence (Ferraro, 
                                                        
53 ‘Thus, it is not outside of ourselves that we grasp the Real: through all eternity the Real is present in us, but we 
do not see it, blinded as we are by our false conceptions’ (Bhattacharya, 2015: 10). 
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2013: 211)), Bhattacharya does not, claiming that the real is simply the ātman-Brahman.  This is 
in turn our essential nature (further, it is the essential nature of everything), our true incorporeal 
being.    
We now have a situation where not only are negations assumed to require an ultimate 
reality or existent in order to make any sense, but the ultimate reality so assumed is treated as 
something existent that is there to be discovered or known.  In making this move, both Ferraro 
and Bhattacharya fail to recognise that a discussion of – and negation of – a concept like the 
ātman or the ultimately real (I make this distinction because Ferraro does not equate his idea of 
ultimate reality with the ātman) does not actually depend on the independent existence of an 
ātman or ultimate reality.  A Buddhist thinker need not accept that the ātman exists in order to 
state that the skandhas do not constitute it.  All that is required is the recognition that an idea or 
concept is under discussion, and regardless of whether or not this concept has a corresponding 
existent entity, simply knowing what the concept means and entails is enough to facilitate a 
discussion of it.  In other words, all the Buddhist really need acknowledge is the concept of the 
ātman. 
It thus strikes me that in saying ‘these things are not ātman’, the Buddhist need not 
implicitly affirm a belief in the ātman, but need only be speaking to their opponent in mutually 
understood terms.  When a Madhyamaka thinker reduces all empirical things to the 
‘conventional’ level, they are not necessarily admitting to the existence of two distinct levels of 
existence with ‘conventional’ somehow beneath the privileged ontology afforded to existents on 
the ‘ultimate’ level.  In fact, all they really need admit to is either their understanding of the 
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Buddhist proclivity to explain experience via ‘ultimate’ existents, or their recognition that there 
appears to be two-levels of truth (and thus existence), and are simply talking in terms that other 
Buddhists – and indeed non-Buddhists – would understand; presumably before jettisoning such 
notions.54  They need not believe an ultimate plane actually exists in order to dispute how it 
might theoretically work, just as I need not believe that God exists in order to make sense of a 
conversation about the attributes of God with an atheist.  I can talk of Harry Potter-style 
Dementors with my young cousin, but I think it a stretch to say that either of us need accept their 
actual existence in the empirical world (though maybe my cousin would!). 
Another convenient way to think of this is as follows: it is not necessary for a unicorn to 
exist independently in the world for me to dispute with a friend that it is not the same as or 
equivalent with the Minotaur.  If my friend says ‘this unicorn is the Minotaur’, I can reasonably 
respond with ‘that unicorn is not the Minotaur’ despite my knowledge that neither the unicorn 
nor the Minotaur empirically exist in the world.  In so doing, I cannot reasonably be accused of 
tacitly affirming the ultimate existence of both unicorns and Minotaurs.  All that is really 
demonstrated is that both my friend and I understand what the idea of a unicorn involves (its 
status as a horse with a horn growing from its head) and what the idea of the Minotaur involves 
(its status as a creature with the body of a man and the head of a bull).55  We can say that as long 
as we understand the idea or concept of something, it does not much matter if it exists 
                                                        
54 This jettisoning of conceptual thought is, I believe, the crux of Madhyamaka thought.  Throughout the course of 
this paper, we will see some similarities with Advaita in this regard, too.  
55 Obviously, we need to understand what a horse, horn, man and bull are, too.   
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independently of the mind or if it does not.  Being able to categorise ideas is what really matters, 
not whether there ever existed entities or objects falling under those ideas.  The same 
understanding can be applied to Siderits’ argument regarding the Madhyamaka use of 
‘conventional’ as critiqued by Ferraro.  The Mādhyamika need not accept the existence of an 
ultimate plane to ‘ground’ the reality of empirical objects or of anything else.  Instead, all they 
really need is an understanding of the theoretical implications of the ‘ultimate’, so that when 
they refer to the two-truths, they do so with a specific goal in mind: eventually dispelling any and 
all notions of ultimacy because notions of ultimacy qualify as metaphysical views (and 
metaphysical views lead to attachment).56   It is a simple fact that an entity need not exist 
independently of mind in order to be talked about or entertained in thought.  
  Given the Buddha’s famed propensity for avoiding extremes and advocating a ‘middle 
way’, it is at least possible that his apparent hesitance to deny ātman outright (instead choosing 
only to say what does not constitute the ātman, namely identifying the ātman as corporeal, as 
resulting from the skandhas) stems from a reluctance to commit to either a permanently existent 
or a nonexistent ātman.  This would, after all, present as either an eternalist or annihilationist 
point of view: both are to be avoided according to the principle of the middle way.   
Bhattacharya, we have seen, also believes that the ātman is ‘ātman in the sense of the 
own-nature of the Buddhas’, and in his footnotes, he endorses the position of K. Venkata 
                                                        
56 This relies on reading Madhyamaka philosophy according to the semantic interpretation of emptiness, a position 
to which I am generally sympathetic.  I also acknowledge, however, that this is not the only reading, or indeed the 
dominant reading of Madhyamaka.   
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Ramanan, which equates svabhāva, svarūpa and the ātman with ‘the essential nature…of the 
individual as well as of all things’ (Bhattacharya, 2015: 114, note 249).  When translating a section 
of the commentary to the Ratnagotravibhāga in support of his position, Bhattacharya writes that 
the Buddha, because of his ‘perfect knowledge’ of the natures of things (yathābhūtajñānena), 
has achieved perfect intuition of the impersonality/selflessness of all dharmas 
(sarvadharmanairātmyaparapāramiprāptaḥ).  The translation continues ‘This impersonality 
accords, from every point of view, with the characteristics of the ātman. It is thus always regarded 
as ātman, because it is Impersonality which is ātman’ (2015: 4-5).  The point being driven home 
here is that the ātman-Brahman of the Upaniṣads is something of which nothing can ultimately 
be said – a notion we covered in some detail earlier.  On this reading, it seems to me that it is not 
just Buddhist impersonality or anātman which is thus identical with the Brahman, but also 
Maimonides’ conception of God, and, indeed, any mystical conception of a godhead or Absolute 
which admits of an attribute-less transcendent reality. 
The Sanskrit relating to this point as presented in Bhattacharya’s book: ‘tac cāsya 
nairātmyam anātmalakṣaṇena yathādarśanam avisaṃvāditatvāt sarvakalam ātmābhipretaḥ 
nairātmyam evātmeti kṛtvā’ (2015: 3).  This, using Bhattacharya’s own translation as a basis, 
translates as something like ‘this impersonality accords, in every way, with the characteristics of 
anātman (anātmalakṣaṇena), it is thus always accepted as ātman, it is impersonality/no-self 
which is ātman.’  In note 19 on page 41, Bhattacharya makes the point – albeit in a laboured way 
– that he wants to convey that on the one hand, the views of adepts of other doctrines are 
‘contradictory to the characteristics of ātman’; on the other hand, despite this, the view of the 
Buddha in some ways nevertheless accords with these seemingly contradictory views.   
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Let us dwell on this apparent paradox for a moment.  Does the Buddha’s view of ātman 
coincide with that of the anyatīrthyāḥ or not?  Word substitutions aside, Bhattacharya says of 
this that ‘on the one hand, the view of the anyatīrthyāḥ is contradictory to the characteristics of 
the ātman (ātmalakṣaṇena visaṃvāditatvāt); on the other hand, the view of the Tathāgatas 
accords with them’ (2015: 41, note 19).  What exactly is at stake here?  We might think of it like 
this:  the view of the anyatīrthyāḥ (an adept of another doctrine, viz. a non-Buddhist) is to seek 
ātman where ātman is not, and so in virtue of their looking in the wrong places and associating 
the wrong things with the ātman, the non-Buddhist’s idea of ātman is necessarily always 
anātman, or not-ātman.  It is, as Bhattacharya puts it, ‘at variance with the characteristics of the 
ātman’ (2015: 4) simply in virtue of it not being the ātman.  Bhattacharya’s point here, though 
subtle, is that first, the anyatīrthyāḥ and the Buddha are in accord insofar as they are both seeking 
ātman in the first instance, but are in opposition regarding both the means by which and the 
places in which it is to be sought.  For his part, the Buddha also arrives at anātman, but does so 
in a different, more deliberate way, the end goal of which is – paradoxically – to gain knowledge 
of what is the ātman by filtering out those phenomena that are not the ātman.  In such a case, 
the impersonality of dharmas is the essence of anātman when applied to mundane things (a 
reified ‘I’ as conceived via the skandhas and so on), and realisation of this impersonality is 
similarly the true state of the Absolute (or, as Bhattacharya would say, of the spiritual ātman-
Brahman).57   
                                                        
57 This is essentially identical to the position in some Mahāyānist schools that sees emptiness as the essence of all 
phenomena and thus the true character of the Absolute.  It is often argued that some Mādhyamikas also subscribe 
to this viewpoint.  Murti, for his part advances the view that Madhyamaka has at its heart a conception of an 
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To put it in other words, the Buddha’s perfect insight allows him to perceive the 
impersonality of worldly phenomena, and it is this impersonality that constitutes the character 
of the true ātman (viz. the ātman-Brahman).  Now we can say that impersonality accords with 
anātman because anātman is the impersonality of dharmas that are mistakenly reified as ātman.  
Bhattacharya thinks that when the Buddha gained perfect knowledge of the impersonality of 
dharmas (sarvadharmanairātmyaparapāramiprāptaḥ), he actually gained knowledge of the 
Upaniṣadic ātman-Brahman (on the Śaṅkaran reading).58  That is to say that, counter-intuitive as 
it seems, the realisation of anātman in dharmas is also the realisation of a unified, transcendent 
absolute ātman underpinning the universe (though it is beyond the empirical reality of the 
universe): the real ātman – as opposed to those things mistaken for ātman – is the impersonality 
of the transcendent Absolute.  Impersonality accords in every way with the principles of anātman 
(because realising anātman through meditative practice leads one to the realisation of the 
impersonality of all phenomena), and so ‘it [impersonality] is always accepted as ātman’ (2015: 
5) precisely because the nature of the true ātman is the nondual impersonality of Brahman.  The 
anyatīrthyāḥ would then, according to Bhattacharya, be in agreement with the Buddha that there 
is an ātman of some description, the difference comes in the methodology involved in gaining 
                                                        
Absolute (2016: 234), but whilst I acknowledge that this position endures in some Madhyamaka sects today, there 
are good reasons to question whether or not it is representative of Nāgārjuna’s position as expounded in the 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.  
58 This turn of phrase might sound clumsy, but it is rather difficult to express in language how a person comes to 
know the ātman-Brahman.  Merely speaking of ‘realisation’ of, or ‘attainment’ of, the ātman-Brahman necessarily 
makes the ātman-Brahman an object or result of some action (Suthren Hirst 2005: 39-40).  This cannot actually be 
the case, as the ātman-Brahman simply is, regardless of a subject-object relationship.  As such, we need to bear in 
mind that for Śaṅkara ‘knowledge of brahman is not knowledge of an object but the state in which all objectivising 
superimpositions have been removed’ (Suthren Hirst, 2005: 40).  Whenever I refer to ‘realising’ the Brahman, then, 
it is very much with this difficulty borne in mind, and I am not seeking to objectify that which cannot be objectified 
(viz. the ātman-Brahman), but simply communicating a change in state on behalf of the practitioner. 
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knowledge of it.  The anyatīrthyāḥ grasps at things that are emphatically not ātman in a 
misguided pursuit of what is ātman, whereas the Buddha eschews this type of grasping and 
realises that impersonality is the true nature of the ātman, and the means by which this is realised 
is by successfully determining that which is anātman.   
2.2 Abhidharmic Dharma Theory 
Bhattacharya supposes that if dharmas are the building blocks of experience and are, as 
argued by Nāgārjuna (among others), impersonal, then it is precisely this impersonality that 
constitutes the true intrinsic nature of all phenomena.  In such an instance, emptiness would be 
the svabhāva of all phenomena.  Is this a satisfactory account?  In order to answer this, we will 
need to give some account of what dharma theory actually entails.  Y. Karunadasa (1996: 2) writes 
that 
The dhamma [dharma] theory was not peculiar to any one school 
of Buddhism but penetrated all the early schools, stimulating the 
growth of their different versions of the Abhidhamma… There are 
sound reasons for believing that the Pāli Abhidhamma Piṭaka 
contains one of the earliest forms of dhamma theory, perhaps even 
the oldest version.  
Karunadasa argues that whilst dharma theory is, strictly speaking, an Abhidharma 
innovation, the method of analysis present in early Buddhist scriptures demonstrates a clear link 
between the formative Buddhist investigations into the empirical world and the more developed 
dharma theories of the various Abhidharmas.  How then can this relation be traced?  Karunadasa 
thinks that the early Buddhist modes of investigation are mutually-dependent – a reasonable 
assumption given the Buddha’s famed emphasis on pratītyasamutpāda (dependent 
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origination).59  Further, Karunadasa holds that this interdependence can be divided into five 
modes of analysis that work something like this: first, analysis of nāmarūpa (1996: 3-4).  This is a 
dvandva compound that translates as name and form.60  It designates the two basic aspects of 
the empirical person: mental aspects (nāma) and physical aspects (rūpa) (1996: 3).  The second 
mode of analysis is that of the five skandhas,61 the third that of the six elements (dhatus),62 the 
fourth that of the twelve āyatanas (the six sense faculties and their corresponding objects),63 and 
the fifth that of the eighteen dhatus.  These are ‘an elaboration of the immediately preceding 
mode obtained by the addition of the six kinds of consciousness which arise from the contact 
between the sense organs and their objects’ (Karunadasa 1996: 4).  This laborious journey 
through the five modes of analysis is not in vain.  Karunadasa argues that the reasoning behind 
each mode of analysis varies, each preceding mode is further analysable by its succeeding mode 
(1996: 5).   This result, whether by design or by coincidence, is an endorsement of the principle 
of pratītyasamutpāda: ‘It is in fact with reference to these five kinds of analysis that Buddhism 
frames its fundamental doctrines.  The very fact that there are at least five kinds of analysis shows 
                                                        
59 Dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) is the thesis that all things are affected by innumerable causes and 
conditions and lack an ultimate, singular grounding start point.  This especially applies to the twelve nidānas that 
account for the causal relationship that produces (from the start point of avidyā (ignorance)) saṃsāra and so 
duḥkha.  In this sense, it is a fundamental Buddhist doctrine.   
60 A dvandva compound has the same meaning as a series of nouns followed by ca (‘and’), and so in this case, 
nāma rūpa ca; name form and; name and form. 
61 The five skandhas (Pāli: khandhas) are rūpa (body), vedanā (sensation), saṃjñā (conceptual thought), saṃskāra 
(mental formations; dispositions of character), and vijñāna (discernment; sense-based perception). 
62 These elements are said to be earth, water, temperature, air, space, and consciousness (Karunadasa 1996: 3). 
63 Predictably, the āyatanas are eyes-visible form; ears-sound; nose-smells; tongue-tastes; body-touch; mind-
mental objects. 
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that none of them can be taken as final or absolute’ [my emphasis] (1996: 4).  This is an important 
point.  Whereas Bhattacharya thinks that there is a final mode of analysis (one that results in 
knowledge of the impersonal ātman-Brahman), Karunadasa writes that the whole purpose of 
these modes of analysis in early Buddhism is to ‘prevent the intrusion of the notions of “mine,” 
“I,” and “my self” into what is otherwise an impersonal and egoless congeries of mental and 
physical phenomena’ (1996: 4).  This changes slightly, he notes, with the advent of the various 
Abhidharmas, at which point ‘the Abhidhammic doctrine of dhammas developed from an 
attempt to draw out the full implications of these five types of analysis’ (1996: 4-5).  At this point, 
the analysis of the world into dharmas is indeed seen as final, though there is still a doctrinal 
aversion to imputing a unitary transempirical reality.   
So far we can see both a difference and a similarity to Bhattacharya’s position.  First, 
Karunadasa forces the point that the analyses present in Buddhist literature prior to dharma 
theory cannot be final or absolute, for reasons that will be explained shortly.  Further, he 
eventually argues that ‘the Pāli Abhidhamma Pit ̣aka did not succumb to this error of conceiving 
the dhammas [dharmas] as ultimate entities or discrete entities’ (1996: 8), instead portraying 
dharmas as simple epistemic tools, the utility of which is in their being used to give accounts of 
specific instantiations of experience.  This point is strengthened by Noa Ronkin (and at some 
length) when she argues that for the early Abhidharmas at least, the svabhāva of dharmas was 
not thought of as essential in the way that Bhattacharya is using the word (Ronkin, 2005: 93).64  
                                                        
64 On this, Noa Ronkin (2005: 94) writes that 
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The consequence of this is that for the early Abhidharma at least, neither dharmas nor their 
svabhāva can reasonably be equated with ātman as essential nature.  Bhattacharya, as we have 
seen, characterises this ultimate impersonality as the svarūpa and svabhāva of all things.  If this 
impersonality is the svabhāva of dharmas, then the dharmas are essentially characterised by 
something that is ultimately existent.  Their reality is nothing else but the ātman-Brahman, which 
pervades and is the support of all existence.  Whilst Bhattacharya holds that the ātman-Brahman 
is ultimately beyond conceptualisation, then, he must nevertheless always hold that it is Real:  in 
fact, it is the only Reality.  We can ‘know’ that the ātman-Brahman is the fundamental reality – 
the Absolute – intellectually through scriptural direction and argument, but it takes something 
extra to know it through experience.  Śaṅkara calls this latter form of knowledge of the ātman-
Brahman ‘anubhava’ (self-experience).  It is, of course, the latter form of ‘knowledge’ that really 
counts – true self-knowledge (ātmabodha) is attained only through experience.  This same 
experience has to be directed by scripture in accordance with Śaṅkara’s emphasis on śruti – at 
least in the initial stages. 
The difference is that the Buddhists, it seems, do not want to make this a commitment to 
an unconditioned monistic first cause, and for good reason.  Karunadasa sketches the way in 
                                                        
[t]he Paṭisambhidāmagga endorses a broad notion of sabhāva as the nature 
that the dhammas essentially share, but it is by no means clear that this nature 
necessarily defines what a dhamma is, or that a dhamma exists by virtue of this 
nature that it possesses… Nowhere is it stated that a dhamma is defined, 
determined or exists by its sabhāva… 
By ‘essentially’ here, Ronkin is not referring to an ultimate, unconditioned essence.  Instead, she is referring to an 
individuating feature, something that serves to determine x entity from y entity.  This is clearly much more 
mundane than the sense in which Bhattacharya uses ‘essential’ when equating ātman, svabhāva, and svarūpa: in 
this sense, ‘essential’ points to the unconditioned ultimate principle that is responsible for all existence.  Such an 
account, thinks Ronkin, makes far too strong an ontological claim. 
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which svabhāva (Pāli: sabhāva) became associated with ultimacy (or ‘the highest’ (level of 
analysis); Pāli: paramattha, Skt.: paramārtha), writing that dharmas eventually came to be 
understood as ‘the final limits into which empirical existence can be analysed’ (1996: 19).  As the 
‘highest’ level of analysis, dharmas became associated with paramārtha, the implication being 
that ‘dhammas [Skt.: dharmas] are ultimate existents with no possibility of further reduction’ 
(1996: 19).  Karunadasa adds that it was from this point that ‘own-nature (sabhāva) [Skt.: 
svabhāva] came to be further defined as ultimate nature (paramattha-sabhāva)’ (1996: 19).  Can 
we equate this type of ultimate nature with that endorsed by Bhattacharya?  It appears as though 
there is some degree of convergence between the position of Bhattacharya and the Abhidharma 
position put forth by Karunadasa.  Bhattacharya wants to claim that the ultimate nature (what 
Karunadasa refers to in Pāli as the paramattha-sabhāva) of all dharmas is the impersonal 
unconditioned Absolute.  The ultimate nature of dharmas is the ātman-Brahman.  But how does 
this sit with Karunadasa’s account?  At first glance, there might be a similarity: Karunadasa 
explains that  
the mental as well as the material dhammas are not actually 
separable one from another.  In the case of the mental dhammas, 
the term used is saṁsaṭṭha (conjoined); in the case of the material 
dhammas, the term used is avinibbhoga (inseparable).  This raises 
the question why the dhammas are presented as a plurality.  
(1996: 24) 
There is more to this than meets the eye, however.  Karunadasa is quick to add that 
despite not being strictly separable, dharmas are nevertheless distinguishable.  The claim is not 
that dharmas are all essentially the same thing (viz. the impersonal ātman-Brahman), or even 
that they all originate from the same thing (again the ātman-Brahman).  It is simply that we can 
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tell what they are in relation to each other if we correctly analyse them.  Indeed, Karunadasa 
writes that ‘[i]t is this distinguishability that serves as the foundation of the dhamma theory’ 
(1996: 24).65  Also significant is that for the early Abhidharma systems, the dharmas are not 
strictly unconditioned, regardless of their ‘ultimate’ status.  They are viewed as ultimate very 
simply because the Ābhidharmikas thought that all analysis of experience stopped with them.  
They are foundational only insofar as analysis of experience bottoms out with them – this does 
not necessarily mean that they have to be assigned some sort of ontological primacy of the type 
that Bhattacharya is keen to impose.  In fact, the dharmas are indeed said to have conditioned 
origination (Pāli: sappaccatatā), and Karunadasa helpfully describes five axiomatic reasons why 
this is accepted to be the case.  All five of these reasons are relevant in one way or another to 
the current discussion, and so I shall quote Karunadasa’s explanations verbatim: 
(i) It is not empirically possible to identify an absolute original cause 
of the “dhammic” process.  Such a metaphysical conception is not 
in accord with Buddhism’s empirical doctrine of causality, the 
purpose of which is not to explain how the world began but to 
describe the uninterrupted continuity of the saṁsāric process 
whose absolute beginning is not conceivable.  In this connection it 
must also be remembered that as a system of philosophy the 
Abhidhamma is descriptive and not speculative. 
(ii) Nothing arises without the appropriate conditions necessary for 
its origination.  This rules out the theory of fortuitous origination 
(adhiccasamuppannavāda). 
(iii)  Nothing arises from a single cause.  This rules out theories of a 
single cause (ekakāraṇavāda).  Their rejection is of great 
significance, showing that the Abhidhammic view of existence 
rejects all monistic theories which seek to explain the origin of the 
                                                        
65 It is important for us to remember that the various dharma/dhamma theories are not prescriptive or 
speculative, but descriptive.  They do not aim to prescribe an account of the world, but to give a full analysis of the 
world as experienced. 
P a g e  | 76 
 
world from a single cause, whether this single cause is conceived as 
a personal God or an impersonal Godhead.  It also serves as a 
critique of those metaphysical theories which attempt to reduce 
the world of experience to an underlying transempirical principle. 
(iv) Nothing arises singly, as a solitary phenomenon.  Thus on the 
basis of a single cause or on the basis of a plurality of causes, a single 
effect does not arise.  The invariable situation is that there is always 
a plurality of effects.  It is on the rejection of the four views referred 
to above that the Abhidhammic doctrine of conditionality is 
founded. 
(v) From a plurality of conditions, a plurality of effects takes place.  
Applied to the dhamma theory, this means that a multiplicity of 
dhammas brings about a multiplicity of other dhammas. 
(Karunadasa, 1996: 25-26) 
It is easy to see why Bhattacharya chose not to rely on the intricacies of Abhidharmic 
Buddhism to bolster his theory.   On the above evidence, the Abhidharma system of analysis flatly 
denies that any monistic understanding is possible.  Despite dharmas being ultimately real (‘the 
ultimate, irreducible data of empirical existence’ (Karunadasa, 1996: 20)) they do not, according 
to the early Ābhidharmikas, share the same intrinsic nature in the way that Bhattacharya would 
need them to.  Bhattacharya claims that the true nature of all dharmas is their insubstantial 
impersonality – he equates this with what Nāgārjuna calls śūnyatā (emptiness).  But we need to 
be careful about how we characterise this impersonality.  For the Ābhidharmikas, each dharma 
simply is its intrinsic nature.  This means in turn that each dharma – in virtue of being 
distinguishable – has a distinct nature that serves to distinguish it as x dharma as opposed to y 
dharma rather than simply having the ātman-Brahman as their nature.  For somebody like 
Nāgārjuna, the difference is even starker.  He does not agree with the Ābhidharmikas that each 
dharma has an (or is its) intrinsic nature precisely because he believes that nothing possesses (or 
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‘is’) an intrinsic nature to begin with.  Further, he does not think that ultimately real dharmas can 
be conditioned or arise from causes and conditions in the way that Karunadasa outlines above.  
Indeed, the very first chapter of the MMK is an attack on the notion of dharmas 
possessing (or being) intrinsic natures (Skt.: svabhāva, Pāli: sabhāva) whilst also being subject to 
causes and conditions.  The basic idea is that dharmas (and so svabhāva) cannot be ultimate 
entities and also be reliant on causes and conditions for their existence because this would 
necessitate some sort of change in that dharma.  If dharmas are equivalent with their intrinsic 
natures, then change is impossible.66  Karunadasa writes, ‘to claim that [a dharma’s] intrinsic 
nature undergoes modification is to deny its very existence’ (1996: 21):  an obvious issue. 
                                                        
66 See all of MMK 1 for the totality of this argument.  This particular point is perhaps made most forcefully between 
MMK 1.6-10: 
naivāsato naiva sataḥ pratyayo ‘rthasya yujyate / 
asataḥ pratyayaḥ kasya sataś ca pratyayena kim //6// 
na san nāsan na sadasan dharmo nirvatate yadā / 
kathaṃ nirvatako betur evaṃ sati hi yujyate //7// 
anārambaṇa evāyaṃ san dharma upadiśyate / 
anthānārambaṇe dharme kuta ārambaṇaṃ punaḥ //8// 
anutpanneṣu dharmeṣu nirodho nopapadyate / 
nānantaram ato yuktaṃ niruddhe pratyayaś ca kaḥ //9// 
bhāvānāṃ niḥsvabhāvānāṃ na sattā vidyante yataḥ / 
satīdam asmin bhavatīty etan naivopapadyate //10// 
A condition of an effect that is existent or non-existent is not accepted / 
Of what [use] are conditions for nonexistents? And for whom [is there use in] 
conditions for existents? //6// 
When no dharma operates that is existent, nonexistent or both existent and nonexistent / 
How in this case can [something be called] an operative cause (nirvatakahetu)? //7// 
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Karunadasa tells us that dharmas appear in clusters: ‘a psychic instance can never occur 
with less than eight constituents, i.e. consciousness and its seven invariable concomitants’ (1996: 
26).  He adds that the relation between the different dharmas in a cluster is ‘one of necessary 
conascence’ (Pāli: niyata-sahajāta; being born or originated together/at the same time) as part 
of ‘a complex correlational system’: the implication of this is that there are no singular, solitary 
phenomena (1996: 26). 
What Karunadasa has outlined is an awkward though not strictly paradoxical position – 
the claim appears to be that dharmas are at once both inseparable (and so unitary) and also 
distinguishable (and so a plurality).  This simply does not work for Bhattacharya if dharmas are 
ultimate existents sharing the same ultimate nature (viz. the ātman-Brahman), and it is likely that 
this tension influenced his dismissal of Abhidharma doctrine; he instead claims that it was the 
Mahāyāna that eventually ‘put things right’ (2015: 39) with the doctrine of emptiness.  This is a 
position that he interprets as stating that the world is composed of entities that share the same 
impersonal nature: that of a transcendent ātman-Brahman. 
Bhattacharya refers to the Buddha’s seeing all dharmas and recognising their 
impersonality as true knowledge of ātman-Brahman.  Bhattacharya agrees in principle with the 
                                                        
It has been taught that dharmas [existents] have no objective support / 
But [where there is] no objective support, again, why [posit] an objective support? //8//   
When dharmas are unproduced [by conditions], cessation does not occur / 
When [a dharma has] ceased, what [is a] condition? Thus, a direct condition is not suitable. //9// 
Since things without intrinsic nature are not [ultimately] existent / 
‘This existing, that comes to be’ does not obtain. //10// 
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Buddha that all dharmas are insubstantial/impersonal: he cites the Buddha’s 
sarvadharmanairātmyaparapāramiprāptaḥ – his perfect intuition of the insubstantiality of all 
dharmas – as evidence of the Buddha’s enlightenment.  For Bhattacharya, this enlightenment is, 
of course, in full agreement with Advaitin doctrine, at least where the ultimate impersonality of 
all (conventionally) existent things is concerned (Bhattacharya, 2015: 4-5). 
Second, there is some similarity between Karunadasa’s account and Bhattacharya’s 
argument: ultimately, the ātman-Brahman is impersonal and is devoid of dualistic notions such 
as ‘self’ and ‘other’, of ‘me’ or of ‘you’.  I suspect, then, that Bhattacharya would take 
Karunadasa’s argument about the Buddhist modes of analysis and drive the point that whilst they 
go about things in a slightly different way (viz. in aiming to buttress introspection against ideas 
of self rather than examining and gaining knowledge of the self), the final result is identical.  The 
culmination of both Buddhist and Advaitin efforts is, for Bhattacharya, arrival at knowledge of 
and experience of an egoless, pure (lacking defilements), unconditioned Absolute.   
Bhattacharya endorses the position that this incorporeal ātman is at once impersonal and 
Absolute, and holds that ‘to know the ātman-Brahman is, in effect, to become it…as long as we 
do nothing but conceive of it, we are far from knowing it’ (2015: 7-8).  It is here that we really see 
how realising impersonality/no-self can aid our achievement of realising the true self, the ātman-
Brahman: the point is to become the ātman-Brahman and thus remove the subject-object 
dualism that blights our day-to-day life.  He writes that failing to become the ātman-Brahman, 
and persisting to merely conceive of it, or assign attributes to the concept of it means that ‘…the 
ātman, the Self, remains an object to us, and, therefore, a non-Self’ (2015: 8).  The use of ‘non-
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self’ here is slightly subtler than previous usages, and it is determining the instance in which the 
actual ātman can be misapprehended rather than determining instances in which entirely the 
wrong things are taken as ātman.  It is as thought the practitioner is on the right tracks, but has, 
in holding onto a preconceived notion of the ātman-Brahman, scuppered their chances of 
actually realising it.  The very act of loading the ātman-Brahman with conceptual constructions 
detracts from its actual status as Absolute, corrupts the mind pursuing it and makes it anātman, 
a non-self in the most basic form of the expression.  The ātman-Brahman is supposed to be 
necessarily inexpressible in positive terms because it is beyond linguistic designation.  This is, at 
least, the view of Śaṅkara’s Advaita.  It is in one sense useful to conceive of the ātman-Brahman 
in the early stages of spiritual development – it is probably even necessary if the diligent 
practitioner wishes to arrive at it in the proper way (why would practitioners bother to devote 
themselves to realising something that has no positive impact?) – but it is simply not enough on 
its own, and continuing to ‘see’ it in this manner is to miss out on it altogether.  
Bhattacharya explains that ‘[a]ll truths as can be formulated are, in fact, but 
approximations of Truth, which is inexpressible; none of them can be identified with Truth itself’ 
(2015: 9).  ‘Truth’ in this context is synonymous with ‘Absolute’ or ‘ultimate’, or, unsurprisingly, 
ātman: only the ātman-Brahman is ‘Truth’ per se, as it is the totality of Being.  Bhattacharya, in a 
passage that would not be out of place in any Madhyamaka textbook, says of approximate truths 
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that ‘[t]hey aid us in reaching [ultimate Truth], they guide our progress towards it; but they must 
be transcended if it is to be reached’ (2015: 9).67   
In any case, successfully reaching this state of Being and becoming the ātman-Brahman 
is, for Bhattacharya, synonymous with the Buddhist goal of reaching nirvāṇa (2015: 11).  
Liberation is to see the emptiness of phenomena; it is their impersonality.  This is why 
Bhattacharya must reject Abhidharmic dharma theory and try to embrace (a version of) 
Nāgārjuna’s vision of śūnyatā.  If many svabhāvas exist, then Bhattacharya’s thesis fails, for all 
existence has but one intrinsic nature: the impersonal ātman-Brahman.  This is fundamental.  It 
is the ‘most profound spiritual reality’ in which one can dwell, as the ‘ātman is the ultimate 
Reality upon which the empirical world is founded’ (2015: 12), or in other words, it is the ultimate 
that provides the basis for the conventional.  For Śaṅkara, ‘the entire expanse of [empirical] 
things is mere illusion’ and not ultimately real: only Brahman is ultimately real (Śaṅkara, 2009: 
138). 
2.3 An Early Buddhist Rejection of Brahman? 
We know that the concept of anātman (Pāli: anattā) is now synonymous with Buddhism 
and that it in principle rejects the idea of any persistent ātman.  We also know that Bhattacharya 
thinks that the real purpose of the Buddhist doctrine of anātman is to deny a specific type of 
ātman and not to deny the ātman in toto:  Bhattacharya, as we have seen, makes the argument 
                                                        
67 The use of ‘truth’ (small ‘t’) and ‘Truth (capital ‘T’) here is significant and is reminiscent of (though not identical 
with) Madhyamaka discussion of conventional and ultimate (truth; reality).  Bhattacharya is splitting the world into 
two levels here: that of ‘truth’, a conventional designation that is but an inferior approximation of the ultimate 
‘Truth’, which is inexpressible yet able to be experienced. 
P a g e  | 82 
 
that the type of ātman rejected is only the empirical jīva and not the reality behind it, the ātman-
Brahman.  Thus, anātman only applies to things that a person mistakenly takes to be ātman: the 
things that we wrongly invest in as parts of ourselves are anātman, whereas the true ātman is 
the ātman-Brahman.  Such an understanding trades on the early Buddhist literature specifying 
that which cannot be ātman (namely anything that comes under the remit of the skandhas) 
rather than denying ātman outright.  Alexander Wynne writes of this general approach that ‘the 
five aggregates are impermanent, subject to change and so unsuitable to be regarded as one’s 
ātman’ (2009: 61).68  Wynne agrees with Bhattacharya when he notes that much of the earliest 
Buddhist discourse regarding ātman does, in fact, tell us where not to look rather than proscribing 
searching per se.  Citing from numerous Buddhist sources including the Catuṣpariṣat Sūtra of the 
Mūlasarvāstivāda (2009: 60), the Māhavastu of the Mahāsāṃghika (2009: 60-61), and the 
Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta (2009: 63) to illustrate the focus of the early Buddhist texts, Wynne 
shows that it does indeed look to be the case that the very earliest Buddhist scripture concerns 
itself only with refuting ātman in specific circumstances, viz. a denial of ātman ‘focused on the 
lack of ‘self’ in the five aggregates’ (2009: 63). 
 
                                                        
68 The idea lurking in the background is then, I suppose, that something that is suitable to be regarded as one’s 
ātman is eternal and unchanging – Bhattacharya capitalises on this possibility to argue that the ātman-Brahman of 
Advaita thus fulfils the requirement to be considered as one’s true ātman.  
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There is at least one sutta that can be read as a denial of the notion of an ātman-Brahman, 
however.  Take the following extracts from Majjhima Nikāya 49 (Brahmanimantanika Sutta):69   
The Blessed One said: "On one occasion recently I was staying in 
Ukkattha in the Subhaga forest at the root of a royal sala tree. Now 
on that occasion an evil [pernicious] viewpoint70 had arisen to Baka-
Brahma: 'This is constant. This is permanent. This is eternal. This is 
total. This is not subject to falling away — for this does not take 
birth, does not age, does not die, does not fall away, does not 
reappear.  And there is no other, higher escape.' 
The Buddha continues: 
"When this was said, Baka Brahma told me, 'But, good sir, what is 
actually constant I call "constant." What is actually permanent I call 
"permanent." What is actually eternal I call "eternal." What is 
actually total I call "total." What is actually not subject to falling 
away I call "not subject to falling away." Where one does not take 
birth, age, die, fall away, or reappear, I say, "For this does not take 
birth, does not age, does not die, does not fall away, does not 
reappear." And there being no other, higher escape, I say, "There is 
no other, higher escape." 
Some unpacking is required here.  First, we see the Buddha outline the ‘pernicious 
viewpoint’ held by Baka-Brahmā, a powerful deity that believes that he has seen the universe 
how it really is.  It is important to note that Baka-Brahmā does not seem to be accounting for an 
empirical world in purely physical terms.  He is, in fact, referring to the ‘world’ (read: cosmos) as 
instantiated in and by himself as heavenly king, on both a material and psychological level.  Baka-
                                                        
69 For the sake of convenience, I here use Thanissaro Bhikkhu’s (2007) translation of this sutta from the Pāli. 
70 I prefer ‘pernicious viewpoint’ to ‘evil viewpoint’ because it adequately communicates that the viewpoint has 
damaging consequences for those that hold it without passing any undue moral judgement.  I think calling such a 
viewpoint ‘evil’ is rather to overstate the case.  One can hold a mistaken, damaging viewpoint without it being 
‘evil’, after all! 
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Brahmā is effectively claiming that he and/or the world that he inhabits is the eternal true reality.  
This is explained by Ajahn Brahm (2006) a couple of minutes into his audio commentary to the 
sutta, when he details that Baka-Brahmā thinks of himself as a creator of an eternal, unchanging 
(and so ultimate) reality.71   
There is a very significant line contained in the above extract; namely where Baka-Brahmā 
talks about ‘[w]here one does not take birth, age, die, fall away, or reappear’.  A realm or entity 
where one is not born, does not age, does not die, fall away or suffer rebirth: this sounds 
suspiciously like the Brahman as discussed in the Upaniṣads and as later expounded in the ātman-
Brahman doctrine of the Advaitins. I think that the presence of these few words is evidence 
enough of the targets that the Buddha had in mind: Brahmins.  Consequently, I think that a case 
can be made that this sutta provides early evidence of a Buddhist rejection of the ātman-
Brahman, a case that is significant in terms of Bhattacharya’s argument because it is found in the 
Pāli literature traditionally ascribed to the Buddha.  As we have seen, Bhattacharya claims that 
the Buddha did not ever explicitly comment on the ātman-Brahman.  Perhaps this is an allegorical 
comment on precisely that. 
Nevertheless, Baka-Brahmā’s most crucial claim is that liberation cannot be found outside 
of the definition of the world that he has offered, that there is nothing higher than his account 
of the totality of existence.  This is a claim that would be advanced at a later time by Śaṅkara, and 
is emphatically advanced by Bhattacharya when he writes that ‘[o]ne who has realized the ātman 
                                                        
71 Thanissaro Bhikkhu (2007: note 1) also writes in a footnote that ‘Baka Brahma here appears to be referring both 
to his Brahma world and to the state of mind that enables one to inhabit his Brahma world.’ 
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is not outside the world, but he looks upon the world with new eyes’ (2015: 13).  Bhattacharya is 
making Baka-Brahmā’s point for him – liberation consists in looking upon the permanent, the 
eternal with ‘new eyes’.  Liberation is to be realised in this world, but also in and as a specific 
vision of this world: in Advaitin terms, in a world supported by the ātman-Brahman.  I contend 
that Baka-Brahmā’s words here place him in such a world, and more, they show that he is actively 
advancing this thesis.  Baka-Brahmā’s arrogance and certainty lead him to dismiss the Buddha as 
just another mediocre ascetic, doomed to spend life under the influence and command of Baka-
Brahmā.72  However, the Buddha quickly establishes himself as fully awakened and thus not 
simply equal to, but actually superior to Baka-Brahmā as regards knowledge of liberation.  The 
Buddha informs Baka-Brahmā that he is ignorant of some spheres of existence outside of his own 
realm – a consequence of having spent too long dwelling in one place, an instance of avidyā made 
manifest by Baka-Brahmā’s reluctance to think beyond himself.  Such realms are not physical 
realms, they are deva realms and are thus made by mental activity (manomaya), which need not 
necessarily imply anything ontologically, viz. that they enjoy some substantial existence.73  Such 
                                                        
72 From the Brahmanimantanika Sutta translated by Thanissaro Bhikkhu (2007): 
'There were, monk, before your time, brahmans & contemplatives in the world 
whose ascetic practice lasted as long as your entire life span. They knew, when 
there was another, higher escape, that there was another, higher escape; or, 
when there was no other, higher escape, that there was no other, higher 
escape. So I tell you, monk, both that you will not find another, higher escape, 
and that, to that extent, you will reap your share of trouble & weariness. Monk, 
if you relish earth, you will lie close to me, lie within my domain, for me to 
banish and to do with as I like. If you relish liquid ... fire ... wind ... beings ... 
devas ... Pajapati ... brahma, you will lie close to me, lie within my domain, for 
me to banish and to do with as I like.’ 
73 Jayarava Attwood (2014) writes convincingly both on why the favoured interpretation ought to be ‘made by 
mental activity’ as opposed to something like ‘made of mind’ (implying that ‘mind’ is some sort of substance from 
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realms are, then, meditative realms, made by mental activity (they are attained via what are 
called jhānas in Pāli (Skt.: dhyānas) – meditative states).  The implication is that the Buddha has 
a more powerful mind, more thoroughgoing insight than Baka-Brahmā.  Despite Baka-Brahmā’s 
protestations, it becomes evident that the Buddha knows more than Baka-Brahmā, and so is his 
superior: 
There is, brahma, the body named Subhakinha (Beautiful 
Black/Refulgent Glory) ... the body named Vehapphala (Sky-
fruit/Great Fruit), {the body named Abhibhu (Conqueror)} which 
you don't know, don't see, but that I know, I see. Thus I am not your 
                                                        
which things can be built), and also on why we ought not to take such discussions to be an assertion of substantial 
existence.  This position is not shared by scholars such as Donald Swearer (1973: 448), who instead opines that 
the ethical and the ontic are definitely related in term mind, that is, the mind 
appears as the center point. It has, as it were, the power to create the "self." 
The ethical dimension stems from this fact. If the mind is ignorant and impure, 
one will suffer; if, on the other hand, the mind is enlightened and pure, one will 
attain happiness. 
It is not immediately clear, however, that a construction of ‘self’ does indeed carry any serious ontological weight.  
We can say that the mind can (and does) ‘create’ narratives – even if these narratives are ultimately false – and yet 
it is a jump to assert any ontological significance to this creation of mind.  Such creations do not appear to 
necessitate any substantial existence at all.  Instead, we simply have a concept entertained in mind under which no 
real entity falls.  In the same way that a deranged person might think that they are able to float through the air, a 
deluded person thinks they have (or are) an ātman.  Both are mistaken designations, false attributions.  Indeed, 
the entire Buddhist project rests on the rejection of ātman!  It strikes me that Swearer’s view runs closely to that 
of the ancient pudgalavādins – Buddhists that accepted the substantial reality of a ‘person’ or form of ‘self’.  His 
reasons for his train of thought are, he says, from the Dhammapada.  He cites it thus (1973: 448): 
Mind is the forerunner of (all evil) states. Mind is chief; mind-made are 
If one speaks or acts with wicked mind, because of that, suffering follows 
even as the wheel follows the hoof of the draught-ox. 
Mind is the forerunner of (all good) states. Mind is chief; mind-made are 
they. If one speaks or acts with pure mind, because of that, happiness follows 
one, even as one's shadow that never leaves. 
It is easy enough to see from where Swearer draws his conclusions.  Good states are ‘mind made’, and acting with 
‘pure mind’ brings about these good states.  Is the claim here really that our mind changes the makeup of the 
world, or is it instead that our mindset changes how we engage with the world?  In light of my argumentation 
throughout this work, I am more inclined to think that the latter applies. 
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mere equal in terms of direct knowing, so how could I be your 
inferior? I am actually superior to you. 
Having directly known earth as earth, and having directly known the 
extent of what has not been experienced through the earthness of 
earth, I wasn't earth, I wasn't in earth, I wasn't coming from earth, 
I wasn't "Earth is mine." I didn't affirm earth. Thus I am not your 
mere equal in terms of direct knowing, so how could I be inferior? I 
am actually superior to you. 
Again, there are a few things to unpack here.  First, the Buddha lists the ‘bodies’ that are 
experienced via the jhānas: a jhāna being, of course, a meditative state and thus implying no 
ontological substance.  The premise here is, as I have said, simply that the Buddha knows more 
than Baka-Brahmā, a supposed great, powerful deity.  The Buddha is illustrating that despite 
Baka-Brahmā’s claims to the contrary, there is some release or liberation different from and 
outside of – higher than – this Brahmā realm (the ātman-Brahman?).  Such release is to be found 
via meditative insight, and it is outside of this realm not insofar as it is an existent place to which 
we can go, but rather in that it is a meditative state beyond Baka-Brahmā’s comprehension or 
ability.  In virtue of being existent as meditative states beyond Baka-Brahmā’s comprehension, 
such realms are ‘higher’ than the account of existence offered by Baka-Brahmā.  This in turn 
means that there is at least the possibility of some ‘higher escape’ provided that sufficient insight 
is developed.  Swearer (1973: 447) writes that ‘[t]hrough attaining the four jhānas the 
consciousness or mind (citta) is made pure (parisuddha), freed from blemish, devoid of evil 
(kilesa), stable and immovable. The citta is thereby freed to direct itself toward the "insight that 
comes from knowledge."’  In other words, the mind is directed not onto worldly concerns or 
reifications, but onto and into itself to develop an insight not to be found in worldly reifications.  
If I am right in linking the cosmic world occupied by Baka-Brahmā to the Brahman, then it strikes 
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me that the Buddha’s insight cannot be related to some sort of cosmic self (because he has 
denied all that Baka-Brahmā has asserted of it).  Nor can it be related to the individual ātman, 
which even Bhattacharya acknowledges was denied by the Buddha.  Maybe it is the case, then, 
that the higher insight alluded to by the Buddha is actually anātman, tying in with the Buddha’s 
denial that what I take to be a metaphor for the Brahman is permanent: 
"When this was said, I told Baka Brahma, 'How immersed in 
ignorance is Baka Brahma! How immersed in ignorance is Baka 
Brahma!  — in that what is actually inconstant he calls "constant." 
What is actually impermanent he calls "permanent." What is 
actually non-eternal he calls "eternal." What is actually partial he 
calls "total." What is actually subject to falling away he calls "not 
subject to falling away." Where one takes birth, ages, dies, falls 
away, and reappears, he says, "For here one does not take birth, 
does not age, does not die, does not fall away, does not reappear." 
And there being another, higher escape, he says, "There is no other, 
higher escape."' 
Even the great creator deity Baka-Brahmā is so tied up in his own sense of self (and self-
importance!) that he has effectively led himself to delusion and ignorance regarding the world.   
There are mental realms potentially open to him that he is ignorant of and that he lacks the 
discipline or insight to access.  There is thus a ‘higher escape’, but he is too self-absorbed to 
recognise it.  There is no permanence to be found in that which he asserts to be the basis of 
reality, nor is there any refuge to be found in the reality in which Baka-Brahmā claims does not 
age, die, ‘fall away’ and so on.  He dwells in this reality as the jīva might be said to dwell within 
the universal ātman-Brahman, that is to say labouring under delusion.  Far from being liberated 
by his knowledge of and living within what he assumes to be the totality of existence, Baka-
Brahmā has in fact contributed to his own trapping in duḥkha by attributing to his reality all of 
the things that it is not! 
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If this sutta is not intended to have parallels with the Vedic conception of Brahman, I 
would be very surprised indeed.  Should my interpretation hold some water, then this is an early 
example of the Buddhist rejection of a cosmic Brahman: the Buddha rebukes Baka-Brahmā for 
his assertion that his realm (which I understand to be analogous to the ‘realm’ of Brahman) is 
permanent, the highest, and the full totality of existence.  The most telling aspect here is that the 
Buddha does not make explicit reference to an ātman-Brahman type realm that is superior to 
that realm of Baka-Brahmā.  He instead talks of imposing permanence and so on to what is not 
permanent, and by extension must refute the idea that the mindset required to ‘enter’ Baka-
Brahmā’s realm is the highest mindset that one might achieve.  This is, I contend, not because 
the Buddha believes that there exists some ātman-Brahman that accounts for the totality of 
existence, but because the Buddha believes the converse.  I point briefly to an extract from the 
Mūlapariyāya Sutta as translated by Thanissaro Bhikkhu (1998): 
He directly knows Unbinding as Unbinding. Directly knowing 
Unbinding as Unbinding, he does not conceive things about 
Unbinding, does not conceive things in Unbinding, does not 
conceive things coming out of Unbinding, does not conceive 
Unbinding as 'mine,' does not delight in Unbinding. Why is that? 
Because the Tathagata has comprehended it to the end, I tell you. 
‘Unbinding’ can here be understood as ‘nirvāṇa’ and so ‘liberation’:  the Buddha denies 
that anything at all comes from the liberated state.  This is interesting because for Bhattacharya 
as an Advaitin, ‘liberation’ comes in knowing the ātman-Brahman, and that same ātman-
Brahman is, as we have seen, both the material and efficient cause of the universe.  In other 
words, things appear to ‘come out of’ the ātman-Brahman (despite this appearance being 
ultimately false), and the ātman-Brahman is immanent in all things as their essential reality.  The 
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Buddha here appears to reject the idea that being is tied up in or owes its existence to some 
other cosmic being.  Although the sutta in question is strictly an argument against Sāṃkhya 
philosophy, the general thrust can be deployed against Advaita.  Thanissaro Bhikkhu (1998) 
writes that 
there has long been — and still is — a common tendency to create 
a "Buddhist" metaphysics in which the experience of emptiness, the 
Unconditioned, the Dharma-body, Buddha-nature, rigpa, etc., is 
said to function as the ground of being from which the "All" — the 
entirety of our sensory & mental experience — is said to spring and 
to which we return when we meditate. 
This does indeed seem to sum up Bhattacharya’s project!  In equating śūnyatā with the 
‘ground of being from which the All. . . is said to spring’,74 Bhattacharya, Murti et al are building 
a Buddhist metaphysics, one that leads to the ātman-Brahman.  Thanissaro Bhikkhu (1998) signs 
off his commentary by simply noting that ‘[a]ny teaching that follows these lines would be subject 
to the same criticism that the Buddha directed against the monks who first heard this discourse.’  
This is simply to say that any attempts at reification of experience into some sort of cosmic self 
are at odds with the positions defended by the Buddha in the above extracts.  I think that we can 
reasonably read into the above an early rejection of Brahman and so a preliminary rejection of 
the thesis that the Buddha actually endorsed the ātman-Brahman.  If my readings are a fair 
reflection of the content, then we have two early examples of the Buddhist aversion to 
absolutism in any sense, not just in the narrow sense of the jīva: to equate the Buddhist liberation 
with that of the Advaitins is to further impose ideas onto reality.  Even if we want to say that 
                                                        
74 The ‘All’ simply being the totality of experience and experienced phenomena. 
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these ideas are true only conventionally (and thus not true in an ultimate sense), there remains 
one idea of an ultimate ground of being.  Such an idea should, on the accounts given above, be 
absent from any Buddhist understanding of the world. 
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§3: The Ātman-Brahman 
In order to assess whether or not the Upaniṣadic ātman-Brahman is compatible with 
Buddhist thought, we need first to situate it, in general terms, in its ‘natural’ place.  For his part, 
Bhattacharya provides a plethora of citations relating to what the Absolute ātman-Brahman is 
from his Śaṅkaran perspective, though continually acknowledging that no positive statement can 
ultimately be predicated of it.  As it forms the entirety of Bhattacharya’s argument, I will first 
focus on the ātman within Advaitic interpretations of the Upaniṣads.75  From there, I will examine 
how knowledge of the ātman-Brahman – and knowledge of the ultimate more generally – might 
work.  From Bhattacharya’s perspective, then, the ātman-Brahman is  
…not the chariot (ratha), but the “master of the chariot” (rathin),76 
its “inciter” (pracodayitṛ).  Even though it moves in all bodies 
(pratiśarīreṣu carati), it “rests in its own greatness” (sve mahimni 
tiṣṭhati), above phenomena (uparistha), not subject to their contact 
“like a drop of water on a lotus petal” (bindur iva puṣkare).  It is 
eternally pure (śuddha), peaceful (śānta), without individuality 
(nirātman)…, “empty” (śūnya).  It is what makes us act (kārayitṛ), 
but does not act itself (akartṛ).  Being “in-itself” (svastha), it is “as a 
spectator” (prekṣakavat) of our acts, good and bad, which do not 
affect it at all (sitāsitaiḥ karmaphalair anabhibhūtaḥ).  
(Bhattacharya, 2015: 29) 
                                                        
75 It is obvious to any reader that Bhattacharya favours the Śaṅkaran rendering of Vedānta over and above that of 
other Vedāntin schools, and consequently, he tends to rely upon the Śaṅkaran rendering of the Upaniṣads, too. 
76 The point here is that whilst the body is the chariot, the ātman sits beyond even the intellect, which is the 
charioteer piloting the chariot, and the mind, which is the reins.  The ātman is thus the ‘master’ or ‘lord’ of the 
chariot but does not – in theory – have a direct hand in the control of the chariot. 
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Considering that the ātman-Brahman is beyond both conceptual thought and linguistic 
designation, both Bhattacharya and the Upaniṣads that he quotes certainly have a lot to say 
about it!  Nevertheless, his descriptions do appear to accord with how the ātman-Brahman is 
represented in the Upaniṣads, particularly in part III of the Aitareya Upaniṣad.  There is some 
incongruence, however, between the ‘spectator’ that is ‘without individuality’ and the notion 
that, as Bhattacharya claims, the ātman-Brahman is the lord of the chariot but simultaneously is 
a step removed from action.  In fact, Bhattacharya claims that the ātman is ‘what makes us act 
(kārayitṛ), but does not act itself (akartṛ)’ (2015: 29).  In the case of the chariot as described in 
the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, then, the ātman is present, and makes the charioteer – the intellect – act, 
but it does this without acting itself.  Precisely how a lord might impel his charioteer to act 
without first acting himself is, it seems to me, something of a mystery.  Perhaps the comparison 
is simply a poor one.  Even if the ātman simply bestows a propensity upon the intellect to act in 
a certain way, I think that we would have to concede that this is a causal action, albeit in a 
relatively weak sense.   
Such examples also presuppose a duality between the acting agent (the charioteer) and 
the lord that causes the agent to act (the ātman-Brahman).  According to Advaitin doctrine, in 
ultimate terms this duality simply cannot stand.  The example is, then, necessarily flawed and 
paradoxical, though the Advaitin would argue that this is because we do not have access to the 
Olympian point of view that we occupy subsequent to the enjoyment of the knowledge of the 
ātman-Brahman.  Anything we say about the ātman-Brahman is problematic because its reality 
transcends all that can be said of it.  We cannot capture it in words; we can only offer 
unsatisfactory approximations.  This notion is, of course, not new to anybody that is familiar with 
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apophaticism and mysticism more generally.  We saw in §1 that this type of thought dominates 
religious mysticism of every kind.  It can be claimed then that, assuming the Śaṅkaran 
interpretation of the Upaniṣads is correct, there is no real problem with our being unable to 
accurately account for the ātman-Brahman through language: ultimately, language is irrelevant 
to the experience, and it is after all the experience that is important.  This is relatively 
controversial.77 
Another compounding factor arises later in the same Upaniṣad when it is claimed that 
this same ātman is ‘beyond time, space, and causality, eternal, Immutable’ (Kaṭha Upaniṣad 
I:3:15).  We might question how anything can be attributed to the ātman if it is beyond causality 
and beyond linguistic attributions, much less how we can thank it for the creation of the cosmos!  
This of course is the point for the Advaitin: we cannot really say anything about the Brahman.  It 
is ultimately beyond all linguistic designations, all worldly attributes, and all characterisation.  It 
seems unsatisfying to claim that conventionally, we can talk about the ātman-Brahman in such 
terms, but then say that ultimately they do not apply.  Nevertheless, this sort of tension is 
common throughout the Upaniṣads.  It is a point that we will revisit repeatedly as we progress 
through this work.   
 
                                                        
77 David Burton (2001: 64) rails against this sort of understanding of mystical experiences, writing that it seems to 
him to be incoherent to claim ‘knowledge’ of something that is inexpressible or non-conceptual.  He argues that if 
there truly were non-conceptual experiences (during which one cannot discriminate or discern), then they should 
be contentless.  The upshot of their being contentless would be that the mystic should not be able to claim that 
they recall the experience whatsoever, let alone have ‘knowledge’ of it. That mystics (including Śaṅkara) do claim 
to have a knowledge of and recalled experience of such mystical episodes suggests, claims Burton, that the 
experience itself involved some degree of discrimination and thus some sort of conceptualisation.   
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The Kaṭha Upaniṣad continues:  
yad idaṃ kin͂ca jagat sarvaṃ prāṇa ejati niḥsṛtam / 
mahad bhayaṃ vajram udyataṃ ya etad vidur amṛtās te bhavanti //2// 
 
All the universe emanates from Brahman [prāṇa; breath of life] 
and moves [in Brahman] / 
[That Brahman] causes great fear, like a poised thunderbolt. Those 
that know this [Brahman] become immortal //2// 
(Kaṭha Upaniṣad, II:3:2) 
Again, we see here that the ātman-Brahman is assigned some causal power.  The universe 
could not emanate from the Brahman’s ‘breath of life’ if there were no means by which the 
ātman-Brahman could exercise this power of creation.  Of course, we must take into account the 
use of figurative language to explain these apparent incongruities.  Personification of the 
Absolute and the assignation of attributes and abilities to it is something that we encounter in 
religious texts of all descriptions.  Bhattacharya would likely argue that this does not detract from 
the overarching message that ultimately, the ātman-Brahman is impersonal, ultimately, the 
ātman-Brahman is inactive, and ultimately, the ātman-Brahman is beyond categorisation: the 
language referring to the ātman-Brahman is then simply a conventional designation; a 
storytelling tool designed to make focused introspection seem attractive and worthwhile.   
All that the assignation of positive attributes and personification really serve to do, then, 
is remind practitioners of the splendour of their religious path and provide a sort of figurehead 
to which they may relate.  Such devices are specifically designed to illustrate why meditating to 
discover the ātman-Brahman is worth the effort.  Indeed, Albahari is at pains to explain that 
attaching such (other) worldly qualities to something that is ultimately beyond such designations 
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is, in fact, an exercise designed to ‘function pragmatically to orient the mind towards the Real, 
by “affirming essential qualities that are really only denials of their opposites”’ (2002: 9).  
Albahari’s suggestion finds endorsement from both Anantanand Rambachan when he writes that 
‘[t]he translation of ānanda as “bliss” is useful for emphasizing the desirability of brahman and 
the celebrative and joyful meaning of liberation’ (Rambachan, 2006: 21), and by Bhattacharya 
when he equates the empirical (in distinction to the transcendent) pursuit of Brahman as the 
attempt to attain a ‘vision of Plenitude’ that ‘is called ānanda “Bliss”’ (2015: 10).78   
One might also ask why Śaṅkara – having realised that the ātman-Brahman is ultimately 
beyond attribution and transcendent of all notions of deity – still deigned to build temples to 
popular deities (as well as compose hymns to these same deities) and advocate the worship of a 
personal God.79  Unsurprisingly, says Biderman, the primary reason for Śaṅkara’s even referring 
to a ‘God’ or ‘Lord’ (Īśvara) in this sense is to see God as directly relating to the world ‘both as 
the first cause of the world and as an object of devotion’ (1982: 246).  If the ātman-Brahman 
(nirguṇa Brahman) is transcendent and ultimately ineffable, then by contrast, Śaṅkara’s 
conception of Īśvara is – as Deutsch remarks – ‘that about which something can be said’ (Deutsch, 
1969: 12).  What is the significance of this?  We have noted that on the surface of things, there 
                                                        
78 Rambachan, it should be noted, explicitly acknowledges that the ātman-Brahman cannot actually be 
characterised as ‘bliss’ because this contradicts the fundamental Upaniṣadic teaching that the ātman-Brahman is 
‘timeless and present in all states and mental conditions’ (2006: 21).  He suggests equating the term ānanda with 
‘limitlessness’ and reading it as a description of the nature of ātman rather than a description of an attribute.  Of 
course, one might wonder whether a description of a nature is not simply a description of an attribute (or a set of 
attributes) and so be tempted to dismiss this semantic wrangling as little more than wordplay.  
79 As Biderman helpfully notes, Śaṅkara’s repeated contrasting of Īśvara (saguṇa brahman: Brahman with qualities) 
with nirguṇa brahman (Brahman without qualities) ensures a notion of a personal ‘God’ persists – to a point, at 
least – even in nondual Advaita (1982: 426).   
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appears to be some sort of tension between the idea – that Bhattacharya, following Śaṅkara, 
endorses – that the ātman-Brahman (or nirguṇa brahman) is ultimately beyond all attribution 
and conception, and the codification of a path to liberation that hinges on the very thing about 
which nothing can be spoken.  This is of little practical help when discussing what liberation is 
and why one should opt to pursue it (often through great difficulty!).  What Albahari, Rambachan, 
Biderman and Deutsch have in common, then, is the idea that Śaṅkara recognises that we need 
to know some sort of lower truth before we can begin to realise a higher one, and, in fact, such 
a contention also forms the backdrop to much of Bhattacharya’s own thesis.  Swami Nikhilānanda 
writes in his translation of Śaṅkara’s Ātmabodha that the reasons for Śaṅkara’s referring to a 
personal God, writing hymns to popular deities, and building temples that encourage deity 
worship can be readily explained.  For Nikhilānanda as for Albahari et al., there is no contradiction 
in Śaṅkara’s extolling the virtues of these personal deities and still ultimately holding that the 
ātman-Brahman is nondual, absolute and ineffable.  On this, he writes that 
The devotee catches a glimpse of the Absolute through the form of 
the Personal God, who is the highest manifestation of the Infinite 
that a finite mind can comprehend on the relative plane.  Śaṅkara 
reiterates this principle in his philosophy.  The beginner learns the 
art of concentration through worship of the Personal God (saguṇa 
Brahman) and acquires purity of heart through performance of 
unselfish duties.  Endowed then with concentration and purity, he 
sets himself to the task of acquiring Knowledge of Brahman and 
realises, in the end, the Impersonal Absolute.  
(Nikhilānanda, 1962: xv)  
Śaṅkara (and, for the Advaitin, the Upaniṣads) are consequently following a method 
familiar to their Buddhist opponents.  That is to say that they are pointing to the 
Ultimate/Absolute without actually speaking directly of it: it is, at its core, simply a negative 
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method.  To do otherwise would be speaking of what is, in effect, unspeakable.  It is precisely 
because the ātman-Brahman is so difficult to know that Śaṅkara is tailoring his teachings to the 
level of attainment that each practitioner occupies, opting to reveal Truth by the gradual 
disclosure of lesser truths.  That Īśvara is connected to the world and can be recognised as such 
is significant, for it can then provide the necessary foothold for the practitioner to begin to ascend 
the transcendental heights that result in realisation of the ātman-Brahman.  Even though Īśvara 
itself is not the highest realisation per se, it is the highest realisation available on the ‘relative 
plane’ or conventional level.  The idea is then that once a practitioner has sufficiently developed 
their mind through devotion to brahman with qualities, they will be better furnished to realise 
the brahman without qualities.80  This journey takes place via a mental process summed up by 
the Sanskrit word bādha, usually translated as ‘contradiction’, but which is frequently translated 
in Advaitin contexts as ‘cancellation’ or ‘sublation’.81  
What is sublation and what role does it play?  Deutsch explains that it is ‘the mental 
process whereby one disvalues some previously appraised object or content of consciousness 
                                                        
80 It should be mentioned that whilst Buddhism traditionally has little to say on the notion of a personal creator 
god, various Buddhist traditions do indeed make use of devas, deities and demons in their narratives (Vajrayāna 
Buddhism makes extensive use of deities as meditative tools, for example).  Devas are, of course, subject to karma 
and so their existence in the heavens is of a finite timeframe.  Further, the realms of existence in which these 
devas dwell are completely detached from that of our human existence, and so they generally cannot intervene in 
human physical or spiritual affairs.  In Vajrayāna traditions, deities are generally not supposed to be thought as 
actually existent, but are rather representations of archetypes that are used to guide practice.  Though 
undoubtedly interesting, this wide-ranging discussion is not directly relevant to my current project, and so I will 
not dwell too much on this particular facet of Buddhist tradition.  It is enough to say that where deities do feature 
in Buddhist traditions, they generally are not used in the same way as the Abrahamic religions or indeed in the 
same way as the devotional Hindu schools. 
81 Those referring back to Deutsch’s work will note that Deutsch himself prefers to reconstruct bādha in his 
writings as ‘subration’ (Deutsch, 1969: 15).  This is an idiosyncrasy of Deutsch’s work.  I will stick with ‘sublation’ as 
there appears to be no discernible difference in meaning and so no meaningful reason for Deutsch’s choice. 
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because of its being contradicted by a new experience’ (Deutsch, 1969: 15).  To use the clichéd 
example oft cited in Advaitin texts as well as Buddhist, we might mistakenly take the coiled rope 
on the floor of a darkened room to be a coiled snake.  In shock, we reach for a light, and it turns 
out that upon closer inspection, when illuminated by our light, this ‘snake’ happily turns out to 
be no more than a coiled rope.  In this instance, we would say that our initial assessment of the 
object of consciousness (the rope) was confused or mistaken, and this mistaken assessment has 
since been sublated by the new information gleaned after we switched on the light (viz. that the 
snake is actually simply a rope!).  It is, as Deutsch writes, ‘a mental process through which one 
rectifies errors’, but importantly, it also requires ‘a turning away from, or rejection of, an object 
or content of consciousness as initially appraised in the light of a new judgement or experience 
which takes the place of the earlier judgement and to which “belief” is attached’ (1969: 16).  This 
means that in some circumstances (Deutsch gives the example of a mathematical concept which 
does not work in one situation but does for another), despite an error of judgement having been 
made, sublation does not occur.  The significance of sublation for both Advaita and Buddhism is 
twofold.82  First, it accounts for the different levels of reality afforded to things and concepts 
within the respective philosophies, and second, it illustrates the means by which one can make 
spiritual progress.  Let us examine why this is the case. 
Ascription of ‘different levels of reality’ within the Advaita project is actually relatively 
straightforward: the more something is capable of being sublated, the less reality it has.  The 
                                                        
82 The process of sublation is not, in fact, unique to Advaita; it is a necessary process for any system operating 
within the framework of the two truths.  This means that sublation is as much a part of the Buddhist process as it is 
a part of the Advaitin process: the need to ‘awaken’ assumes the need to sublate worldly experience! 
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distinction really hinges on what the Buddhists, predating Śaṅkara with their theory of two levels 
of truth (and so in some cases, reality), designated as conventional and ultimate truth, a 
distinction that, as many scholars – including Whaling (1979: 15) and Suthren Hirst (2005: 90) – 
recognise, very likely influenced Śaṅkara via the work of Gauḍapāda.  Things that are experienced 
on the conventional level are capable of first, being mistaken, and second, being sublated once 
other information becomes known that contradicts this prior mistaken judgement or experience.  
Even more than this, experiences and judgements on the conventional level are not only able to 
be sublated, they are necessarily sublated.  This is – as we have already seen – because for the 
Buddhists, Śaṅkara, and Bhattacharya, everything on the conventional level is but an imperfect 
approximation of the Truth of the ultimate level. 83   Owing to this inherent imperfection, 
everything experienced on the conventional level must be sublated in order for us to make 
spiritual progress.  Put simply, as we begin to realise the ātman-Brahman, ultimate truth 
supersedes conventional truth: every conventional judgement or experience is necessarily 
replaced by experience of the ultimate; the ātman-Brahman.  Suthren Hirst captures the process 
nicely when she writes that ‘[w]hen their true nature is realised, these [conventional experiences] 
all act as analogies for the process of sublation… one realises the provisional nature of the 
conventional world on “waking” to the ultimate truth’ (2005: 92). 
                                                        
83 There is a caveat here in relation to Indian Madhyamaka Buddhism (as opposed to its current-day Tibetan 
incarnation) which will be fully explained later.  Put simply, it is not obvious that Nāgārjuna actually believed in two 
levels of existence or in a privileged ontology of any kind. 
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3.1 Knowing the Ātman-Brahman 
There is a more elementary question behind all this talk of Brahman.  How do we know 
that the Brahman exists prior to embarking upon this intense journey of reflective discovery?  
Swami Nikhilānanda asserts that the Vedāntins believe that ‘Brahman is neither a dogma of 
religion nor a private mystical experience, but a metaphysical truth based upon universal reason 
and experience’ (1962: xvii).  In other words, the Brahman exists whether we choose to believe 
it as a matter of religious adherence or not.  More than that, its existence can be deduced ‘based 
upon universal reason and experience’, and so a religious bent of one flavour or another is  
presumably all but irrelevant when it comes to knowing that the Brahman exists!  This conflicts, 
though, with Śaṅkara’s commentary to Brahmasūtra 1.1.2, which deals with the definition(s) of 
Brahman.  Despite the ātman-Brahman being beyond definition and conceptual thought, Śaṅkara 
still allows something to be said about it.  Given first is the definition of Brahman as the ‘cause of 
the world’, which is the ‘Taṭastha Lakṣaṇa’, or ‘that characteristic of a thing which is distinct from 
its nature and yet serves to make it known’ (Swami Vireswarananda, 2014: 21).  Śaṅkara writes 
in his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 1.1.2: 
That omniscient omnipotent cause from which proceeds the origin, 
subsistence, and dissolution of this world–which world is 
differentiated by names and forms, contains many agents and 
enjoyers, is the abode of the fruits of actions, these fruits having 
their definite places, times and causes, and the nature of whose 
arrangement cannot even be conceived by the mind,–that cause, 
we say, is Brahman. 
(Śaṅkara, 2011: 16)  
There is a subtlety to tease out here.  It is problematic to say in a passage like this that the 
Brahman is the cause of the world and all within it whilst simultaneously holding that the 
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Brahman does not act.  Bhattacharya, citing the Maitri Upaniṣad says of the ātman-Brahman; 
‘[i]t is what makes us act (kārayitṛ), but it does not itself act (akartṛ)’, and that it (the Brahman) 
is ‘”as a spectator” (prekṣakavat) of our acts, good and bad, which do not affect it at all (sitāsitaiḥ 
karmaphalair anabhibhūtaḥ)’ (2015: 29).  According to the Advaitin Swami Vireswarananda, this 
apparent causal attribute does not form any part of the Brahman’s nature, which is ‘eternal and 
changeless’ (Swami Vireswarananda, 2014: 21).  Vireswarananda further writes that Śaṅkara also 
uses a scriptural definition to assert that ‘Truth, Knowledge, Infinity is Brahman’, and this 
definition he refers to as the ‘Svarūpa Lakṣaṇa’, or ‘that which defines Brahman in Its true 
essence’ (2014: 21).  How does any of this conflict with Swami Nikhilānanda’s assertion that the 
Brahman can be known through ‘universal reason’?  Śaṅkara also maintains that the Brahman 
cannot be known via reason alone: ‘Brahman is not an object of the senses, it has no connection 
with those other means of knowledge.  For the senses have, according to their nature, only 
external things as their objects, not Brahman’ (2011: 19).  This means that if the Brahman cannot 
be known via the means of knowledge (pramāṇas), then it cannot strictly be reasoned toward.  
Instead, it must be experienced.  To this end, reason is only useful insofar as it improves one’s 
(conventional) understanding of Brahman: it can never account for Brahman.  It would look as 
though Nikhilānanda’s assertion that the Brahman’s existence can be known ‘through universal 
reason’ is, then, at odds with the position of Śaṅkara.   
Whilst Śaṅkara obviously places a high value on the experience of the Brahman, it seems 
clear that for him, the śruti is the authoritative source of knowledge of the Brahman.  To see this, 
we need only look at his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 1.1.2, where on the one hand he lauds the 
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significance of ‘intuition’ (anubhava) of the Brahman when paired with śruti revelation (2011: 
18), yet later in the same text (2.1.6), asserts the following: 
For Brahman, as being devoid of form and so on, cannot become an 
object of perception; and as there are in its case no characteristic 
marks (on which conclusions, &c. might be based), inference also 
and the other means of proof do not apply to it; but like religious 
duty, it is to be known solely on the ground of holy tradition. 
(Śaṅkara 2011: 306-307) 
Śaṅkara maintains, according to Swami Vireswarananda, that despite the veracity of the 
pramāṇas (means of knowledge) on a conventional level, ‘Brahman cannot be so established 
independently of the scriptures (śruti)’ very simply because ‘Brahman is not an object of the 
senses’ (2014: 21).84  This is an assertion that we see borne out in the extracts given above. 
                                                        
84 Buddhism – principally following the work of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti – allows two pramāṇas: perception 
(pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāṇa).  There is also an emphasis on scripture, but this is largely viewed as a kind of 
derivative of perception and inference, and so there is a marked difference in the approach of Buddhist schools to 
that of the Advaitins. ‘Śruti’ literally translates as ‘what is heard’, but should be understood in the Advaitin context 
as something like ‘revelation’ (specifically, scripture that was ‘spoken to’ – revealed to – the ṛṣis).  Thus, the key 
point to take away from Śaṅkara’s position is that when it comes to knowledge of the Brahman, scripture (śabda; 
śruti) is the authoritative pramāṇa. 
For clarity, the six pramāṇas generally allowed in Advaita are pratyakṣa (perception); anumāṇa (inference); śabda 
(verbalisation of the testimony of the scriptures; verbalisation of śruti; the revealed word); upamāṇa 
(comparison/analogy); arthāpatti (postulation/presumption); anupalabdhi (non-recognition/non-perception)).  
There is some debate over whether or not Śaṅkara actually endorsed six pramāṇas, with some scholars claiming 
that Śaṅkara only ever endorsed three (Radhakrishnan, 1962: 488), and others, such as Sharma, acknowledging 
that there is reference to ‘at least five’ pramāṇas in Śaṅkara’s collected works (1992: 520). 
Nevertheless, this is a significant point of departure from Buddhism and might serve to illustrate part of a decisive 
split not just between Advaita and Buddhism’s methods of teaching and liberation, but also in the principles 
grounding these very traditions, viz. how belief in an ātman-Brahman manifests in the first place. 
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Nikhilānanda and Śaṅkara agree, though, that Brahman can be experienced, or to put it 
in a way more palatable to the staunch Advaitin, known.85  As we might expect, there is a caveat 
on Śaṅkara’s part.  Brahma-Sūtra 1.1.3, ‘śāstrayonitvāt’ (literally ‘because scripture is the 
source’), proclaims that scripture is the source of self-knowledge (and so because ‘self’ is 
brahman, by extension, scripture is the source of knowledge of brahman) – as ‘Brahman has no 
form etc. and so cannot be cognised by direct perception’ (Vireswarananda, 2014: 24).  For 
Śaṅkara, the omniscience represented within the scriptures serve as a sort of signpost that should 
impel the practitioner to seek the origin of that omniscience, which consists not in the scripture, 
but in omniscience itself (Śaṅkara, 2011: 20).  In other words, whilst the scripture manifests the 
omniscience and orients us towards it, the scripture is not itself the source of that omniscience. 
There is an obvious implication here for both the nature of Brahman and the nature of 
knowledge: we have already seen that despite Nikhilānanda’s assertion to the contrary, for the 
Advaitin, the Brahman cannot be discovered, found or known through reason alone.  In this 
sense, we might borrow a phrase from Tillemans (1999: 29) and say that the ātman-Brahman is 
‘radically inaccessible’ (Sanskrit: atyantaparokṣa).  Indeed, it seems to me that this is a driving 
reason for Advaita’s wide range of (arguably) six pramāṇas as opposed to the comparably austere 
two pramāṇas of Buddhism.  Śruti and śabda necessarily occupy a primary position, for it is only 
via the scriptures themselves (śruti) and their verbalisation (by a guru/teacher; śabda) that the 
ātman-Brahman can be established at all.  This is a fundamental reliance upon the authority of 
                                                        
85Again, ‘experienced’ implies a subject-object relationship that the Advaitin would be at pains to point out cannot 
exist in a unified, undifferentiated Brahman.  It is simply a case of knowing what one is rather than ‘experiencing’ 
something new or different.  
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scripture.  Of course, reliance on scripture is – to differing degrees – also present in Buddhism, 
but the very simple fact is that, as Bhattacharya must concede, the Buddha does not ever claim 
in any surviving literature that his own method is established in virtue of the authority of 
revelation.  The Buddha’s path to liberation was established through experience, that is to say 
that the Buddha’s awakening relied only on insight gained through meditation rather than on any 
scriptural direction.  The Buddha does not claim that any Buddhist teaching is true simply because 
it is written, or because it has been said.  Still, the Buddhist traditions that followed the Buddha 
have, to some degree, also relied upon ‘scripture’, at least once they finally got around to writing 
things down.  It would be strange to claim that scripture (āgama) does not direct Buddhists when 
every Buddhist tradition bases its core beliefs on the Buddhist method as espoused in scriptures.  
Nevertheless, even this reliance is, as Tillemans observes, presented in a novel way.  To this end, 
Tillemans writes that 
[t]his tension between scripture and reason, which is a recurrent 
one amongst religious philosophers, was however approached in a 
novel way by the Buddhists, a way which allowed them to accept 
certain “propositions of faith” but nonetheless retain a rationalistic 
orientation and extreme parsimony with regard to acceptable 
means of knowledge. 
(Tillemans, 1999: 27) 
Interestingly, Dharmakīrti – despite his usual proclivity toward vastubalapravṛtta 
inferences – allows some recourse to scripture.86  The means by which he justifies this step is in 
                                                        
86 Tillemans (1999: 28-29) writes that an inference which functions according to vastubalapravṛtta functions 
‘objectively, or ‘by the force of real entities’, which is to say that such inferences ‘should be evaluated purely on 
the basis of facts and states of affairs, and not in any way because of belief, acceptance or faith in someone or his 
words’.  In terms of a transcendental ātman-Brahman, the implication is clear – a Buddhist is simply not justified to 
assert it in virtue of religious dogma; he needs to be able to see it, experience it, and point to it.  An Advaitin, 
though, is, as we have seen, fully entitled to assert based on religious tradition and scriptural authority.  
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some ways analogous to the means by which Śaṅkara justifies his reliance on scripture for 
knowledge of the existence of the ātman-Brahman, and so is of relevance to the current 
discussion.  Let us see how Dharmakīrti allows such recourse to scriptural authority.  First, the 
‘epistemological school’ to which Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are said to belong allows three types 
of objects: the perceptible (pratyakṣa), the imperceptible (parokṣa), and the ‘radically 
inaccessible’ (atyantaparokṣa).  As Tillemans points out, the perceptible includes things with 
form (rūpa) – such as everyday objects – that are accessible to direct perception; the 
imperceptible includes things – impermanence, selflessness – that can be proven via the ‘usual 
vastubala kind of inference’.  The radically inaccessible includes objects ‘such as the different 
heavens (svarga) or the details of the operation of the law of karma, which are, of course, 
inaccessible to direct perception’, and we might say that these things are then ‘beyond the limits 
of normal rationality’ (Tillemans, 1999: 29).  Dharmakīrti intentionally restricts the import of 
scriptural authority to instances of the radically inaccessible, which means that he preserves the 
integrity of his arguments in favour of inferences being ‘objectively’ grounded more generally (in 
the case of pratyakṣa and parokṣa).   
There are, however, some more limitations on the use of scripture.  Tillemans points out 
that Tibetan scholars following Dharmakīrti detail a ‘threefold analysis’ which can ascertain when 
it is appropriate to deploy scriptural authority.  The point of this analysis is to test whether or not 
scripture can be a sound basis for inferential reasoning.  In order to be suitable, the relevant 
scriptural passage must be ‘(i) unrefuted by direct perception, (ii) unrefuted by 
vastubalapravṛttānumāna, and (iii) free from contradiction with other propositions whose truth 
is scripturally inferred’ (Tillemans, 1999: 30).  Tillemans recognises an inductive argument here, 
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writing that ‘the scripture’s assertions concerning pratyakṣa and parokṣa are seen to be 
trustworthy, and so, similarly, its assertions about atyantaparokṣa, if not internally inconsistent, 
should also be judged trustworthy’ (1999: 30).  How does this compare to the types of knowledge 
advanced by Śaṅkara?  There is some crossover – both clearly allow some recourse to scripture 
to ‘prove’ some points, namely regarding the radically inaccessible.  It seems that Dharmakīrti 
allows much less recourse, however.  Śaṅkara reckons that scripture serves to orientate us 
towards the ātman-Brahman and that we could never know the ātman-Brahman if not for the 
written words of the divinely inspired ṛṣis.   
To this end, the Vedas are self-sufficient and independent of other pramāṇas.  As Śaṅkara 
writes in his bhāṣya to Brahmasūtra 2.1.1: ‘[t]he authoritativeness of the Veda with regard to the 
matters stated [viz. that there is ‘one universal self’: ātman-Brahman] by it is independent and 
direct, just as the light of the sun is the direct means of our knowledge of form and colour’ 
(Śaṅkara, 2011: 295).  This is strikingly unambiguous.  Just as our knowledge of colour and form 
is made possible by the light of the sun, it is the light of the scriptures that make possible 
knowledge of the ātman-Brahman.  This, it seems to me, places a heavy emphasis on the role 
scripture to the detriment of the rest of the pramāṇas allowed by Śaṅkara.  Like Dharmakīrti, 
though, Śaṅkara is quick to place some restrictions on the scope of scripture, most strikingly is 
his insistence that scriptural knowledge claims cannot be valid if they contradict another 
P a g e  | 108 
 
pramāṇa. 87   This is identical to the restriction placed by Dharmakīrti!  What, then, is the 
difference? 
The short answer is that Śaṅkara appears to see scriptural authority as central: śruti as 
the most significant of the pramāṇas.88  The reason for this is that it makes the ātman-Brahman 
known to us.  Śaṅkara does not appear to foresee a situation in which scriptural inference would 
be inaccurate.  Dharmakīrti does not share this view, going so far as to deny that scriptural 
inference is really a fully-fledged inference at all.89  Tillemans illustrates the crux of the argument 
as follows.  Whilst scriptural inference is preferable to guesswork or randomness, it is not a 
precise science and is not preferable in toto.  This is partly because words have no necessary 
relation to the objects that they signify (1999: 42), and partly because given that scriptural 
inference is an instance of inductive reasoning, incorrect assumptions can be made and so 
incorrect conclusions drawn.  This sort of inference relies upon probabilities, and so there is an 
                                                        
87 Indeed, Śaṅkara writes the following in his bhāṣya to the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (trans. Mādhavānanda, 1950: 
301-302): 
Things in the world are known to possess certain fixed characteristics such as 
grossness or fineness. By citing them as examples the scriptures seek to tell us 
about some other thing which does not contradict them. They would not cite an 
example from life if they wanted to convey an idea of something contradictory 
to it. . . You cannot prove that fire is cold, or that the sun does not give heat, 
even by citing a hundred examples, for the facts would already be known to be 
otherwise through another means of knowledge. And one means of knowledge 
does not contradict another, for it only tells us about those things that cannot 
be known by any other means. Nor can the scriptures speak about an unknown 
thing without having recourse to conventional words and their meanings. 
88 When śruti refers to the revealed scriptures about which śabda is authoritative. 
89 Tillemans outlines the reasons why scriptural inference cannot be certain (whereas a normal inference ought to 
be) in significant detail (1999: 41-47). 
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inherent risk of error.  Where scriptural inferences are used, it is, says Tillemans, always subject 
to a proviso.  Thus, ‘if we make the move of accepting a scripture’s statements on radically 
inaccessible matters, it is because we are not, as far as we can judge, precluded from doing so, 
and because we want to or need to do so for our spiritual goals’ (1999: 45).  The Sanskrit cited by 
Tillemans is ‘varam āgamat pravṛttāv evaṃ pravṛttir’, or ‘if [one is] engaged with scripture, better 
engage [with scripture] like this’.  The turn of phrase indicates, I think, that Dharmakīrti knew 
that scriptural inferences were uncertain (or a least carried a risk of uncertainty), but that we 
could perhaps minimise the risk of straying too far into prospective uncertainty.  The way in which 
we might do this is by both analysing them according to the threefold analysis, and bearing in 
mind the pragmatic reasons that we have for using them in the first place. 
The difference then is that for Śaṅkara, scripture is authoritative when it comes to 
determining the existence of and how to orientate oneself towards the ātman-Brahman.  This is 
an important way in which the scripture is authoritative, especially when the related soteriology 
entirely hinges on knowing the ātman-Brahman.  It is to effectively say that the only way one can 
reach liberation is to know the ātman-Brahman, and the only way in which one can know the 
ātman-Brahman is via the requisite scriptures (namely the Upaniṣads), presumably with some 
added help from Śaṅkara’s commentaries on such epics as the Gītā.   Dharmakīrti, on the other 
hand, does not place any such burden on the Buddhist scriptures, because its most central of 
claims (minus the operations of karma) are backed via vastubala inferences.  Whereas Śaṅkara 
thinks that we need recourse to scripture to know the ātman-Brahman, Dharmakīrti thinks that 
we can know the truth of anātman more directly, through perception and inference.  The main 
aspect of Advaita soteriology is, when it comes down to it, solely reliant on scriptural authority.  
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The main aspects of Buddhist soteriology are, in contrast, grounded in reason: the scope of 
scriptural authority for the Buddhist is much narrower.   
This amounts to a real difference in how we gain important types of knowledge.  For 
Advaita we know that knowledge of the ātman-Brahman is primary.  This is directed by scripture 
alone, for we would not even know of the ātman-Brahman’s existence were it not for the 
scriptures.  For Dharmakīrti as a Buddhist, the proof of the pudding is really in the eating.  We do 
not in principle need scripture to discover the Buddhist path; we could reason our way there 
regardless of scripture.  With all this in mind, we might ask of what use is scripture for someone 
like Dharmakīrti?  Dunne (2004: 243) translates this from Pramāṇavārttika 1.218cd:  
Every judicious person who wishes to act analyses statements to 
determine what is and what is not scripture (āgama); he does so as 
one who wishes to act [effectively], and not because of some 
pernicious habit.  Learning what should be put in practice from the 
scripture, he thinks, “Having acted accordingly, I might realise my 
goal.”  On the basis of the trustworthiness of that scripture with 
regard to things that can be experienced [through perception or 
empirical inference], that person acts with regard to other things 
[i.e. the supersensible objects described in that scripture] because 
such is the case for most practical action in the world.90 
From this, it is obvious that for Dharmakīrti, scripture does have some instrumental value.  
It is to be measured with some caution, however, and only in relation to those aspects of the 
scripture which we can verify ourselves:  if these aspects are verifiable through perception and 
inference, then we might provisionally trust in the more outlandish, supersensible aspects of the 
                                                        
90 All annotations are Dunne’s. 
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scripture.  This is, as it turns out, very different indeed from the emphasis placed on scripture by 
the Advaitins. 
3.2 Ultimate Knowledge 
We have established that for Śaṅkara, the ātman-Brahman falls into the category of 
‘radically inaccessible’ in the same way that the Absolute does for thinkers such as Pseudo-
Dionysius and Maimonides; after all, we have already seen in the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya the role of 
scripture in revealing the ātman-Brahman’s existence.  It is here that Śaṅkara explicitly denies 
that the ātman-Brahman can be known in any way other than through the revelation catalogued 
in the scriptures.91  We must remind ourselves, though, that for Advaita, there are potentially six 
pramāṇas and not only two: we have seen how Śaṅkara allows one pramāṇa specifically in order 
to safeguard the validity of both scripture and the verbal communication of scripture, a move not 
permitted by Buddhists of any tradition.   
Further, in his translation of Śaṅkara’s commentary to Brahmasūtra 1.1.4, 
Vireswarananda writes that  
[t]he uniqueness of Brahman is quite apparent, as It cannot be 
realised either by direct perception or inference in the absence of 
form etc. and characteristics respectively.  Reasoning also has been 
adopted by the scriptures here by citing the example of clay to 
elucidate their point.  As different objects are made out of clay, so 
are all things created from this Brahman. 
 (Swami Vireswarananda, 2014: 26) 
                                                        
91 That is to say that we would not know of the ātman-Brahman’s existence – or even to bother looking for it – if it 
were not for the scriptures detailing as much.  It is not something that can be discovered out in the world by some 
accident. 
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This passage is telling on two fronts.  First, Vireswarananda specifically denies that 
knowledge of the ātman-Brahman is any sort of inference – a distinction that will prove relevant 
shortly. 92   Second, we see an instantiation of another pramāṇa, analogy (upamāṇa), when 
Vireswarananda elaborates on the example of one lump of clay making many things.  It is the 
scriptures that give this example (specifically Chāndogya Upaniṣad 6:1:2-6), but the ātman-
Brahman discussed in these same scriptures is also supposed to be ultimately non-dual, inactive 
and so without attributes.  It must be the case, then, that this example of action is given not as 
an ultimate, literal account of the Brahman, but rather as an analogy to allow the unenlightened 
practitioner to begin to gain knowledge of the Brahman on a conventional, basic level.  The same 
applies to the pramāṇa of inference (anumāṇa): on an ultimate level, no inference gives insight 
to the nature of the ātman-Brahman, but on the conventional level that we occupy, some 
inferences serve to orientate the practitioner towards Brahman.  How might this work?  The most 
obvious instance is when Śaṅkara argues that it follows from the fact that there is a body of 
scripture ‘possessing the quality of omniscience’ that the Brahman ‘is the source, i.e. the cause 
of the great body of Scripture’ (2011: 20).  He further states that ‘Scripture consisting of the Rig-
veda, &c., as described above, is the source or cause, i.e. the means of right knowledge through 
which we understand the nature of Brahman’ (2011: 20), and goes on to write that it is via 
scripture alone that we come to know Brahman as the cause and origin of the world.  How does 
scripture tell us this?  Quite simply because Brahman inspired the scriptures!  There are, of 
                                                        
92 I think it worth mentioning that ‘knowledge of’ here means something very specific, viz. knowledge of the 
essence of the Brahman.  It refers to an intuitive mystical gnosis. 
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course, some inferences here.  But the point is that such inferences are conventional and do not 
stand alone as Truths: the point of the scriptures talking in such lowly conventional terms – which 
are ultimately inapplicable to the Brahman – is to inspire action on the part of the reader.  The 
scripture should spur the reader to introspection and meditation upon the ātman-Brahman.  It is 
then through that action that one might come to know Brahman through intuitive experience. 
It is still the case, however, that the pramāṇas are doing the work here.  Though the 
Brahman is ultimately formless and without attributes, at least two pramāṇas are at play when 
we speak about ‘knowledge’ of it: first, scriptural authority, second, analogy (which builds on the 
ideas revealed through scripture).  There might even be a third pramāṇa at play – anubhava: 
direct experience, intuition – though whether or not this strictly counts as a pramāṇa is 
somewhat controversial (Sharma, 1992).93  However, there is a caveat.  Insofar as the pramāṇas 
are useful to the Advaitin practitioner, they are only useful on this conventional level.  It is here 
that we begin to see some strong parallels with the Madhyamaka of Nāgārjuna.  Śaṅkara 
recognises that there is a tension between the ultimate existence of the ātman-Brahman and the 
process of directing people toward this ultimate existence using words (śabda, śruti).  Like 
Nāgārjuna, Śaṅkara believes that there are two levels of truth and reality: conventional and 
                                                        
93 Sharma argues that anubhava should be classed as a pramāṇa, but in a slightly different way than Śaṅkara would 
usually admit.  By Sharma’s reading (1992: 522), this would involve classing anubhava as a ‘means of valid 
knowledge’ rather than a ‘valid means of knowledge’ (which is how a pramāṇa is usually defined).  The difference 
is subtle but significant.  Sharma writes that ‘Śaṅkara seems to equivocate, for śruti is a valid means of knowledge 
about Brahman in the vyāvahārika realm, and anubhava is a means of valid pāramārthika knowledge. In the case 
of śruti by itself, one 'knows' about Brahman because one cites the scriptures; in the case of anubhava, one cites 
the scriptures because one knows [Brahman]’ (1992: 522).  The idea is that at the time anubhava is used as a 
pramāṇa, the need for pramāṇas passes: once one has direct perception of the Brahman, the need for language 
describing the knowledge (be it valid means of knowledge or means of valid knowledge) disappears.  
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ultimate.  For Śaṅkara, Brahman is the ultimate truth/reality, and everything else is, in 
Bhattacharya’s words, an imperfect approximation: ‘[a]ll truths as can be formulated are, in fact, 
but approximations of Truth, which is inexpressible; none of them can be identified with Truth 
itself’ (2015: 9).  This means that every account of reality that does not culminate in 
intuition/knowledge/experience of the ātman-Brahman is necessarily inferior.  It is lacking in a 
fundamental way – it is avidyā.  
Nāgārjuna thinks that in order for the pramāṇas to be established in the way that his 
Naiyāyika opponents assume they are, the pramāṇas must themselves be ultimate in nature.  
That is to say that the pramāṇas must establish their own existence, and as such, cannot be 
subject to causes, conditions or influences.  According to such criteria, a pramāṇa must then 
possess a svabhāva.  It is a matter of fact that Nāgārjuna has no time for svabhāva, and so it 
should come as no surprise that his starting position will be that a pramāṇa cannot exist with 
svabhāva.  Viz., a pramāṇa cannot be self-caused/self-established. 
Of course, if we accept svabhāva, then we have quite a different view.  A proponent of 
svabhāva might well claim that we do, in fact, see intrinsic natures in the world’s phenomena.  
Where Nāgārjuna sees a mistake, such a person might see insight into the true nature of reality 
(i.e. that everything exists with svabhāva).  Accordingly, such an objector might want to argue 
that the pramāṇas are indeed self-established in virtue of their respective intrinsic natures.  
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Indeed, at Vigrahavyāvartani (VV)94 8, Nāgārjuna offers one such objection to his arguments that 
all entities are empty of svabhāva: 
nairyāṇikasvabhāvo dharma nairyāṇikāsc̒a ye teṣām / 
dharmāvasthoktānāmevamanairyāṇikādīnām //8// 
And those things which are conducive to liberation [possess] intrinsic natures 
[which are] conducive to liberation / 
Thus, [the same holds for] things spoken of [in relation to] the state of things 
[and for things that] are not conducive to liberation //8// 
Nāgārjuna further details his opponent’s stance in the commentary: 
iha ca dharmāvasthoktānāṃ nairyāṇikānāṃ dharmānāṃ 
nairyāṇikaḥ svabhāvaḥ anairyāṇikānāmanairyāṇikaḥ 
(svabhāvaḥ)95 bodhyaṅgikānāṃ bodhyaṅgikaḥ 
abodhyaṅgikānāmabodhyaṅgikaḥ bodhipakṣikāṇāṃ 
bodhipakṣikaḥ abodhipakṣikāṇāmabodhipakṣikaḥ / evamapi 
se̒ṣānām / tadyasmādevamanekaprakāro dharmāṇāṃ svabhāva 
dṛṣṭastasmādyadyuktaṃ niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā 
niḥsvabhāvatvāccūnyā iti tanna / 
Now, things mentioned in connection with the state of things, and 
things [that are] conducive to liberation, have an intrinsic nature 
[that is] conducive to liberation. [Things that are] not conducive to 
liberations [have an] intrinsic nature [that is] not conducive to 
liberation, the limbs of liberation [have an intrinsic nature that is] 
the limbs of liberation, [those that are] not the limbs of liberation 
[have an intrinsic nature that is] not the limbs of liberation.  [The 
things that] belong to perfect wisdom (bodhipakṣika) [have an 
intrinsic nature that] belongs to perfect wisdom, [those things 
that] do not belong to perfect wisdom [have an intrinsic nature 
that] do not belong to perfect wisdom.  Thus for the remaining 
                                                        
94 Sanskrit text for the Vigrahavyāvartani taken from Bhattacharya, Johnston, Kunst, The Dialectical Method of 
Nāgārjuna: Vigrahavyāvartanī (2002). 
95 This is added in the Tibetan translation once, and the Chinese translation after each item in the list, though it is 
apparently not present in the original Sanskrit (Bhattacharya, Johnston, Kunst, 2002: 49).  The meaning remains 
largely the same whether svabhāva is added or not, with the first instance of svabhāvaḥ enough (strictly speaking) 
to establish that we are referring to the intrinsic natures of each consecutive item mentioned.  I have added it here 
simply because I think it reads a little easier with the second ‘svabhāvaḥ’ included. 
P a g e  | 116 
 
[things].  Because in this way different kinds of intrinsic natures 
are seen, the statement ‘all things lack intrinsic nature, [and 
because of this] lack of intrinsic nature [all things are] empty 
(śūnya)’ is not valid (tan na). 
The opponent is stating that because we can readily distinguish intrinsic natures, the 
Mādhyamika contention that all entities are empty of intrinsic natures cannot be established.  
This serves two purposes in relation to the pramāṇas.  First, because the pramāṇas are obviously 
supposed to be conducive to liberation (insofar as they allow one to determine what is Real and 
disregard that which is not), nairyāṇikasvabhāvo dharma nairyāṇikāsc̒a ye teṣām is simply a 
statement of fact: things that are useful to liberation have intrinsic natures that make them useful 
to liberation.  Second, if the pramāṇas do indeed have an intrinsic nature, then they are 
established from their own side and so require no further metaphysical or epistemic justification.  
This means that by extension, the pramāṇas are ultimately existent.  In fact, even if it were 
somehow the case that the pramāṇas were not conducive to liberation, the opponent holds that 
they would still have an intrinsic nature.  In such a case, this nature would simply be one that is 
not conducive to liberation!  It is obvious that the objector holds an essentialist view of the world 
– the existence of svabhāva is not in question for them, instead, the only question is around how 
each intrinsic nature is to be categorised (conducive/not conducive to liberation, etc.). 
We might say that so far, this looks like less an argument from the opponent and more of 
an assertion.  The reasons for their holding this position are not developed until VV 9, where the 
opponent makes the familiar argument that without intrinsic natures grounding things in the 
world, the statement purporting to negate intrinsic natures could not possibly exist. The 
statement ‘there are no intrinsic natures’ requires that there be an existent referent, and for the 
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opponent, the only way such a referent could possibly exist is through possession of an intrinsic 
nature.  Thus at VV 9 we read: 
yadi ca na bhavetsvabhāvo dharmānāṃ niḥsvabhāva ityeva / 
nāmāpi bhavennaivaṃ nāma hi nirvastukaṃ nāsti //9// 
If things [had] no intrinsic nature, even the name ‘no intrinsic 
nature’ [would] not exist / 
For [there] is no name without [an] object [to which it refers] //9// 
This is a simple reassertion of the view – common then as it is now – that there must be 
some grounding principle behind reality.  Of course, we know that we do indeed have names for 
things that do not exist in reality: we would be hard pushed to find an existent banshee to which 
the name ‘banshee’ refers, for example.  Nāgārjuna further extrapolates his opponent’s position 
in the commentary to VV 9, writing in the Sanskrit: 
yadi sarvadharmāṇāṃ svabhāva na bhavettatrāpi niḥsvabhāva 
bhavet / tatra niḥsvabhāva ityevaṃ nāmāpi na bhavet / kasmāt / 
nāma hi nirvastukāṃ kiṃcidapi nāsti / 
tasmānnāmasadbhāvātsvabhāvo bhāvānāmasti 
svabhāvasadbhāvāccāśūnyāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ / tasmādyaduktaṃ 
niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā niḥsvabhāvatvācchūnyā iti tanna / 
If all things [have] no intrinsic nature, there would be an absence 
of intrinsic nature.  Then, even the name ‘absence of intrinsic 
nature’ [would] not exist.  Why?  Because a name without an 
object [to which it refers] does not exist.  Thus, because [the] 
name exists, [so too does] intrinsic nature.  Intrinsic nature being 
true (sadbhāva), all things are non-empty (aśūnyāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ).  
Therefore, the statement ‘all things lack intrinsic nature, [and 
because of this] lack of intrinsic nature [all things are] empty 
(śūnya)’ is not established (tan na). 
The argument from the opponent is simple enough to grasp – we cannot say that an entity 
lacks svabhāva if we want to speak meaningfully about the world.  Intrinsic nature is the 
grounding principle of all existent things, and without this grounding principle – intrinsic nature 
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– there is nothing to be negated.  We can only make sense of the statement ‘there is no intrinsic 
nature’ if there is actually an intrinsic nature to deny - something can only be negated in virtue 
of its existence.  The opponent’s view assumes that intrinsic nature exists and that it grounds 
everything.  This means that every object, statement, entity etc. is grounded by its svabhāva 
(which by extension means that every entity has what we might loosely call a ‘self’). 
It is not obvious, however, that Nāgārjuna need believe an intrinsic nature actually exists 
in order to dispute how it might theoretically work.  Just as I need not believe that God exists in 
order to make sense of a conversation about the attributes of God with a theist, so too may 
Nāgārjuna discuss with an opponent principles and ideas that do not actually exist.  As I have 
already said, I can talk of Harry Potter-style Dementors with my young cousins (sort of – I am far 
from an expert!), but I think it a stretch to say that either of us need accept their actual existence 
in the world.  I can write a story about vampires without accepting their actual existence.  Safe 
to say then, that negating the idea of intrinsic existence does not necessarily require that the 
negating statement be grounded in reality by an intrinsic nature.  This is to in some ways place 
the cart before the horse – ideas do not need to exist as ‘real’ entities in order to be discussed: 
pramāṇas do not need to exist in order to be negated. 
As mentioned earlier, a convenient way to think of this is as follows: it is not necessary 
for a unicorn or minotaur to exist independently in the world for me to deny their existence in 
the world.  I cannot reasonably be accused of tacitly affirming the ultimate existence of both 
unicorns and minotaurs by writing that they are mythical creatures that do not exist.  All that is 
really demonstrated is that I understand what both the idea of a unicorn involves (its status as a 
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horse with a horn growing from its head) and what the idea of the Minotaur involves (its status 
as a creature with the body of a man and the head of a bull) and so on.  We can say that as long 
as we understand the idea or concept of something, it does not much matter if it exists 
independently of the mind.  Being able to categorise ideas is what really matters, not whether 
there ever existed entities or objects falling under those ideas.  This is, I hazard, Nāgārjuna’s 
starting point.  Whilst he understands what intrinsic nature entails conceptually, he thinks that 
he can still deny its existence (much as he denies the establishment of the pramāṇas) without 
the baggage of a tacit affirmation of the ultimate existence of intrinsic nature (or the pramāṇas).  
Such an affirmation would, after all, be an insidious trap that binds us to a view.  As Huntington 
(2017: 18) so eloquently writes: 
One thing is clear: Nāgārjuna’s soteriological aim entails the 
cessation of all clinging to ideas (vikalpa), views (dṛṣṭi), assertions 
(pakṣa), and propositions (pratijñā), and the consequent immersion 
in a groundless state of non-abiding—what is referred to in the 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā as the “extinction of conceptual diffusion 
in emptiness”. 
The point of the objection is that the opponent thinks that all of reality must be reducible 
to some sort of ultimate basic.  Obviously, the issue for the Mādhyamika is that this state of affairs 
is both deeply unattractive as well as untenable in practical terms.  Nāgārjuna expends a great 
deal of effort in refuting the very notion of objects and ideas being ‘established’ (by which he 
means real, or ultimately existent rather than simply conventionally existent), and so even the 
pramāṇas by which thinkers such as Śaṅkara justify their knowledge of the ātman-Brahman 
cannot be ultimately existent.  This is significant to us not simply in terms of the rejection of 
Advaitin epistemology, but also more broadly.  Nāgārjuna clearly and consistently demonstrates 
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a deep-seated aversion to accepting any ‘ultimate’ entity, rejecting the possibility of svabhāva at 
every opportunity.  This means that whilst Nāgārjuna does not offer one large, concerted 
argument specifically against the ātman-Brahman, the consistent application of his philosophy 
must necessarily preclude one from equating śūnyatā with the ātman-Brahman.  
Let us then look at Nāgārjuna’s particular arguments against the establishment of 
pramāṇas as presented in the VV.  To be clear, my aim here is not to refute or put forth a theory 
of knowledge per se.  It is strictly to illustrate the far-reaching nature of Nāgārjuna’s staunch anti-
essentialism and to illustrate the lengths to which he is prepared to go in order to refute any kind 
of permanence, reification, or theory-building.  I hope that it is by now clear that these lengths 
are crucial in distinguishing Nāgārjuna’s version of Madhyamaka from Advaitin doctrine.  The 
most important arguments for my purposes begin around VV 30, and so it is here that I will start.  
The verse on its own is relatively terse and difficult, and so I will quote both the verse and the 
commentary from VV 30-33 and extrapolate from there.  It is worth bearing in mind, I think, that 
the majority of the arguments presented here are, though aimed primarily at the Naiyāyikas, 
effective toward anybody holding this sort of pramāṇa viewpoint: this includes other Buddhists.  
To reiterate, the issue is not with a pramāṇa viewpoint per se.  It is with the essentialism that the 
viewpoint – especially when taken on any terms that resemble the Naiyāyika position – seems to 
entail.   
VV 30 reads: 
yadi kiṃcidupalabheyaṃ pravartayeyaṃ nivartayeyaṃ vā / 
pratyakṣādibhirarthaistadabhāvānme ‘nupālambhaḥ //30// 
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yadyahaṃ kiṃcidarthamupalabheyaṃ96 
pratyakṣānumānopamānāgamaiścaturbhiḥ pramāṇaiścaturṇāṃ 
vā pramāṇānāmanyatamena ata eva pravartayeyaṃ vā 
nivartayeyaṃ vā / yathārthamevāhaṃ kaṃcinnophalabhe 
tasmānna pravartayāmi na nirvartayāmi / tatraivaṃ sati yo 
bhavatopālambha ukto yadi pratyakṣādīnāṃ 
pramāṇānāmanyatamenopalabhya bhāvānvinivartayasi nanu tāni 
pramāṇāni na santi taiśca pramāṇairapi gamyā arthā santīti sa me 
bhavatyevānupālambhaḥ /  
If I apprehended something [via means of] perception etc., then I 
would affirm or deny [something about the object apprehended] / 
[But since such] an object does not exist, I am not to blame //30// 
If I apprehended some object [via the] four pramāṇas, by 
perception, inference, comparison, and authority (āgamaiḥ), or 
through one of these four pramāṇas, then I would affirm or deny. 
Since, in fact (eva), I do not ever perceive an object [via the 
pramāṇas], I neither affirm nor deny.  In this context, your 
criticism is ‘Though you deny objects after having apprehended 
them by one of the pramāṇas [such as] perception, [you claim 
that] those pramāṇas do not exist and the objects apprehended 
by [those] pramāṇas do not exist.’  That does not concern me at 
all. 
There is an anti-essentialist undercurrent throughout the verses cited that is worth 
considering in some more detail.  First, to VV 30: here we see Nāgārjuna contend that he neither 
asserts nor denies anything about objects perceived via the pramāṇas precisely because there is 
no object in existence which is perceived via the pramāṇas. What this means is not that objects 
that are perceived do not exist (or at least appear to exist!), but rather that objects cannot be 
perceived by pramāṇas.  This subtle difference is meant to highlight that perception does not 
                                                        
96 The first member of this compound is given in the BJK version of the VV as kaṃcid.  I follow the amendment by 
Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana in substituting this by kiṃcid instead.  There is no discernible change in meaning with this 
substitution, I simply think that it reads better; the particle kam being principally Vedic in terms of origin and era of 
use (Whitney, 1879: 408). 
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occur via some things called pramāṇas – a controversial notion even in Buddhist circles!  We will 
see that Nāgārjuna thinks that this is the case because he does not think that pramāṇas can be 
satisfactorily explained or established.  Nāgārjuna goes on to write that any criticism based 
around the idea that he somehow utilises the pramāṇas to perceive objects which he then 
roundly denies simply ‘does not concern’ him – this is because it falls foul of an elementary 
misunderstanding and misrepresents his actual argument.   But how can this be the case?  The 
objector seems to be arguing that the pramāṇas are what we perceive the world through 
whether or not we believe that they exist.  To them, the very fact that Nāgārjuna perceives at all 
means that he is utilising at least some pramāṇas – he might as well be sitting on a chair whilst 
claiming that the chair does not exist! 
Of course, Nāgārjuna would indeed sit on a chair and claim that it does not exist, because 
when he uses the word ‘existent’ (bhāva), he generally means ‘ultimately existent’.97  This is 
apparent throughout his various writings, but is perhaps most neatly summarised at MMK 15.4 
where Nāgārjuna argues that ‘existence’ is a result of intrinsic or extrinsic natures.98  For a thing 
                                                        
97 Siderits and Katsura (2013: 158) note that Nāgārjuna might sometimes be employing wordplay when he uses 
bhāva; it can after all mean ‘existent’ or ‘nature’.  Owing to such ambiguities inherent in Sanskrit, it is largely down 
to the interpreter to try to make sense of such quirks in style, relying on, above all, context.  It is owing to the 
overall context of this chapter of the MMK that I feel comfortable in discerning that bhāva here stands for 
‘existent’, which is then shorthand for ‘ultimate existent’ (viz. an existent with svabhāva). 
98 MMK 15.4: 
svabhāvaparabhāvābhyām ṛte bhāvaḥ kutaḥ punaḥ / 
svabhāve parabhāve ca sati bhāvo hi sidhyati //4// 
Without intrinsic and extrinsic natures, whence [comes an] existent? / 
[For an] existent is established on account of intrinsic or extrinsic nature. 
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to be ‘established’, it must be ‘ultimately established’ and so ultimately exist.  In other words, it 
must have svabhāva.  It is crucial to remember that for Nāgārjuna, to possess svabhāva is to be 
ultimately existent, immutable and permanent.99  This is the central theme underpinning all of 
his work – svabhāva sabotages the soteriological project of Buddhism as its possession precludes 
change.  It is for this reason that Nāgārjuna spends so much time railing against what he considers 
essentialist philosophical and religious positions – it is precisely because of their essentialism (viz. 
their endorsement of svabhāva) that they remove the means to liberation. 100   Nāgārjuna’s 
problem is not with perception – he knows very well that we perceive and experience.  This is, in 
                                                        
Nāgārjuna elsewhere argues that neither intrinsic nor extrinsic natures are possible, for example at MMK 15.1-2 
where Nāgārjuna argues that svabhāva cannot be produced by causes and conditions because it would then be a 
product and thus not intrinsic at all.  This is unacceptable to even the Ābhidharmikas, for as Karunadasa writes, 
‘’[s]ince a dhamma and its intrinsic nature are the same (for the duality is only posited for purposes of 
explanation), to claim that its intrinsic nature undergoes modification is to deny its very existence’ (1996: 21).  
Nāgārjuna thinks that something that is a product is modified, namely by its causes and conditions.  Consequently, 
a produced existent (something that exists with svabhāva) cannot exist. 
99 By the time of Nāgārjuna’s writing, this was, I think, the standard understanding of svabhāva across many 
traditions.  It was not always this way, however.  For more on the development of svabhāva and dharma as 
ultimately existent entities, see Ronkin (2005).  For more on the cognitive and ontological aspects of svabhāva, see 
Westerhoff (2007). 
100 The route to liberation is here hindered in two ways.  First, if svabhāva exists (remember that it would 
necessarily be an ultimately existent thing), then this would be enough to physically halt any change at any place at 
any time.  The idea is that a thing with svabhāva simply cannot be otherwise, and so it cannot stop being the way 
that it is.  In terms of liberation and removal of defilements and the like, this would entail that every defilement 
exists the way it exists permanently, and so accounting for liberation becomes extremely problematic.  The upshot 
would be that nobody could ever become liberated.  Nāgārjuna does not accept this – the Buddha is proof that we 
can reach liberation!  For Nāgārjuna, then, svabhāva cannot exist and must instead be a mistaken imputation 
forced onto objects by deluded minds.  This is what forms the basis of every argument deployed by Nāgārjuna in 
both the MMK and the VV. 
Second, the very idea of svabhāva halts progress along the soteriological journey.  Why?  Very simply because it is 
something to which practitioners cling.  This also goes for Buddhist practitioners, who sometimes think that 
śūnyatā is the essential principle of everything, making it equivalent to svabhāva in all but name (indeed, 
Bhattacharya makes this very claim (2015:13)).  Nāgārjuna wants to avoid this sort of conflation and remove any 
form of clinging: to do this is to reify that which is supposed to remove the habit of reification!  There will be more 
to say on this a little later. 
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fact, a basic maxim of Buddhism.101  Rather, Nāgārjuna could be classified as what Mohanta calls 
a ‘cognitive sceptic’:  elaborating on what this position entails, Mohanta (1997: 53) writes that  
Cognitive scepticism may be taken thus for a philosophical attitude 
which suspends the possibility of making conclusive statements 
concerning valid cognition (prāma) for want of sufficiently 
warranted grounds or pramāṇas.  A cognitive sceptic does not go 
for theory-making. 
Nāgārjuna is concerned, then, with three things.  First with casting doubt on the 
assumption that the pramāṇas establish the (ultimate) reality of their objects (prameyas), second 
with casting doubt on the assumption that the pramāṇas themselves are established as ‘real’ (in 
Nāgārjunian terms, ultimately real), and third, with avoiding advancing any theory of his own.102   
What is the misunderstanding that ‘does not concern’ Nāgārjuna?  It is the idea that he 
perceives via the same pramāṇas that he argues are not established.  In light of the above, this 
is simply not a problem for Nāgārjuna.  He is not claiming that our experience of the world is false 
per se, nor is he claiming that there is no perception or even that we cannot make some sorts of 
claims about the world that are conventionally grounded in experience.  Rather, the point is that 
ultimately, such claims are not grounded in anything.  This is significant in terms of the current 
work, because it means that by extension, there is no ground.  Put another way, there can be no 
                                                        
101 Insofar as Buddhism aims to analyse, reduce and then remove all experiences of dissatisfaction (duḥkha). 
102 As Ayer (1956: 40) notes, ‘All that [the cognitive sceptic] requires, is that errors should be possible, not that 
they should actually occur. For his charge against our standards of proof is not that they work badly; he does not 
suggest that there are others which would work better. The ground on which he attacks them is that they are 
logically defective; or if not defective, at any rate logically questionable.’ The ‘no-thesis’ approach alluded to by 
Ayer is ubiquitous in Madhyamaka philosophy.   
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ātman-Brahman.  Thus for Nāgārjuna it is the case that ultimately, the pramāṇas are not 
established, and nor are their objects (prameyas): 
yadi ca pramāṇataste teṣāṃ teṣāṃ prasiddhirarthānām / 
teṣāṃ punaḥ prasiddhiṃ brūhī kathaṃ te pramāṇānām //31// 
yadi ca pramāṇatasteṣāṃ teṣāmarthānāṃ prameyāṇāṃ 
prasiddhiṃ manyase yathā manairmeyānām teṣāmidānīṃ 
pratyakṣānumānopamānāgamānāṃ  caturṇāṃ pramāṇānāṃ 
kutaḥ prasiddhiḥ / yadi tāvanniṣpramāṇānāṃ pramāṇānāṃ 
syātprasiddhiḥ pramāṇato ‘rthānāṃ prasiddhiriti hīyate pratijñā / 
And if proof of these objects is established based on pramāṇas / 
tell [me] how these pramāṇas are [in turn] established //31// 
And if you think that such objects of true cognition are established 
via the pramāṇas as a measuring instrument [establishes that 
which is to be] measured, how are the four pramāṇas – 
perception, inference, comparison, authority (āgama) – 
established?  If the pramāṇas may be established without 
[recourse to] pramāṇas, [then your] proposition [that] ‘objects are 
established via the pramāṇas’ is abandoned. 
Here at VV 31, Nāgārjuna notes that his opponent argues for the existence of objects of 
valid knowledge because they can be perceived through the pramāṇas, which are the only true 
means of knowledge.  According to his opponent, these pramāṇas thus give insight into the true 
nature of reality.  However, the question is once again raised as to what it is that establishes the 
pramāṇas themselves (and so designates them as the tools by which true knowledge might be 
gained).  Nāgārjuna is quick to bring in the relational characters of pramāṇas as the means of 
valid knowledge, and prameyas as the objects of valid knowledge.  One does not make sense 
without the other: how can we have instruments of valid knowledge if we do not have objects of 
knowledge for the instruments to help us ‘know’?  For the Naiyāyika opponent it is clearly the 
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case, then, that the objects of knowledge are ‘established’ by the pramāṇas, but what of the 
pramāṇas themselves?   
Nāgārjuna asks how it might be the case that the pramāṇas establish something without 
first being established themselves.  The problem here is twofold.  First, accepting that the 
pramāṇas have a causal power to establish objects of knowledge (i.e. that the pramāṇas are the 
means through which we perceive reality) without asking what grounds the pramāṇas 
themselves is, at best, an example of unjustified dogmatism.  It is at worst indicative of a short-
sighted essentialism.103  The significance of this type of accountability cannot be overstated – 
Nāgārjuna is, after all, a loyal Buddhist.  His Buddhist praxis and philosophy revolves around the 
acceptance of radical change and radical interconnectivity through pratītyasamutpāda, but this 
commitment would be jeopardised by a dogmatic assertion of a permanent ‘grounds’ of 
knowledge.  Second, if we do ask how the pramāṇas are established and conclude that they 
‘prove themselves’, then we effectively say that they have svabhāva.  The end result for 
Nāgārjuna is that mindlessly accepting the pramāṇas as ‘established’ leads to undesirable and 
untenable positions.  We can assert their essential establishment without due consideration of 
the facts (based, for example, on religious tradition); we can explicitly make the argument that 
they are somehow self-established and so exist intrinsically with svabhāva; we can make some 
recourse to an infinite regress of causes, where each pramāṇa establishes another, which 
establishes another, which establishes another, and so on.  At some point, one of these infinitely 
                                                        
103 Nāgārjuna thinks that essentialism is impossible.  More than that, he thinks that it is demonstrably impossible.  
With this in mind, holding that the pramāṇas ‘just are’ existent is, for Nāgārjuna, a lazy sidestep into an 
essentialism that makes little intellectual or practical sense. 
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regressed pramāṇas – established by innumerable other pramāṇas – then somehow establishes 
its prameyas as well.   
Thus we read at VV 32: 
anyairyadi pramāṇaiḥ pramāṇasiddhirbhavettadanavasthā / 
nādeḥ siddhistatrāsti naiva madhyasya nāntasya //32// 
yadi punarmanyase pramāṇaiḥ prameyāṇāṃ prasiddhiteṣāṃ 
pramāṇānāmanyaiḥ pramāṇaiḥ 
prasiddhirevamanavasthāprasaṅgaḥ / anavasthāprasaṅge ko 
doṣaḥ / anavasthāprasaṅga ādeḥ siddhirnāsti / kiṃ kāraṇam / 
teṣāmapi hi pramāṇānāmanyaiḥ pramāṇaiḥ 
prasiddhiteṣāmanyairiti nāstyādiḥ / āderasadbhāvāt kuto 
madhyaṃ kuto ‘ntaḥ / tasmātteṣāṃ pramāṇānāmanyaiḥ 
pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhiriti yaduktaṃ tannopapadyata iti / 
If the pramāṇas are established by [other] pramāṇas, [then] there 
is an infinite series / 
[This being the case,] neither the beginning, nor the middle, nor 
the end can be established //32// 
If you think [that the] objects of true cognition (prameya) are 
established as such by the means of true cognition (pramāṇas), 
then there follows an infinite series (anavasthāprasaṅga).  What 
fault [is there] in an infinite series?  Because you think that these 
pramāṇas are established by other pramāṇas, and those other 
pramāṇas [through other pramāṇas], no beginning exists.  Without 
a beginning, how [can there be] a middle and end?  Consequently, 
your statement ‘the pramāṇas are established by [other] 
pramāṇas’ is not valid. 
Toward the very end of VV 31, Nāgārjuna discusses the case for other pramāṇas 
establishing some other pramāṇas.  But does this explanation work for us?  At VV 32, Nāgārjuna 
argues that this is not an acceptable resolution to the issue of the pramāṇas’ establishment.  
Why?  Simply because from such a position, ‘there follows an infinite series 
[anavasthāprasaṅga]’, and this particular sort of infinite regress is undesirable.  We already know 
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that Nāgārjuna is not afraid of accepting the occasional infinite regress – he fully accepts the 
infinite web of causation that is necessitated by pratītyasamutpāda, for example.  The difference 
is that the regress currently under discussion is vicious rather than virtuous: Westerhoff explains 
that the regression is vicious ‘since the burden of proof is transferred in its entirety to the 
preceding stage, as a [single] epistemic instrument would have to establish all the succeeding 
ones’ (Westerhoff, 2017).  The major difference between this type of infinite regress and the type 
of infinite regress present in discussion around pratītyasamutpāda is that in the latter case, one 
object or process is not 100% responsible for another.  The very idea of pratītyasamutpāda is 
that everything is linked in inextricable, intimate ways.  For every one object, there are huge 
numbers of intertwined causes and conditions.  The Buddhist position is that this stands in each 
and every causal relationship to have ever come to pass, it is one of the most fundamental of 
conventional truths.  Compare this to the infinite regress described at VV 31, where it is the case 
that every pramāṇa must be 100% established by a previous one, ad infinitum. 
This point is elaborated upon in VV 32, where Nāgārjuna specifies that the nub of the 
problem with an infinite regress of this type is that ‘neither the beginning, nor the middle, nor 
the end can be established’.  Beginnings, middles and ends are important in Buddhism.  They are 
especially important in Madhyamaka, which is, after all, claimed to be the ‘middle way’ between 
the extremes of absolutism and annihilationism.  Without an end, for example, liberation would 
be impossible – how might we end suffering if beginnings, middles and ends are not to be found?  
In our immediate context, if a beginning, middle and end of an entity such as a pramāṇa cannot 
be determined, then we run the risk of characterising it as eternal: how can an entity that has no 
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determinable beginning, middle or end possibly cause or be caused?104  If the pramāṇas have an 
infinite regress to other pramāṇas (one instrument establishes another instrument, which 
establishes another instrument, which… etc.), then they must have a start point and an end point, 
lest any notion of causation be rendered incoherent.  It seems that there needs to be an infinite 
trail of pramāṇas in order to validate even one single object of true cognition (prameya).  Further, 
at which point would the infinite trail of pramāṇas terminate in order make the step to establish 
the object?  It is difficult on these criteria to account for a process by which an infinite series of 
pramāṇas serving only to justify other pramāṇas then breaks from itself to establish not another 
pramāṇa, but a prameya instead.  The upshot here is that if the pramāṇas establish other 
pramāṇas, then it seems that this is all that they could do.  We would end up, for example, with 
the establishment of means of knowledge (a pramāṇa), but not of the thing known (a prameya).   
There is also an extra issue for the Naiyāyika if they wish to claim that the pramāṇas 
somehow possess svabhāva (and we have seen that they do indeed want to make this claim) and 
yet still have this reliance on other pramāṇas.  Discounting for a moment Nāgārjuna’s argument 
against infinite regressions, if pramāṇas self-establish in virtue of their svabhāva (recall from VV 
9 that the objectors do indeed think that existent objects possess svabhāva), they cannot possibly 
establish other objects (namely the prameyas) that also presumably possess a svabhāva.  
Nāgārjuna argues at MMK 15.1-2: 
na saṃbhavaḥ svabhāvasya yuktaḥ pratyayahetubhiḥ / 
hetupratyayasaṃbhūtaḥ svabhāvaḥ kṛtako bhavet //1// 
                                                        
104 If the pramāṇas are established in virtue of their svabhāva, then they are – when svabhāva is understood in 
ontological terms – necessarily eternal. 
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svabhāvaḥ kṛtako nāma bhaviṣyati punaḥ katham / 
aḳrtrimaḥ svabhāva hi nirakpekṣaḥ paratra ca //2// 
[An] intrinsic nature dependent upon causes and conditions is not 
possible / 
[An] intrinsic nature [that is] produced from causes and conditions 
would be a product //1// 
But how [can there] exist an intrinsic nature [that is] produced? / 
For an unproduced intrinsic nature is independent of anything else 
//2// 
Taken in context, the result would be that if each pramāṇa has an intrinsic nature, and if 
each prameya has an intrinsic nature, each pramāṇa could not possibly establish each (or indeed 
any) prameya.  The reasoning is very simple: for one thing to establish another is for one thing to 
cause another.  For Nāgārjuna, such causation can only be accounted for in conventional terms, 
viz. in virtue of emptiness (śūnyatā), and so an intrinsically existent entity causing another 
intrinsically existent entity is a non-starter.  The very definition of being intrinsically existent (and 
so possessing svabhāva) is – according to Nāgārjuna – to be uncaused by anything else.  It is for 
this reason that emptiness takes primacy in his philosophy, for it is only because of the emptiness 
of all entities that any change can occur, and thus it is via emptiness that liberation is possible.  
This is the central thesis of the MMK.  For Nāgārjuna then, if both pramāṇas and prameyas have 
svabhāva, then it is simply impossible for one to be established by the other.  Indeed, it is 
impossible for the pramāṇas to be established whatsoever: 
teṣāmatha pramāṇairvinā prasiddhirvihīyate vādaḥ / 
vaiṣamikatvaṃ tasminviśeṣahetuśca vaktavyaḥ //33// 
atha manyase teṣām pramāṇānāṃ vinā pramāṇaiḥ prasiddiḥ 
prameyāṇāṃ punararthānāṃ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhiriti evam sati 
yaste vādaḥ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhirarthānāṃ itis a hīyate / 
vaiṣamikatvaṃ ca bhavati keṣāṃcidarthānāṃ pramāṇaiḥ 
prasiddhiḥ keṣāṃcinneti / viṣeśahetuśca vaktavyo yena hetunā 
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keṣāṃcidarhtānāṃ pramāṇaih prasiddhiḥ keṣāṃcinneti / sa ca 
nopadiṣṭaḥ / tasmādiyamapi kalpanā nopapanneti / 
[OR:] atrāha / pramāṇānyeva svātmānaṃ parātmānaṃ ca 
prasādhayanti / yathoktaṃ / 
dyotayati svātmānaṃ yathā hutāśastathā parātmānaṃ / 
svāparātmānāvevaṃ prasādhayanti pramāṇānīti // 
[NR:] yathāgniḥ svātmānaṃ parātmānaṃ ca prakāśayati tathaiva 
pramāṇāni prasādhayanti svātmānaṃ parātmānaṃ ceti / 
atrocyate / 
[If you think that] these [pramāṇas] are established without the 
pramāṇas, [then] your doctrine is abandoned /  
[There is an] inequality, and you should state the special reason 
[for this inequality] //33// 
Now, [if] you think that those pramāṇas are established without 
[recourse to other] pramāṇas, [but that] the objects of true 
cognition are, however, established through the pramāṇas, [then] 
your doctrine that [all] objects are established through the 
pramāṇas is abandoned.  There is an inequality: some objects are 
established through the pramāṇas, and some are not.  The reason 
for this inequality – why some objects are established by the 
pramāṇas and others are not – should be stated, but it is not 
specified.  Thus, this hypothesis too is not justified. 
[Opponent’s reply:] 
The pramāṇas prove themselves as well as others.  As it is said: 
‘As fire illuminates itself and other objects, so too do the 
pramāṇas prove themselves and others.’ 
[Nāgārjuna’s reply:] 
As fire illuminates itself and others, so do the pramāṇas prove 
themselves and other objects.  [To this] we say…105 
                                                        
105 Nāgārjuna leaves open the last sentence – he goes on in subsequent verses (I do not intend to address the 
ensuing verses in detail here) to attack the idea that fire is self-illuminating and argues that if fire illuminates itself, 
it must also be said to consume itself; an absurd position to hold. 
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Having established that the Naiyāyikas cannot feasibly hold that the pramāṇas are 
established by other pramāṇas, Nāgārjuna now pits this conclusion against the Naiyāyika 
assumption that the pramāṇas establish the objects of cognition (prameyas).  Thus at VV 33, he 
asks how it can be the case that the pramāṇas establish prameyas but cannot establish 
themselves: 
Now, [if] you think that those pramāṇas are established without 
[recourse to other] pramāṇas [but that] the objects of true 
cognition, are, however, established through the pramāṇas, [then] 
your doctrine that [all] objects are established through the 
pramāṇas is abandoned. 
This argument is relatively straightforward.  If the pramāṇas are not established via other 
pramāṇas, then the thesis that everything knowable is established via the pramāṇas fails.  This 
is because the pramāṇas themselves are apparently not established via themselves or by other 
things of the same type.  Why is this a problem?  Simply because the pramāṇas are supposed to 
be known to us.  The idea is that all psycho-physical objects can be known via the pramāṇas, but 
according to Nāgārjuna’s refutations laid out here, the pramāṇas themselves cannot be known – 
an obvious pitfall.  We need to know what our means of valid knowledge are before we know if 
they have been deployed in such a way that we have gained valid knowledge.  The idea of valid 
knowledge is useless to us unless we know that there are definite ways by which we can acquire 
it.  The second problem to be explained is, according to Nāgārjuna, that the Naiyāyika apparently 
holds the position that the pramāṇas establish the prameyas, but the pramāṇas themselves 
remain unestablished.  Thus,  
[t]here is an inequality: some objects are established through the 
pramāṇas, and some are not.  The reason for this inequality – why 
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some objects are established by the pramāṇas and others are not – 
should be stated, but it is not specified.  Thus, this hypothesis too is 
not justified. 
The Naiyāyikas do not specify why this seemingly arbitrary distinction is made – why is it 
that some things are established by the pramāṇas and other things are not?  The response from 
the Nyāya adherent is that ‘[a]s fire illuminates itself and other objects, so too do the pramāṇas 
prove themselves and others.’  This is, to Nāgārjuna, simply absurd: he holds that if fire 
illuminates itself, it must also be said to consume itself.  Given that this analogy is absurd, so too 
is the idea that pramāṇas establish themselves and other objects in the same way.  For 
Nāgārjuna, much as fire cannot illuminate itself unless it also consumes and destroys itself, the 
pramāṇas cannot establish themselves without falling into the same trap of absurdity.   
So what is left of the pramāṇas?  It would, I think, be to place the cart before the horse 
to argue that because Nāgārjuna thinks that there are no established pramāṇas he also thinks 
that there is no knowledge.  If this were the case, his own Buddhist project would be fatally 
undermined.106  If we cannot know anything, then the means to liberation is compromised.  
Further, even knowing that there can be any liberation would be on this account, it seems, 
impossible.  We could not know about pratītyasamutpāda, we could not know about the Four 
Noble Truths, we could not know that the Buddha’s methods work, and so on for all aspects of 
Buddhist praxis.  We would not even be able to know about dissatisfaction (duḥkha) broadly 
construed, and so would not know that we are dissatisfied!  It should go without saying that 
Nāgārjuna does not want to completely undermine the Buddhist path – he is a Buddhist, and he 
                                                        
106 There are those that think that it is! Burton (2001) is one such example. 
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thinks that the Buddha’s methods for liberation are efficacious.  Clearly, then, Nāgārjuna 
acknowledges that we can know things about the world.  The issue is clearly one of 
’establishment’, which is to say it is a problem of proving intrinsic existence.  Pramāṇas establish 
the existence of prameyas and it is by using the framework that results from this interaction that 
Naiyāyikas build their definitions of correct knowledge.  It is important to bear in mind that these 
endeavours are not fundamentally concerned with explaining the world as it is (as is for example, 
the modern scientific/empirical method), but rather with explaining how we might reach 
liberation.  The same is true for Nāgārjuna.  It is soteriological aims which underpin all of this 
wrangling, not a scientific understanding of the world.  To put it in starker terms, Nāgārjuna is 
concerned with a prescriptive account of liberation, not with a descriptive account of reality. 
Instead, I propose a more nuanced reading – one that is in principle acceptable to Śaṅkara 
when it comes to knowledge of the world around us.  Nāgārjuna clearly thinks that the pramāṇas 
cannot exist ultimately, and I think that for the Mādhyamika, a knock-on effect of this stance is 
that they cannot give an account of the ultimate, either.  We are faced then with a situation in 
which the pramāṇas offer – at best – a conventional explanation of the world around us.  That is 
to say that whilst the pramāṇas might be useful tools in navigating the conventional world, they 
offer no input as regards the status of the ultimate.  It seems to me that Śaṅkara must also 
broadly subscribe to this view, for although he allows recourse to pramāṇas in order to facilitate 
liberating insight, he also holds that ultimately, such means of knowledge are formulaic, largely 
reliant on language and consequently ineffective.  It seems to me that for Śaṅkara, the pramāṇas 
are conventional insofar as they allow a practitioner to discern truth within the world of māyā.  
The end goal is to transcend the world of māyā.  Although liberation does not consist in physically 
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moving beyond the world of illusion, it does require an intuitive gnosis of the Absolute ātman-
Brahman, and in the end, it is only this gnosis that matters: all attempts to capture it, describe it 
and so on are, as we have seen, doomed to failure.  As such, even in a situation where there is 
belief in an Absolute and the end goal is some gnosis of it, the pramāṇas must be ultimately 
inadequate in providing any definitive knowledge of it.  The pramāṇas can orientate, but they 
cannot strictly be used as a yardstick against which the ultimate is to be measured.  This would, 
I suggest, need to be Śaṅkara’s final position.   
It would be tempting to argue that this is also necessarily true of Nāgārjuna’s position.  
Indeed, I suspect that Bhattacharya would argue this, and I am convinced that a thinker like Murti 
would, too.107  It cannot, however, be the case that Nāgārjuna holds an identical view to Śaṅkara 
on this matter.  It might be the case that Nāgārjuna could in principle assign some value to the 
pramāṇas in much the same way that Śaṅkara does.108  That is to say that Nāgārjuna could in 
principle view the pramāṇas as useful conventional designations that provide practitioners with 
a yardstick by which to measure what is conventionally true.  As a Buddhist, he would of course 
have recourse to fewer pramāṇas than Śaṅkara (Buddhists generally allow only two (sometimes 
three, as we saw earlier): perception and inference), but these two can in principle be useful in 
navigating the world as it is experienced conventionally.  As is the case for Śaṅkara, Nāgārjuna 
                                                        
107 R. Ninian Smart pulls no punches when he writes that ‘Murti, who disliked having foreign and homegrown 
untouchables studying works flowing from a sacred revelation (he was a Brahmin, of course), thought that his 
version of Madhyamaka was a "poor man's Advaita”’ (McCagney, 1997: xi).  This attitude manifests in Murti’s 
writing and – owing to his citing of Murti’s ideas – risks being represented in the writing of Bhattacharya. 
108 It at least seems to me that Śaṅkara should view the pramāṇas in this way. 
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too would need to jettison the notion that the pramāṇas can provide some sort of ultimate 
knowledge.  We have seen in the discussion of the VV above that Nāgārjuna’s real issue with the 
pramāṇas is twofold: first, he argues against the idea that the pramāṇas are or can be ‘ultimately’ 
established.  That is simply to say that he does not think that the pramāṇas could have svabhāva.  
With this being the case, they are not in a position to ‘establish’ that which exists with svabhāva 
(for the Advaitin, this would be the ātman-Brahman).  This is, of course, the second issue with 
which Nāgārjuna grapples: the scope of the pramāṇas.  How can that which is not ‘established’ 
itself (i.e. that which does not have svabhāva) then ‘establish’ something else (with a svabhāva)?  
In other words, how might an unestablished pramāṇa establish a prameya (that to be known; 
the ātman-Brahman)?  Interestingly, the issue of scope also presents itself for the Advaitin, albeit 
in a different way than it presents for the Mādhyamika.  I shall explain how this is the case. 
Although the Advaitin must concede the inadequacy of the pramāṇas in capturing the 
ultimate character of the ātman-Brahman, they do still have a use in terms of the ultimate: they 
confirm that there is an ultimate/Absolute.  Indeed, we have seen at the beginning of this 
subsection that for Śaṅkara, it is the authority of scripture that proves the existence of the 
Brahman.  These same scriptures then use analogy to build on the assertion of Brahman’s 
existence in order that we might orientate ourselves towards it.  The difference between the role 
of pramāṇas for the Advaitin and the role of pramāṇas for the Mādhyamika is then that for the 
Advaitin, even if they do not (indeed they cannot) provide any true account of the ultimate’s real 
nature (which is ineffable), they do at least establish something as ultimately immanent.  For the 
Mādhyamika, the pramāṇas as accounted for in the literature of the Advaitins – much like that 
of the Naiyāyikas – cannot account for anything in an ultimate sense.  Nāgārjuna thus rejects the 
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pramāṇas so conceived by his opponents, though I do not think that he would strictly need to 
disregard them in a conventional sense if it was accepted that they have no svabhāva.109  In such 
a scenario, the pramāṇas might provide some expedient means by which we can navigate the 
world of convention.  But this is all that the pramāṇas could do, and this is a very limited 
application.  If the pramāṇas do not account for anything in an ultimate sense, then why bother 
with them at all?  They are, after all, designed to protect the practitioner against error and 
mistaken positions by providing a metric through which they can ascertain ‘true’ statements and 
beliefs about the world. 
McCagney writes that whilst Nāgārjuna and his followers did not explicitly answer 
questions regarding how the mind objectifies concepts or about the nature of error, neither did 
they simply disregard them (1997: 42).  The point for Nāgārjuna is, I am at pains to repeat, not to 
give an account of the world, but to give an account of the means to liberation.  McCagney writes 
about the nature of error that ‘such questions were dismissed for philosophical and soteriological 
reasons.  The Madhyamaka effort concerned the radical purification of mental fictions rather 
than an explanation of error’ (1997: 42).  As such, I think that we can assume that Nāgārjuna’s 
reluctance to speak about pramāṇas outside of his argument with the Naiyāyikas stems from his 
seeing both the pramāṇas and further discussion of them as a waste of time.  After all, the 
Madhyamaka project is not to system build, but to tear down systems systematically!   Nāgārjuna 
                                                        
109 This would stand in contrast to Buddhists like Dharmakīrti who have no qualms about integrating svabhāva into 
theoretical frameworks.  For Dharmakīrti, svabhāva and ‘essential connections’ are crucial to his account of 
inference.  Of course, Dharmakīrti also argues for the existence of ultimately real dharmas, something that 
Nāgārjuna vociferously disputes. 
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takes seriously prapañca (conceptual proliferation), and it seems to me that he would likely 
consider the pramāṇas to be an instance of conceptual proliferation; a pointless reification that 
serves no real soteriological purpose.   
With what, then, are we left?  Nāgārjuna does not view the pramāṇas as useful expedients 
by which to remove error, false views and so on.  Instead, they are at worst a manifestation of 
those false views (especially if as the Naiyāyikas claim, they have svabhāva) and do more harm 
than good.  At best, they are needless reifications that do no real work.  Even if they could tell us 
something about the conventional world, this is for Nāgārjuna inadequate, for we have already 
noted that he is not at all interested in giving an account of the world.  Instead, Nāgārjuna thinks 
that we can simply undercut the work allegedly done by the pramāṇas.  As McCagney puts it, 
‘[t]he point, for the Mādhyamikas, is not to understand the source of error, but to eliminate it’ 
(1997: 43), and Nāgārjuna’s preferred means of achieving this is not by talking about concepts 
and phenomena and judging them according to pramāṇas, but by simply halting the reification 
and proliferation of concepts to begin with.  Obviously, this is a radical, fundamental aim.  The 
pramāṇas cannot exist with svabhāva and as such are as transient and reified as the next concept.  
Treating them as some peculiarly established thing by which we can attain an established 
‘knowledge’ is a problem – put simply, nothing is established because nothing exists 
independently of another (viz. nothing exists with svabhāva).   
McCagney discusses the ‘establishment’ of entities at some length.  She sums up the 
Nāgārjunian notion thus (1997: 60): 
[N]o event [or entity] can exist independently of another since it 
would depend on there being another from which it could differ. If 
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the event [or entity] did have independent existence (svabhāva), it 
could not exist in relation (dependent on conditions) and so it could 
not exist at all. And if svabhāva (self-nature) causes another event 
[or entity] to arise, that event [or entity] would be "other-nature" 
and the original condition would not exist independently or 
essentially. 
All of this metaphysical deconstruction relies on śūnyatā – the emptiness of svabhāva – 
of all entities.  McCagney instead translates śūnyatā as ‘openness’, which is probably not as much 
of a stretch as it first seems.  If we think of a vast, open space, we might say that it is ‘empty’.  
McCagney repeatedly forces the point that in various places in the Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā, 
śūnyatā is used in conjunction with metaphors of space (ākāśa), writing that ‘[t]he symbols in 
early Prajñāpāramitā texts show that the Mahayana notion of ākāśa derives from meditation 
(dhyāna) on the sky, which is experienced as vast, luminous and without boundaries’ (1997: XX).  
This would mean that Nāgārjuna’s equation of śūnyatā and pratītyasamutpāda amounts to an 
endorsement of ‘the openness or limitlessness of events’ (1997: XX), which does not in turn imply 
anything permanent (nitya), unmade (akriyate), independent (nirapekṣaḥ paratra), or without 
causes and conditions (ahetu pratyaya).  In other words, Nāgārjuna is equating the openness or 
limitlessness of events with a lack of svabhāva, which is indeed permanent, unmade, 
independent, and without causes and conditions. 
I want to insist here that Nāgārjuna (and so the Madhyamaka in general) repeatedly 
denies that anything can be substantial, permanent, uncaused and independent.  It should then 
be obvious that this includes any substantial entity such as the ātman-Brahman.  Even when the 
diligent Mādhyamika moves beyond such dualisms as existence and nonexistence – asserting 
neither for fear of inadvertently attaching oneself to a view (dṛṣṭi), the question, such as it is, 
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remains open-ended.  Nāgārjuna does not appear to be denying that things appear to exist, only 
that things exist ultimately; permanently, uncaused, self-sufficiently, with svabhāva.  They do not 
exist in the manner in which we uncritically take them to exist.  As nonexistence is defined in 
opposition to existence, he does not claim that any entity does not exist, either.  Buddhapālita 
(translated by Paul Williams) writes that 
(57) Therefore the meaning of dependent designation is precisely 
that an entity which is dependently designated cannot be said to be 
existent or nonexistent because it is completely empty of intrinsic 
nature. [But] there is no fault in a conventional statement (tha 
snyad kyi tshig, probably vyavahāra-vacana or -vākya). 
He continues further, clarifying why this is the case: 
(58) How is it logically possible to say that the Tathāgata, who is  
dependently designated, either exists or does not exist? For if a 
Tathāgata existed, he would just exist, even without an  
appropriation, but he does not exist without an appropriation. How 
can one who does not exist without an appropriation be said to 
exist? How, too, can a Tathāgata who is dependently designated be 
said not to exist? For a nonexisting uḍumbara flower cannot be 
designated. 
(Williams, 2005: 33-34) 
The idea here is that the Madhyamaka position that anything that does not exist with 
svabhāva is ‘dependently designated’.  It is because the Mādhyamika rejects the claim that 
anything exists with svabhāva that they must also stop short of asserting existence or 
nonexistence.  For the Mādhyamika, existence and nonexistence are similarly problematic 
trappings: real ‘existence’ (with svabhāva) denotes entities that are immutable and ahetu 
pratyaya; real ‘nonexistence’ (without svabhāva) would thus denote entities that did not appear 
in the first place.  This is very clearly not what Nāgārjuna and his followers think is going on in the 
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world.  If existence by/with svabhāva obtained in the world, then every existent entity would be 
ultimately grounded in virtue of its ultimately existent intrinsic nature (svabhāva).  Any existent 
entity must have svabhāva (and so must necessarily exist).  It cannot do otherwise.  This means 
it cannot come into existence, change, or go out of existence (because for Nāgārjuna, to have 
svabhāva is to be permanently, necessarily existent).  The significance of this understanding of 
the world cannot be overstated.  According to that same svabhāva doctrine, then, it is impossible 
for there to be an entity without svabhāva because all existent entities necessarily have 
svabhāva. 110   To speak of a nonexistent entity is then nonsensical.  Hence Buddhapālita’s 
insistence that the Mādhyamika assert neither existence nor nonexistence: neither is 
appropriate, both result in states of affairs that are demonstrably false.  Instead, Buddhapālita 
follows Nāgārjuna in claiming that entities cannot exist by svabhāva, but can and do exist 
conventionally as designations.111 
The point of refusing to subscribe to a dṛṣṭi that asserts either existence or nonexistence 
is purely soteriological.  As we have already seen, the Mādhyamika method aims not to give an 
account of the world, but instead to expedite our liberation from duḥkha (dissatisfaction).  To 
assert a monism in an entity akin to the ātman-Brahman is for Nāgārjuna a manifestation of 
avidyā (ignorance; mischaracterisation) in much the same way that asserting the ultimacy of a 
                                                        
110 This might seem a peculiar way to use a phrase such as ‘existent entity’.  The idea is that an entity with 
svabhāva is basic, like the dharmas with which Nāgārjuna is so concerned.  For such an entity to be ‘really 
existent’, it must exist with svabhāva.  If it does not, then it is derivatively existent, not ultimate and ‘not really 
existent’. 
111 Even ‘exists’ is here used only conventionally, viz. without any substance (svabhāva) underpinning it.   
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pramāṇa or a dharma is avidyā.  It is to reify a concept under which nothing really falls and assign 
it a permanence that is according to Nāgārjuna demonstrably impossible.  This stands in stark 
opposition to Śaṅkara and subsequent Advaitins, for whom – as we have seen – the permanent 
(nitya) uncaused (ahetu) ātman-Brahman is the solution to avidyā (ignorance; misconception) 
and all that avidyā entails.   
It should now be clear why Nāgārjuna jettisons the very notion of pramāṇas after 
attacking them in the VV:  pramāṇas are nothing but instantiations of prapañca, and such 
instantiations ought to be removed at the root.  Each pramāṇa is a dṛṣṭi: it is a view regarding 
what can or cannot be considered a means to valid knowledge and in turn establishes the 
prameya (thing to be known).  They – as we have seen – usually apply to metaphysical concerns 
such as the nature of Reality (knowledge of the ātman-Brahman).  Part of Nāgārjuna’s issue with 
pramāṇas then is that he does not think that they can actually do anything given that svabhāva 
cannot exist – this has been demonstrated above.  The other part of the issue is that Nāgārjuna 
does not think that there is an ultimate reality to be known via these means of knowledge.  How 
can an epistemic instrument provide a means to knowledge about an entity that cannot be 
established as existent?  We cannot know about what is not there to be known!  By extension, 
the ātman-Brahman is not established primarily because Nāgārjuna thinks that all phenomena 
are ‘selfless’ (lacking svabhāva) and insubstantial (nairātmya).  If the ātman-Brahman were 
existent in the way that Advaitins require it to be, it would exist with svabhāva and so have 
substantiality: indeed, it could be the only substantial entity and the only svabhāva. 
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§4: Advaita and Buddhism  
In this section, I will give a brief account of the relationship between Advaita Vedānta  and 
Buddhism, illustrating some doctrinal developments from Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara and their 
relation to Buddhist doctrines.  From there, I will attempt to demarcate how Śaṅkara viewed 
contemporary Buddhist schools, and then detail some important ways in which both the 
Madhyamaka and Yogācāra schools differ from Śaṅkaran Advaita in relation to seeking liberation 
within a substantial Absolute.  Given that out of the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra schools it is 
generally thought that it is the Yogācāra that veers most closely to an Advaitin form of Buddhism, 
this section will primarily be concerned with Vasubandhu’s conception of Yogācāra.  My intention 
in focussing on Vasubandhu is primarily to demonstrate that despite claims from scholars such 
as Bhattacharya and Murti, absolutism need not be a necessary consequence of Yogācāra 
philosophy. 
First, to the Upaniṣads.  Frank Whaling (1979: 21) attests that taking the Upaniṣads 
literally when they make positive attributions to the ātman-Brahman was traditionally the norm: 
Hindu predecessors to Śaṅkara’s forerunner, Gauḍapāda, had indeed ‘taken the Upaniṣadic 
creation texts literally’, and though they taught the sole reality of Brahman, they had also 
‘allowed the possibility of modifications in Brahman, and even of parts to Brahman’ (1979: 21).  
It was Gauḍapāda that rejected the apparent dualism of unity and diversity within Brahman and 
‘insisted that duality was unreal and that advaita [non-duality] was ultimate’ (Whaling, 1979: 21), 
and so it was really with Gauḍapāda that the big doctrinal switch was made in Advaita. 
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Gauḍapāda, writes Whaling, was then the first Advaitin to systematically reform Vedānta: 
he rejected the traditional view of ritual as a means to liberation; stressed ‘the identity of the jīva 
and Brahman, and insisted that their difference was only apparent’; rejected the early Vedas as 
authoritative, and rejected the contemporary Vedāntin view that ‘there was a genuine 
transformation of Brahman into the world and the world into Brahman’ (1979: 22).   Gauḍapāda 
was undoubtedly a reformer. 
  Whilst Whaling concedes that it is at least possible that such a Vedāntin revolution could 
have been entirely internal, he concludes that on the balance of probabilities, it is much more 
likely that Gauḍapāda was either directly or indirectly influenced by Buddhism than it is that a 
newly-reformed Vedānta influenced the comparably strong and well-established Mahāyāna 
schools (Whaling, 1979: 22-23).  Importantly, Whaling argues that this ‘does not mean that 
[Gauḍapāda] has become a Buddhist or that he has forsaken Vedānta’, but only that he has 
‘merely reinterpreted the message of the Upaniṣads in the language and thought forms of his 
day, and in so doing, he paved the way for Śaṅkara to carry on his work in a more systematic way’ 
(1979: 21).  It was with Gauḍapāda that Advaita began to take its form most recognisable to us 
today, and it is from Gauḍapāda, says Whaling, that Śaṅkara inherited the means by which he 
would expound Advaita in contrast to Buddhism.  
It is in consideration of contact between the newly-reformed Advaita and the established 
Buddhist schools that Whaling (1979: 5) asks ‘[d]id Śaṅkara understand Buddhism?’  This is of 
significance to this work, because Śaṅkara’s understanding of Buddhism (or, potentially, lack 
thereof) is of some significance when attempting to eke out points of conflict between Buddhism 
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and Advaita.  Furthermore, determining – as best we can, at any rate – what Śaṅkara actually 
thought about his Buddhist cotemporaries is perhaps the best way of establishing if Śaṅkara saw 
for himself the similarities that Bhattacharya apparently does between his doctrine and those of 
the Buddhists.  This is especially relevant if – as I am inclined to think – Buddhist schools 
contemporary to Śaṅkara (such as Madhyamaka) do not actually share or endorse his type of 
absolutism. 
 Obviously, this question is different to the one initially posed by Bhattacharya, which 
effectively asks if the Buddha is an Advaitin,112 but I hope that the pertinence that the question 
of Śaṅkara’s relationship to Buddhism has to the wider question asked by Bhattacharya is so 
obvious as to negate the need for any further justification.  In examining the relationship between 
Advaita and the Upaniṣads, I hope to glean some sort of understanding relating to Bhattacharya’s 
own obvious predilection for an Advaitic reading of the Upaniṣads and the means by which this 
might affect his view of both precanonical and canonical Buddhism.   
It might be thought that if the Buddha had effectively been espousing the same doctrine 
as Śaṅkara, then Śaṅkara would himself would have recognised this and been aware of portions 
of – if not most of – the contemporary Buddhist corpus.  Whether or not he would admit this is 
a different matter – it is possible that such an acknowledgement by Śaṅkara was prevented owing 
                                                        
112 Ostensibly, Bhattacharya presents a thesis that the Buddha re-hashes pre-existing Upaniṣadic ideas in a novel 
way, viz. that he placed less emphasis on the philosophy, and more emphasis on the path.  The implication seems 
to be that this novelty is the reason why Buddhism survived as a path distinct from the Advaita that it somehow 
duplicates.  Nevertheless, Bhattacharya thinks that the Buddha’s path affirms in every significant way the existence 
of the Upaniṣadic ātman-Brahman (2015: 209-210), and further, that this advocates the same sort of liberation as 
popularised by Śaṅkara.  If true, this would make the Buddha – at least in principle – an Advaitin of the same sort 
as Śaṅkara.  (Technically, I suppose, it would make Śaṅkara an Advaitin of the same sort as the Buddha!) 
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to sectarian reasons.  I suspect that for Bhattacharya, this issue might be no more than peripheral, 
for if, as he argues in his book, the Buddha simply laid a soteriological path based upon Upaniṣadic 
doctrine, Śaṅkara’s doing the same centuries later is simply testament to the veracity and validity 
of those very same Upaniṣads.  There is nothing strange in and of itself in the idea that two people 
restated the same ideas at two separate points in time, especially if, as argued, their starting 
points were the same.  Thus, the real point of interest is in the Buddha’s alleged adherence to 
Upaniṣadic principles.  How we understand what these Upaniṣadic principles actually are, 
however, relies on numerous factors, not least of which are the significantly different 
interpretations of the same scriptures by different Hindu schools, none of which I have the space 
or time to cover in any great detail.  Additionally, it is nevertheless a point of historical fact that 
Buddhism developed as a tradition outside of and not cognate with, Hindu thought in general.  If 
the Buddha really did expound the same doctrine as both the Upaniṣads and Śaṅkara, then we 
might expect there to be an explanation for this quirk of history, and it would not be 
unreasonable to expect this reason to be already well established.  On balance, then, 
investigating the links between Śaṅkaran Advaita and its contemporary Buddhist schools might 
prove fruitful in determining how best to read both the Upaniṣadic conception of ātman-
Brahman and its relation to the Buddhism of the Nikāyas and the Mahāyāna.  
  On the question of Śaṅkara’s understanding of Buddhism, Whaling has a lot to say.  First, 
he argues that Śaṅkara himself recognised – and thus, presumably engaged with – three Buddhist 
schools: the Sarvāstivādins, Mādhyamikas, and the Yogācārins.  We immediately notice that 
Śaṅkara does not appear to engage with the ‘precanonical’ Buddhism with which Lindtner, 
Bhattacharya and Albahari are all concerned.  This is at least partly understandable given that it 
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was not the Theravāda that was present in India during Śaṅkara’s lifetime, but the Mahāyāna, 
and so, even with its waning influence, it is natural that it is the Mahāyāna that bore the full 
extent of Śaṅkara’s criticism.  In narrower terms relevant to the current project, it is worth 
recalling that Bhattacharya claims that it is the Mahāyāna schools of Buddhism ‘which put things 
right’ in terms of how ātman is treated doctrinally (2015: 39), and so Śaṅkara’s focus on these 
three Mahāyāna schools is for these reasons unproblematic.  His attitudes to these schools, in 
fact, should allow us to gain insight into Śaṅkara’s wider views relating to Buddhist doctrine, and 
thus allow us to begin to assess the extent to which he himself – and consequently, his system of 
Advaita – was influenced by Buddhism.  This should in turn allow us to make some sort of 
judgement regarding the precise extent to which Advaita and the Mahāyāna accord; a crucial 
point if there is any weight to Bhattacharya’s assertion that it was the Mahāyāna ‘which put 
things right’ in terms of reverting back to the Upaniṣadic conception of ātman-Brahman (2015: 
39). 
Whaling (1979: 4) argues that as Śaṅkara’s arguments against Sarvāstivādin doctrine 
coincide with those of Bhāskara, we can probably adduce that these criticisms are not original to 
Śaṅkara, but are both drawn ‘from the same common source’, viz. these arguments are the stock 
Vedāntin refutations against the Sarvāstivādins.  The generic Vedāntin response to the 
Sarvāstivādin dharma theory is that if ‘basic elements did exist and act independently, then there 
[is] no reason why they should ever cease to do so, thus the conditions for cessation of activity 
in the sense of nirvāṇa would be jeopardised’ (1979: 4).  The idea here being that if there were 
independently existent atomic particles making up the entirety of what we perceive as reality, 
then there could be no hope of liberation.  Why is this?  Well, because if reality really does consist 
P a g e  | 148 
 
of independent elements that express their reality in spite of the other elements around them, 
there is no reason to suppose that we can affect these independent elements and stop their 
expression in order to bring around liberation.  In other words, independently existent particles 
of this sort would necessarily be such that we could not affect their existence (because they are 
independently existent and so are unaffected by the operations of existent particles or forces 
outside of themselves).  This takes a particularly problematic turn when we think of defilements 
and negative traits.  If suffering is the manifestation of independently-existent atomic particles 
(as it necessarily has to be if the whole of reality consists of these particles), then there is no 
reason to suppose that we can ever stop these particles from expressing their realities (viz. we 
could not stop the relevant dharmas from expressing defilements and so propagating suffering).  
Very simply, we could not bring about the cessation of activity that supposedly characterises 
nirvāṇa.  For the Advaitin, this particular problem is conveniently bypassed: reality consists of 
ātman-Brahman and the empirical world is no more than an ultimately unreal expression of 
Brahman: only Brahman is real, and everything in the empirical world derives a sort of 
conventional, contingent reality from the ultimate reality of Brahman (Rambachan, 2006: 77).   
Interestingly, the Vedāntin argument against such essentially existent atomic elements is 
very similar to that offered by Nāgārjuna in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and by Vasubandhu in 
the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya.  Against Sarvāstivādin dharma theory, Nāgārjuna claimed that 
nirvāṇa could not be existent without being characterised by old age and death, which would in 
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turn mean that nirvāṇa, is conditioned rather than ultimate.113  In a similar vein to the Advaitins, 
Nāgārjuna argues throughout the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā that if the basic elements of empirical 
reality that combine to constitute all psycho-physical phenomena (the Sarvāstivādin dharmas) 
were independently existent, immutable and permanent, there could be no hope for liberation.  
Why not?  For precisely the same reason put forth by Śaṅkara: their immutability means that 
they will never stop being the way they are; nothing we could possibly do would ever affect such 
independent, self-sufficient entities.  This in turn means that the change in conditions required 
for liberation can never (and could never in the future) be achieved.  This, think both Śaṅkara and 
Nāgārjuna, negates the possibility of independently existent, permanent elements existing in a 
world where liberation is possible.  As liberation is the highest goal and – significantly – regarded 
as an accurate scriptural inference (as well as being demonstrably possible), the existence of 
permanent, independently existent atomic elements is rejected. 
                                                        
113 MMK 25.4-5: 
bhāvas tāvan na nirvāṇaṃ jarāmaraṇalakṣaṇam /  
prasajyetāsti bhāvo hi na jarāmaraṇaṃ vinā //4// 
bhāvaś ca yadi nirvāṇaṃ nirvāṇaṃ saṃskṛtaṃ bhavet / 
nāsaṃskṛto hi vidyate bhāvaḥ kva cana kaś cana //5// 
Nirvāṇa is not an existent; [if it were, its having] the characteristics of decay and death would 
follow / 
No existent is without [the characteristics of] decay and death //4// 
And if nirvāṇa were an existent, nirvāṇa would be conditioned / 
An unconditioned existent is never found anywhere  //5// 
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To elaborate, for the Madhyamaka Buddhists as well as the Advaitins, anything that is 
empirically existent is not – and what is more, cannot be – ultimately existent.114  On the face of 
things, though, this looks problematic for Bhattacharya’s claim that the Buddhist nirvāṇa is 
identical with the Upaniṣadic ātman-Brahman.  Śaṅkara (and, we may assume, by extension, 
Bhattacharya) characterise the Brahman as being – in the words of Rambachan – ‘timeless and 
present in all states and mental conditions’ (2006: 21).  There looks to be a degree of tension 
here if the Brahman is timeless and ever-present (eternal and thus unconditioned) but the 
nirvāṇa with which this Brahman is supposed to be identical is nonexistent (read: not ultimately 
existent) and thus conditioned (impermanent, unreal).  I do not think it controversial to postulate 
that Bhattacharya would respond that from the ultimate perspective, there is only an apparent 
tension and that Nāgārjuna is advocating the transcendence of descriptions like ‘existent’, 
‘nonexistent’, ‘conditioned’ and ‘unconditioned’.  On this I concede that he would be – in part, at 
                                                        
114 Hugh Nicholson points out that this sort of distinction between conditioned and unconditioned was a distinctly 
Śaṅkaran progression in Advaita, writing that Śaṅkara ‘introduced a hitherto unknown distinction between the 
conditioned and unconditioned forms of brahman’ that was ‘perhaps borrow[ed] from some version of the 
Buddhist Two Truths doctrine’ (Nicholson, 2007: 531).  We find superficial parallels regarding the conditioned and 
unconditioned in Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.  Some examples can be found at 1.10, 5.2 and 7.16 where 
Nāgārjuna argues that whatever exists in dependence (viz. is conditioned) is necessarily without an intrinsic nature, 
and whatever entity is without an intrinsic nature or defining characteristic (svabhāva) is unreal (not ultimately 
real).  At 7.33, Nāgārjuna goes one further and shows that this is only part of the story: the unconditioned cannot 
be ultimately real, either.  This is why the similarities are only superficial: Nāgārjuna thinks that because we cannot 
ultimately explain how conditioned things exist, then we cannot ultimately explain how unconditioned things exist, 
either.  For this reason, both ‘conditioned’ and ‘unconditioned’ entities and states are ultimately unreal, and 
Madhyamaka philosophy undergoes a divergence from, rather than a convergence with, the sort of liberation 
attested by Śaṅkaran Advaita.  For this reason, it cannot be claimed that the Mahāyānists ‘put things right’ in 
relation to the Upaniṣadic ātman-Brahman.  Very simply, the troubles associated with clinging to any sort of 
permanent entity whilst simultaneously seeking liberation should preclude the Mādhyamika from positing any 
entity of a similar sort to the ātman-Brahman.  For the Advaitin, even though the Brahman is ultimately nondual 
and beyond conception, it is at least Real (indeed, it is the only Reality).  Nāgārjuna would surely reject any such 
assertion as an example of reification. 
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least – correct.  What, then, might be said about nirvāṇa from a Madhyamaka viewpoint?  Siderits 
and Katsura read Nāgārjuna as wrestling with whether nirvāṇa might be an existent (viz. a 
positive being, or bhāva), a nonexistent (viz. a negative being, abhāva), both, or neither (2013: 
292).  The conclusion reached at the end of the 25th chapter of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā is 
that nirvāṇa cannot possibly be any of these things: Nāgārjuna explicitly equates nirvāṇa to 
saṃsāra at MMK 25.19 and then goes on to refute the notion that even nirvāṇa can exist 
ultimately!  At this point, it is sufficient to say that the support for his thesis that Bhattacharya 
expects from Madhyamaka philosophy looks to be at risk from the very outset.115 
Another interesting caveat that provides some illumination into Śaṅkara’s attitudes to 
first, other doctrines, and second, matters of history is that he appears to conflate two 
Sarvāstivādin schools and criticise them as one entity.  As we know, there can be significant 
doctrinal and practical differences between sects that are ostensibly subsumed under the same 
school of thought: Śaṅkara himself has stark doctrinal differences from the other Vedāntin 
schools!  Nevertheless, in an attitude that Whaling opines is ‘typical of his indifference to history’ 
(1979: 6), Śaṅkara conflates the doctrines of the Sautrāntikas and the Vaibhāṣikas.  I will spend a 
little time illustrating how this is the case because I think that it sheds some light on two things: 
                                                        
115 Added to which, Śaṅkara seems to classify the Mādhyamikas as ‘nihilists’ (Śaṅkara, 2011: 401); a familiar charge 
against the school that persists to this day.  This is odd if, as Bhattacharya suggests when he cites K. Venkata 
Ramanan, both the Mādhyamikas and Śaṅkara are in agreement regarding the ātman-Brahman: 
…one can say that the one accepts or denies the ātman as much as the other; 
both [the Mādhyamika and the Advaita Vedānta] deny ātman as a separate 
substantial entity inhabiting the body of each individual, and both accept ātman 
in the sense of the essential nature, the svarūpa or the svabhāva, of the 
individual as well as of all things. (2015: 114, note 249) 
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first, on Śaṅkara’s apparent ignorance regarding the intricacies of Buddhist doctrine, and so his 
ignorance of the Buddhist path to liberation.  Second, on the diversity of opinion in early 
Buddhism as to how liberation might be reached and by extension, as to what constituted an 
accurate portrayal of the Buddha’s teachings.  Both of these factors interrelate with my 
investigation into Bhattacharya’s reading of both the Upaniṣads (and thus Advaita) and early 
Buddhism.  Given that Śaṅkara was at least partly concerned with refuting contemporary schools 
of Buddhism (in what seems to have been a successful attempt to consolidate Advaita in India), 
we might think ourselves justified in assuming that he was indeed aware of (at least some of) the 
doctrinal differences between the rival schools that he was attacking.  That Śaṅkara was at least 
superficially aware of some differences (viz. that he was aware that there were fundamental 
differences between the three schools he attacks) is made clear in Vedānta Sūtra 2.II.32 (Śaṅkara, 
2011: 428).  Here, he writes that the ‘Buddha by propounding the three mutually contradictory 
systems. . . [has made it clear] that he was a man given to make incoherent assertions.’116  From 
this I find it relatively unproblematic to suggest that Śaṅkara was indeed aware – at the very least 
– of the basic differences in doctrine between different Buddhist schools.   This in mind, I suggest 
that he either really believed that the Buddha was the confused, single source of all of these 
schools and their apparently divergent incompatible doctrines, or that he glossed over these 
differences in a deliberate attempt to lump together – and so dismiss together – the various 
Buddhist traditions.   
                                                        
116 An extended version of this quotation adds that if the Buddha is not deluded and confused, then a ‘hatred of all 
beings induced him to propound absurd doctrines by accepting which they would become thoroughly confused’ 
(1890: 428).  The ‘three mutually contradictory systems’ referred to are the respective schools of the Vaibhāṣikas, 
Sautrāntikas, and Mādhyamikas. 
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Whaling briefly surveys the rest of Śaṅkara’s objections to Buddhism and outlines them 
as follows: Śaṅkara argues against the twelve links (nidānas) of dependent origination 
(pratītyasamutpāda) on the very simple basis that each nidāna is sufficient only to explain the 
cause of the succeeding nidāna and not to explain the causal chain as a whole (Whaling, 1979: 4-
5).  There is rejection of the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness based on the idea that each 
momentary particle’s action would stop prior to the rise of the next particle, thus leaving no link 
between cause and effect (1979: 5).  This leads to an attack on the Buddhist idea that 
unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) dharmas are non-momentary and are thus eternal.117  Śaṅkara saw a 
tension insofar as ‘there is a self-contradiction in the Bauddha statements regarding all the three 
kinds of negative entities, it being said, on the one hand, that they are not positively definable, 
and, on the other hand, that they are eternal’ (1890: 413).  Whaling then gives a brief account of 
Śaṅkara’s attack against the Buddhist argument from similarity, which is, he points out, an 
original argument not found in prior Advaitin literature (1979: 5).  This argument is relatively 
simple and hinges on the supposition that if there is no enduring subject that is able to mentally 
grasp two similar things, then recognition cannot be based on similarity.  Again, the reasoning is 
simple: Śaṅkara thinks that if a mind is also subject to momentariness (as it presumably must be 
according to Buddhist doctrine), then it necessarily cannot endure.  If the same mind does not 
endure, then each thing grasped is done so by what is effectively a different mind.  From this 
                                                        
117 These asaṃskṛta dharmas are space (ākāśa), cessation through discernment (pratisaṃkhyānirodha), and what 
Whaling calls ‘cessation through the absence of a productive cause’, but might be better rendered as something 
like ‘cessation without discernment’ or ‘cessation not dependent upon discernment’ (apratisaṃkhyānirodha) 
(1979: 5).  Thibaut translates apratisaṃkhyānirodha as ‘cessation not dependent on such an act’, where the ‘act’ 
referred to is a ‘sublative act of the mind’, viz. discernment (Śaṅkara, 2011: 410). 
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premise, Śaṅkara argues that if the Buddhist were to admit ‘that there is one mind grasping the 
similarity of two successive momentary existences, he would thereby admit that one entity 
endures for two moments and thus contradict the tenet of universal momentariness’ (Śaṅkara, 
2011: 414).  Further, Śaṅkara argues that the act of saying ‘this is similar to that’ demarcates two 
distinct existent things, viz. two separate cognitions that are then linked by a ‘judgment of 
similarity’ (2011: 414).  He continues ‘[i]f the mental act of which similarity is the object were an 
altogether new act (not concerned with the two separate similar entities), the expression “this is 
similar to that” would be devoid of meaning’, which is to say that insofar as we recognise ‘this’ 
as similar to ‘that’, we must also recognise that this judgement of similarity is predicated on two 
existent things separated temporally.  The recognition (as similar objects) of these existents 
depends on their separation both temporally and conceptually, and for Śaṅkara, this in turn has 
to at least partly rely on a permanence not admitted by the Buddhists.   
In terms of the ātman, Śaṅkara argues that we do not rely on a notion of similarity, but 
that we are instead directly conscious of it ‘being that which we were formerly conscious of, not 
of it being merely similar to that’ and that ‘the conscious subject never has any doubt whether it 
is itself or only similar to itself; it rather is distinctly conscious that it is one and the same subject 
which yesterday had a certain sensation and to-day remembers that sensation’ (1890: 415).  This 
is, to Śaṅkara’s mind, the single most effective argument against the Mādhyamikas, and is, to my 
knowledge, the only direct attack he makes against them.118 
                                                        
118 One might be tempted to ask whether, if the empirical world is illusory (as it is according to the Advaitin 
māyāvāda), then is it not possible that the conscious subject is somehow deluded in its thinking of itself as 
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In what follows, I will discuss some apparent points of doctrinal divergence between the 
three Buddhist schools mentioned by Śaṅkara.  This will serve a dual purpose – first, it will, I hope, 
illustrate why Śaṅkara thought these schools so different from his own (viz. because they deny 
ultimate entities such as the ātman).  Second, I hope that in so doing it will become clear why 
Bhattacharya’s thesis regarding the Mahāyāna and the endorsement of an Absolute that creates 
and underpins reality should fail.  I will then detail why I think Yogācāra Buddhism should reject 
any suggestion of an ultimately existent ātman-Brahman by discussing Vasubandhu’s own 
philosophy.  My final position will see the claim staked that whilst absolutism might be one 
possible outcome for a Yogācārin (indeed, such variations exist), it need not be the default 
Yogācāra position.  This claim would, I think, be shared by Śaṅkara, who we have seen berate 
Buddhist philosophy in contrast to his own. 
4.1 The Vaibhāṣika Account of Possession  
Now to the details.  A significant point of departure between the two of the three 
Buddhist schools mentioned by Śaṅkara is the ‘doctrine of possession’.  When discussing 
Vasubandhu’s account of the Vaibhāṣika doctrine of possession in his Abhidharmakośabhāsya 
(AKBh), Collett Cox writes that  
[p]ossession is used here with regard to the first moment in which 
a factor is attained; accompaniment refers to one's state of being 
endowed with that factor, or being endowed with the acquisition 
                                                        
permanent in much the same way that it is deluded in thinking of anything in the outside world as real and 
permanent?  I suspect that this idea occurred to Śaṅkara, and that he likely thought two things.  First, that the 
conscious subject (ātman) knows itself more intuitively, immediately and intimately than it is possible for it to 
know anything external to it, and second, that the argument to the contrary is perilously close to that of the 
Buddhists: they would argue that the very idea of the ātman is simply a mistaken reification.  Despite criticisms 
attesting to his ‘crypto-Buddhism’, it is clear (as shown above) that Śaṅkara at least regarded his own philosophy as 
distinct from that of the Buddhist schools. 
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of that factor, in the second and subsequent moments until it is 
discarded.  
(1995: 82) 
That there is an idea of ‘one’s state of being endowed’ with something is subtly 
problematic for the Buddhist that wants to refute the idea of an enduring subject.  On this, Conze 
writes ‘[t]he term prāpti [acquisition; obtaining] obviously sails very near the concept of a 
“person” or “self”.  “Possession” is a relation which keeps together the elements of one stream 
of thought, or which binds a dharma to one “stream of consciousness”, which is just an evasive 
term for an underlying “person”’ (1983: 141).  In other words, if there is an underlying entity or 
reality that is capable of ‘acquisition’ and ‘possession’, then this would seem to have the 
undesirable consequence of affirming some sort of enduring ‘I’ or ātman.  Conze elaborates when 
he says that ‘possession’ must imply ‘a support which is more than the momentary state from 
moment to moment, and [is] in fact a kind of lasting personality, i.e. the stream as identical with 
itself, in a personal identity, which is here interpreted as “continuity”’ (1983: 141).  The 
Vaibhāṣikas believe that possession and its opposite, non-possession, must be discrete dharmas 
(and so existent as immutable factors across the three times) that are detached from thought in 
order to successfully account for the abandonment of defilements (and thus liberation).  Cox 
helpfully contextualises why this needs to be the case when she writes that according to 
Vaibhāṣika ontology, ‘[d]efilements, like all factors, exist as real entities in the three time periods 
but manifest their activity of defiling only in the present’ (1995: 89).119   
                                                        
119 Of course, as ‘real entities’, these dharmas have svabhāva.  The Vaibhāṣikas assert that each dharma is 
characterised by this svabhāva and that the momentariness of each dharma refers to its activity rather than to the 
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Cox then goes on to give a comprehensive overview of how the process of possession 
works.  According to the Vaibhāṣikas, 
[e]ach defilement is said to arise in the present in relation to a 
particular object-support through certain causes and conditions 
and to be connected to a given life-stream by a simultaneously 
arising possession.  Even when the present activity of that 
defilement and its possession cease and become past, they both 
continue to be connected to that life-stream through subsequent 
present possessions that arise successively dependent upon that 
original possession.  These successive possessions form a stream of 
effects of uniform outflow (niṣyandaphala) that not only connects 
a life-stream to that past defilement but also serves as a cause for 
the arising of the possession of future defilements. Within the life-
stream of each individual, these streams of possession connecting 
one to past defilements continue regardless of whether or not 
defilements are presently active; the streams can only be 
interrupted or terminated through religious praxis.  
(Cox, 1995: 89-90) 
As Cox notes, these defilements exist as entities across all three times (past, present and 
future) and so because of this they cannot be ‘abandoned’ by simply destroying them.  How then 
can the Vaibhāṣikas remove these defilements to reach a liberated state?  The answer comes in 
the sense of abandoning through separation.  This is accomplished by severing the possession of 
a defilement, and thus nullifying the connection of a given defilement to a given stream (Cox, 
1995: 90), and is the reason why the doctrine of possession is so important for the Vaibhāṣikas 
to begin with: their ontological commitments require it.  As defilements exist as real dharmas 
across the three times and are thus permanent and immutable, they cannot be changed or 
                                                        
dharma itself, which is categorically not momentary: it exists permanently across all three times!  There is a 
distinction, then, between a dharma’s svabhāva and its activity; the svabhāva (and thus the dharma itself) is 
permanent, whereas the causal activity of the dharma is what is impermanent. 
P a g e  | 158 
 
destroyed.  Liberation can only be achieved, then, if one manages to sever the connection that 
the defilements have to the stream.  This, Cox continues, happens in two stages.  First, there is 
the cessation of the ‘possession of connection’ to a given defilement, and this serves as the cause 
for the arising of the second stage, the ‘possession of disconnection’ (or the possession of the 
non-possession of) the defilement in question (1995: 90).  The second step is the 
pratisaṃkhyānirodha, or ‘cessation through discernment’.  La Vallée-Poussin notes that ‘[t]here 
are as many pratisaṃkhyānirodhas as there are "objects of attachment", past, present or future’ 
(1930: 39), and it is when a practitioner ‘is in possession of all; he is perfectly disconnected from 
all impure things; the universal detachment is his own; he possesses the Nirvāṇa, the Nirvāṇa of 
all’ (1930: 40).  Cox, too, notes that it is possession of all possible pratisaṃkhyānirodhas that the 
Sarvāstivādins equate with nirvāṇa (1995: 90).120   Note that this is not, then, a transcendental 
realm or subsumption into an essential principle of the sort defended by Bhattacharya, but 
instead a case of permanently severing the attachment of defilements to one’s stream of 
consciousness.  Instead, it is a meditative process that is designed to help the practitioner see 
things as they really are, and things really are built of dharmas.  This brings us back full-circle 
                                                        
120 Cox (1995: 91-92) details the means by which this ‘change’ takes place according to Vaibhāṣika doctrine.  She 
writes that though continuing to exist as discrete dharmas across the three times, the defilements (and their 
streams) are interrupted by ‘counteragents’ (and streams of counteragents).  These counteragents – and their 
streams – are sufficient to block the arising of any subsequent defilements, and they do this via the same process 
of ‘possession’ and ‘non-possession’: ‘[a]s factors dissociated from thought, possessions or non-possessions of 
factors of differing moral qualities can arise simultaneously in one moment of thought.  The possession of a 
particular defilement can arise in the same moment as the counteragent to that defilement, or, strictly speaking, in 
the same moment as the possession of that counteragent.  In this way, the uniform outflow of successive 
possessions of past and present defilements can be interrupted and the arising of future defilements can be 
obstructed through the presence of yet other possessions, specifically, the possessions of the counteragents 
(pratipakṣa) to those defilements’ (1995: 91-92).  This is how the Vaibhāṣikas argue that spiritual progress can be 
made despite the permanence of dharmas. 
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regarding Śaṅkara:  it is clear to see why he would not endorse such a metaphysics.  The 
Vaibhāṣikas still endorse ultimately real atoms – each with their own independent, self-sufficient 
natures – that converge and combine in order to account for the world: this is not in accordance 
with a doctrine of ātman-Brahman unless the actual svabhāva of all these different dharmas is 
in fact the ātman-Brahman.  For the Vaibhāṣikas at least, it is clear that this is not the case.   
What then, of the Sautrāntika response to this doctrine of possession?  The difference, as 
we will see, is, despite their shared heritage with the Vaibhāṣikas (both ostensibly belong to the 
Sarvāstivādin school of thought), stark.  Vasubandhu rejected the differentiation between a 
dharma’s svabhāva and its activity and instead argues that a dharma’s existence is constituted 
by its activity.  Cox (1995: 94) explains that this means that a dharma does not exist as a discrete 
entity across the three times, which in turn means that ‘momentariness refers to the 
transitoriness of the factor [dharma] as a whole’, and presents an ontological principle that 
‘implies that only the present moment exists’.  The reasons for this are surprisingly 
straightforward.  We have already touched on an objection to the permanence of dharmas on 
the basis that there is no reason why, if a dharma is permanent, that it should ever stop being 
the way that it is, or more pertinently, ever stop being active or manifesting its activity.  I think 
that Vasubandhu probably surmised that this provided a stark challenge to the Vaibhāṣika 
soteriological project that their doctrine of possession could not satisfactorily overcome.  Gold 
(2015: 36) explains that the Vaibhāṣika cannot claim that the conditions necessary for the 
dharmas to be continually active in all three times do not yet exist.  This is because the belief that 
dharmas exist across all three times necessarily means that all that has existed in the past, exists 
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in the present, and will exist in the future, is already necessarily existent.  Thus, it should be the 
case that a dharma’s activity is always active.121   
Gold gives the example of an eye: the future conditions that, ‘together with an eye, may 
some day produce a visual sensation, must already exist, to the same degree that the future eye 
does’, meaning that consequently, ‘a future eye should be able to see its future visual objects, 
                                                        
121 While this is true, we have seen via Cox (1995: 90) that the Vaibhāṣika thought that these activities could be 
blocked by the relevant counteragents: this does not mean that defiling dharmas stop existing or stop trying to 
manifest their activity, only that they are prevented from doing so.  Consequently, we might think that this 
bypasses the problem before it gets started.  Nevertheless, there is still a tension here in terms of causality and 
discrete dharmas that exist permanently: if possession and non-possession are discretely existent dharmas as 
upheld by the Vaibhāṣika, then it becomes increasingly difficult to account for their change in circumstances or the 
changes in circumstance that they facilitate, viz. possession or non-possession should be permanently existent 
states that continue to manifest circularly (as all the requisite conditions already exist across all times), as 
according to Vasubandhu’s objection.   
In other words, if possession and non-possession are both discrete dharmas rather than two stages of the same 
dharmic activity, there is some tension in accounting for how, for example, ‘possession’ arises and attaches itself 
to the relevant lifestream.  One would assume that if possession manifests its activity at all then it always 
manifests this same activity in the same place both in virtue of its inability to change and in virtue of the conditions 
required for the activity to manifest at all (being permanently existent across all three times).  There is a similar 
issue with non-possession.  To even begin to try and solve this problem, there would presumably need to be a 
circular possession of possession; possession of possession of possession; possession of possession of possession 
of possession and so on ad infinitum, which is undesirable for numerous reasons, not least because it would 
greatly overpopulate Vaibhāṣika ontology.   
Cox (1995: 86) demonstrates that the Vaibhāṣikas were aware of this issue and so claimed that  
[t]hough this would appear to incur the fault of infinite regress, the original 
possession and the secondary possession of possession function reciprocally; 
the original possession possesses both the factor and the secondary possession 
of possession, and the secondary possession of possession, in turn, possesses 
the original possession. 
It strikes me that this solution might bypass the problem of regression, but the problem of explaining how entities 
that exist (and so manifest their natures permanently) across the past, present and future could possibly change or 
effect change remains.  As I have said, it seems that dharmas that have as their nature the action of possession 
ought to be always possessing or being possessed.  If that is the case, then positing them at all is superfluous as 
they are simply static entities unable to perform any practical, worthwhile role.  They are, always have been, and 
always will be possessed or possessing that which it is within their nature to possess or be possessed by. 
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because they exist, along with it, as future entities; together, they should then be able to produce 
the causal result of the contact of eye organ’ (2015: 36).  To Vasubandhu, this makes little sense, 
and so as both Gold (2015: 37) and Cox (1995: 94) recognise, he rejected the Vaibhāṣika 
ontological model and instead advocated a model of a different sort, denying the immutability 
of svabhāva but not denying the presence of it (in conventional terms, at least!).  What 
Vasubandhu does reject is the equating of a dharma’s causal activity and its svabhāva, instead 
arguing that a dharma’s activity is constituted by its svalakṣaṇa (own-characteristic), its causal 
power or efficacy.  It is not the dharmas themselves that are basic, it is their svalakṣaṇa, and a 
given svalakṣaṇa can only manifest in the present.  This obviously removes the focus upon 
dharmas (and so svabhāva) existing across three times and means that dharmas are conditioned 
and thus not ultimately existent.  Cox (1995: 94) sums it up well when she writes that ‘[c]ausal 
interaction then becomes meaningful only as a relation between the present and its immediately 
preceding moment, and all present arising can be explained only through a stream of contiguous 
conditioning’.   
This stream of conditioning is affected by ‘seeds’, which, Cox writes, Vasubandhu equates 
with the five skandhas: ‘the very mental and material aggregates of which the life-stream 
consists’ (1995: 95).  Cox explains that these seeds have the potential to bring about effects inside 
a lifestream: this is what is known as their ‘seed-state’.  Given that they are not actualised events 
but instead potentialities, multiple seed-states can exist in any lifestream.122  Seed-states are 
                                                        
122 Cox (1995: 95): ‘Since this seed-state is a potentiality and not an actualized event manifesting definite qualities, 
seed-states of any moral quality can coexist in one life-stream.’ 
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conditioned (dependently originated) and momentary, and as such bypass any recourse to 
ultimately existent svabhāva.123 
As far as Vasubandhu is concerned, this solves multiple problems with the Vaibhāṣika 
account.  First, it is closer to pratītyasamutpāda in that there are no discrete dharmas with 
svabhāva posited as existing ultimately outside of dependent origination.  Second, it is closer 
than the Vaibhāṣika model to an account of momentariness that, whilst not strictly a feature of 
early Buddhism (von Rospatt, 1995: 15-17), can tentatively be traced back to first century CE 
canonical literature and can likely be assumed to have been a topic of serious discussion among 
Buddhist circles even earlier than that (1995: 17).124  Third, it disposes with the difficulties that 
manifest because of the belief that all three times exist.  Fourth, this account of momentariness 
                                                        
123 Cox (1995: 5) gives a succinct and detailed account of how seed-states operate.  I shall reproduce it here: 
Like all conditioned factors, these aggregates and their potential capability as 
seed-states are momentary, and this potentiality is passed along through the 
contiguous conditioning by which aggregates are produced in each successive 
moment. Thus, the actualization of a seed's potential at a later time is not the 
direct result of the original factor or action by which the stream of that seed-
state was initially implanted. Rather, the later actualization is conditioned 
indirectly through the successive reproduction of the efficacy of the original 
action in each consecutive moment in the form of a seed-state. At a certain 
moment, when the appropriate causes and conditions coalesce, the seed's 
potential is actualized. 
124 Von Rospatt (1995: 18) ultimately concludes that  
on the whole the examination of the Nikāyas/Āgamas and of alleged quotations 
of the Buddha yields little concrete information on the development of the 
theory of momentariness. Besides the vague possibility that already by the first 
century B.C. the theory may have been current (possibly even as the teaching of 
the Buddha), it reveals only that if the theory had existed at all by the time of 
the final redaction of the canon, then only without acquiring a canonical status 
– possibly because it would have been confined to certain circles of Buddhists. 
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and continuity (especially in terms of moral accountability and spiritual progress) is, it seems, 
designed to function in the absence of a unifying principle or ground of experience.  As Cox (1995: 
96) puts it, it is designed to ‘account for direct and indirect causal efficacy in the face of 
momentariness and the absence of a unifying substratum’.125  I agree with Gold when he argues 
that this can be linked convincingly to Vasubandhu’s denial of ātman.126  Gold’s point is that there 
is no need for Vasubandhu to ‘posit continuity between past experiences and present memories 
for the same reason that there is no need to posit a real nonexistent to take up the space when 
an existent entity passes away’ (2015: 110).127   
Although each of the reasons given above is significant in their own different way, I am 
primarily concerned with the first and fourth of these reasons insofar as they interrelate: the 
denial of ultimate intrinsic natures and unifying principles.  Vasubandhu had several reasons to 
deny the ultimate, immutable existence of svabhāva, but paramount among them is his 
reluctance to veer from doctrinal orthodoxy.   
                                                        
125 Of course, Vasubandhu was not always a Yogācārin (and thus not always a Mahāyānist), but the lack of a single 
unifying substratum is for him – as for Nāgārjuna – a constant.  It seems odd that Vasubandhu would expend so 
much effort denying svabhāva and a unified substratum if he intended his philosophy to endorse the existence of 
the ātman-Brahman. 
126 About which, more will follow (p167-176). 
127 Vasubandhu specifically thinks that it is nonsensical to infer from the absence of an existent entity a 
nonexistent cause that brings about the nonperception of that same entity.  Such a ‘nonexistent’ is a conceptual 
construction, a parikalpita, brought about by an inference and which cannot cause anything real.  Recall that for 
Vasubandhu, a ‘real’ entity is causally engaged with other entities; mere inference is not sufficient for a causal 
connection.  The destruction of an entity cannot be caused by any other entity because for Vasubandhu, 
destruction/absence is not a real thing.  It is, in fact, a conceptual construction that is imposed on the world when 
an entity is no longer present: destruction is, as Gold puts it ‘simply the nonexistence of a recently past thing’ 
(2015: 109). 
For a more detailed analysis of this position, see Gold (1995: 107-110). 
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At AKBh 298.21-22, Vasubandhu cites the Buddha: 
svabhāvaḥ sarvadā cāsti bhāvo nityaśca neṣyate / 
na ca svabhāvād bhāvo 'nyo vyaktamīśvaraceṣṭitam // 
Intrinsic nature (svabhāva) exists at all times, [but its] existence is 
not accepted (neṣyate) as eternal (nitya) / 
Nor is there existence different to intrinsic nature – [this is] clearly 
stated by the Lord // 
Verses like this can be difficult to interpret because they are both frustratingly terse and 
look on the face of things to be contradictory.  Such appearances are typical of Buddhist 
literature.  On the one hand, Vasubandhu appears to be endorsing an immutable svabhāva and 
simultaneously equating it with all existence.  More than that, it could even be interpreted that 
the Buddha (and so Vasubandhu in virtue of the quotation) is claiming that svabhāva exists across 
all three times – just like the Vaibhāṣikas!  Yet on the other hand he is clearly stipulating that 
intrinsic nature be ‘not accepted as eternal’.  We have seen how dharma theory leaves open the 
reification of dharmas (which ‘are’ their svabhāva) as immutable, permanent entities, eternal 
and uncaused.  Vasubandhu is aware of this problem and so denies that svabhāva is this 
immutable thing present across all three times (past, present and future), instead eventually 
arriving at the doctrine of trisvabhāva, or three natures. 128   How, then, to account for the 
Buddha’s apparent assertion that svabhāva ‘exists at all times’ (sarvadā: always, forever)?  Gold 
contends that Vasubandhu holds that the Buddha means not that intrinsic natures exist eternally 
                                                        
128 Recall from §2 that according to this theory, entities do not have one immutable, eternal, really existent 
svabhāva; instead, what we usually understand to be svabhāva is best understood as three interconnected 
perspectives.   
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(as held by the Vaibhāṣikas), but rather that a given entity can have no nature but its intrinsic 
nature (2015: 38).  In other words, for an entity in the world to ‘exist’ (conventionally), it must 
have a svabhāva, but this svabhāva is resolutely not eternal.  Indeed, Vasubandhu’s later 
trisvabhāva doctrine states that the second nature of an entity (it can be understood as the 
second perspective on an entity) is its causal story, that the svabhāva commonly understood is 
actually causally conditioned according to dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) (Gold, 
2015: 149).  We experience things in such a way, but at the same time, a person with sufficient 
insight knows that this is an appearance and not the truth of the matter.  We have not a singular 
svabhāva, but a svabhāva that is ‘inherently threefold’ (Gold, 2015: 148).  This, of course, negates 
the Vaibhāṣika understanding of immutable, independent svabhāvas – the very fact that the 
nature of an entity is in three distinct but dependent parts means that the nature is not a unitary, 
self-sufficient, immutable thing.  As Gold notes, the fact that svabhāva is now ‘not accepted as 
eternal’, not thought of as a unitary, self-sufficient thing, means that svabhāva must be a mental 
construction, a parikalpita (2015: 148). 
We now know why Vasubandhu rejects the doctrine of possession: it relies upon the 
permanent existence of the three times (past, present, future), and the dharmas that provide the 
mechanics of the theory require intrinsic existence across those three times.  It is for these 
reasons that Nāgārjuna would also reject a doctrine of possession: if there are no svabhāvas, 
then there can be no existence across three times.  Nāgārjuna is keen to point out that change is 
constantly occurring and permanence is an impossibility.  We will see more on this in a later 
section.  This being the case, how could a doctrine of possession be endorsed by a Mādhyamika?  
If there are no svabhāvic dharmas, there is nothing to be possessed across time.  If the three 
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times lack svabhāva, they too are not simultaneously existent.  A Madhyamaka argument against 
Vaibhāṣika possession, then, is as simple as that.  It is not just Nāgārjuna for whom impermanence 
is of central importance – it appears that Vasubandhu took Nāgārjuna’s arguments on this front 
very seriously indeed.  As we will see in the next section, permanent existence is a problem for 
Vasubandhu because he thinks that entities can only be ‘real’ (and so can only have any causal 
efficacy) if they are momentary, have a causal effect, and are immediately cognisable (i.e. 
knowable).  In what follows, I will elaborate on why Vasubandhu thought this way and the extent 
to which this philosophy precludes belief in permanent unchanging entities such as svabhāva and 
the ātman-Brahman. 
4.2 Vasubandhu on Svabhāva, Change, and Denial of the Ātman 
For Vasubandhu, then, intrinsic natures might appear to be real, but they cannot be 
ultimately real if we are to account sufficiently for change and thus for the Buddhist soteriological 
process: they must all be mental constructs.129  This must apply, of course, to a universal intrinsic 
nature such as the transcendent ātman-Brahman just as it applies to the personal ātman (what 
Bhattacharya (2015: 5-6) refers to as the jīva).  Buddhists – including Vasubandhu – would 
                                                        
129 On Vasubandhu’s conception of liberation, Trivedi (2005: 234) writes: 
To see things as they really are, claims Vasubandhu, is to see them in 
meditation without the distorting dualistic mentations and imputations of our 
ordinary consciousness. Instead, they are seen in an ineffable meditative 
experience as being dependent and always changing, as being part of a flow of 
things that have no essences or fixed natures or own-beings (niḥsvabhāva). 
This, I suggest, is what Vasubandhu means by the claim that the perfected or 
fulfilled aspect (pariniṣpannasvabhāva) of things is their dependent aspect 
(paratantrasvabhāva) without the imagined or constructed aspect 
(parikalpitasvabhāva). 
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generally make no distinction between ‘jīva’ and ātman (talk of the jīva is in my experience either 
entirely absent from Buddhist discussions of self, or simply taken to be equivalent with ātman), 
but as we have seen, Bhattacharya contends that the ātman – synonymous with ātman-Brahman 
– is the hyper-reality behind the jīva.  This distinction is, I think, largely irrelevant to Vasubandhu’s 
denial of the ātman because denial of one ought to necessitate denial of the other.  I will first 
give an account of Vasubandhu’s denial of the ātman and then assess how useful this denial is in 
separating his type of Buddhism from the Advaita of Śaṅkara.  From there, it should be clear 
whether Vasubandhu would or indeed could endorse an ātman-Brahman. 
So far, the defining mark of permanence, of an ātman, has been ‘svabhāva’.  A 
permanent, fixed, immutable essence.  Nāgārjuna is probably the most famous Buddhist to take 
issue with the conception of svabhāva as a fixed essence, arguing that it precludes change, 
cannot be found under even the deepest analysis, and is little more than a reified idea that serves 
only to frustrate the Buddhist soteriological project.  The Buddhist aversion to ascribing 
permanent existence or ātman, though, is well attested even in the canonical literature.130  It 
looks as though Vasubandhu took Nāgārjuna’s criticisms of svabhāva seriously.  We know that 
                                                        
130 Wynne (2009: 77) dates the first instance of a codified anātman doctrine to around the time of the Second 
Sermon, adding that a ‘‘no self’ doctrine cannot be taken back to the Buddha, but was of such inﬂuence that it 
came to define the Buddhist mainstream for more than two thousand years.’  Wynne agrees with Bhattacharya 
insofar as they both claim that the Buddha explained only what was not self rather than that there is no self.  
However, such distinctions might prove to be toothless.  As Thanissaro Bhikkhu writes, ‘[s]ome writers try to 
qualify the no-self interpretation by saying that the Buddha denied the existence of an eternal self or a separate 
self, but this is to give an analytical answer to a question that the Buddha showed should be put aside’ (1996).  We 
ought to take the same tack with arguments such as Bhattacharya’s.  The Buddha thought such questions should 
be set aside because they are mere distractions, pointless at best and damaging at worst to the soteriology that he 
was laying out.  The point is liberation, and at that point, writes Thanissaro Bhikkhu (1996), ‘questions of self, no-
self, and not-self fall aside. Once there's the experience of such total freedom, where [or why] would there be any 
concern about what's experiencing it, or whether or not it's a self?’ 
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he divided the concept up into three distinct but interrelated aspects, the trisvabhāva.  Far from 
asserting the ultimate existence of such svabhāvas, Vasubandhu is at once accounting for the 
experiences that deluded minds have of entities whilst also redefining the reified svabhāva as 
something that is necessarily conditioned and constructed.  This means that by definition, the 
trisvabhāva could not be ultimately existent, immutable, or eternal.   
Indeed, a ‘real’ svabhāva of the sort endorsed by the Vaibhāṣikas would, thinks 
Vasubandhu, necessarily preclude change – a position shared with Nāgārjuna.  This should in 
theory rule out the idea that Vasubandhu’s version of Yogācāra is absolutist, though there is some 
degree of disagreement on this.131  Interpreters such as Tola and Dragonetti point to the opening 
kārikā of the Trisvabhāvakārikā (also Trisvabhāvanirdeśa) of Vasubandhu in support of the idea 
of a transcendent Absolute.  They translate pariniṣpanna as ‘absolute’, citing convention (1983: 
234), whereas Trivedi and Williams prefer to translate it as ‘perfected’ (this is also a legitimate 
                                                        
131 Trivedi (2005: 233) notes that Paul Williams appears to characterise Yogācāra as ‘absolute idealism’.  By this, 
Trivedi means that Williams characterises Yogācāra in such a way that ‘what exists ultimately (and, in some 
versions of absolute idealism, creates all that exists) is one overarching mentalistic or spiritual thing or principle or 
force, whether the Absolute or Mind or Brahman’ (2005: 202-233).  Williams does indeed appear to support such a 
view when he writes that ‘in Yogācāra texts emptiness is redefined to mean that the substratum which must exist 
in order for there to be anything at all is empty of subject-object duality’ (2000: 157).  However, whilst this does 
endorse a substratum, it does not necessarily lead us to some endorsement of ātman-Brahman, which is 
fundamentally different to ‘mind’ so considered in Yogācāra.  Williams (2000: 157) clarifies his position when he 
writes that  
[w]hat we have to know in order to let go of the grasping which is 
unenlightenment is that the flow of experiences which we erroneously 
understand in terms of subjects and objects is actually, finally, all there is. It is 
therefore empty of those subjects and objects as separate polarised realities. 
That emptiness, the quality of ‘being empty of’ is the perfected aspect. 
What we actually have as substratum then is a flux, the events in which are (conventionally) subject to dependent 
origination and karma.  Ultimate reality simply is this flux.  It is the basis of our experience, and it is the final 
analysis of our condition.  Williams is quick to point out that this does not make the flux ‘some immutable 
Absolute’ (2000: 159).   
P a g e  | 169 
 
option: see Monier-Williams, 1960: 596).  I shall illustrate why how we understand this word 
influences how we make sense of the concept more generally and of Vasubandhu’s project when 
it comes to talk of svabhāva.   
In the Sanskrit, we read at TSK/TSN 1: 
kalpitaḥ paratantraśca pariniṣpanna eva ca /  
trayaḥ svabhāvā dhīrāṇāṃ gambhīrajñeyamiṣyate 
Tola and Dragonetti (1983: 251) render this into English thus: 
It is admitted that the three natures, the imaginary, the dependent 
and the absolute one, are the profound object of the wise men's 
knowledge. 
Talk of an ‘absolute nature’ sounds perilously close to talking about a real svabhāva or a 
nature that is somehow ‘beyond’ the world but underpinning it, much like the Advaitin 
conception of the ātman-Brahman.  Could this really be what Vasubandhu meant?  Trivedi and 
Williams are perhaps more measured with their translation of pariniṣpanna as ‘perfected’, and 
this is likely due to their awareness that the word can be understood as ‘reality’, ‘existing’ and 
even ‘real being’ (Monier-Williams, 1960: 596).  These possible translations certainly seems to 
lend themselves to the concept of a Real nature hidden among those that we mistakenly assume 
to be ‘real’ natures.  In other words, it leaves open the possibility that Bhattacharya is correct: all 
entities have a Real nature, and that is the ātman-Brahman.  We simply look in the wrong places 
when we mistakenly assume something other than the ātman-Brahman to be the ground of all 
existence or ‘real being’.  Paul Williams thinks that even for the Yogācārin, ‘[i]n order for there to 
be absence of subject-object duality there has actually to exist something which is erroneously 
divided into subjects and objects’ (2000: 158).  He goes further, writing that in the Yogācāra, ‘it 
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is very much not the case that there is universal absence of own-existence (svabhāva)’ (2000: 
158).  In other words, Yogācārins endorse the existence of svabhāva – potentially of the same 
sort as the ātman-Brahman – as the hyper-reality or ground that we bifurcate because of our 
deluded thought process and deluded engagements with concepts.  This is ostensibly true for 
some Yogācārins (there is, like any Buddhist school, divergence over technicalities and details!), 
but I do not think it is the case for Vasubandhu, as I will demonstrate. 
What exactly did Vasubandhu mean?  Williams disagrees with both Gold and Trivedi in 
his discussion of the absolute or perfected aspect (perfected nature, absolute nature; 
pariniṣpannasvabhāva) insofar as he concludes that this perfected aspect does not imply the 
nonexistence of svabhāva.  Instead, he argues that the emptiness (śūnyatā) referred to in 
Yogācāra is ‘redefined to mean that the substratum which must exist in order for there to be 
anything at all is empty of subject-object duality’ (2000: 157).  There is still emptiness; it is just 
not used in the same way that Nāgārjuna used it.  It is worth noting, however, that Nāgārjuna 
certainly thought that emptiness understood as the lack of svabhāva necessitated a lack of 
subject-object duality.  Indeed, McCagney writes that for Nāgārjuna, ‘[t]he term “śūnyatā” 
functions by pointing to the incoherence of assuming that events are determinate or definable’ 
(1997:95).  Thus, McCagney (1997: 93) opines that events and entities are beyond categorisations 
of ‘existence’ ‘not because they have svabhāva, independent eternal existence or nonexistence, 
but because they are niḥsvabhāva, open-ended (śūnya) and indeterminate (animitta).  Therefore 
they can occur.’  This is to say that a diligent Mādhyamika ought not to commit to either position: 
I ought not to affirm my laptop’s existence, but nor should I affirm its nonexistence.  Getting 
tangled up in either concept is the trap into which people generally fall, and this trap only 
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compounds our dissatisfaction.  ‘Existence’ is used in a nuanced way: my laptop exists 
conventionally, a designation that illustrates the product of innumerable causes and conditions 
that have combined in various ways to produce that on which I type.  My laptop does not exist 
ultimately, by or with svabhāva; it does not enjoy a privileged status according to which it has an 
immutable, supra-mundane nature.  It does not have a permanent, eternal identity.  This is what 
it means to be ‘ultimate’ in the Buddhist literature succeeding the Abhidharma. 
Whilst the distinction between śūnyatā in a Madhyamaka context and śūnyatā in a 
Yogācāra context can be forced in the above manner, then, it strikes me that they need not 
necessarily be considered as fundamentally different in scope or result.  Taking away the 
ontological aspect for a moment, both aim at the epistemological realisation that there are no 
immutable, eternal entities.  There is of course disagreement regarding the scope of śūnyatā in 
terms of ontology.  I am not at all convinced that Nāgārjuna is actually concerned with providing 
a metaphysic of ontology for reasons that will become clear as we progress.  He certainly appears 
to be concerned with removing other people’s ontological positions, but he does so with a 
specific goal in mind.  It is uncontroversial to say that Nāgārjuna is mainly concerned with 
providing an account of the means to liberation; this is the raison d'être of all Buddhist praxis and 
of all the Buddhist philosophy that aims to make some sort of sense of this praxis.  This account 
of liberation from dissatisfaction (duḥkha) mainly focusses on how we understand and interact 
with the world.  People impose ontological views and these views then corrupt or detract from 
their soteriological aim.  Nāgārjuna wants to recapture this central objective.  He thus reduces 
ontological claims down to absurdities, as in the case of svabhāva (and, I think by extension, 
dharmas as characterised by Ābhidharmikas).  But this is not to say that he replaces these 
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ontological principles with śūnyatā.  Śūnyatā looks to me to function as a tool of understanding, 
namely of understanding change and causality with the terminal aim of explaining how we might 
change from deluded to awakened.  What it does not look to be – though it has been taken as 
such by several subsequent Buddhist schools – is some sort of substantial substratum or 
Absolute.  This would be the most egregious of reifications and an affront to Nāgārjuna’s entire 
project.  In other words, use of śūnyatā strikes me primarily as an epistemic endeavour.  This 
would certainly be in keeping with the Buddha’s famed reluctance to answer what he saw as 
irrelevant metaphysical questions; ruminating on the ontological makeup of the world would for 
Nāgārjuna be as pointless and distracting as it was for the Buddha.  Consequently, we should 
focus on our understanding of the key principles of liberation, none of which involve speculation 
about a ground or Absolute principle in the vein of the ātman-Brahman. 
Despite the apparent disregard by Nāgārjuna for any sort of grounding principle, I do not 
think that he wants to claim that entities do not ‘exist’ conventionally, for we engage with things 
all of the time, and he recognises that we must navigate this world of objects.  Nor is it to say 
that events do not occur conventionally, for we experience them all of the time.  Instead, we can 
see that Nāgārjuna wants to say that they do not enjoy a privileged existence; they are not 
endowed with svabhāva.  They are not ultimately existent.  King points out that for Nāgārjuna, 
there is no possibility of substantial existence (dravya sat), and all dharmas are, therefore 
nominal (prajna͂pti sat) (1995: 120).  There are, then, no substantial entities – how could there 
be a substantial ātman-Brahman?  There is a caveat in terms of Yogācāra, however.  The 
Yogācārins claim that consciousness (translated by Lusthaus as vijn͂apti, synonymous with citta) 
is a dravya – it is a real thing.  Lusthaus writes that to be real in a Yogācārin sense is to be 
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momentary, causally efficacious, and able to be cognised (2002: 453).  Such a thing is still saṃvṛti.  
The idea at play here is that whilst consciousness does not enjoy a privileged existence (and so 
whilst ‘real’, it is not ‘ultimately real’), it ought not to be rejected as nonexistent (Lusthaus, 2002: 
462).   
There is some concern in the Yogācārin texts that a Madhyamaka approach might 
unwittingly fall foul of this problem.  Mādhyamikas do indeed tend to negate everything.  They 
would have no problem in arguing ‘neither consciousness nor not consciousness’, for example, 
placing the role of what Yogācārins consider to be the primary means by which we analyse our 
existence in some sort of existential limbo.132  For the Yogācārins, this is a problem precisely 
because to deny consciousness, or to remain ambiguous about consciousness, is to deny 
everything.  Lusthaus (2002: 463) elaborates: 
Without some acceptance of the facticity which is never anything 
or anywhere other than consciousness, nothing whatsoever can be 
affirmed or denied, nothing can be known or understood. 
Knowability, by definition, requires consciousness, i.e., an 
amenability to awareness. Without some basis for knowledge, not 
a single determination can be made about the form or content of 
one's experience. 
Consciousness is then a ground of sorts – it grounds our knowledge of the world insofar 
as it allows both experience of and reflection upon objects, events and so on.  A ground of this 
sort, though, is not quite equivalent to a ground of the sort that Bhattacharya concludes that 
Mahāyānists endorse.  It is not a ground of all being.  It is not the material and efficient cause of 
                                                        
132 I think that this concern is somewhat misplaced in the wider scheme of things.  In negating or ‘denying’ 
consciousness, all a Mādhyamika is really doing is denying its ultimate ontological status one way or the other. 
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existence as Brahman is purported to be.  Nor is consciousness a fundamental Absolute: 
Vasubandhu acknowledges other minds without supposing that they all share the same causal 
nexus, viz. as microcosms of the ātman-Brahman.  In order to avoid the charge of solipsism, the 
Yogācārins need to account for more than one mind.  Lusthaus (2002: 489) demonstrates that 
Yogācāra necessitates multiple consciousnesses, arguing that such intersubjectivity is essential 
to the Yogācāra account of the world:  
Yogācāra does not advocate solipsism. Consciousness is 
intersubjective; karma is communal as well as personal. Therefore, 
the existence of other minds is affirmed. . . Not only is no attempt 
made to reduce ` other minds' to mere projections of one's own, but 
the very core of Buddhism – the teaching of Dharma by one sentient 
being to another – is made absolutely contingent on there being 
consciousnesses external to and yet perceptible by other 
consciousnesses. In other words, the entire point of Yogācāra 
phenomenology rests on both the necessity and possibility that 
there be communication between distinct minds. 
Thus the final realisation, insofar as there is one, looks to me to be identical in the case of 
both Madhyamaka and Yogācāra: there are no immutable, intrinsic natures.  For Nāgārjuna, the 
realisation of śūnyatā provides this insight.  For Vasubandhu, the realisation of the perfected 
aspect provides this insight.  In both cases, there is a common factor: the insight remains the 
same.  
This truth is to be realised in meditation, a feature that Nāgārjuna’s use of śūnyatā 
appears to share with the Yogācārins.133  The Yogācāra of Vasubandhu thus shares a couple of 
                                                        
133 Williams writes that ‘[t]hat emptiness, that very absence itself, is the perfected aspect, and it has to be known 
directly on the deepest possible level, in meditation’ (2000: 158). 
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important features with Madhyamaka.  Śūnyatā still necessitates a lack of svabhāva, and this 
truth is to be realised in meditation.  Both appear to disregard any sort of substantial substratum 
existing through the past, present and future, although it can certainly be argued that 
Nāgārjuna’s means of doing so is more thoroughgoing than that of Vasubandhu.  We have seen  
that Nāgārjuna categorically rejects any substance at all, equating substantial existence with 
possession of svabhāva.  But what of Vasubandhu?  Is not Yogācāra concerned with mind-only, 
and this being the case, is the mind a substance?  Williams writes that the ‘mind’ is the primary 
substratum for Yogācāra; it ‘is the one primary existent that serves as the substratum for 
everything else’ (2000: 160).  This phraseology is awkward, for my own previous talk of substrata 
has been in relation to supra-mundane, immutable Absolutes.  It is true that for Yogācārins – 
including Vasubandhu – the mind is the primary consideration.  This does not, however, mean 
that the mind is some sort of ultimate reality or basic cosmic principle. 
 Lusthaus writes that the ‘real’ for a Yogācārin is saṃvṛti (conventional) and not 
paramārtha (ultimate) (2002: 453), which sheds some light on Williams’ contention.  Though the 
mind is that with which the Yogācārins are concerned, and though it is the lens through which all 
experience must be analysed, it is not an Absolute.  If it were, it would be thought of in terms of 
the ultimate; as paramārtha.  This is precisely how Bhattacharya, Murti et al. think of the ātman-
Brahman and śūnyatā.  We have seen above that śūnyatā cannot be equated with the ātman-
Brahman.  There is again a caveat – whilst the mind/consciousness is not a substantial absolute, 
there are for Vasubandhu some substantial entities: this is a marked point of departure from 
Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka.  Gold writes that for Vasubandhu, it is present entities and only 
present entities that exist substantially (2015: 40).  It is tempting to think that this opens up a 
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route for the possibility of an ātman-Brahman, but we have already seen that the ātman-
Brahman is thought of as eternal, unchanging and so on.  It is not clear to me that we could 
recharacterise a sort of radically momentary, radically present ātman-Brahman because such a 
characterisation necessitates – as Vasubandhu is at pains to point out -  a chain of causal efficacy.  
An entity is only substantial insofar as it is present (present phenomena can only be momentary) 
and insofar as it has causal efficacy.  Gold explains in the concluding remarks to Paving the Great 
Way that for Vasubandhu, a self (ātman) cannot be substantially real because  ‘[f]rom a causal 
point of view, there is no agent and no experiencer who plays an indispensable role in the causal 
story of the aggregated elements that make up the apparent self’ (2015: 216).   In other words, 
the personal ‘self’ so construed in Hindu literature (what Bhattacharya refers to as the jīva) is a 
reification precisely because it has no bearing on the causal account of experience. The skandhas 
account for experience perfectly well, and so positing a ‘self’ serves no verifiable purpose.  The 
causal story remains intact without the ātman. 
But what about a transcendent ātman-Brahman?  Bhattacharya – as we have seen – was 
clear in his assertion that whilst the Buddha rejects the reality of a jīva, he does not reject the 
reality of the ātman-Brahman.  Further, recall that he contends that the Mahāyāna schools were 
the ones to remedy this oversight by actively endorsing a doctrine of ātman-Brahman.  This does 
not seem like an avenue that is open to Bhattacharya in relation to Vasubandhu’s version of 
Yogācāra.  According to Vasubandhu, something real (and substantial) requires a causal story.  
Further to this, it is required to have some causally efficacious role in that causal story.  The 
ātman-Brahman satisfies these criteria.  Recall that for the Advaitins, it is both the material and 
efficient cause of the world, and so everything that exists is really Brahman.  At this point, we 
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need not be too concerned with the intricacies of accounting for causality within a substance that 
is ultimately without attributes and immutable (such a discussion could fill a book of its own!), 
we need only acknowledge that Advaitins do believe that Brahman is the cause of and support 
of the world.  Also recall that Brahman is thought of as eternal and unchanging.  It is its eternality 
and immutability that precludes the ātman-Brahman from being real and substantial according 
to Vasubandhu’s formulations: an eternal substance cannot be momentary in the true meaning 
of the word.  The best we could say would be that the eternal ātman-Brahman somehow 
manifests objects/events momentarily, but this still leaves open two problems.  First, the ātman-
Brahman itself is still eternal, and so unreal.  Second, the ātman-Brahman does not on this 
account have the ability to effect change in a temporal causal series.  This is simply because an 
eternal ātman-Brahman could not change, and acting to bring about change necessitates some 
change in the state of the thing doing the act.134  Of course, we know that for Śaṅkara and the 
Advaitins, ‘there is no object that enjoys a separate ontological existence and nature from 
brahman’ (Rambachan, 2006: 88).  But for Vasubandhu, we have seen that there is no way that 
an eternal ātman-Brahman could really exist: talk of eternality and so on would make the 
Brahman some static thing, not acting, not causing and not responsible for anything.  Whilst this 
might accord with the Advaitin neti neti approach, it does nothing to account for a world that the 
                                                        
134 This is a mundane point.  If I want to do something, there are several changes in ‘state’.  First, I must decide to 
do something, which is a change in my mental state.  Then I must act, which changes my physical state; I need to 
get up and go into the kitchen if I want to make a cup of tea.  Then there are results, which might again change 
both of these states in some way.  We can see that the act of effecting change also necessitates some degree of 
change – no matter how minor – in the thing doing the acting.  Śaṅkara denies this in relation to the Brahman, 
using the doctrine of māyā to explain away how the Brahman only appears to act.  This is deeply unsatisfying and 
is, to my mind, not satisfactorily explained by any Advaitin literature. 
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Advaitins still want to claim is Brahman.  More to the point, by Vasubandhu’s criteria, the 
Brahman simply cannot exist.  Brahman does not act, is eternal and yet somehow created the 
world.  None of this tallies with Vasubandhu’s account of a real entity, which, as we know, is to 
be causally efficacious, cognisable and momentary.  To be causally efficacious takes on an added 
dimension in terms of Vasubandhu’s philosophy.  It is not enough to cause some effect; the entity 
must itself be a momentary effect of a prior, past cause.   Causal efficacy is reliant on a chain, the 
chain of pratītyasamutpāda, which has no discernible beginning.  The Brahman is by definition 
uncaused.  It cannot be part of this causal chain, just as it cannot be truly momentary in the sense 
that it is caused, manifests, passes.  It seems clear to me then that no Yogācārin following 
Vasubandhu’s lead ought to endorse the ātman-Brahman as the immutable ground of all 
existence.  To do so is to surely miss the point, and so I think that Bhattacharya’s thesis that 
Mahāyānists believe in an equivalent to the ātman-Brahman fails if that Mahāyānist is a 
Yogācārin (or at least a Yogācārin in the tradition of Vasubandhu).  This demonstrates that it is 
not necessarily the case that the Mahāyāna directs practitioners toward an ātman-Brahman. 
4.3 Brahman, Action, and Māyā 
Bhattacharya, we saw earlier, writes that Brahman ‘is what makes us act (kārayitṛ), but it 
does not itself act (akartṛ)’ (2015: 29).  Such language is typical of Advaitin literature and typical 
of the Upaniṣads.  Bearing in mind what has been said above, Vasubandhu’s retort is simple 
enough – how can that which does not change cause something else to change?  I previously 
wrote that every act requires a change in the agent, be it mental or physiological.  Is it the case 
that the ātman-Brahman can somehow cause actions without itself acting?  Would not an action 
require some sort of motive?  Is Brahman just so radically other to us that it can cause acts 
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without acting, without motive, and we are simply unable to understand how?  This is not a 
defence offered by Śaṅkara, nor is it a defence offered by Bhattacharya.  It is deeply dissatisfying 
to claim that a cause of an effect does not itself have a cause: this is the Buddhist account of 
dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda).  For the Buddhists, it is a matter of experience and 
analysis that every cause has a myriad of causes and conditions behind it; never at any time can 
we discern there to be a single start point of causes.  There is instead an infinite web of 
innumerable causes and conditions interacting to bring about all psycho-physical phenomena.  
How then can the Advaitin be justified in claiming that the ātman-Brahman, that which does not 
act but causes action is responsible for the world?  How can Brahman create if it is eternal and 
unaffected by motives?  Fost cites Bādarāyana’s account of creative action, claiming that 
Brahman ‘is moved not by need or necessity but rather by a free, spontaneous, and joyous 
creativity, a release of energy for its own sake’ (1998: 393), which relays the stock Advaitin 
response, but does not get us any closer to an adequate explanation.  According to this account, 
Brahman is still moved by a motive; it is simply that the motive is playfulness.  On this, Fost writes 
that ‘notion of "sport" or "play" (līlā) represents a third sort of activity, one that is neither 
purposive nor purposeless’ (1998: 393).  I understand that play might be said to be ‘mindless’ 
insofar as we can engage in it in an uncritical, unthinking way, but I think that to claim that play 
is ‘neither purposive or purposeless’ is somewhat mistaken.  Play might not have a purpose 
outside of itself, that is to say that play can be done for its own sake and so on.  But there is still 
a motivation to play, even if that motivation is simply to play for playing’s sake.  Brahman cannot 
be motivated.  Indeed, Brahman cannot be affected by anything.  Consequently, we are left in 
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the dark as to why there is anything at all.  For this reason, I find neither Bādarāyana nor Fost’s 
account particularly satisfying. 
Buried in all of this wrangling is a significant point:  if Brahman creates according to mere 
sport or playfulness, the Brahman has still acted.  Fost responds to this by arguing that the 
explanation of playfulness is not meant to be taken literally as an ultimate account of Brahman.  
I have written elsewhere that for the Advaitin, nothing at all can be predicated of Brahman on an 
ultimate level.  Instead, Fost writes, we should understand līlā only on the conventional level, as 
a helpful but ultimately sublatable designation (1998: 396).  He then equates līlā with māyā, 
writing that ‘[t]he metaphysical category is māyā not līlā, which is used only as a metaphor to 
defend the absolute freedom of Brahman’ (1998: 396).  Māyā is another tricky topic for the 
Advaitins.  Translated literally, it means ‘illusion’ or ‘magic’, and the Advaitins generally consider 
it to be the cosmic force that obfuscates the Brahman in the eyes of the unenlightened.  As 
Brahman is everything (and indeed everything is Brahman), māyā must be an aspect of Brahman.  
The Advaitin position is that māyā is a veil of ignorance (avidyā) that conceals our true nature, 
the ātman-Brahman.  The precise nature of māyā and its relation to the Brahman is not 
developed in any detail by Śaṅkara.  There are the usual metaphors of ropes mistaken for snakes 
until knowledge sublates the misapprehension of reality and defeats the delusion, as it were, but 
this does not go far enough.  It simply tells us how we might operate within māyā, not how māyā 
came to be a thing in the first place.  Śaṅkara also talks about māyā as an illusion performed by 
a magician: it affects the audience, but not the performer.  Fost cites Śaṅkara thus: 
One of the favorite analogies used by Advaitins to depict the world 
of māyā is that of the magician and his deceptive ploys. Just as a 
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magician, who with his conjuring tricks "plays" with our perceptual 
faculties in order to create the illusion that something has come 
from nothing or that one thing has changed into another, so 
Brahman by his mysterious, creative power deludes us into 
believing that the phenomenal world is real.  Śaṅkara writes: "As 
the magician is not at any time affected by the magical effect 
produced by himself, because it is unreal, so the highest Self is not 
affected by the world-[effects (or appearances)]. 
Again, we have an explanation – plausible or not – of how māyā might manifest as part 
of Brahman without actually affecting Brahman, but we are again left with a question of agency.  
A magician chooses to perform an illusion, cast a spell, and ‘play with our perceptual faculties’, 
does the Brahman?  The answer needs to be a resounding ‘no’, and so the metaphor is 
unsatisfying.  I expect that the response from an Advaitin would very likely be that the metaphor 
is not meant to give a literal account of the relationship between Brahman, māyā, and the jīva.  
All of this stuff is, after all, ultimately beyond linguistic designation.  Brahman is beyond agency, 
beyond attributes, beyond everything.  Nevertheless, there seems to be no causal explanation 
for our delusion and the apparently random obfuscation of the ātman-Brahman even on the 
conventional, worldly level.  This has to be a source of some dissatisfaction even for an Advaitin.   
In contrast, a Buddhist account of delusion has at its core a causal chain to account for how we 
get to this point of delusion and avidyā.  We reify because we mistake the causal interactions of 
skandhas and the causal interactions of all other psycho-physical phenomena as indicative of 
intrinsic existence.  This mistake means that we think of the world around us as immutable and 
independent rather than mutable and dependent – we then reify both the existence of the ‘I’ and 
the existence of day-to-day entities and invest into them all sorts of meanings and feelings, 
cultivating different levels of attachment and resulting in different levels of dissatisfaction.   
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The primary cause of this dissatisfaction is, famously, the ‘self’ (ātman).  The Advaitin 
account, or so it seems to me, has no such causal account by which to explain how or why we – 
being identical to the ātman-Brahman – confuse or mistake both the world and ourselves.  Where 
one is offered, it is incomplete and dissatisfying, having recourse to metaphors that do not quite 
address the real questions and taking as a given the existence of a Brahman from which māyā 
has shrouded us, and about which we are perennially confused.  Māyā is itself a mystery, its 
existence appearing to be taken on faith.  Māyā is, as Lusthaus says, ‘an inexplicable cosmic flaw’ 
(2002: 484).  We have the assertion of Brahman as a basic substantial ground of everything, and 
we have māyā inexplicably clouding our self-knowledge (which is in the final analysis equivalent 
to obscuring our knowledge of the Brahman).  This is a clear point of departure between Advaita 
and Buddhism.  How can Buddhist schools that conceive of the world in the ways in which I have 
outlined above be said to endorse or believe that there is a transcendent ātman-Brahman as put 
forth by Śaṅkara?  It is my contention that if they take seriously pratītyasamutpāda, reason, and 
analysis, they simply cannot. 
4.4 Yogācāra Idealism? 
Finally, can the argument be made that Yogācāra as a type of idealism necessitates that 
there is only one consciousness, of which we are all parts or manifestations?  If this is the case, 
then Yogācāra would indeed be a Mahāyāna school which endorses a permanent, immutable, 
single substance akin to the ātman-Brahman.  This would, of course, mean that Bhattacharya 
would be right – at least in part!  Recall that Bhattacharya cited the Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāra to 
illustrate that Asaṅga equates emptiness and impersonality with the ātman-Brahman (2015: 2) – 
I offered some arguments against Bhattacharya’s specific interpretations in §1;  I also advanced 
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my own alternative understanding of the passage in question based upon Vasubandhu’s wider 
philosophical method, and so I will not rehash those same arguments here.  It is important to 
note, however, that in some contexts, Yogācāra is indeed interpreted as endorsing a non-dual 
substance like the ātman-Brahman.   
Dan Lusthaus has much to say on the question of idealism as applied to Yogācāra.  The 
general thrust of the arguments presented throughout Lusthaus’ Buddhist Phenomenology is that 
‘idealism’ is an inappropriate term to apply to Yogācāra.  This is because for Lusthaus, despite the 
name Yogācāra strictly meaning ‘mind-only’ or ‘consciousness-only’, no one form of idealism 
really captures the Yogācārin project.  To this end, he outlines (and rejects) three main sorts of 
idealism, which I now give (Lusthaus, 2002: 5):135 
1) The mind or some supermental, non-material entity or force 
creates all that exists. This is metaphysical idealism.  
2) The ultimate ground of all that is or can be conceived is the 
cognizing subject, such that the subjective self is the one 
epistemological nonreducible factor. This is a different form of 
metaphysical idealism, closer to epistemological idealism. 
3) Critical epistemological idealism, as opposed to metaphysical 
idealism, need not insist on metaphysical or ontological 
implications, but merely claims that the cognizer shapes his/her 
                                                        
135 Lusthaus is at odds with Trivedi (2005: 232), who think that Yogācāra might best thought of as a type of 
epistemic idealism: 
Epistemic idealism, in contrast, makes not an ontological claim but rather the 
claim that we know things not as they really are, as claim epistemic realists, but 
rather as they are given to us by our ideas, our concepts, and categories. . .a 
metaphysically agnostic reluctance to make ontological pronouncements, 
combined with something like epistemic idealism, just might be Vasubandhu’s 
position if he doubts not external objects themselves but externality, that is if 
he doubts not external objects but instead whether our ordinary consciousness 
can say anything about objects outside its acts of cognizing them. 
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experience to such an extent that s/he will never be able to 
extricate what s/he brings to an experience from what is other to 
the cognizer. Like can only know like, so what is truly other is 
essentially and decisively unknowable precisely because it is other, 
foreign, alien, inscrutable.  
It is the first of these with which I am most concerned: ‘metaphysical idealism’.  This 
sounds, on the face of things, very close to what Bhattacharya et al. propose when they argue 
that Mahāyāna Buddhism necessarily entails an ātman-Brahman.  On Lusthaus’ definition, the 
‘non-material entity or force [which] creates all that exists’ would simply be the ātman-Brahman.  
That which we understand to be our consciousness would be no more than a microcosmic 
instantiation of this ātman-Brahman, somehow deluded into thinking that we are other than it.  
Reality would be one single consciousness creating the world for itself.  This, says Lusthaus, is to 
mischaracterise Yogācāra.  Lusthaus writes that rather ‘than claiming that a cosmic mind creates 
the universe, they assert, on the contrary, that one only comes to see things as they actually 
become by 'abandoning' or destroying (vyāvṛti,) the mind’ (2002: 5).   
We have seen in Vasubandhu’s philosophical method that to reify the mind would be as 
mistaken as denying it outright.  As Trivedi puts it, ‘consciousness is not the ultimate reality or 
solution, but rather the root problem’ (2005: 233).  This is not histrionics or a simple instance of 
overstating the case.  Vasubandhu is, it seems to me, primarily interested in accounting for our 
experience of the world and how we manage to mistakenly reify things; an act that will then go 
on to cause us dissatisfaction.  In this regard, I think his way of approaching the Buddhist soteric 
method is analogous to that of Nāgārjuna.  Neither seem too concerned with ontological system-
building, but are instead trying to give a roadmap by which we can deconstruct our worldviews 
in order to release ourselves from the existential anxieties that we face.  Against the charge of 
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metaphysical idealism, Trivedi counters ‘that all phenomena as they appear to us, as we know 
and experience them, are due to the representations and constructions of our 
consciousness alone (vijn͂apti-mātra). It does not mean, as is sometimes thought, that 
external objects themselves are created by the mind or are somehow mind-dependent’ (2005: 
236).  He bases this assessment on the opening verse to Vasubandhu’s Viṃśatikā, which I 
translate as: 
vijñaptimātramevaitadasadarthāvabhāsanāt / 
yathā taimirikasyāsatkeśacandrādidarśanam //1// 
[All of] this is consciousness-only (vijn͂apti-mātra), because of the 
appearance of unreal things, like [a person] with dimmed-eyes136 
sees unreal hairs, moons and so on. 
It is tempting to read a metaphysical idealist position into this.  We could interpret 
Vasubandhu as arguing that only consciousness is real because sometimes we see things exterior 
to our consciousness that are not real.  We might even interpret it to mean that consciousness 
creates the objects that appear to us.  I do not think that this is what Vasubandhu is really driving 
at.  Instead, I concur with Lusthaus (2002: 463) and Trivedi (2005: 236) when they argue that 
Vasubandhu is simply forcing the point that our frame of reference is exclusively tied to our 
consciousness.  Our experiences as we see, feel, and know them are ‘consciousness-only’ 
because our subjective consciousness of them is the only way in which they can be known. 
Obviously, this is a quite different claim to that which says Vasubandhu is espousing the mind-
dependence of ‘external’ objects.  Just because somebody with an eye disorder sees unreal hairs 
                                                        
136 I think this odd turn of phrase might relate to cataracts, or some such similar eye condition. 
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and unreal moons does not mean that every moon or hair they see is unreal.  As Trivedi points 
out, that a person with an eye disorder sees – owing to their faulty perceptual apparatus – some 
unreal hairs and moons does not mean that there are no hairs or moons whatsoever outside of 
their perceptual apparatus (2005: 236).  Thus, for Trivedi, Yogācāra does not necessarily deny 
events and phenomena external to us: ‘Vasubandhu is not denying that reality exists, as an 
idealist might do, but instead is only denying that our conceptual constructions, as presented to 
us, correspond to something out there’ (2005: 237-238).  The idea is that for Vasubandhu, reality 
exists outside of us, it is just the case that our experience of it – as reified – is constructed in 
consciousness. 
Lusthaus has a slightly different take, though it is, like Trivedi, in no way absolutist.  For 
Lusthaus, it is externality itself that is problematic for Yogācārins, and not external objects.  This 
is because we do not experience ‘externality’ in immediate perception – to the Yogācārin, it is 
another construct that we impose onto an experience after the fact.  Externality is unreal insofar 
as it cannot be directly cognised (it is instead inferred retrospectively), and has no momentary 
causal efficacy: recall that these are two of the three criteria that Yogācārins use to distinguish 
the ‘reality’ of phenomena.  The idea is that when we retroactively push externality onto 
phenomena, we do so to appropriate them, which is another way of saying that we do it to forge 
some degree of attachment.  Lusthaus writes that ‘externality is the necessary condition for 
appropriation’ (2002: 484).  I do not think it much of a stretch to add that appropriation is a 
sufficient condition for attachment!  Of course, attachment to phenomena is generally 
problematic for Buddhists, as I covered in a previous section.  Here, we find that attachment is 
linked with appropriation, which in turn means that we have a degree of attachment to 
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everything that we cognise.  Lusthaus writes that Yogācārins explain this by arguing that because 
consciousness is an activity that usually requires consciousness of (that is to say that 
‘consciousness’ detached from cognition of something makes no sense), 137  when we are 
conscious of something taken to be external, we appropriate it into our cognition (2002: 486).  
This appropriation is an act that imposes a duality and generally imposes reifications: we 
appropriate objects or events and think of them as ‘real’, investing in them attributes, properties 
and attachments that are not there.  The mind, however, is not something that can be 
appropriated.138 
Liberation must come, then, as non-discriminating cognition (nirvikalpaka-jn͂āna): a type 
of cognition that does not appropriate anything, does not impose anything, and requires the 
absence of any sort of discursive, discriminative thought.  Sponberg (1979: 52) adds that there is 
a positive aspect, ‘the direct and intuitive cognition of the Absolute’, but from what has been 
discussed, we know that ‘absolute’ in a Yogācāra sense is not equivalent with ‘absolute’ as we 
would understand it, for example, in Advaita.  We saw previously that the ‘absolute’ or ‘perfected 
                                                        
137 The following extract really gets to the crux of what Lusthaus (2002: 492) is trying to demonstrate: 
All I know directly is what happens immediately within my own consciousness. 
In other words, consciousness is always and everywhere a case of cognitive 
closure. But the closure can never be absolute. What is not of my consciousness 
in the genitive and generative sense (i.e., what does not exist simply in virtue of 
my consciousness either possessing or creating it) may still exert an influence 
on me, it may still be perceived remotely, i.e., filtered through my cognitive 
apparatus. 
138 Lusthaus forces this point when he writes that ‘[y]ou can't move someone else's mind (or hand) the way you 
can move your own, since it has an independent cetanä. Secondly, hands grasp tangible things. But consciousness 
does not 'grasp' (chih, appropriate) other minds, implying that minds are intangible’ (2002: 490). 
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nature’ was the understanding that all experienced phenomena are empty (śūnyatā), and so 
‘direct and intuitive cognition of the absolute’ simply amounts to what the Mādhyamika might 
call ‘the realisation of emptiness’.139  This cognition is still of something, but it is so without 
appropriation.  In this way, the enlightened mind can still operate within the world, but it does 
not grasp at either the world or itself.   
Sponberg argues that nirvikalpaka-jn͂āna is thus a mode that allows the Yogācārin to 
operate ‘in both nirvāṇa and saṃsāra, in the supramundane Absolute and in the mundane realm 
of discrimination’ (1979: 52), but I think that this is a step too far for reasons outlined above.  It 
seems to me that this is the only real account of nirvāṇa open to a Yogācārin: they cannot claim 
it a permanent place or state for reasons already discussed, and so I wonder in what sense the 
‘absolute’ can really be said to be supramundane.  It is not a substratum that supports reality, or 
a substance that creates reality, such as the ātman-Brahman.  Much like the Madhyamaka 
project, Yogācārin liberation lacks an ‘essence (niḥsvabhāva) to clearly distinguish it from 
anything else. There is, however, no final and all encompassing essence or svabhāva which might 
function as some sort of essential self or paramātman to all things’ (King, 1998: 69).  It is simply 
a way of seeing things, a way of interacting with and thinking about the world.  Liberation comes 
when consciousness just is; it is conscious of itself in its purest form, without appropriation or 
grasping.  This does not suggest to me a hyper-real substratum.  Intuition of the perfected aspect 
is how we reach apratiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa, or liberation not permanently established.  We know, of 
                                                        
139 Whether or not this is actually possible is a debate for another day.  My main concern here is not to prove that 
these conceptions of nirvāṇa are realistically feasible, only that the conception of them need not result in some 
absolute like the ātman-Brahman. 
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course, that it is vital to both the Yogācārin and Mādhyamika accounts of nirvāṇa that it is not 
permanent, for permanence of nirvāṇa would make it either a separate metaphysical realm, or 
a permanent mental state that is either eternal and thus not escapable, or eternal and so not 
attainable.140  
So is the denial of externality a form of metaphysical idealism?  Lusthaus claims that the 
Yogācārins deny externality is real on both doctrinal and pragmatic grounds, and I add that 
externality is not something immediately cognisable or causally efficacious in the way required 
for Yogācārins like Vasubandhu to call phenomena ‘real’.  There is, however, a catch.  
Metaphysical idealism is an ontological concern.  It looks to explain the way the world is via some 
means or other.  Lusthaus contends, though, that Yogācāra does not care to build an ontology.  
There is no concern at all for ‘ontological regions, but rather psychosophical regions’ (2002: 
484).141  All this means is that – like Nāgārjuna – Vasubandhu and the Yogācārins are primarily 
interested in how we interact with the world, why we construct reifications, our karma, and how 
we might end duḥkha (Lusthaus, 2002: 484).  Ontological theorising is a distraction that at best 
distracts us from and at worst actively works against the Buddhist soteriological method.   
Metaphysical idealism is not simply an epistemic concern, though perhaps Bhattacharya 
and other Advaitins would prefer to characterise it that way.  At its heart is the ontological idea 
                                                        
140 This aside from other problems, such as nirvāṇa’s being divorced from pratītyasamutpāda, which I have 
covered elsewhere. 
141 ‘Psychosophy’ as a term is popular in some theosophical circles and has its origins in the Greek words ‘psychē’ 
and ‘sophiā’.  In this context, I think Lusthaus would translate these as ‘mind’ (as opposed to ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’) and 
‘wisdom’. 
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that there is a single source of existence.  It is an epistemic shift that allows one to see this truth, 
but the ontological aspect remains throughout.  It is the highest truth that all is ātman-Brahman.  
Yogācāra, as I hope to have demonstrated does not endorse such a position.  Indeed, if it is to be 
philosophically consistent, it cannot endorse such a position.  Lusthaus cites directly from the 
Ch'eng wei-shih lun to argue that Vasubandhu’s Yogācāra recognises the existence of other 
minds. 142   The idea is that Yogācāra both acknowledges other minds but maintains 
consciousness-only.  Lusthaus’ translation is as follows: 
You should examine and alertly listen. If there were only a single 
consciousness how could the ten directions, the sages and ordinary 
folk, causes and effects, and so on, be distinguished? Who would 
look for [the teachings] and who would espouse them? What 
[would differentiate] the Dharma from its seeker? Thus, the words 
'wei-shih' have a deep meaning. The word shih (consciousness, 
vijn͂apti, vijñāna) in general reveals that all sentient beings each 
have [their own] eight consciousnesses, six types of caittas, altered 
[consciousness] (so-pien) qua nimitta- and darśana- [bhāgas], 
distinguishing divisions, and tathatā which is disclosed through the 
principle of emptiness. Since the self-characteristics (svalakṣaṇa) of 
the consciousnesses, [the dharmas] associated with consciousness, 
the two altered [bhāgas], the three divisions, and the four real 
natures [of the preceding categories], as well as all other dharmas, 
are never separate from consciousness, we have established the 
[sense in which we use the] term shih.143 
(Lusthaus, 2002: 487) 
                                                        
142 The Ch'eng wei-shih lun is a Chinese text attributed to Xuanzang.  Its Sanskrit name is Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, or 
the Discourse on the Perfection of Consciousness-only.  It is based around Vasubandhu’s Triṃśikāvijñaptikārikā and 
is an important text in Chinese Yogācāra. 
143 All annotations Lusthaus’. 
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The central thesis at play is, we can see, that there are of course other minds.  We are not 
simply microcosms of one single supermind, superself, or paramātman.  The final point made is 
that the ‘only’ in consciousness-only is used to force the point that nothing in experience can 
ever be separated from consciousness, and so it is with consciousness that one must work in 
order to quell dissatisfying experiences.  Lusthaus (2002:491) translates an extract from the 
Ch'eng wei-shih lun which gives an account of how other minds are independent but not separate 
to our own: 
It is only like a mirror, which 'perceives' what appears [within it as] 
external objects. [This kind of perception is the type we] term 
'discerning (liao) other minds,' though they can't be immediately - 
directly discerned. What is discerned immediately-directly is [one's 
consciousness'] own alterations (so-pien). Hence the 
[Saṅdhinirmocana] Sūtra says: There is not the slightest dharma 
which can grasp the remaining dharmas; only when consciousness 
arises does one project/perceive the appearance of that, which is 
called 'grasping that thing.  
The point is that there are other consciousnesses, but that we are only aware of them in 
the first place because of changes in our own consciousness: it is of these changes in our own 
consciousness that we are immediately aware.  This means that other minds are both 
independent of our own consciousness insofar as they exist, but not separate from our own 
consciousness insofar as we only know of this existence via the changes elicited in our own sphere 
of consciousness.  In this way, then, other minds exist independently of our own mind, but they 
can never be known outside of our own mind.  Can this apply to objects and so in that populate 
the world?  If so, it would banish any spectre of metaphysical idealism within the Yogācāra.  
Lusthaus (2002: 491) translates the following line in conclusion of the above argument: ‘[o]ther 
mind is this sort of condition; rūpa, etc. are the same case.’  This is an incredible claim if Yogācāra 
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is actually idealist in nature.  Other minds are real; they exist independently of our own 
consciousness of them, but it is only in our own consciousness that we can know them.  The same 
is true for rūpa, commonly translated as ‘form’, denoting objects, stuff, entities.  Rūpa is, as 
Lusthaus writes, ‘a remote ālambana’ (2002: 491), or a remote sense-object.  It is independent 
of our consciousness, but not wholly separate from it because our knowledge of it in the first 
place relies on its causing some effect or change within our consciousness.  If this bold claim is 
true (and there are no reasons that jump out at me to suppose that it is not), then Yogācāra 
simply cannot be called ‘idealist’ in any of the senses earlier outlined by Lusthaus. 
Lusthaus is thus vindicated in his claim that to try to prove that only mind exists, or to 
take the ‘position’ or view (dṛṣṭi) that only mind exists is to miss the point by some distance.  
Consciousness is that lens through which the Yogācārins analyse experience because it is the 
means through which we ‘do’ our experiencing.  Lusthaus is right to state that consciousness so 
analysed by the Yogācārins – not as a permanent immutable entity, but as an ever-responding, 
ever-changing, intersubjective flux consisting of consecutive moments of consciousness – is 
difficult to cling and attach to.  In Lusthaus’ words, ‘[c]onsciousness itself is in and as itself 
impossible to grasp, rendering it less susceptible to the psychosophic abuses that an external, 
physical, possessible world is prone to, or even encourages. One can cling to ideas, but not a 
fleeting moment of consciousness’ (2002: 488).  This is the crux of the Yogācārin method.  This 
understanding does not resemble any of the forms of idealism outlined at the beginning of this 
subsection, and it certainly does not resemble a monistic absolutist doctrine comparable to that 
of the Advaitins.   Consequently, it is my contention that Yogācāra philosophy understood as it is 
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in this work is not absolutist and cannot lead to the conclusion that all of reality is the ātman-
Brahman. 
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§5: Madhyamaka and Absolutism 
I have already said that Bhattacharya is not alone in claiming that Buddhism teaches some 
sort of absolutism.  It would be a misrepresentation of the Buddhist literature – at least from a 
Mahāyāna point of view – to claim otherwise.  I follow Tillemans (forthcoming) in acknowledging 
that insofar as Mahāyāna Buddhism speaks of the dharmakāya, it tends to do so in an absolute 
sense; that is to say that discussions around dharmakāya usually tend to hold it as some sort of 
ultimate reality, the essential nature from which the entirety of reality emanates.  Tillemans 
argues – wisely, in my view – that we should not be so quick to write off absolutistic notions in 
Mahāyāna literature as some sort of ‘wrong reading’ imputed by a modern bias.  To do so, he 
argues would be to ignore a major trend in Indian Buddhist thought and to throw out the 
proverbial baby with the bathwater.  He writes that ‘there were important ways Prajñāpāramitā 
and Abhisamayālaṃkāra commentators took dharmakāya as a substantive and accorded it an 
absolute sense.  This is not a theological flight of fancy; it is a major philosophical idea in Buddhist 
scholasticism’ (Tillemans, forthcoming: 6, note 9).  It is clear then that despite what we know of 
the traditional Buddhist preoccupation with insubstantiality and avoidance of absolutes of any 
kind (this is, after all, what the famed ‘middle path’ is all about!), there is a relatively strong 
tradition within the Mahāyāna schools of asserting an absolute reality.  I do not contest this – it 
is a matter of historical fact.  Instead, I want to argue that this assertion of an absolute reality is 
not a necessary part of the Mahāyāna.  Further, I want to argue that Nāgārjuna – the Mahāyāna’s 
founding father – does not appear to support any such assertion in his seminal writing, the 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK), and as we have seen, no absolutism is endorsed in the 
Vigrahavyāvartani (VV).  With this in mind, I will discuss some of the terms pointed to by 
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Bhattacharya as equivalent (2015: 13) and analysing them – as far as possible – in a Madhyamaka 
context.  In so doing, I hope to show that Nāgārjuna did not – and so we need not – impute from 
such terms any idea of an Absolute like the Upaniṣadic ātman-Brahman. 
5.1 Understanding Dharmakāya  
Despite the Mahāyāna tendency to speak of dharmakāya in positive, absolutist terms, it 
would be disingenuous to state that the use of dharmakāya (or its Pāli equivalent, dhammakāya) 
in wider Buddhist literature and traditions is always absolute.  There is a strong, demonstrable 
Theravāda tradition that views dharmakāya/dhammakāya as the sum of the Buddha’s verbal 
teachings or even the sum of the Buddha’s mental qualities (and so correctly discerning all 
dharmas is the dhammakāya).  I will return to this reading shortly.  Chanida attributes the 
difference in interpretation to Buddhaghoṣa, who at various points in his works tends to use 
dhammakāya in these different ways (Chanida, 2008: 6).  Following Buddhaghoṣa, says Chanida, 
Dhammapāla144 interpreted dhammakāya ‘as bodies of those extraordinary qualities connected 
with the Buddha’s mental purity’ (Chanida, 2008: 7, note 36).145  It seems obvious to me that 
‘bodies’ can here be understood in terms of a collection, viz. the collection of qualities connected 
with the Buddha’s mental purity, or the collection of qualities possessed by tathāgatas.  It is this 
                                                        
144 Though there are multiple Theravāda writers of this name, I here refer to that Dhammapāla famed for 
commentaries on seven early Theravāda texts in or around the fifth century. 
145 I think it relatively uncontroversial to assume that ‘body’ here refers to a collection of something – in this case, 
qualities or teachings – in the same vein as ‘aggregate’.  It need not refer to a physical body, but simply a collection 
of content that is in some way linked or alike. 
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interpretation (as opposed to a metaphysically substantialist absolute interpretation) that I 
contend is necessitated by Nāgārjuna’s wider philosophical outlook. 
The principal passage cited in regards to the appearance of dhammakāya’s appearance 
in the canonical literature is Dīgha Nikāya (DN) 27.9 (Aggaññasutta), the rear end of which states 
(in Pāli): 
Taṃ kissa hetu? Tathāgatassa h'etaṃ Vāseṭṭhā, adhivacanaṃ 
dhammakāyo iti pi, brahmakāyo iti pi, dhammabhūto iti pi, 
brahmabhūto iti iti pi. 
Why is this? Because, Vāseṭṭha, this designates the Tathāgata 
dhammakāya, brahmakāya, dhammabhūta, brahmabhūta. 
How we choose to render these words is of crucial importance.  Let us begin with 
dhammakāya: is the Tathāgata designated as the collection of their teachings?  Are they simply 
the sum of their mental qualities?  Is, as some Mahāyānists would have us think, the Tathāgata 
to be designated as the manifestation of an unchanging, ever-present ultimate reality?  There is 
a lot of ground to cover here, and I do not intend to tread all of it.  Instead. I will give a brief 
overview of the different ways that dhammakāya/dharmakāya might be interpreted and then 
assess these interpretations in the light of Madhyamaka philosophy more broadly construed.   
It is from this starting point then that I will contest Bhattacharya’s claim that the 
Mahāyāna ‘put things right’ (2015: 39) in terms of developing an absolutist theory, and that it is 
the Mahāyāna texts that classify the ultimate as ‘śūnyatā, tathatā, bhūtakoṭi, dharmadhātu, 
dharma-kāya . . . and also ātman in the Upaniṣadic sense’ (2015: 13).  I will argue that for 
Nāgārjuna at least (and so for Indian Madhyamaka) this equivalence is mistaken, and that 
śūnyatā, dharmakāya are, whilst related to the same soteriological aims, nevertheless distinct. 
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I start, then, with dharmakāya.  Echoing what has been said above, Paul Harrison explains 
that 
the dharma-kaya ("Dharma-body," "Body of Truth," "Cosmic Body," 
"Absolute Body," etc.) is both formless and imperishable, 
representing the identification of the Buddha with the truth which 
he revealed, or with reality itself. As such the dharma-kaya is often 
linked with various terms for reality, such as dharmata, dharma-
dhatu, and so on, and has even been regarded as a kind of Buddhist 
absolute, or at least at one with it. 
(Harrison, 1992: 44) 
We can see how dharmakāya might be interpreted, but so far we are no better off in 
terms of understanding why this is the case.  It is later in the article that Harrison really sets out 
his stall.  Analysing the use of dharmakāya in the whole Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra 
(AsPP), Harrison lists five instances in which the compound occurs and argues that translators 
sometimes get their interpretations wrong.  This is, he argues, because there is a tendency to 
assume that dharmakāya is to be always interpreted as a noun (thus as a tatpuruṣa or 
karmadhāraya substantive) rather than as a bahuvrīhi adjective (1992: 50).  His reading of 
dharmakāya at chapters 4, 17, and 31 of the AsPP as an adjectival compound is, he argues, in line 
with the Pāli equivalent as used at DN 27.9, where it is, he says, meant to be understood as an 
attribute of the Buddha rather than as a thing in itself.  Thus he writes that ‘[t]o put it in more 
elegant English, the Buddha is truly “embodied” in the dhamma, rather than his physical person’ 
(1992: 51).  Eckel (1992: 97) has a slightly different take on things, citing passages from AsPP III.146    
These passages show the Buddha determining that a person who is devoted to the Perfection of 
                                                        
146 The translation used by Eckel is that of Conze, 1973 (specifically, the passages contained between pages 105-
107). 
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Wisdom (reading, reflecting on, reciting, honouring, and reproducing the text) will receive greater 
merit than a person that builds and worships stūpas containing relics of the Buddha.  In this sense, 
says Eckel, the ‘Dharma body’ is the prajñāpāramitā text, and it is, in a real sense, a relic of the 
Buddha.  It is not then the Buddha himself that is embodied in the text, but a relic of his thought 
(Eckel, 1992: 98).147 
  Also of relevance to AsPP III are the occurrences of śarīra.  Eckel translates śarīra as ‘relic’ 
(such as the remains of the Buddha, a monk, a historic religious item); it can also simply mean 
‘body’, usually (though – importantly – not always) in the physical sense.  It is, then, arguably 
                                                        
147 Eckel (1992: 97) also makes the point that the extract given below is not drawing any sort of distinction 
between worship of a relic and study of a text; nor is it drawing a distinction between relics that are physical or 
intellectual.  Instead, writes Eckel, ‘[i]t is simply drawing contrast between the worship of one physical object and 
another.’  He later elaborates on this, writing that ‘[c]omparisons between different kinds of worship are common 
in Buddhist literature’, before giving some examples (1992: 213, note 4).  This is a fair point to raise (it is indeed 
true of many Buddhist writings!), and it is one that has some merit here – a great deal of time is spent extolling the 
virtue of honouring the Perfection of Wisdom by covering it in cloth, garlands of flowers, surrounding it with bells 
and flags, and so on. 
However, it is also worth noting that the Buddha spends a lot of time detailing in the extract to 
Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā 3 exactly how ‘cognizing the all-knowing’ is so important to other beings’ (viz. to 
people that are not the Buddha) spiritual journey.  Similarly, the Buddha emphasises that worship of the 
Prajñāpāramitā is identical to worshipping the cognition of the omniscient (and so worshipping the Buddha’s own 
thoughts and teachings), and he does not say this in isolation.  When the Buddha speaks of the ‘cognizance of 
omniscience’, it appears that his meaning is that it is the practitioner that does the cognizing of the Buddha’s 
omniscience – in so doing, the practitioner actually takes part in the Perfection of Wisdom, even if only at an 
elementary, basic level.  This, it seems to me, suggests that the practitioner is indeed being urged to engage with 
the text: to study the text is to cognise the (words: thoughts: teachings of) the omniscient.  To worship the book 
that the text is written in without studying (reading) it is, it seems obvious to me, to cognise none of these things.  
Honouring it with flowers, oils, holy robes and so on is but one aspect of the process – yes, it will gain merit 
according to Buddhist orthodoxy, but is that really enough?  Can these ritualistic acts really be called ‘cognizing the 
all-knowing’?  Does ritual (which can be performed pretty mindlessly) really amount to the ‘cognizance of 
omniscience’?  I think not.  It strikes me that cognising the thoughts/words of the omniscient entails reading or 
hearing them, especially if we are to have the dharma-body, saṅgha-body , and Buddha-body ‘revealed’ to us!  
Simply placing a book on a pedestal and prostrating before it and so on is, whilst useful in dedicatory and karmic 
terms, surely not enough to ‘cognize the omniscience of the all-knowing’.  Of course, a short but significant feature 
of the AsPP extract given below is the idea that the person ‘copies out’ the book – I suspect it would be very 
difficult to copy out a book in a language one understands without engaging with its contents! 
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technically distinct from kāya, which can refer to a physical body or a collective ‘body’ (aggregate; 
group: of texts, for example), though any distinction that I have found seems to be imposed by 
later writers in the commentarial traditions.  It is, though, when instances of the compound 
dharmaśarīra occur that things become a little more blurry.  The compound dharmaśarīra can, 
according to the Monier-Williams Sanskrit Dictionary, mean either a body or collection of virtues, 
or a body or collection of Buddhist relics (Monier-Williams, 1960 512) – recall that dharmakāya 
can mean a collection of something, too.  With this in mind, it looks as though śarīra might – in 
the context of the compound dharmaśarīra – provide some clue as to how the Buddha’s ‘truth 
body’ is to be understood after all.   
Indeed, at AsPP III, it looks as though either understanding of dharmaśarīra can apply: the 
prajñāpāramitā texts referred to by the Buddha can be said to be a ‘relic’ of his thought, but they 
can also be said to contain – documentarily, at least – the body of virtues possessed by or the 
body of teachings conveyed by the Buddha.148  Some scholars understand dharmaśarīra still 
differently, arguing that it can be equated with dharmakāya – I have Mitomo (1983) in mind, 
                                                        
148 I tentatively suggest that ‘relic’ would be here understood in one of two ways.  First is to see the book 
containing the Prajñāpāramitā as a historical relic in the way that an ancient Bible might be (and so an object of 
historical or cultural significance that has survived from a much earlier time).  The second way would be to treat 
the book itself as a religious relic that elevates the capturing of the Buddha’s thoughts to the same sort of level as 
a physical relic of the same sort as a piece of his body that has been preserved after death.  Either one can be 
argued for in the current context, though I do not find either particularly convincing in the wider context of the 
passage cited.  That a book outlining the Prajñāpāramitā can be a ‘collection of virtues’ in an abstract way is, I 
suggest, relatively uncontroversial.  Insofar as the book faithfully documents the teachings of the Buddha – 
teachings based on and stemming from the Buddha’s virtues as an enlightened being – it can be claimed to be a 
‘collection of virtues’ at least in an abstracted documentary sense: a documented collection detailing the Buddha’s 
virtues.  Indeed, there are those that claim that shrines to books containing prajñāpāramitā teachings are identical 
to dharmakāya in the transcendental sense (Mitomo, 1983: 1119), and so they are physical manifestations of the 
Absolute.  Needless to say that I do not think that this is the appropriate conclusion to draw here.  
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here (though he is not alone on this).  Whilst I will eventually argue that dharmaśarīra and 
dharmakāya can be thought of in analogous terms (in at least some significant ways), I do not 
think that we need necessarily subscribe to any absolutist or transcendental interpretations.  The 
details of all these interpretations will be discussed shortly, looking at a couple of excerpts from 
the AsPP.  I will then give what I think should be a typical Madhyamaka response to ideas of 
absolutism and transcendentalism, drawing primarily on the work of Nāgārjuna.  In the excerpt 
of the AsPP that I have chosen, we find the following:149 
Thus spake Śakra Devānāmindra (Lord of the Gods): ‘The Lord has 
said that it is through learning the perfection of wisdom that the 
Tathāgata has obtained supreme enlightenment [and] perfect 
understanding.’ 
                                                        
149 Extract from Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā 3:  
evamukte śakro devānāmindro bhagavantametadavocatihaiva bhagavan bhagavatā prajñāpāramitāyāṃ 
śikṣamāṇena tathāgatenārhatā samyaksaṃbuddhena anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhiḥ sarvajñatā pratilabdhā 
abhisaṃbuddhā / bhagavānāhatasmāttarhi kauśika nānenātmabhāvaśarīrapratilambhena tathāgatastathāgata iti 
saṃkhyāṃ gacchati / sarvajñatāyāṃ tu pratilabdhāyāṃ tathāgatastathāgata iti saṃkhyāṃ gacchati / yeyaṃ 
kauśika sarvajñatā tathāgatasyārhataḥ samyaksaṃbuddhasya prajñāpāramitānirjātaiṣā / eṣa ca kauśika 
tathāgatasyātmabhāvaśarīrapratilambhaḥ prajñāpāramitopāyakauśalyanirjātaḥ san sarvajñajñānāśrayabhūto 
bhavati / enaṃ hyāśrayaṃ niśritya sarvajñajñānasya prabhāvanā bhavati, buddhaśarīraprabhāvanā bhavati 
dharmaśarīraprabhāvanā bhavati saṃghaśarīraprabhāvanā bhavati / ityevaṃ 
sarvajñajñānahetuko'yamātmabhāvaśarīrapratilambhaḥ sarvajñajñānāśrayabhūtatvātsarvasattvānāṃ 
caityabhūto vandanīyaḥ satkaraṇīyo gurukaraṇīyo mānanīyaḥ pūjanīyo'rcanīyo'pacāyanīyaḥ saṃvṛtto bhavati / 
evaṃ ca mama parinirvṛtasyāpi sataḥ eṣāṃ śarīrāṇāṃ pūjā bhaviṣyati / tasmāttarhi kauśika yaḥ kaścitkulaputro 
vā kuladuhitā vā imāṃ prajñāpāramitāṃ likhitvā pustakagatāṃ vā kṛtvā sthāpayet enāṃ ca divyābhiḥ 
puṣpadhūpagandhamālyavilepanacūrṇacīvaracchatradhvajaghaṇṭāpatākābhiḥ satkuryāt gurukuryāt mānayet 
pūjayet arcayet apacāyet ayameva kauśika tayoḥ kulaputrayoḥ kuladuhitrorvā bahutaraṃ puṇyaṃ prasavet / 
tatkasya hetoḥ sarvajñajñānasya hi kauśika tena kulaputreṇa vā kuladuhitrā vā pūjā kṛtā bhaviṣyati yaḥ kulaputro 
vā kuladuhitā vā iha prajñāpāramitāyāṃ likhyamānāyāṃ pustakagatāyāṃ vā satkāraṃ gurukāraṃ mānanāṃ 
pūjanāmarcanāmapacāyanāṃ pūjāṃ ca vividhāṃ kuryāt ayameva tato bahutaraṃ puṇyaṃ prasavet / tatkasya 
hetoḥ sarvajñajñānasya hi kauśika tena pūjā kṛtā bhaviṣyati yaḥ prajñāpāramitāyai pūjāṃ kariṣyati // 
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The Lord [responds]: ‘Therefore, Kauśika, [it is] not by obtaining this 
physical personality 150  that the tathāgata comes to be called 
(saṃkhyāṃ gacchati) the tathāgata, [it is] by obtaining omniscience 
[that] the tathāgata comes to be called the tathāgata.’ 
‘Kausíka, the omniscience of the tathāgata, of one who has attained 
complete enlightenment, comes forth from the perfection of 
wisdom.’ 
‘Kausíka, the physical personality of the tathāgata, [on which the] 
cognizance [of] omniscience is dependent, is the result of skill-in-
means [of] understanding the perfection of wisdom.’151 
‘Supported by this cognizance [of] omniscience, the Buddha-body, 
Dharma-body, and Saṅgha-body are revealed.’152 
‘As the [acquisition of the] physical personality causes [the] 
cognizance [of] omniscience, the cognition [that] causes 
omniscience becomes a refuge [and a] shrine for all beings. [It is] 
worthy of being honoured, of being revered and of being 
worshipped.’ 
‘And after my parinirvāṇa, [my] relics will [also] be worshipped.’ 
                                                        
150 I follow Conze (1973: 105) in here translating ātmabhāvaśarīra as ‘physical personality’ rather than ‘physical 
body’ or variations on that theme.  This is because in the context of this extract, talk of a physical body without the 
connotations of the connected personality seems redundant: the Buddha has acquired a certain personality, a set 
of personal dispositions, in virtue of his enlightenment and omniscience.  It would be bizarre to say that the 
Buddha had acquired his physical body in virtue of his enlightenment – he was necessarily embodied before he 
was enlightened!  Harvey (1995: 234) writes of the Buddha’s ‘personality’ that ‘when the Buddha is in a non-
nibbanic state, he manifests his nature by a 'body', or personality, which is redolent with factors of the Path’, 
illustrating that what technically means ‘body’ can here be translated in this manner.   
151 I think that the Buddha must mean that the ‘cognizance of omniscience’ by other people is dependent upon the 
tathāgata’s personality, viz. the Buddha’s personality – modified upon becoming awakened (thanks to the 
Perfection of Wisdom) – is what is responsible for conveying his omniscience to others so that they might cognize 
it.  I suppose that this would occur when the practitioner dedicates themselves to copying out the book. 
152 I have here translated buddhaśarīra, dharmaśarīra and saṁghaśarīra  as ‘Buddha-body’, ‘Dharma-body’, and 
‘saṅgha-body’ rather than ‘Buddha-relic’, ‘dharma-relic’, and ‘saṅgha-relic’.  It could be argued, however, that 
each are ‘relics’ that are revealed through awareness of the omniscient if we understand ‘relic’ to be the historic 
record of the Buddha’s thought/teaching, in which case, awareness of or cognizance of omniscience might be said 
to ‘reveal’ the Buddhas thoughts on each aspect in turn.  We can also choose to interpret these things as a body of 
ideas related to each jewel (I do not think it a coincidence that the choice of ‘bodies’ marries to the three jewels 
prescribed by the Buddha!).  The significance of each of these bodies is thus made clear upon our cognizance of 
omniscience, viz. upon our awareness of the thoughts/teachings of the omniscient (the Buddha).   
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‘Therefore, Kauśika, whoever – son or daughter of noble birth – 
having copied [out] the Perfection of Wisdom, having made [it into] 
a book, establishing it, worshipping it, honouring it with pūjā, with 
heavenly flags, banners, perfume, flowers, bells [et cetera], this 
being the case Kauśika, those two will produce greater merit.’ 
‘In so doing, Kauśika, the son or daughter of noble birth [that has] 
made a copy of the Perfection of Wisdom, who worships, honours 
and respects it with pūjās of many kinds; they produce the greatest 
merit.’ 
Why so? Because, Kauśika, in worshipping the Perfection of 
Wisdom, he worships the cognition [of the] omniscient.’153 
As touched on earlier, we have in this passage two central ideas at play.  First, we have 
the idea that adherence to the Perfection of Wisdom is the only way to achieve enlightenment 
(and so omniscience).  Second, we have the idea that a person that writes down (and reproduces 
– an arduous task requiring concentration and dedication) the Perfection of Wisdom and honours 
it (via worship, and, presumably, by living according to it) will be performing a deed more 
meritorious than the person that simply worships the relics of the Buddha’s physical body after 
his death.  It is the distinction between the significance of worshipping and honouring the words 
(and so thoughts) of the Buddha over and above his physical body that primarily interests me, 
but both aspects are relevant to the current discussion.   
The Buddha is very clearly attempting to impress upon Śakra (also referred to as Kauśika) 
the importance of the Perfection of Wisdom to both accrual of merit (karman) and to liberation.  
                                                        
153 I chose this particular passage from the AsPP because I think that for my purposes, it gives the most 
comprehensive overview in the shortest amount of space.  That is to say that it almost makes the point for me that 
the ‘body of the Dharma’ can be contained in a book chronicling the Buddha’s thoughts and teachings.  Indeed, the 
Buddha himself says that ‘in worshipping the Perfection of Wisdom, [the practitioner] worships the omniscient’. 
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The Buddha says that enlightenment ‘comes forth from the Perfection of Wisdom’ and that 
omniscience is dependent upon ‘understanding the Perfection of Wisdom’, emphasising the 
significance of meditative insight into reality when it comes to liberation.154  The Buddha makes 
a distinction between his personality (and so his dispositions, his methods of teaching and so on) 
and his status as a tathāgata, and this is simply because he wants to force the point that he is 
not awakened because of his personality.  He is awakened because he has completely and 
perfectly understood the Perfection of Wisdom, which itself facilitates omniscience.  In fact, the 
Buddha’s personality is, he claims, simply a result of skill-in-means: ‘Kauśika, the physical 
personality of the tathāgata is the result of skill-in-means and [of] understanding the perfection 
of wisdom [on which] omniscience is dependent.’  This seems to suggest that the Buddha’s 
personality is a manifestation of the Perfection of Wisdom that comes about as a result of the 
Buddha’s skill-in-means of the same Perfection of Wisdom.  In other words, owing to the 
Buddha’s skill in both understanding the Perfection of Wisdom and in teaching it, his personality 
comes to manifest that same Perfection of Wisdom (i.e. he ‘lives’ what he teaches; he is an 
embodiment of the Perfection of Wisdom).  This reading is, I believe, supported elsewhere in the 
                                                        
154 There are different ways to understand exactly what such insight involves.  A common way to understand the 
purposes of the Prajñāpāramitā texts is to see them as guides that aim to direct the practitioner to the nature of 
ultimate reality (which is generally characterised as non-dual, non-conceptual, and transcendental).  In this sense, 
then, it is easy to see how such a transcendental focus on non-duality would appeal to Bhattacharya, especially 
given that, as Harrison (1992: 48) points out, this non-dual transcendental vision of reality is also non-conceptual: 
it sounds precisely like the ātman-Brahman described by Bhattacharya!  It is not clear, however, that this is the 
only way to understand the Prajñāpāramitā: somebody like Nāgārjuna, for example, would in my opinion object to 
the idea of immersion into a true reality and instead argue that the quelling of conceptual thought need not 
necessitate a oneness with some sort of essential principle.  On this reading, the general thrust of the 
Prajñāpāramitā texts would be preserved, viz. their direction toward a meditative state that precludes conceptual 
thought (and so halts reification of entities).   
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Buddhist canonical and post-canonical texts.  For example, at Saṃyutta Nikāya (SN) 22.87 we see 
the Buddha referring to himself as the embodiment of the dhamma (dharma): 
Alaṃ vakkali kiṃ te iminā pūtikāyena diṭṭhena? Yo kho, vakkali, 
dhammaṃ passati so maṃ passati; yo maṃ passati so dhammaṃ 
passati. Dhammañhi, vakkali, passanto maṃ passati; maṃ 
passanto dhammaṃ passati. 
Stop, Vakkali!  Why [do] you [want to] see this foul body?  He who 
sees [the] Dhamma, Vakkali, sees me; he who sees me, sees [the] 
Dhamma.  In seeing [the] Dhamma, Vakkali, [one] sees me; in 
seeing me, [one] sees [the] Dhamma.155 
The Buddha says at Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā 3 that ‘supported by this omniscience, 
the Buddha-body, Dharma-body, and Saṅgha-body are revealed’, which can be understood in a 
couple of different ways.  First, in the obvious transcendentalist manner.  On this view, the 
omniscient tathāgata sees the transcendental truths of the dharma-body, saṅgha-body, and 
buddha-body – presumably as ultimate essential principles in the same vein as the 
transcendental dharmakāya as explained by Paul Harrison (1992: 44).  We already know that for 
a significant number of Buddhists, the dharmakāya is to be understood in such a manner.  This 
being the case, then why should we not also interpret dharmaśarīra – a word which can in 
principle be a synonym of dharmakāya – in the same way?  It occurs to me that if we are to take 
dharmaśarīra in this sense, then we must also for the sake of consistency take saṁghaśarīra and 
                                                        
155 One might also advance the argument that when the Buddha says that he ‘is’ the dhamma, he is speaking 
figuratively in accordance with upāya (expedient means, skilful means).  This would mean that his ‘being’ the 
dhamma is not necessarily an ultimate truth (and so does not reflect the way that things really are – he is not 
literally the dhamma), but is simply a helpful pedagogical device that allows the practitioner to better orientate 
themselves toward the path.  
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buddhaśarīra in the same sense.  Indeed, it looks as though they are intended to be taken in the 
same sense when we read them in context in the Sanskrit.   
This is, I think, where things become a little problematic for a transcendentalist approach 
– at least if we want to view the transcendentalist view as one of metaphysical ultimate realities 
in the vein of some popular understandings of dharmakāya.  First, it is not obvious to me how we 
might take the ‘saṅgha-body’ in a strongly transcendental sense.  By this I mean I am unsure how 
a metaphysical transcendence might be accounted for in the same way that, for example, there 
is sometimes a metaphysical import to dharmakāya as ultimate reality.  If we understand 
saṁghaśarīra as ‘saṅgha-relic’, we might understand the book (that is the 
Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā) as containing documentary evidence of the saṅgha in a similar 
way that we can understand it as providing documentary evidence of the Buddha’s teachings and 
documentary evidence of the collection of virtues necessarily possessed by any buddha.  In this 
sense, it is a ‘relic’ of thought and praxis.  It can, it seems to me, also be simultaneously 
understood as a ‘body’ of thought and praxis, and so if we move away from the notion of ‘body’ 
as a transcendental metaphysically Real ‘thing’, the precise translation seems to matter less.156 
In any case, the transcendentalism issue is, I think, more of an issue here than it is for 
Dharma-body and Buddha-body.  Both Dharma-body and Buddha-body can be understood 
transcendentally as essentially the same thing – Bhāvaviveka certainly thought that there was no 
                                                        
156 I have intentionally neglected to comment on the sense of śarīra as physical relics left behind after a monk or 
buddha has died and been cremated.  Whilst these might be interesting in a wider Buddhological context, it is clear 
enough that this is not an application referred to in the extract of Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā 3.   
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difference at all between the Dharma-body and the Buddha-body (which is for all intents and 
purposes identical to the Tathāgata-body that he references (Eckel, 1992: 42)).157  I suppose that 
in some loose sense, we might be able to claim that the spiritual endeavours of each member of 
the saṅgha (be they layperson or monastic) ‘transcends’ the physical borders of specific Buddhist 
groups, communities, countries and so on.  This sort of understanding would simply mean that 
there is some ‘thing’ that binds members of the saṅgha outside of their cultural or communal 
bounds: a Buddhist in Sri Lanka shares something with a Buddhist in North America, who in turn 
shares something with a Buddhist in South Africa, for example.  This shared aspect is Buddhism 
– to this extent, then, we might say that the saṅgha-body transcends borders and so on.  And yet 
this sense of ‘transcend’ seems fundamentally different to the sense advanced in discussions of 
the dharmakāya – instead of some strong sense of metaphysical transcendence, of 
transcendence into a metaphysical Reality, we have a weaker transcendence; one that is linked 
by ideas.  The saṅgha-body is a transcendental entity then insofar as it is a set of shared ideals 
that extends further than individuals, small communities, and even nations.  Of course, Nāgārjuna 
                                                        
157 Eckel also translates significant portions of Bhāvaviveka’s Madhyamakahṛdayakārikās (MHK) and the 
accompanying commentary, the Tarkajvālā, and it is here that we can really see the transcendental import around 
the ideas of Dharma-body, tathāgata-body, and Buddha-body: 
idaṃ tat paramaṃ brahma brahmādyairyanna gṛhyate / 
idaṃ tat paramaṃ satyaṃ satyavādī jagau muniḥ //289// 
Now, that Supreme Brahman is not grasped by [those (gods)] attached to and connected with 
Brahma / 
That sage [who] spoke the truth taught that this [Dharma-body] is the ultimate truth // 
What is interesting here is the manner in which Bhāvaviveka attempts to distinguish the ‘supreme Brahman’ (MHK 
III.289) of the Hindus (and so the Advaitins), and that of the Buddhists - especially Mādhyamikas.  It is the Dharma-
body however it is conceived) which is the ultimate truth, not the Supreme Brahman that eludes those associated 
with Brahma. 
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would acknowledge that any such identity is not ultimately real and does not have svabhāva.  
This would mean that the saṅgha-body is a conceptual construct, which in turn makes it 
conventional.  The same applies to the ideas, rules, and beliefs shared by ‘members’ of this body. 
 Indeed, the context of dharmakāya in the Sarvāstivādin interpretation appears to be 
different still!  Guang Xing writes that on the Sarvāstivādin view, Buddhists take refuge in the 
dharmakāya of the Buddha because the rupakāya158 is impure.  What precisely does this mean?  
Xing interprets a section of the Mahāvibhāṣa: 
Some people say that to take refuge in the Buddha is to take refuge 
in the body of the Tathāgata, which comprises head, neck, stomach, 
back, hands and feet. It is explained that the body, born of father 
and mother, is composed of the defiled dharmas, and therefore is 
not a source of refuge. The refuge is the Buddha’s fully 
accomplished qualities (aśaikṣadharma)159 which comprise bodhi 
and the dharmakāya. 
(2005: 49) 
The last sentence is the interesting part of this extract – the Sarvāstivādins recognised 
that the Buddha’s physical body is necessarily impure given that it is made up of defiled dharmas.  
This is the case whether the Buddha has ‘nothing left to learn’ or not – in virtue of his body being 
                                                        
158 This is perhaps best translated as the ‘physical body’ or ‘physical form’ of an enlightened being, where rūpa is 
‘form’ and kāya is ‘body’.  This is usually described as the physical form of an enlightened being, viewed as a living 
embodiment of wisdom or as the embodiment of qualities. 
159 We can translate aśaikṣadharma as something like ‘dharmas of those with nothing left to learn.’  There are said 
to be ten such dharmas and so the implication is relatively clear: the Buddha has acquired the ten qualities that 
constitute liberation.  It is in these qualities that we must take refuge, which is to say that these qualities can also 
liberate us provided that we work on their cultivation. 
P a g e  | 208 
 
physical (even if it is the physical manifestation of wisdom!), it is impure and conditioned.  
Precisely because this is the case, Xing further writes that 
[t]he emphasis of the Sarvāstivāda is on the attainment of 
Buddhahood, the dharmakāya, while the physical body is 
considered secondary. The dharmakāya of all Buddhas is the same. 
Therefore, according to the Sarvāstivāda, taking refuge in the 
Buddha is to take refuge in all Buddhas because the term ‘Buddha’ 
includes all the Tathāgatas since they are of the same kind. Thus 
another question arises: since the dharmakāya or the Dharma is so 
important to the Sarvāstivādins, why do they first take refuge in the 
Buddha and not the Dharma? The Sarvāstivādins explained that the 
Buddha was the founder. If the founder had not taught, then the 
Dharma would not have been manifested. Thus the Buddha is seen 
as the first refuge, just as a patient first seeks a good doctor before 
asking him for medicine. The patient then seeks a nurse to prepare 
the medicine. The Buddha is like the doctor, the Dharma like the 
medicine, and the Saṃgha is the nurse. Such is the order of the 
three refuges. 
(2005: 50) 
I think that this helps clarify things a little.  The practitioner first seeks refuge in the 
Buddha, specifically in his aśaikṣadharma.  This is, we can see, equivalent to taking refuge in all 
buddhas because every buddha is of the same sort: they have the same aśaikṣadharma in virtue 
of following the same path and attaining the same insight and wisdom.  In saying that the 
dharmakāya of all buddhas is identical, Xing appears to be claiming that every buddha manifests 
or embodies the dharma in the same way, presumably because they have attained the same 
insights and wisdom.  He adds elsewhere that the earliest Buddhists probably understood the 
dharmakāya simply as the teachings of the Buddha, and then later as the scripture containing 
these teachings (2005: 36).  It was from this latter position, Xing suggests, that disagreements 
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between schools regarding how to quantify the dharmakāya began to spring forth.160  It is not 
too much of a step to see how from discussions of quantification (in terms of possession of 
dharmas) there could be reification of the dharmakāya as a transcendental Absolute, especially 
given how Karunadasa (1996: 20) accounts for the supposed ultimacy of dharmas.  Nevertheless, 
the suggestion at this point is that the dharmakāya is still being thought of as a collection of 
qualities rather than as an Absolute of some kind.  The practitioner then takes refuge in the 
saṅgha (Buddhist community, usually of monastics), which Xing describes as a nurse that 
prepares medicine (and presumably gives support – monks and nuns generally live, chant, and 
meditate together). The Dharma itself is then the medicine, prescribed by the doctor (the 
Buddha), and administered by the saṅgha who then support you while it takes effect.  Refuge is 
to be taken in all three because all three are vital to curing our dissatisfaction (duḥkha).161 
We can see then that in principle, dharmakāya and dharmaśarīra have a close 
relationship with each other.  In dharmakāya, we have reference to the collection of Dharma: 
the totality of the Buddha’s teachings, or we have reference to the dharmas possessed by the 
Buddha that allows him to manifest his wisdom and that account for the character of his 
                                                        
160 Xing (2005: 36-44) provides a very thorough account of how the dharmas that constitute various conceptions of 
dharmakāya might be interpreted according to the schools from which each list originated.  It is outside of the 
scope of my current aims to go into much more detail on this. 
161 There could be a case made that the prajñāpāramitā texts constitute a dharmakāya in a slightly different – but 
no less absolutist – manner.  The Sikhs have their Guru Granth Sahib; a collection of holy scriptures that form the 
basis of the Sikh religion but which are also taken in a very literal sense to be the living leader of the Sikh faith.  The 
collection of texts is thus seen as an eternal, living, real manifestation of God’s word and will.  It is in principle 
possible to interpret Buddhist scriptures in a similar vein, as an eternal, ‘living’ manifestation of the Absolute (I am 
not aware of any sect which does this).  On such a reading, the Tathāgata is designated ‘dharmakāya’ insofar as 
they are a fleeting physical manifestation of this eternal Absolute.   
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enlightened state: the difference here seems to be negligible.  In dharmaśarīra, we have either 
reference to the collection of virtues acquired by the Buddha (and so extolled in Buddhist 
literature), or the ‘relic’ documenting the Buddha’s cognition (and so communicated in the 
ensuing literature).  Let us not forget that the Buddha’s teachings are supposed to lead to a state 
of affairs where the practitioner can too acquire the virtues of a tathāgata (and thus awaken): it 
seems to me that it is the case that dharmakāya and dharmaśarīra are two sides of the very same 
soteriological coin.  To put it another way, a practitioner cannot awaken without acquiring the 
collection of virtues that all tathāgatas have possessed (possessing these virtues necessarily 
means that any defilements are removed).  The general idea is that practitioners would struggle 
to acquire these virtues without first being told and shown how to by the Buddha’s (collective) 
teachings.162  Further, to understand and adhere to the teachings is to acquire the virtues, whilst 
to acquire the virtues is to know the ‘essence’ of the body of the Buddha’s teachings.  It seems 
clear to me, then, that the dharmakāya need not be characterised as an eternal metaphysical 
absolute that is somehow ‘entered into’ by advanced practitioners.  It can instead be understood 
as the collected ‘body’ of teachings and virtues; it can be understood as a mere concept.  As we 
know, for Nāgārjuna, all concepts are constructed and conventional, and this happily bypasses 
any idea of ultimate existence.  It is my contention, then, that this interpretation of dharmakāya 
might look like something that Nāgārjuna would endorse. 
                                                        
162 It is not impossible to reach liberation without hearing and understanding the Buddha’s teachings, at least 
according to the Mahāyāna; it is simply rare. 
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5.2 Brahmakāya, Dhammabhūta, Brahmabhūta 
The next of the four words that we need to place in context is brahmakāya.163  This can 
be rendered as brahma-body, which Walshe (1995: 604, note 823) thinks should be understood 
as something like ‘the highest’.  This is to be understood with the latter part of the sentence: 
‘become dhamma, become brahma’ (dhammabhūta and brahmabhūta respectively).  On 
Walshe’s interpretation, then, this segment should be taken to mean that the tathāgata 
(synonymous with buddha more generally: any enlightened being) has ‘become the highest’ due 
to achievement of liberation via their own efforts.  On this reading, the use of ‘brahma’ is 
uncontroversial.  Ergardt (1977: 96-97) claims that rather than stating that the awakened has 
become one with the Brahman (see, for example, the usage of brahmabhūta at BG 18.54)164, one 
that is brahmabhūta has become so in virtue of their adherence to the religious lifestyle (Pāli: 
brahmacariya; Skt.: brahmacarya).  This means that the Buddha and the arahants 165  are 
brahmabhūta not because they have melded with the ātman-Brahman, but because they fulfil 
the requirements dictated by the religious lifestyle they lead: they perform their religious duties 
                                                        
163 DN 27.9: Taṃ kissa hetu? Tathāgatassa h'etaṃ Vāseṭṭhā, adhivacanaṃ dhammakāyo iti pi, brahmakāyo iti pi, 
dhammabhūto iti pi,brahmabhūto iti iti pi. 
164 BG 18.54: 
brahmabhūtaḥ prasannātmā na śocati na kāṅkṣati / samaḥ sarveṣu bhūteṣu 
madbhaktiṃ labhate parām //  
 
[He who has] become one with the Absolute (brahmabhūtaḥ), [who has 
attained] the serene-nature (prasannātmā), [does] not lament nor [does he] 
desire: [he] is equanimous [towards] all living beings; [he] attains highest 
devotion to Me. 
165 Skt: arhat; in the Tipiṭaka, an arahant is one that is free from defilements, that is enlightened.  This definition 
gradually evolved to mean different things to different Buddhist schools (particularly upon the advent of the 
Mahāyāna), but such later developments are peripheral to the point here. 
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with diligence.  Analysing this, Ergardt writes that ‘the obvious qualities of a life according to 
dhamma must be the foundation for the meaning of the word brahmabhūta’ (1977: 97).166   
Xing takes a different view, writing that the Buddha appears to be comparing himself to 
Brahma for effect, writing that in such instances where brahmakāya appears ‘[a] parallel is clearly 
being drawn between a brāhmaṇa  and a Sakyaputtiyasamaṇa, and to indicate that dhammakāya 
is equated to brahmakāya’ (2005: 71).167  Xing further cites Buddhaghoṣa to advance the claim 
that according to the Theravādins, dharmakāya/dhammakāya ‘simply means the teachings of 
the Buddha’ (2005: 71).  This being so, brahmakāya is usually understood as ‘the body of Brahma’ 
or the ‘divine body’.  We can also understand it as ‘the highest body’.  This is, I think, subject to 
the same sorts of nuance as dhammakāya in the contexts of the Nikāyas: ‘body’ as a collection 
or aggregate.  It is not obvious to me, then, that Bhattacharya is justified in assuming that the 
Buddha is equating himself with Brahmā for any other purpose than to reason with Brahmins in 
the terminology that they are used to.  I contend that at DN 29.9, the Buddha simply means that 
he has become the highest (brahmabhūta), become the dhamma (dhammabhūta), and that the 
wisdom of the Tathāgata constitutes the collected dharma (dhammakāya), which is the highest 
collection (brahmakāya).  It is straightforward enough to see why the Buddha would, when 
                                                        
166 At least in these Buddhist contexts, for we have already said that brahmabhūta has different connotations in 
Hindu contexts. 
167 In this instance, a brāhmaṇa is a Brahmin priest and a Sakyaputtiyasamaṇa is a follower of the Buddha.  
Sakyaputtiyasamaṇa translates from the Pāli as something like ‘ascetic [that] belongs to the son of the Sā́kyas’, or 
‘monk that follows the Buddha’ (note in Sanskrit that the Buddha is referred to as Śākyamuni, ‘sage of the Sā́kyas’). 
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talking to a Brahmin, use this terminology: he equates himself with Brahmā in order to soften the 
reluctance of Brahmā’s followers to take on board the dharma. 
Unsurprisingly, Bhattacharya disagrees with both of the positions outlined above.  Whilst 
he concedes that the aim of the relevant passage is to ‘establish the superiority of Dhamma in 
relation to brahmins’ (2015: 124), he goes on to claim that the phrasing at DN 27.9 is supposed 
to be taken in a transcendental sense.  That is to say that for Bhattacharya, talk of the Buddha 
being dhammakāya and dhammabhūta is to be taken literally – the Buddha is the dharma in the 
same way that everything in the world is the ātman-Brahman.  He has become the dharma and 
the Brahman in the same way that the liberated Advaitin has become Brahman.  I think that this 
is mistaken: brahmabhūta can, for example, be translated as ‘become pious’, ‘become highest’, 
‘become the best’.  Similarly, brahmakāya can, if analysed in a manner similar to dharmakāya, 
simply mean ‘the greatest collection (of qualities)’.  This is because as I have already said, kāya 
can simply mean ‘body’ (as in the collection of things constituting a ‘body’), whilst brahma is 
frequently used in Buddhist literature as a synonym for ‘supreme’ (Harvey, 1995: 234). 
We are thus left with some relatively uncontroversial and decidedly non-absolutist 
accounts of words that might otherwise have prima facie lent themselves to the Advaitin project.  
These interpretations are, I feel, more in line with the general understanding of Buddhism at the 
time of the Nikāyas.  I have to wonder that if the Buddha had meant to preach the dharma as an 
addendum to the Vedānta, would he not have just said so?  Interpreting key terms in this way is 
entirely plausible, and read in the ways that I have outlined, I contend that these terms need not 
be imputed with a substantialist interpretation, even if that has clearly been the case across some 
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Mahāyāna traditions.  I reiterate that my argument is not that Bhattacharya is mistaken in noting 
that some Mahāyāna schools propagate substantialist ideas of an Absolute, it is simply that he is 
mistaken in asserting that the Mahāyāna does this in toto.  Madhyamaka when understood by 
the writings of its founder, Nāgārjuna, should not do so.  It is Bhattacharya’s position that 
Madhyamaka should (and indeed does!) endorse such a position, and it is true that parts of the 
Madhyamaka school do hold such a view: it is present in parts of tathāgatagarbha and 
prajñāpāramitā literature, however we choose to interpret it.168  It is not, however, a necessary 
conclusion.  
5.3 The Tathāgata and Ensuing Implications 
  We can make further sense of the contexts afforded to dharmakāya (and, by extension, 
dharmaśarīra) if we place them in context with the other attributes assigned to the Tathāgata in 
the Dīgha Nikāya.  We have already seen that for Bhāvaviveka, the dharma-body, Buddha-body 
and Tathāgata-body seem to be equivalent.  In terms of etymology, Buddhagoṣa outlines eight 
ways that tathāgata might be understood,169 but it is generally thought that only two of these 
interpretations are tenable.  As such, these two etymologies are the most commonplace in 
scholarship today.  It is to these two interpretations that I now turn.  The first compound generally 
accepted by modern scholarship is that of tathā (adverb: thus) + gata (past participle of √gam: 
                                                        
168 Be that as endorsing an Absolute, as graduated teachings according to upāya (which would involve teaching 
things only to later sublate them with advancing levels of ‘truth’), or in some other manner.  I suppose that the 
ambiguity is part of the point: if one interpretation is favoured or intended, we might expect it to be explicit. 
169 Chalmers (1898: 104-105) gives a comprehensive overview of Buddhagoṣa’s etymologies.  It is not, however, all 
relevant to my point here, and so I forego the arduous task of replicating and assessing all of what Buddhaghoṣa 
(and, for that matter, Chalmers!) has to say on this. 
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gone).  This interpretation then resolves as thus-gone, which sounds pretty but doesn’t on the 
face of things help much.  Thus-gone from what?  Suggestions such as this by John Makransky 
(2003: 1) state that ‘tatha-gato, meaning “one who has gone thus,” who has attained nirvana like 
all prior buddhas, freed from the conditioned, distorted mentalities and sufferings of mundane 
existence.’  This at least gives us something to work with, but it is cumbersome for a couple of 
reasons.  First, it runs the risk of reifying nirvāṇa: the implication here is that the Buddha has 
‘gone’ to his awakening or ‘gone’ to nirvāṇa, which implies that nirvāṇa is an ultimate place or 
plane that is somehow outside of the practitioner and is indeed somewhere to which we are able 
to ‘go’.  Lindtner (1997: 116) acknowledges that the notion of nirvāṇa as a place to which we can 
go does seem to have a place in the canonical literature, namely at DN 11.88 [PTS D i223] and 
Udāna 8.1 and 8.3 [PTS Ud. 80].170  This would be unacceptable to a great many Buddhists, but 
                                                        
170 DN 11.88: 
kattha āpo ca paṭhavī tejo vāyo na gādhati.  
kattha dīghañca rassañca aṇuṃ thūlaṃ subhāsubhaṃ,  
katta nāmañca rūpañca asesaṃ uparujjhatīti.  
  
Tatra veyyākaraṇa bhavatī:  
  
viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ anantaṃ sabbato pahaṃ  
ettha āpo ca paṭhavī tejo vāyo na gādhati 
ettha dīghañca rassañca aṇuṃ thūlaṃ subhāsubhaṃ 
ettha nāmañca rūpañca asesaṃ uparujjhati.  
viññāṇassa nirodhena etthetaṃ uparujjhatīti // 
Ud. 8.1: 
atti bhikkave, tadāyatanaṃ, yattha neva paṭhavi, na āpo, na tejo, na vāyo, na 
ākāsānañcāyatanaṃ, na viññānañcāyatanaṃ, na ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ, na 
nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaṃ, nāyaṃ loko, na paraloko, na ubho candimasuriyā. Tatrāpāhaṃ 
bhikkhave, neva āgatiṃ vadāmi, na gatiṃ, na ṭhitiṃ, na cutiṃ, na upapattiṃ. Appatiṭṭhaṃ 
appavattaṃ anārammaṇamevetaṃ. Esevanto dukkhassāti // 
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Ud. 8.3: 
evaṃ me sutaṃ: ekaṃ samayaṃ bhagavā sāvatthiyaṃ viharati jetavane anāthapiṇḍikassa 
ārāme. Tena kho pana samayena bhagavā bhikkhū nibbānapaṭisaṃyuttāya dhammiyā kathāya 
sandasseti samādapeti samuttejeti sampahaṃseti. Te ca bhikkhū aṭṭhi katvā manasi 
katvāsabbaṃ cetaso samannāharitva ohitasotā dhammaṃ suṇanti.  
  
atha ko bhagavā etamatthaṃ viditvā tāyaṃ velāyaṃ imaṃ udānaṃ udānesi: atthi bhikkhave, 
ajātaṃ abhūtaṃ akataṃ asaṅkhataṃ. No ce taṃ bhikkhave, abhavissā ajātaṃ abūtaṃ akataṃ 
asaṅkhataṃ, nayidha jātassa bhūtassa katassa saṅkhatassa nissaraṇaṃ paññāyetha // 
At DN 11.88, I assume this conclusion has been reached owing to the repeated presence of ‘ettha’ (there/here) 
and ‘kattha’ (where) denoting places.  In context, they question where the four elements, name and form, and 
eventually object-based, dualistic consciousness are brought to an end.  When this happens, the practitioner 
experiences viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ, a difficult term that is perhaps best translated as ‘non-partaking 
consciousness’ (non-manifest is also relatively popular).  Bhikkhu Sujato (2011) writes in a blog post that the 
context of this particular extract of the DN is often neglected and that far from trying to sneak in some idea of a 
‘cosmic consciousness’ (as Bhattacharya would no doubt claim!) or trying to point to a ‘place’ where such 
discernments cease, the Buddha is instead reformulating the questions asked in order to serve a specific purpose, 
i.e. to refute the Brahminical positions.  On this, Sujato (2011) writes that 
the reason for the Buddha’s reformulation of the original question becomes 
clear. The errant monk had asked where the ending of the four elements was – 
which is of course the formless attainments. But the Buddha said the question 
was wrongly put, as this would merely lead beyond the form realm of Brahma 
to the formless realms. The real question is what lies beyond that, with the 
cessation of consciousness. It is not enough for matter to be transcended, one 
must also transcend mind as well. If not, one ends up, apart from all the other 
philosophical problems, with a mind/body dualism. 
If Sujato is right (and it seems to me that his interpretation is entirely plausible), then the Buddha’s rhetoric at DN 
11.88 can be sufficiently explained not as endorsing the view that liberation exists somewhere else (i.e. that we 
literally travel to it), but rather in terms of his replying to specific query regarding Brahma.  As Sujato writes, ‘the 
four material elements cease temporarily in the formless attainments, which is the highest reach of the 
Brahmanical teachings – even this much Brahma, being a deity of the form realm, did not know’ (2011), and 
further still, ‘the Buddha’s real teaching is not to temporarily escape materiality, but to reach an ending of 
suffering. And since all forms of viññāṇa (yaṁ kiñci viññāṇaṁ…) are said countless times to be suffering, even the 
infinite consciousness has to go’. 
In the case of Udāna 8.1, the Buddha speaks of the state, place or dimension (tadāyatanam) in which 
conceptualisation stops. It is, I think, reaching to argue that either of these instances (DN 11.88 or Ud. 8.1) really 
illustrate that the Buddha points to nirvāṇa as a place or as a substantial thing whatsoever, especially in the case of 
Ud. 8.1 where the Buddha seems to me to be more concerned with negating lists of things that can be clung to 
than he is with pointing towards an Absolute.  If we choose to translate tadāyatanam as (mental) ‘state’ rather 
than ‘region’ or ‘dimension’, for example, the meaning of the whole passage dramatically changes.  I thus follow 
Ireland, who when listing the possible translations for tadāyatanam writes that, ‘Here it [tadāyatanam] is not 
meant in any directional (or temporal) sense’ (1977: 161).  Adopting this position allows us the luxury of a more 
nuanced understanding of the passage, where the Buddha simply wants to illustrate that there is a meditative 
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especially to Nāgārjuna, with whom my wider argument is primarily concerned.  Perhaps we 
could say that the tathāgata has ‘thus-gone’ from the trappings of saṃsāra, from the 
conventional to the ultimate, but this again suggests that upon awakening, there is movement 
to some place that is fundamentally different to the place occupied by the unawakened, and it 
involves a claim to the existence of an ‘ultimate’ that Nāgārjuna would find problematic. 
But is this a necessary conclusion?  We might be able to understand ‘go’ and ‘gone’ in a 
weaker sense, one that bypasses connotations of ultimacy or of a super-reality into which we are 
subsumed.  This understanding might see us view the ‘thus-gone’ as a person that has ‘gone’ 
from one understanding of reality to another, more nuanced understanding.  This would tally 
with Ireland’s (1977: 161) argument that usually directional or temporal words such as 
tadāyatanam (translated in numerous ways, usually as ‘region’ or dimension’) – which are 
present in such places as Ud. 8.1 – can be understood as ‘state’.  If we translate ‘tadāyatanam’ 
in this manner, then we can say in a weak sense that a Buddhist practitioner can ‘go’ from one 
understanding of the world to another.  In such an instance, a tathāgata is somebody that has 
‘thus-gone’ from delusion to awakening, but in a very specific way.  They have not ‘gone’ to an 
ultimate plane, nor have they been subsumed into the ātman-Brahman.  They have simply 
changed their understanding of the phenomena of the world.  Gombrich regards all of the above 
as ‘fanciful’ (2009: 151), and instead suggests that we understand tathāgata as ‘thus-being’, or 
                                                        
state in which conceptualisation ceases without grasping at or endorsing the view that there is a specific ‘place’ in 
which this occurs.  I hope it is becoming obvious by this point that in speaking of some ultimate ‘place’ where 
something happens, we add discernments, and discernments inevitably lead to reification and so dissatisfaction 
(sentiments echoed above by Sujato). 
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‘one who is like that’, which is to say that the tathāgata is a certain way, but that it is unable to 
be sufficiently described (2009: 151). 
This is an idea that I think is mirrored in Nāgārjuna’s philosophy.  According to his work in 
the MMK, it cannot possibly be the case that we ‘go’ to liberation in any absolutist sense.  Instead, 
it is implied at MMK 25.19-20 that the concepts of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are epistemic rather that 
physical, metaphysical, or otherwise hyperphysical.  The interpretation of tathāgata as 
somebody that has ‘gone’ elsewhere (be it a mental plane or somewhere else) appears to tally 
with the interpretations that characterise dharmakāya as a ‘cosmic body’ or as an otherwise 
existent Absolute to be entered into.  Bhattacharya does note that he agrees with Nāgārjuna that 
the basis of liberation is epistemic and not ontological.  He writes that ‘[o]ne who has realized 
the ātman is not outside the world, but he looks upon the world with new eyes’ (2015: 13), and 
so agrees in principle with the idea that liberation is a matter of outlook and understanding rather 
than a shift in ontological status.  There is still an ontological claim being made, though.  
Fundamental to Bhattacharya’s outlook is that there is a Real thing that we eventually see clearly, 
namely the ātman-Brahman.  We saw in §2 that there are good reasons to believe that early 
Abhidharma Buddhists would outright reject any notion of a unitary super-reality underpinning 
existence.  We have similarly seen that some schools of thought in the Mahāyāna would indeed 
interpret dharmakāya in absolutist terms – something that Tillemans calls ‘a major philosophical 
idea in Buddhist scholasticism’ (Tillemans, forthcoming: 6, note 9).’  However, my point is that 
not all Mahāyānists would or should subscribe to this position, despite Bhattacharya’s 
implications to the contrary (2015: 39).  I contend that Nāgārjuna does not (indeed, cannot) hold 
such a view. 
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The MMK is replete with examples that make monistic, ultimate or Absolute 
interpretations of key Buddhist terms unlikely if not impossible, but perhaps the most salient in 
the context of nirvāṇa are at MMK 25.19-20 and 25.24 given below: 
na saṃsārasya nirvāṇāt kiṃ cid asti viśeṣaṇam / 
na nirvāṇasya saṃsārāt kiṃ cid asti viśeṣaṇam //19// 
nirvāṇasya ca yā koṭiḥ koṭiḥ saṃsaraṇasya ca / 
na tayor antaraṃ kiṃ cit susūkṣmam api vidyante //20// 
There exists no difference whatsoever between saṃsāra and 
nirvāṇa / 
There exists no difference whatsoever between nirvāṇa and 
saṃsāra //19//  
The limit of nirvāṇa [is the] limit of saṃsāra / 
There is not even the subtlest difference between them //20// 
sarvopalambhopaśamaḥ prapan͂copaśamaḥ śivaḥ / 
na kva cit kasyacit dharmo buddhena deśitaḥ //24// 
The extinguishing of all cognition, the extinguishing of reification, 
is blissful / 
No Dharma [was] ever taught by the Buddha to anyone //24// 
If – as it looks here – it is the halting of cognition that characterises nirvāṇa, then it does 
indeed appear to be the case that the tathāgata is somebody that has made some sort of mental 
shift: they have halted reification and thus halted duḥkha.  Indeed, this point is initially laid out 
in the MMK’s maṅgalaśloka, where Nāgārjuna writes that the Buddha taught the benevolent 
pacification of prapañca (prapañcopaśamaṃ śivam). This halting of reification, the pacification 
of conceptual proliferation, is, it seems, the liberated state according to the Mādhyamika: it is a 
way of being.  We might be tempted to construe an Advaitic slant to this.  We have already said 
that Bhattacharya supports the idea that liberation consists in a mental shift, in seeing the world 
differently rather than in going to a new plane of existence (or other such fantastical notions).  
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The difference between the position of Nāgārjuna and the position of Bhattacharya is then that 
Bhattacharya argues that this mental shift occurs in the light of recognising the absolute monism 
of Reality, in recognising and, in fact becoming the ātman-Brahman (2015: 21).  Nāgārjuna’s 
starting premise is to deny that any such monistic or pluralistic ultimate existence is possible: 
such an entity requires an intrinsic, immutable nature that Nāgārjuna thinks impossible.  The 
difference in starting points could not be starker!  We shall come to see that whilst Bhattacharya 
declares that ‘[t]he belief in the existence of an eternal I is folly, but the belief in the non-
existence of an I is even greater folly’ (2015: 25), Nāgārjuna (MMK 18.6) declares that the 
question itself is folly: 
ātmety api prajn͂apitam anātmety api deśitam / 
buddhair nātmā na cānātmā kaścid ity api deśitam //6// 
‘Self’ is disclosed [and] ‘not-self’ is taught  
by buddhas: neither ‘self’ nor ‘not-self’ is also taught //6// 
This seems paradoxical, but there are good reasons for this position.  It is not some sort 
of linguistic trick on behalf of the Mādhyamika.  It is a terse statement intended to impress upon 
the reader that from an ultimate perspective, neither self nor not-self is an appropriate 
discernment.  The key point that overarches even this position is that there can be no ultimate 
perspective!  This might initially sound confusing, but the pedagogical intent is easily analysed.  
There are many examples of the Buddha conveying his teachings in a manner that could 
reasonably be said to imply a substantial self (ātman) – Siderits and Katsura accurately opine that 
this is a fact which is ‘generally acknowledged’ by most Buddhist scholars (2013: 199).  This is, we 
can say, to tailor the Buddha’s eventual position toward listeners that might not even have 
believed in karma – if they did not believe in karma then it is likely that they had an 
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underdeveloped sense of moral responsibility.  In such cases, it is helpful for the Buddha to foster 
a provisional belief in ātman in order to orientate the listener towards developing their sense of 
personal responsibility.  This would be classed as an example of the Buddha’s upāya, of his skill-
in-means when teaching.  He is simply taking the long view: he nurtures an understanding of 
ātman early on so that the listener becomes practitioner.  Once listeners become practitioners, 
they begin their journey towards understanding not-self: a view that aims to cut through the 
fetters of attachment associated with a strong belief in a substantial self or I.   
The basic idea here is that at each step, the Buddha is replacing damaging beliefs with 
less damaging ones: each view is amended via a process of sublation that is facilitated by the 
Buddha’s graduated or progressive teachings.  A belief in ātman – though misguided – is better 
than a belief in nothing and an abandonment of virtue.  A person that believes in ātman will 
generally believe that their good deeds and bad deeds do not die with them, but will condition 
their future lives.  This, in theory, impels the listener to take responsibility and reorientate their 
life from a degenerate towards a virtuous existence.  Later, the Buddha can teach that this belief 
is itself misguided, and that belief in a substantial self – although better than degeneracy and 
belief in nothing at all – is to be abandoned if the practitioner is to make spiritual progress.  
Then there are passages that either disregard or outright negate the substantial self.  We 
have seen that Bhattacharya claims at numerous points that the Buddha’s apparent disregard of 
the ātman (he never seems to speak about it directly) might be because ‘the Upaniṣads had 
already spoken enough about it’ (2015: 37).  He claims that the negations of ātman present in 
the canonical Buddhist literature provide a tacit affirmation that ‘the Absolute is the sole Reality’ 
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(2015: 35).   We might find some support for this position within some Buddhist literature: 
Bhattacharya specifically appeals to the Ratnagotravibhāga. 
The Ratnagotravibhāga is, as Richard King writes, ‘unique as the only Indian śāstra 
devoted specifically to an exposition of the tathāgatagarbha doctrine’ (1995: 217).  The usual 
translation of tathāgatagarbha is buddha-nature or sometimes buddha-seed, which should give 
some insight into what the concept alludes to, viz. the potentiality to become awakened.  That 
Bhattacharya would appeal to such a text is unsurprising given the controversy surrounding the 
Buddhist literature dealing with buddha-nature – there is precedent even within Buddhist schools 
for the idea to be taken in an absolutist way.  As implied in the translation, there is a tendency to 
associate buddha-nature with one of two things.  First, with the notion of an embryonic seed 
contained somewhere within us (or, perhaps, identical with us), a real, actual potential to 
become enlightened.  Secondly, the idea that the buddha-nature reflects our natural state, which 
has simply become obscured by various imperfections and reifications – this is in a similar vein 
to the luminous mind (Skt.: prakṛtiprabhāsvaracitta; Pāli: pabhassaracitta) referred to by the 
Buddha in the Aṅguttara Nikāya (1.49-52).  This would mean that the dharmakāya (which is to 
be obtained via the removal of defilements) is present all along and is simply uncovered once 
defilements are removed – this certainly looks to have parallels to the sort of ātman that 
Bhattacharya thinks that Buddhism endorses.  Both of these concepts are on these terms 
amenable to his agenda, though to differing degrees.  First, we might think that the idea that we 
have within us the potential to awaken is an uncontroversial point that any Vedāntin should 
endorse, for what is the point in Vedāntic practice if one does not gain knowledge of the ātman-
Brahman?  The potential to gain this knowledge must presuppose the act of actually gaining the 
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knowledge required for liberation: it is there in all of us whether we take the opportunity to 
realise it or not.  This gains additional traction if we understand buddha-nature to be identical 
with sentient beings.171  Whilst Bhattacharya’s interpretation appears to have some basis, there 
is at least one scriptural explanation for the apparent absolutist bent of tathāgatagarbha 
literature such as the Ratnagotravibhāga.  Eltschinger (2013: 46) translates an extract from the 
Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (78.5-79.9) where the Buddha explains that absolutist teachings in Buddhist 
literature are not meant to be taken at face value. 172   They are, in fact, different from the 
teachings of the ‘outsiders’ (Hindu teachings relating to ātman and Brahman) because 
tathāgatagarbha is selflessness.  Here is part the extract as translated by Eltschinger: 
For this reason, O Mahātami, the teaching of the tathāgatagarbha 
differs from the outsiders’ teaching of self.  Thus by teaching the 
tathāgatagarbha, [the tathāgatas] teach (°upadeśena nirdiśanti) 
the tathāgatagarbha in order to attract the outsiders who adhere 
to the doctrine(s) of the self.  How indeed could they quickly 
awaken to the supreme perfect awakening, [those persons] whose 
thought (āśaya) has fallen into the false view [consisting in] the 
erroneous concept of the self [and] who possess a thought that has 
fallen from the domain of the three [doors] to liberation?  It is for 
this purpose, O Mahātami, that the tathāgatas, arhats [and] 
perfectly awakened ones teach the tathāgatagarbha.  Therefore, 
                                                        
171 King cites Grosnick (1979: 52): Grosnick argues that ‘”all beings are the garbhas of the Tathagāta,” where the 
tathāgatagarbha is a tatpuruṣa compound that is the original meaning of the term’ (King, 1995: 305).  This 
illustrates that in practice as well as theory, the precise definition of tathāgatagarbha is open to debate, though it 
must also be noted that Grosnick himself strongly resisted the tendency to classify tathāgatagarbha as some sort 
of monistic absolute (King, 1995: 311).  
172 Eltschinger also notes that there is a curious lack of both Buddhist and Hindu sources referring to the 
tathāgatagarbha doctrine as endorsing a self (2013: 44).  One might expect such a thing to be seized upon by 
opponents both in rival religious movements and from opponents in rival Buddhist sects: this occurred with the 
infamous pudgalavādins, their doctrine known to other Buddhists as a heresy because it endorsed a sort of ātman.  
It is perhaps telling that there does not seem to be any arguments made from either side that the 
tathāgatagarbha texts are heretical on account of endorsing some sort of ātman. 
P a g e  | 224 
 
this teaching [of theirs] differs from the outsiders’ doctrine(s) of the 
self.  And hence, O Mahātami, you ought to follow selflessness173 
which is [nothing but] the tathāgatagarbha in order to go beyond 
the outsiders’ false view(s). 
We can see here that there is more to the tathāgatagarbha literature than immediately 
meets the eye.  The claim is that the tathāgatagarbha teachings are little more than a device for 
proselytisation: they are taught to appeal not to Buddhists, but to other religious people for 
whom inquiry into the nature of ātman is liberating.  Such a person might read the 
tathāgatagarbha literature and see links between the doctrine they currently adhere to and this 
form of Buddhism; this might then make it easier for them to convert to Buddhism!  Eltschinger 
summarises thus: ‘[i]n other words, if the tathāgatagarbha teachings are meant as an expedient 
device aimed at proselytizing the substantialist non-Buddhists, emptiness and selflessness aim at 
diverting the “converted” from false conceptions of, and excessive attachment to the self’ (2013: 
51).  It can be characterised, then, as an attempt to enhance the middle way. 
Such a view can be further supported by an interesting extract from the Mahāparinirvāṇa 
Sūtra, which states that despite appearances, tathāgatagarbha teachings do not advance a belief 
in a permanent ātman.  Eltschinger (2013: 60) translates from the Tibetan: 
If what is called “self” were an eternally permanent (kūṭasthanitya) 
dharma, there would be no freedom from suffering (duḥkha).  And 
if what is called “self” did not exist, pure religious conduct 
(brahmacarya) would be of no avail […] It is to be known that the 
buddha-nature is the middle way (madhyamā pratipat) altogether 
free from the two extremes (antadvaya) […] Non-duality is reality: 
by nature self and not-self are without duality (gn͂is su med ma).  
The Lord Buddha has thus affirmed that the meaning of the 
                                                        
173nairātmya; selflessness, impersonality, insubstantiality. 
P a g e  | 225 
 
tathāgata is unfathomable […]  In the Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtra also I 
have already taught that self and not-self are without duality by 
characteristic. 
The general thrust of this extract as I read it is that we ought not to cling to notions of 
self, not-self, both self and not-self, neither self nor not-self.  The point is not to cling to such 
notions at all, not to endorse one or the other over and above one or the other.  This clearly ties 
into Nāgārjuna’s whole method, and is, I contend directed not toward the personal ātman (jīva) 
or even the ātman-Brahman, but simply with the ending of conceptual proliferation (prapañca).  
The idea is not to arrive at knowledge of some ultimately existent substratum akin to the ātman-
Brahman, but to arrive at a point where we no longer impose conceptualisations on our 
experience.  Non-duality is, I think, to be experienced in meditation; we saw in other sections 
that this is also the case for Vasubandhu.  The whole endeavour then strikes me not as an exercise 
in ontology, but in epistemology: how ought we to understand the world around us – how should 
we think about and engage with the world around us – if we are to do away with dissatisfaction?  
I think that this is the crux of the method, and to this end, it is cognate with the other Buddhist 
methods discussed thus far. 
Is, as the above sūtra claims, this also the case for the tathāgatagarbha and 
prajñāpāramitā literature?  Dan Lusthaus offers a short but significant discussion regarding how 
best to understand the prajñāpāramitā and tathāgatagarbha literature.  The problem as he sees 
it amounts to two different conceptions of liberation: sudden and gradual.  For Lusthaus, the 
Buddhist traditions that tend toward essentialism (and so the traditions that Bhattacharya would 
point to in defence of his thesis) do so because their understanding of liberation is one that sees 
jñāna as ‘the means or agent for attaining some-thing which in itself is impervious to or 
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indifferent to the vicissitudes of epistemological approaches, though made accessible through 
such approaches’ (2002: 256).  This is the ‘sudden’ view of liberation, so called because if ‘a ready-
made transcendental realm already exists, then what is essential about Awakening remains 
entirely separate from temporal considerations’ (2002: 257).  There is no necessary unfolding of 
the process within a temporal timeframe.  The jñāna required for entry into such a 
transcendental realm can simply manifest, causing immediate entry into the liberated state.  In 
other words, the right type of intuitive knowledge makes available to us some sort of ‘thing’ that 
constitutes the ultimate reality or ultimate truth (or both).  Such a thing would, in virtue of its 
ultimacy, be considered eternal, immutable, and intrinsically existent.  This obviously would apply 
to the ātman-Brahman, but it can as we have seen also apply – though not necessarily – to 
Buddhist concepts like the dharmakāya.   Particular knowledge would then unlock access to this 
ultimately existent thing and provide liberation. 
This stands in contrast to a gradual process, which sees jñāna acquired over the course of 
what amounts to the Bodhisattva path.  In such an account, Lusthaus argues that there occurs ‘a 
progressional unfolding that never posits anything apart from the process itself’ (2002: 257).  In 
other words, there is not any ‘realm’ of the enlightened, nor is there an essential, permanent 
feature of awakening.  Instead, there is simply a temporal process of Buddhist praxis; we practice, 
gradually ‘awaken’, and then act in the world according to the jñāna that we have acquired via 
this same gradual process.  I think of the difference in very simple terms:  for essentialists, 
liberation is ontological.  It involves ‘entry’ to some eternal state, a ready-made realm.  For 
progressionalists, liberation is epistemological.  Prajñā is that which brings about a mental 
change, and this change informs how we interact with the world.  If we interact without grasping, 
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without imposition and appropriation, we might be said to be awakened.  As Lusthaus writes, in 
such a state, ‘[i]mpermanence (e.g., in terms of rūpa) continues unabated, but it is now upekṣa, 
i.e., no longer experienced as loss.  Amata [deathless, deathlessness] is thus an epistemic change, 
not ontological’ (2002: 265).174  Understood in this manner, prajñāpāramitā literature does not 
endorse an ātman-Brahman, because such an endorsement requires not only an epistemological 
aspect, but also an ontological? aspect: everything is Brahman!  Similarly, tathāgatagarbha 
literature can simply be understood as endorsing the mental potential to gain the relevant insight 
to overcome duḥkha.  It need not necessitate an Absolute into which we meld, or about which 
we gain gnosis.  It is, as Lusthaus (2005: 255) writes, the ‘active functioning of one's potential for 
Buddhahood.’  It can be no more and no less than this.  It would seem very odd to view our 
potential as residing in an Absolute, or indeed to view it as the Absolute itself. 
It seems clear to me, then, that whilst some Buddhist sects have indeed interpreted both 
tathāgatagarbha and prajñāpāramitā literature to have essentialist, absolutist ends, such 
conclusions need not be a necessary outcome of the literature’s analysis.  In the preceding 
                                                        
174 Lusthaus (2002: 265) makes a compelling argument that the early Buddhist goal of becoming ‘amata’ 
(deathless) be understood in the following way: 
To be undying means to not arise, to not arise means 'unborn' (anutpāda) in the 
sense of not constrained by conditioning, not condemned to habitually repeat 
previous experience, to have one's experience determined by the moment by 
moment 'arising of conditions' (utpāda). "I don't die" means (1) there is no self 
which undergoes death (but this is strictly formulaic, not existential), and (2) it 
connotes asaṃskṛta, in the sense that Chinese translated that term, viz. wu-wei, 
i.e., the non-conditioned spontaneity and freedom of tzu-jan. Further, it meant 
to not suffer loss due to impermanence, to remain unaffected by loss and gain. 
Impermanence (e.g., in terms of rūpa) continues unabated, but it is now 
upekṣa, i.e., no longer experienced as loss. Amata is thus an epistemic change, 
not ontological. 
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section, I have outlined some alternative ways of understanding key terms that lend themselves 
to reification as synonyms for a Buddhist Absolute.  The crux of the matter involves eschewing 
ontological concerns in favour of epistemological ones.  It is by doing this that I think that we can 
make sense of what are some challenging, difficult themes in challenging, seemingly inconsistent 
texts.  If we interpret the more controversial aspects of the literature in these ways, it seems 
clear to me that we must deny that the resulting conclusions endorse any sort of ontological 
Absolute.  Bhattacharya’s interpretations that contend that Mahāyāna Madhyamaka, Yogācāra, 
tathāgatagarbha, and prajñāpāramitā literature lead to a Buddhist endorsement of the ātman-
Brahman are then rejected.  
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§6: Nāgārjuna’s Approach 
We have seen thus far that if we interpret aspects of the Mahāyāna in certain ways, there 
is no need to arrive at a conception of an Absolute underpinning and running through our 
experienced reality.  That is to say, interpreted in the ways in which I have outlined, there are 
good reasons to doubt Bhattacharya’s thesis that Mahāyāna philosophies result in endorsement 
of the ātman-Brahman as the material and efficient cause of the world.  Nāgārjuna has played a 
role throughout the previous discussion, but only partially and relatively fleetingly.  My next task, 
then, is to assess whether or not Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā can be read in such a way 
as to endorse the ātman-Brahman.   
The claim by Bhattacharya is, as we have seen, that śūnyatā – Nāgārjuna’s principal 
philosophical tool – is the ātman-Brahman (2015: 13).  The argument for this is principally that 
because the ātman-Brahman is ultimately beyond characterisation, beyond attributes, and 
impersonal, then Nāgārjuna’s arguments in the MMK that conclude with the impersonality and 
emptiness (of intrinsic nature) of all phenomena is, in effect, an argument for the ātman-
Brahman.  Mādhyamikas disagree, often claiming that this is to misconstrue emptiness, and also 
to overstate the case: Nāgārjuna simply doesn’t make any claims of his own! 
David Burton, however, takes the view that Nāgārjuna does indeed make claims of his 
own.  His point is that Nāgārjuna must make a knowledge claim regarding how things really are 
whenever he talks about śūnyatā (1999: 37).  In other words, if Nāgārjuna is claiming that all 
phenomena are empty of intrinsic existence (svabhāva), then he is making some sort of claim 
about the workings of the world.  The interesting thing here is the way Burton characterises 
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Nāgārjuna’s claims.  For Burton, the knowledge-claim made by Nāgārjuna can be characterised 
in two distinct ways.  First, we can understand śūnyatā as an ultimate truth that accurately 
corresponds to an ultimate reality; in other words, it is the true nature of phenomena to lack 
intrinsic nature.  If śūnyatā is an ultimate reality, we can make a link with the claim advanced by 
Bhattacharya that it is the nature of the world to be impersonal. 
Second, Burton refers to a different sort of understanding that dictates that ‘one knows 
that one does not know and cannot know how things actually are’ (1999: 37), which we might in 
turn characterise as viewing śūnyatā as an inexpressible thing that is ultimately beyond our 
understanding.  On either of these views, the claimant is obviously making some sort of 
assessment regarding how the world actually is – they are either claiming that there is an 
underlying nature, śūnyatā, or they are claiming that we cannot know if there is an underlying 
nature.   
The focus of this point for Burton is Nāgārjuna’s relatively controversial claim at MMK 
13.8 that those for whom emptiness is a ‘view’ are incurable.175  Burton contends that contrary 
to some prominent interpretations (see Siderits & Katsura, 2013: 145), a person is not ‘incurable’ 
simply in virtue of taking śūnyatā as some sort of metaphysical view.  On this reading, the 
positions outlined above – mere knowledge claims, taking emptiness as a view in a weakened 
                                                        
175MMK 13.8: śūnyatā sarvadṛṣṭīnāṃ proktā niḥsaraṇaṃ jinaiḥ / yeṣāṃ tu śūnyatādṛṣṭis tān asādhyān babhāṣire // 
We can understand this as something like ‘emptiness is declared by the conquerors [as the] remedy to remove all 
views. But those for whom emptiness is a view are said [to be] incurable.’  It is with what actually constitutes 
taking emptiness as a view that Burton is here concerned.  
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sense – are not the issue at hand for Nāgārjuna.  Instead, Burton argues that to become 
‘incurable’ is to specifically fall ‘into either of the two extremes of nihilism or essentialism’ (1999: 
37).  The nihilist would simply take emptiness to mean that no entities exist.  Burton writes that 
according to his view, the nihilist would believe that no entities whatsoever exist rather than the 
more subtle claim that no entities with svabhāva exist (1999: 37).   
On this first account, Nāgārjuna is a nihilist if he denies outright that any entities exist; a 
position that he ostensibly does not appear to advance.176  Nevertheless, Burton will indeed 
conclude that the logical conclusion of Nāgārjuna’s philosophy is nihilism, whether he intended 
it or not.177  Of course, if Nāgārjuna is indeed a nihilist, then Bhattacharya’s argument fails – at 
least if we adhere specifically to Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka as found in his writings rather than to 
later adaptations and evolutions of the school as found elsewhere.  After all, how might 
Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka assert or endorse an Absolute if nothing at all exists? 
For Burton, the emptiness-eternalist has two possible roads that they might traverse: 
gross eternalism and subtle eternalism.  The gross eternalist misunderstands śūnyatā as an 
unchanging, ultimately existent Absolute.  Burton surmises that given Nāgārjuna’s assertion at 
                                                        
176 But also a conclusion that would preclude him from advancing any sort of support for or belief in the ātman-
Brahman! 
177 This conclusion is first outlined in Burton’s introduction, where he writes that ‘I believe that the knowledge-
claim that all entities lack svabhāva entails nihilism’ (1999: 4). Giuseppe Ferraro also advanced this thesis in his 
2013 paper, A Criticism of M. Siderits and J. L. Garfield's 'Semantic Interpretation' of Nāgārjuna's Theory of Two 
Truths.  Ferraro later adapted his position to argue that Nāgārjuna is not a nihilist, but rather occupies a realist 
anti-metaphysical position.  This position, thinks Ferraro, ‘seems to hinder and prevent the possibility of any 
nihilistic interpretation of Nāgārjuna’ (2017: 73). 
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MMK 25.19 that there is no difference between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, this grossly Absolutist view 
is obviously false.  It could be the case, though, that ‘nirvāṇa is the true nature of cyclic existence, 
viz. its absence of svabhāva, rather than being a non-dependently originating Absolute Reality 
which is separate from the dependently originating world’ (1999: 38). 178  Subtle eternalism, 
opines Burton, could mean that whilst ‘emptiness means entities dependently originate, it might 
not be understood that emptiness also means that dependently originated entities are one and 
all conceptual constructs’ (1999: 38).  Burton’s concern looks to be that the ‘incurable’ 
practitioner fails to realise that all dependently originated phenomena are in fact conceptual 
constructs.  He elsewhere claims that conceptual constructs have no foundational existence 
(dravyasat) (1999: 35), and so I think his point is that a Buddhist could feasibly hold the opinion 
that śūnyatā is equivalent with pratītyasamutpāda but simultaneously assign some sort of real 
existence to the dependently originated entities that they encounter.179  This would not be too 
dissimilar to the Sarvāstivādin dharma theory insofar as it allows for pratītyasamutpāda but only 
if the entities that dependently originate are reducible down to immutable, ultimately existent 
dharmas.180 
                                                        
178 Thus, it seems that for Burton, the idea that a Madhyamaka Absolute might be equivalent with the Advaitin 
ātman-Brahman is fundamentally flawed: one would need to be characterised by a lack of any svabhāva, whereas 
the other is characterised by a substantial existence (thus a svabhāva). 
179 Though Nāgārjuna does initially appear to equate śūnyatā with pratītyasamutpāda at MMK 24.18, the following 
line adds a caveat, namely that śūnyatā is a dependent concept (prajn͂apti).  This is to say that emptiness is not 
equivalent with dependent origination because they are the same thing, but to say that emptiness follows from 
dependent origination: it is an example of its operation (Siderits & Katsura, 2013: 278). 
180 This reduction is said to preserve the principle of pratītyasamutpāda because all phenomena dependently 
originate based upon the basic dharmas, i.e. all experienced things dependently originate as a result of interactions 
of dharmas; all phenomena dependently originate apart from the dharmas. 
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Talk of a ‘true nature of cyclic existence’ is interesting, because it implies that the idea 
that we have of said nature is currently false.  Burton’s claim is that the misunderstanding that a 
gross emptiness-eternalist might hold could be one that acknowledges that the svabhāva view is 
false and contends that the impersonal niḥsvabhāva (lacking intrinsic existence) conception of 
nirvāṇa is actually the true nature of reality.  This is problematic for Nāgārjuna because what is 
in effect occurring is that the practitioner is, in their zeal to deny svabhāva, simply replacing it 
with another reified concept under which nothing falls (śūnyatā).  The effect is a straightforward 
substitution of one ‘real’ nature with another sort of ‘real’ nature, which is by Nāgārjuna’s 
analysis both undesirable and impossible.  Nāgārjuna would, it seems to me, prefer to do away 
with the idea of ‘real’ natures in toto, viewing them as nothing more than reifications.  It is in this 
sense that scholars often interpret Nāgārjuna as having ‘no thesis’ – it is not that he wants to 
state how things ultimately are; he wants to dispel any such idea.  In order to try to achieve this, 
Nāgārjuna then states instead how things are not.  It is clear how the objections brought earlier 
by Bhattacharya might also be brought by Burton: in saying how things are not, Nāgārjuna is at 
the very least implying how things are.  We have seen that the idea is that there can be no 
negation without that which is to be negated.  I think that this point would carry more weight if 
it could be demonstrated that Nāgārjuna is actually interested in defending any sort of 
metaphysic, but it seems to me that Nāgārjuna is in the business of removing metaphysics from 
the discourse (owing to its potential for reification).  In such a scenario, we might want to claim 
that Nāgārjuna is less concerned with providing an account of the world as it is, and more 
concerned with analysing the world as it appears to us and as we interact with it.  After all, 
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Nāgārjuna at no point denies that we experience and interact with a ‘reality’, he only denies that 
we can think of it in essentialist, substantial terms (i.e. in terms of svabhāva). 
Nevertheless, Burton is suspicious of the ‘no-thesis’ position attributed to Madhyamaka.  
It is the case, for example, that Nāgārjuna gives what we are to assume is an exhaustive account 
of (ultimate) origination at MMK 1.1: 
na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpy ahetutaḥ / 
utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kva cana ke cana //1// 
Not from itself, not from another, not from both, nor without 
cause:  
Never in any way is there any existing thing that has arisen //1// 
I think that Burton is certainly correct when he says that this account of origination has a 
specific aim in mind, namely to illustrate that ‘entities with svabhāva do not originate in any of 
these four ways’ (1999: 40).  The way in which Nāgārjuna makes these claims, thinks Burton, 
means that Nāgārjuna is not a sceptic.  Nāgārjuna is emphatically arguing that ultimate entities 
do not originate in this manner; he thinks that the evidence available to us when we analyse the 
world logically proves to us that this is the case.  For Burton, this is not the position of a sceptic.181  
I make the point, however, that Nāgārjuna’s claims about how things are not (that entities with 
svabhāva do no originate in this way; that entities with svabhāva could not originate whatsoever 
(MMK 1.13-14)) might not fall under the scope of ultimate truth.  Indeed there are those that 
hold the position that we are not entitled to infer anything at all from Nāgārjuna’s negations.  So 
                                                        
181 I mentioned earlier that according to Mohanta (1997: 53), and by drawing on Ayer (1956: 40), Nāgārjuna can be 
characterised as a specific type of sceptic: a cognitive sceptic.   
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much of Nāgārjuna’s writings depend on a nuanced understanding of the differences between 
the scopes of conventional and ultimate truths that it would be folly merely to assume that any 
apparent knowledge claims – whatever they might be – ought to be automatically treated as 
ultimate claims describing how things really are.  Ferraro recently published a novel take on this, 
arguing that Nāgārjuna’s philosophy as presented in the MMK and VV is realistic ‘insofar as it 
acknowledges – in line with the Buddha’s position – the existence of a reality in itself’ (2017: 79).  
This reality could in principle be the object of an ‘ultimate’ cognitive experience, or to phrase it 
slightly differently, this reality could be the object of the epistemic transformation that 
Nāgārjuna’s writings direct us towards. 
Ferraro’s reading here seems uncontroversial – given that Nāgārjuna spends so much 
time arguing against immutable intrinsic natures in favour of radical change (to facilitate 
pratītyasamutpāda and thus the Buddhist path generally), I think it relatively straightforward that 
Nāgārjuna acknowledges some sort of reality (and so is not a nihilist in the way argued by scholars 
such as Burton (2001)).  His problem then is not with the fact that we experience a reality and 
operate within it, but rather with how we interact, analyse and deal with the reality in front of 
us.  It is not that he denies that we operate in this world, but rather that he denies that we 
operate in a specific conception of this world, viz. the world consisting of immutable, permanent, 
intrinsically existent (with svabhāva) dharmas. Such a vision of the world is, on Nāgārjuna’s 
interpretation, imposed onto the world by us as a result of uncritical cognition.182  It is then an 
                                                        
182 Throughout the MMK and at certain points in the VV (some translated and discussed in this work), Nāgārjuna 
laments that we impose onto the world the views that we experience various types of existence or nonexistence.  
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issue of epistemology rather than one of ontology – Nāgārjuna’s anti-metaphysical bent suggests, 
I think, that he is really in the business of preventing us imposing a metaphysic onto the world 
that we experience, and this is very simply because doing so breeds attachment (to dṛṣṭi; views, 
specifically metaphysical views).  Thus, counter-intuitive as it might seem, Nāgārjuna is arguing 
that we ought not to impose any notions that might claim to account for how the world ultimately 
is (viz. svabhāva).  Burton would say that this is still a knowledge-claim, because it at least implies 
how the world ultimately is not (without svabhāva).  It is, but it is a knowledge-claim of specific 
and limited scope.  Nāgārjuna – if my reading is correct – wants to deny both the possibility and 
utility of describing an ultimate state of affairs.  The knock-on effect of this is that in the end, it is 
pointless to discuss an ultimate state of affairs, and so whilst talk of an ultimate might in some 
instances be a simple pedagogical device (upāya), it is to be eventually abandoned as another 
example of dṛṣṭi that insidiously breeds attachment. 
Indeed, Ferraro opines that Nāgārjuna’s philosophy ‘is rigorously antimetaphysical to the 
extent that it opposes (again in tune with at least one dimension of the Buddha’s teaching) any 
attempt to define reality, that is, to project any dṛṣṭi on it or, in other words, to construct any 
possible metaphysics’ (2017: 80).  This is the case despite his realist view of the world, i.e. his 
view that there is some reality within which we operate, and that we can change our outlook 
                                                        
For example, imposing a svabhāva view is an example of holding a dṛṣṭi.  Similarly, imposing śūnyatā onto to world 
as an existent thing (bhava) is also a dṛṣṭi.  The point, then, is to remove and avoid any further dṛṣṭi! 
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within this reality to become awakened/liberated.183  The point then is that we do not impose 
anything onto the world.  We instead ‘empty’ it of definitions in order to avoid constructing and 
imposing dṛṣṭi.  Nevertheless, Ferraro has a nuanced take on what constitutes ‘ultimate truth’.  
He writes that the process of ‘emptying’ has no definitional content in relation to ‘ultimate truth’, 
and this is precisely because the concept emptiness (śūnyatā) and the process that it entails are 
intended not to give an account of reality, but to remove any dṛṣṭi (2017: 80).  Ferraro qualifies 
this in his footnotes, stating that  
[according to this reading] the word satya in the locution 
paramārthasatya does not qualify the characteristic of a true 
statement (or belief), that is, a statement that corresponds to a real 
state of things. Indeed, paramārthasatya is not a specific 
representation of some particular state of things.  Rather, it is the 
(general) way buddhas see reality: a way that certainly corresponds 
to how reality is in itself, but that does not equate to a specific 
statement or a series of statements. 
(2017: 80, note 33) 
In other words, Ferraro’s argument is that Nāgārjuna understands paramārthasatya 
(absolute truth; the highest truth) in a specific way – a way that differs in a radical way from that 
understanding to which other Buddhist schools adhere.  On this reading, Nāgārjuna interprets 
                                                        
183 Ferraro specifies that in his view, Nāgārjuna presupposes that reality exists and that we operate within it.  He 
does not, however, go any further than that by, for example, aiming to give an ultimate account of the way that 
reality actually is: 
Accepting a broad definition of ‘metaphysics’ (as the one GS probably have in 
mind) we should therefore distinguish between a metaphysics1, which simply 
presupposes that reality exists, and a metaphysics2, which offers some kind of 
definition of reality itself. On this basis, my interpretation is that in Nāgārjuna 
we only find a metaphysics1 and a rejection of all forms of metaphysics2. 
(2014: 453) 
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paramārthasatya as a general way of being, the result of the shift in cognition that occurs once 
a practitioner has successfully employed the concept of śūnyatā to empty out their conventional 
experience (this necessarily includes ‘emptying’ emptiness so as not to reify it as a dṛṣṭi!).184  This 
reading also equates paramārthasatya with nirvāṇa (2014: 459; 2017: 79-80); we know that 
Nāgārjuna asserted that there is no difference between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa at MMK 25.19, and 
so I think that Ferraro is correct in arguing that the distinction – insofar as there is one to be made 
– is one of epistemology and not ontology.  By this, I mean that if I read Ferraro correctly, then 
his understanding of Nāgārjuna tallies with my own understanding of MMK 25.19: there is no 
ontological difference between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa precisely because Nāgārjuna believes the 
following two things.  First, that we should not think of the world in terms of metaphysics because 
it actively hinders our soteriological aims – this includes taking emptiness as a view (reification of 
a dṛṣṭi).  Second, liberation consists in thinking differently about the world, not in there being a 
(meta)physical change in the world.  The world is how the world is; Nāgārjuna sees no change in 
it from when we are in the throes of delusion to when we are awakened, nor does he feel any 
urge to impose upon the world some sort of metaphysic.  The change must consequently be 
internal and cognitive. 
                                                        
184 It is also the case that saṃvṛtisatya (conventional truth) is not a ‘specific true expression’ of reality; it is instead 
a ‘cognitive approach or an epistemic level’ that is common to unenlightened people:  put very simply, the 
difference between conventional truth and ultimate truth is ‘a general way of seeing things’ (Ferraro, 2017: 80, 
note 33).  This sort of understanding allows for a similarity between the Advaitin method and that of the 
Mādhyamika: liberation consists in a change of outlook.  There is still a significant point of divergence, however, 
and that is where the Mādhyamika has ‘emptied’ any dṛṣṭi, the Advaitin still holds at least one: the ultimate is a 
substantial entity; it is the ātman-Brahman. 
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On Ferraro’s reading, then, emptiness is not to be reified as a metaphysical view 
whatsoever – a position slightly different from  Burton’s, who as we have already said thinks that 
to take emptiness as a view is to treat emptiness specifically as a form of eternalism or nihilism.   
For Burton it looks as though treating emptiness ‘metaphysically’ is not in itself an issue.  Ferraro, 
it seems, makes the more fundamental claim that emptiness is not to be imposed as a view (dṛṣṭi) 
at all and in any circumstance.185  It is to be utilised and then disregarded.  I do not think that 
Ferraro’s reading necessitates that Nāgārjuna violate his ‘no-thesis’ maxim in any significant way.  
Whilst Nāgārjuna must invariably hold that there is some reality and that there is some way of 
thinking about and engaging with it, he emphatically rejects the idea that we should hold any 
dṛṣṭi about that reality or the ways in which we interact with it.  I submit that this is where the 
no-thesis maxim really applies: it is a soteriological tool aimed at removing impositions onto 
reality.  When Nāgārjuna claims that he has no thesis to pursue, he really means that he has no 
horse in the metaphysical race; that he has no metaphysical thesis outside of that which states 
we ought not to have a metaphysical thesis!  He thinks, then, that we can be in the world and 
navigate the world without the imposition of any metaphysic: this is the point of Nāgārjuna’s 
method. 
6.1 Madhyamaka Metaphysics 
Burton thinks that one problematic mystical interpretation of Nāgārjuna sees him trying 
to explain the inexpressible through verbal expression.  The idea is that while we cannot say 
                                                        
185 To wit, whereas Burton supposes that there is a certain type of metaphysical view that Nāgārjuna warns 
against, Ferraro takes the more foundational stance that Nāgārjuna opposes any metaphysical view (dṛṣṭi) at all. 
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anything of the ultimate, we can speak in conventional terms to try to orient ourselves toward 
the ultimate:  recall that this is the role of scripture according to Śaṅkara and is a tactic employed 
by a great many mystics as outlined in §1.  Burton further pushes this point when he claims that 
Nāgārjuna ‘must be saying, at least, that it is necessary to rely on these [conventional] teachings 
to come to know ultimate truth’ (1999: 80).  This is not too controversial a position: indeed it is 
shared by esteemed Madhyamaka scholar Jay L. Garfield.186  As regards Burton’s first point, it is 
not clear to me that Nāgārjuna does attempt to give an account of the inexpressible.  Further, it 
is not clear to me that he really wants to.  I think that Ferraro is, on balance, right when he writes 
that despite the ultimate being described by Nāgārjuna at MMK 18.9 as not proliferated by 
proliferations (prapañcair aprapañcitam), non-conceptual (nirvikalpam), and undifferentiated 
(anānā-artham), this does not mean that the ultimate is ineffable – instead, it just means that it 
is different from the conventional.  Further, the descriptions of the ultimate here all hinge on 
cognitive awareness: not proliferated by proliferations, not cognised via concepts, 187  not 
differentiated and so on.  Following Ferraro’s argument, these negations (not x, not y) merely 
state that the awakened see things not in terms of the conventional (which is populated by 
proliferations, which is full of reification, which does rely on conceptual thought).  We have 
already said that we are not entitled to infer from these negations anything about what the 
                                                        
186 Garfield writes that ‘the understanding of ultimate truth is in an important sense the understanding of the 
nature of the conventional truth’ (Garfield, 1995: 299), hinting at the contingency of the ultimate on the 
conventional – to understand the ultimate, we must understand the conventional. 
187 The term vikalpa can be problematic insofar as there are questions around how we might cognise something 
sans-concepts.  This is an area of debate to which no justice can be done in the space available here, and so I shall 
not attempt to answer this most complex of questions.  
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ultimate is really like.  Consequently, Ferraro sums up Nāgārjuna’s approach thus: ‘[o]nce again, 
the negations should be interpreted in the prasajya fashion, and do not suggest a metaphysics 
counterposed to the one that is rejected’ (2017: 54).  The negations present in the writing of 
Nāgārjuna, then, should not be taken to imply anything further.  This is contrary to the 
interpretations of both Bhattacharya (2015: 36) and Murti (2016: 234-235), and is contra the 
position offered above by Burton.  If Ferraro is correct about Nāgārjuna’s intention (and it seems 
to me that his interpretation of Nāgārjuna is at least plausible), then Burton’s concern is 
unwarranted.  Nāgārjuna simply does not offer any sort of description of an ineffable Absolute – 
he is in fact chiefly concerned with the removal of descriptive content.  Madhyamaka philosophy 
then is decidedly unconcerned with any account of a mystical metaphysic, and there can 
consequently be no Madhyamaka account of a mystical experience.  If the raison d'être of 
Madhyamaka philosophy is indeed to remove any dṛṣṭi then there is simply no reason to think 
that Nāgārjuna is ever concerning himself with characterising some ultimate reality, and because 
of this, Nāgārjuna is not a mystic. 
Now to the second point.  I remain unconvinced that Nāgārjuna must commit himself to 
using conventional truths to understand ultimate truths.  It seems to me that Nāgārjuna simply 
recognises that in terms of a soteriology (and let us not forget that Buddhism is at top and bottom 
a soteriology before all else), imposing the idea of a metaphysical ‘ultimate’ onto the world is 
counter-productive.  He thinks that getting rid of essentialist ideas is what equates to liberation 
from suffering.  This is an epistemic process rather than an ontological one.  So, is Nāgārjuna 
really saying that understanding conventional truth x will lead to understanding ultimate truth y?  
I think that the question itself is mistaken, as I shall now explain. 
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If we accept the claims that ultimate and conventional truths do not provide a ‘specific 
true expression’ of the content of ‘reality’ (whatever that might turn out to be), we are left with 
the somewhat surprising notion that Nāgārjuna does not really want to describe reality at all.  
What he actually wants is to describe the ways in which we tend to engage with reality as-it-is, 
and then illustrate how one way is more expedient than the others are if we hope to achieve 
liberation from dissatisfaction and suffering.  This means that Nāgārjuna is not much concerned 
with describing the world, but with describing how we respond to it psychologically.  To this end, 
Nāgārjuna is making some sort of knowledge-claim, but it is not about reality per se (which is 
assumed but never really detailed); it is instead about how we think about reality.  Nāgārjuna 
thinks that the knowledge he has is in relation to enlightenment, not in relation to the nature of 
reality.  If liberation is a cognitive shift that allows a certain way of seeing things, then it is enough 
for Nāgārjuna to account for this psychologically over and above accounting for ‘reality’, which is 
simply assumed.  Emptiness is thus a tool for ridding our minds of these insidious essentialist 
thought processes that ascribe svabhāva to phenomena and thus impose a metaphysics onto the 
world.  And yet we would be just as wrong to suppose that emptiness facilitates a lack of being 
in a given phenomenon.   Ascribing svabhāva is to fall into eternalism, for we have already said 
that svabhāva actually ‘is’ that which possesses it.  It is the fundamental nature of a given 
phenomenon, immutable and permanent.  Denying it outright is useful for a person caught up in 
essentialist traps, but it is not the full story.  A denial of svabhāva is also undesirable – we can 
easily fall into the trappings of nihilism, as many Madhyamaka detractors have continually 
pointed out.  What then should our final position be?  
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Ferraro writes that  
the mere position (or presupposition) of an ultimate reality 
(accessible to the buddhas) cannot be considered a form of 
substantialism or reificationism.  Indeed, according to this reading, 
phenomena are just conventionally real, without any ontic referent 
or substantiality; the very reality in itself could also not be 
considered a substance or something endowed with the attribute 
of existence. In fact, the non-implicative (prasajya) nature of 
Nāgārjuna’s negations prevents us from inferring the substantiality 
of ultimate reality from the negation of substantiality of 
conventional reality.  Actually, the category of being does not 
qualify the tattva-paramārtha any more than the category of non-
being (or the combination or the lack of being and non-being). 
(2017: 81) 
Ferraro seems to be arguing that on Nāgārjuna’s account, the reality we experience does 
not require any substantiality.  That is to say that we do not need that reality to exist via svabhāva 
or some other substance that is svabhāva in all but name – this is what Nāgārjuna spends so 
much time denying.  It is Nāgārjuna’s opinion that imposing such essentialist ideas onto 
phenomena is simply to propagate attachment via dṛṣṭi.  In turn, this hinders our progress 
towards liberation.  With such a notion in mind, we might wonder what use talking of the 
conventional and ultimate really is.  If Nāgārjuna’s philosophical method should be understood 
as a concerted effort to remove any possible dṛṣṭi (and I think that it should), then speaking of a 
conventional and ultimate way of seeing things might contradict this aim.  Ferraro makes the 
point that the difference between the conventional and ultimate is ‘a general way of seeing 
things’ (Ferraro, 2017: 80, note 33), and so I hazard that for Ferraro, this general way of seeing 
things need not have any particular metaphysical import. 
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Nevertheless, there is a question to be answered here.  Another part of the semantic 
interpretation is concerned with reification of positions, specifically with reification of the idea 
of an ‘ultimate truth’ (and so ultimate reality).  Indeed, Siderits’ famous (and much contested) 
slogan is ‘the ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth’ (Siderits, 2016: 24).  This requires 
a little unpacking, and I will do this as we go along.  First, an obvious point: if the ultimate truth 
is that there is no ultimate truth, then this thesis appears to run counter to that of Ferraro.  We 
have seen that Ferraro thinks that there is some sort of ultimate, and it is characterised by a 
change in the way we exist in the world.  Can these two positions be reconciled?  I think there 
might be a ‘middle way’. 
The scope of the semantic interpretation of emptiness can be summarised as follows: 
śūnyatā is, when interpreted semantically, a principle concerned not with the nature of the 
world, but with the nature of truth.  Siderits writes that ‘[s]pecifically, it takes the claim that all 
things are empty to mean that the ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth – there is only 
conventional truth’ (2003: 11).  The strongest defence of this position is, I think, at MMK 25.24, 
a short but significant line that would be easily missed if we did not recognise its context: 
sarvopalambhopaśamaḥ prapan͂copaśamaḥ śivaḥ / 
na kva cit kasyacit dharmo buddhena deśitaḥ //24// 
The extinguishing of all cognition, the extinguishing of reification, 
is blissful / 
No Dharma [was] ever taught by the Buddha to anyone //24// 
This is taken from the chapter entitled ‘Analysis of Nirvāṇa’, which Nāgārjuna thinks is 
itself neither existent nor ‘an absence’ (abhāva; nonexistent).  We know that the Buddha did 
indeed teach the Dharma, and so does Nāgārjuna: he ends his magnum opus by offering 
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salutations to the Buddha, whom Nāgārjuna thinks taught the ‘true Dharma’ (saddharma) to 
terminate all views (sarvadṛṣṭiprahāṇāya)!  There must then be something else going on in this 
seemingly innocuous kārikā.  I think that Nāgārjuna is thinking here in terms of the ultimate; if 
there is no possibility of svabhāva and thus no possibility of an eternal, immutable character or 
identity (or, indeed, ātman), then the Dharma of the Buddha is contingent.  It is contingent in the 
sense that its arising relies on causes and conditions, and that its continued ‘existence’ is reliant 
on yet more causes and conditions. 188   These causes and conditions are simple enough to 
conceive; the Dharma is taught because there are unenlightened minds attaching themselves to 
and grasping at things; they labour under existential dissatisfactions.  The continued existence of 
these unenlightened minds means that the Dharma endures (conventionally), and once a mind 
becomes enlightened, there is no need for the Dharma to exist: owing to its dependent origins, 
should every mind become enlightened, the Dharma – like all other phenomena – would perish.  
In these ways, the Dharma is dependently originated and exists only conventionally.  Accordingly, 
the truth of the Dharma as a tool to reach liberation is also thoroughly dependent and so 
conventional.  It has no innate character, no eternal, intrinsic existence, and so ‘no [permanent, 
ultimately existent] Dharma was ever taught by the Buddha to anyone’.  In other words, the 
Dharma is not ultimately existent and so not ultimately true.  It is conventionally existent and so 
conventionally true, and it is useful only as long as there are deluded minds to liberate; its truth 
is contingent on these minds and their deluded states. 
                                                        
188 I am here using ‘existence’ in a conventional manner.  That is to say that I do not mean to imply that the 
Dharma is ultimately existent. 
P a g e  | 246 
 
6.2 Why Posit Conventionality and Ultimacy? 
We might again wonder what the point of distinguishing between the conventional and 
ultimate is to Nāgārjuna.  It holds some significance, because he claims at MMK 24.9 that anybody 
that does not understand the distinction between the two truths does not understand the 
Dharma as taught by the Buddha!189  We have seen some wrangling by Ferraro and Burton 
around this question, but neither provide a fully satisfactory account.  Siderits and Katsura (2013: 
272-273) suggest two ways in which the distinction between conventional and ultimate might be 
understood.  The first is borrowed from Candrakīrti, and understands ‘conventional’ to mean 
something along the lines of ‘customary practices of the world’ (2013: 272).  Saṃvṛti is thus ‘of 
the nature of (the relation between) term and referent, cognition and the cognized, and the like’ 
(2013: 272), which means that conventionality is simply normal, everyday relations between 
semantic and cognitive aspects; between words and their associated cognitive ‘objects’.190  The 
                                                        
189 MMK 24.9 thus reads: 
dve satye samupāśritya buddhānāṃ dharmadeśanā / 
lokasaṃvṛtisatyaṃ ca satyaṃ ca paramārthataḥ //8// 
ye ‘nayor vijānti vibhāgaṃ satyayor dvayoḥ / 
te tattvaṃ na vijānanti gambhīre buddhaśāsane //9// 
The Dharma-instruction of the Buddha rests on two truths:  
conventional truth and ultimate truth //8// 
[Those] who do not know the distinction between the two truths, 
they do not understand the Buddha’s profound teaching //9// 
190 They are ‘cognitive objects’ because names and so on are prapañca: the old example of a chariot being nothing 
above a name assigned to parts arranged chariot-wise illustrates this point. Entities are reifications, they are 
semantic constructions assigned to conceptual constructions that occur through cognitive processes.  The claim 
here is not that things do not exist.  Instead, the claim is that we invest things with a sort of existence that they do 
not actually have.  Things do not exist the way we take them to exist.  Every part of every entity has innumerable 
causes and conditions – we do not see this reflected in language or the usual ways of thinking about the world.  
We invest them with permanence: a chariot is just a chariot, with some svabhāva indicating as much.  For thinkers 
like Nāgārjuna, it is fine to refer to a chariot, but we must recognise that this is a conceptual construction referring 
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underlying point is then that conventional thought is everyday thought, and everyday thought is 
in some way mistaken: namely insofar as it tends to reification and conceptual proliferation 
(prapañca).  At MMK 24.16, Nāgārjuna specifies exactly how this conventional thought manifests 
itself: as taking existents to have svabhāva and thus be intrinsically real.  This in turn, says 
Nāgārjuna, means that conventional thought – thought that reifies – takes objects to be without 
causes and conditions (ahetupratyaya).  It is an uncritical mindset, a way of thinking about and 
engaging with the world; a way that is that is mistaken. 
It is here that we see the import of referring to an ultimate truth: it allows a clear 
demarcation between thought processes, an old way of seeing things (conventional) and a new 
way of seeing things (ultimate).  It might help for us to think of śūnyatā as an ultimate truth when 
we are caught up in conventionalities and are ascribing svabhāva to that which lacks svabhāva: 
it stands as a ‘higher’ principle on the road to liberation precisely because clinging to notions of 
‘self’ via intrinsic nature is the nexus of all dissatisfaction.  This being the case, we can likely 
characterise use of the two truths as part of the Buddha’s skilful means (upāya), as a raft that 
helps us cross the proverbial river, but is of no further use when we get across the river and stand 
at the foot of the mountain.  Nāgārjuna, I think, would have seen the two truths in a similar 
manner – he cannot uphold an ultimate truth if he is to remain consistent.  It seems to me that 
to understand the two truths is to see them as handy ways of demarcating higher and lower 
levels of teachings that lead to better or worse ways of engaging with the world.  In this sense, 
                                                        
to a collection of dependent causes, conditions and parts.  In this sense, it is conventional.  It is also in this sense 
that it is a ‘cognitive object’.  The way we think a chariot exists is owing to a mistaken way of thinking about the 
world and the phenomena that interact within it.  Precisely because there are no svabhāvas, there are no 
independent entities.  The thought that there are independent entities is exactly that: a thought. 
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we might think of things termed ‘ultimate truths’ as penultimate teachings!  They are the best of 
conventional understanding, but are still themselves somehow inadequate – they are not the 
final step, but they are about all we can say before taking a final step.  Nāgārjuna is quick to point 
out that we must reach liberation via recourse to the conventional (MMK 24.10),191 the worldly 
means that surround us and that we make use of, the most basic of which is language.  This 
means that we might class conventional truths as the ‘normal’ way of engaging with the world, 
and ultimate truth as a type of upāya that is useful to us, but which is in the final analysis – insofar 
as there is one – to be abandoned as mere concept.  
Recall that Buddhists from the Abhidharma onwards account for experience via dharmas: 
I have elsewhere covered the intricacies of how dharmas were thought by the Ābhidharmikas to 
operate, and so will not retrace those steps here.  Instead, I offer two final kārikās from Nāgārjuna 
providing the bedrock to the argument that all dharmas are empty and thus impermanent and 
so there cannot be any ‘ultimate’ entities.  At MMK 25.22-23 we find: 
śūnyeṣu sarvadharmeṣu kim anantaṃ kim antavat / 
kim anantam ca nānantaṃ nāntavac ca kim //22// 
kiṃ tad eva kim anyat kiṃ śāśvataṃ kim aśāśvatam / 
aśāśvataṃ śāśvataṃ ca kim vā nobhayam apy atha //23// 
All dharmas [being] empty, what [is] without end? What has an 
end? / 
What [is both] with end and without end; what [is neither] 
without end nor [having an] end? //22// 
                                                        
191 On this, Nāgārjuna writes ‘vyavahāram anāśritya paramātho na deśyate’, which we can understand as 
something like ‘the ultimate truth is not taught detached from the world of appearances’, viz. liberation must be 
described, taught and reached in the conventional world.  I think that this lends credence to the notion that for 
Mādhyamikas, conventional-ultimate distinctions are simply epistemological tools to aid us on the path rather 
than ontologically significant realms.   
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What is identical? What is different? What is eternal? What is 
noneternal? / 
What [is both] eternal and noneternal?  What is neither (na 
ubhaya)? //23// 
The point that Nāgārjuna is making is that given that all psycho-physical dharmas are 
empty of intrinsic nature (svabhāva), what sense does it make to talk about entities that are 
eternal, noneternal, both or neither?  The question is itself mistaken; it is an instance of 
imposition, of conceptual proliferation (prapañca), and is ultimately a form of grasping that 
complicates the path to liberation.  It seems clear then that Nāgārjuna does not see any value in 
positing an existent ‘ultimate’.  ‘Ultimate’ is used to mark some distinctions when discussing a 
difficult subject, but when it comes down to it, there are no entities or states of affairs which fall 
under the concept ‘ultimate’. The ‘ultimate’ is a useful construction, designating the precipice at 
which linguistic designations and discursive cognition must end.  It signifies the edge of the 
linguistic world.  As with minotaurs and unicorns, it is important only that we understand what 
the concept means in relation to other concepts, in this case the ‘conventional’ and all that 
entails.  It is not important that some entity or state of affairs actually fall under this concept. 
This still sounds like a metaphysical claim, and to some degree, it is.  But we are by this 
point at an advanced stage along the path, and this is important.  At this stage, Nāgārjuna is 
toying with metaphysics in order to demonstrate the futility of doing metaphysics.  When he asks 
‘what is identical, what is different? What is eternal, what is non-eternal?’ and so on, Nāgārjuna 
is doing much more than engaging in mere sophistry.  These questions ought to apply to 
everything, and the resulting reductio so advocated by commentators like Candrakīrti should lead 
us to stop asking metaphysical questions in toto.  This is a controversial thesis, with many scholars 
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arguing that Nāgārjuna advocates nihilism, or that he ends up at some metaphysical viewpoint 
somewhere down the line, but I think that both of these positions are wrongheaded.  We can see 
very clearly that Nāgārjuna does engage in some metaphysics, but he only engages with 
metaphysics insofar as he is required to in order to prove the silliness of metaphysical systems.   
Accordingly, the metaphysical requirement upon Nāgārjuna really extends only as far as 
jettisoning certain commitments and ideas that get in the way of our liberation.  This can be seen 
with Nāgārjuna’s insistence that emptiness itself must be empty, a tactic clearly aimed at halting 
any possible reification of śūnyatā as an ultimate entity.  Further than this, Nāgārjuna wants to 
halt all conceptual thought.  We see at MMK 25.24 that ‘the extinguishing of all cognition, the 
extinguishing of reification, is blissful’, and at MMK 27.30 that the Buddha taught the ‘true 
Dharma (saddharma) for the abandonment of all views’ (sarvadṛṣṭiprahāṇāya).  The ultimate is 
a view; it is descriptive not insofar as it designates some ultimately real state of affairs, but insofar 
as it describes the means by which the practitioner might reach the penultimate stage to 
liberation.  Counter-intuitively, the final stage must be the disregarding of concepts of ‘ultimate’ 
and so on, so that no concepts at all remain.   
Even the Four Noble Truths are only conventionally true, being relevant to us at all only 
as long as there is origination, cessation and so on (MMK 24.40).192  No Noble Truth is true in and 
of itself, but instead emerges in reliance upon those things that cause it and otherwise affect it 
in some way.  Should dissatisfaction not occur, then we do not need to account for its origination, 
                                                        
192 The truths being 1) dissatisfaction, 2) the origination of dissatisfaction, 3) the cessation of dissatisfaction, and 4) 
the means to the cessation of dissatisfaction 
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cessation or the means by which we might expedite its cessation.  Once dissatisfaction dissolves, 
the Noble Truths no longer hold – how could they?  Those that do not understand this type of 
intimate connection between śūnyatā and pratītyasamutpāda – a connection that precludes the 
existence of any and all ‘ultimate’ entities –  are called ‘dull-witted’ (MMK 24.11; 
mandamedhasam) and ‘slow’ (MMK 24.12; manda).   
Those of sufficiently sharp mind know, then, that there are no ultimate entities or states 
of affairs, and as such, no corresponding ultimate truths.  This is how Nāgārjuna characterises his 
Middle Path: his position is between the extremes of ultimate existence and ultimate 
nonexistence.  It is thus clear to me that Nāgārjuna could not possibly have endorsed any entity 
or principle analogous to the ātman-Brahman.  This would be to reify śūnyatā and, as discussed 
earlier, to propagate one more insidious form of self-attachment, which has the unthinkable 
consequence of effectively negating Madhyamaka’s raison d’être.  As we see at MMK 24.11, 
Nāgārjuna thinks that such a position would be advanced only by the dull-witted! 
6.3 The Ultimate as a Conventional Designation 
Ultimate truth, then, should be thought of as a type of prapañca, although a less 
damaging one than those that traditionally fall under the scope of the conventional.  It is a 
concept under which nothing can fall if we are to account for change via emptiness, and it is a 
concept about which speculation is pointless once we reach the final stage of the path to 
liberation.  It is an imposition with no reality of its own: like everything else, it must be 
dependently originated and relies for its communication upon conventional means of 
communication.  This is of significance if we want to claim that Madhyamaka endorses a 
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permanent, immutable Absolute like the ātman-Brahman.  Nāgārjuna is clear that we must 
jettison notions of ultimacy at MMK 25.19-24 and 27.29-30.  Let us examine these kārikās.193  
At MMK 25.19-24, we find: 
na saṃsārasya nirvāṇāt kiṃ cid asti viśeṣaṇam / 
na nirvāṇasya saṃsārāt kiṃ cid asti viśeṣaṇam //19// 
nirvāṇasya ca yā koṭiḥ koṭiḥ saṃsaraṇasya ca / 
na tayor antaraṃ kiṃ cit susūkṣmam api vidyate //20// 
paraṃ nirodhād antādyāḥ śāśvatādyāś ca dṛṣṭayaḥ / 
nirvāṇam aparāntaṃ ca pūrvāntaṃ ca samāśritāḥ //21// 
śūnyeṣu sarvadharmeṣu kim anantaṃ antavat / 
kim anantam antavac ca nānantaṃ nāntavac ca kim //22// 
kiṃ tad eva kim anyat kiṃ śāśvataṃ kim aśāśvatam / 
aśāśvataṃ śāśvataṃ ca kim vā nobhayam apy atha //23// 
sarvopalambhopaśamaḥ prapan͂copaśamaḥ śivaḥ / 
na kva cit kasyacit dharmo buddhena deśitaḥ //24// 
There exists no difference whatsoever between saṃsāra and 
nirvāṇa / 
There exists no difference whatsoever between nirvāṇa and 
saṃsāra //19//  
The limit of nirvāṇa [is the] limit of saṃsāra / 
There is not even the subtlest difference between them //20// 
Views concerning [what is] beyond cessation, the end of the 
world, and the perpetuity of the world / 
depend on [views concerning] nirvāṇa, death, and the future 
//21//194 
                                                        
193 A couple of these kārikās have been mentioned elsewhere in this work.  I hope that their repetition will be 
forgiven: the overall context is, I think, important. 
194 Siderits and Katsura (2013:303) translate ‘nirvāṇa, the future life, and the past life’, stating that this kārikā 
relates to the Buddha’s reluctance to answer questions regarding states of being following ‘the cessation of such 
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All dharmas [being] empty, what [is] without end? What has an 
end? / 
What [is both] with end and without end; what [is neither] 
without end nor [having an] end? //22// 
What is identical? What is different? What is eternal? What is 
noneternal? / 
What [is both] eternal and noneternal?  What is neither (na 
ubhaya)? //23// 
The extinguishing of all cognition, the extinguishing of reification, 
is blissful / 
No Dharma [was] ever taught by the Buddha to anyone //24// 
Nāgārjuna’s style here can seem cryptic or confusing, but I think we can interpret it in a 
relatively straightforward way.  First, Nāgārjuna denies the difference between saṃsāra and 
nirvāṇa, which is not without controversy if you are a Buddhist that believes in some ultimate 
nirvāṇa realm to which entry is gained upon awakening!  However, given that Nāgārjuna has by 
this point in the text spent so long arguing against the possibility of svabhāva (and so svabhāvic 
realms or entities), it is my contention that the best interpretation here is to take Nāgārjuna as 
denying the existence of an immutable, ultimately existent nirvāṇa realm.  As svabhāva is the 
only way by which entities might exist ultimately, it makes no sense for us to say that ultimately, 
there is either saṃsāra or nirvāṇa.  Their shared ‘limit’ is that they are both conventional: neither 
exists with svabhāva.  In this sense then there is no difference between the two.   
Next, we see that views regarding what is beyond nirvāṇa, about the perpetuity or 
finitude of the world and so on are thought by Nāgārjuna to be directly reliant upon views about 
                                                        
composite things as persons, whether the world is limited in space, and whether the world has limits in time.’  
Such questions presuppose and answer to whether or not nirvāṇa has a beginning and end.   
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nirvāṇa.  Siderits and Katsura are in my opinion correct when they link this kārikā to the 
indeterminate questions that the Buddha famously refused to answer (2013: 303).  If nirvāṇa has 
a beginning or end, then it follows that the other questions must also have discernible answers.  
We find Nāgārjuna’s answer to this underlying question at MMK 11.1: 
pūrvā prajn͂āyate koṭir nety uvāca mahāmuniḥ / 
saṃsāro ‘navarāgro hi nāsyādir nāpi paścimam //1// 
The Great Sage [has] said [that] the first point [of saṃsāra] cannot 
be known / 
Saṃsāra [is] without first and last, [it is] without beginning or end 
//1// 
The underlying point to all of this is that such questions – even if they could be answered 
– are mere distractions.  The act of asking them in the first place is misguided: views regarding 
one thing depend on views regarding something else, depend on views regarding something else, 
and so the chain continues in a circle of dissatisfaction, never finding one single, ultimate source.  
It is pointless to look for a beginning or end within saṃsāra, and doing so causes nothing but 
anxieties related to wrong views. It is a waste of our energies to focus on these distractions 
precisely because even if they could be answered, the resulting knowledge would not aid our 
quest for liberation.  Nāgārjuna spends a lot of time arguing against the possibility of real 
(intrinsically existent) stages of existence.  Chapter 11 of the MMK is dedicated to demonstrating 
that there are no ‘real’ prior or posterior stages of anything.  This is because for there to be real, 
distinct stages, we need to account for succession in time, which as Siderits and Katsura explain, 
cannot be explained ‘without positing an absolute beginning, a posit which would be irrational’ 
(2013: 127).  Nāgārjuna thinks this to be the case first because his denial of svabhāva also means 
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a denial of absolutes, and second because positing such a thing would violate the laws of 
pratītyasamutpāda.195 
We see this point really forced in the following lines.  Given that svabhāva is impossible 
and all dharmas are thus empty, it is nonsensical to talk about beginnings, ends and so on.  All 
dharmas being empty, there can be no possibility of ultimately existent entities.  Nāgārjuna had 
hinted at this in Chapter 7 when he wrote that given that conditioned (dharmas) are 
unestablished, unconditioned (dharmas) cannot be established either.196  Thus, an underlying 
                                                        
195 MMK 11.3-6 really spells this out.  Briefly, the argument is that if there were a first birth that was uncaused by 
old age and death, then the traditional account of rebirth would be invalidated: birth would be causeless.  
Similarly, if old age and/or death were the first point in the series (of rebirths), then they too would be uncaused 
by birth and so ultimately uncaused.  Nāgārjuna, like all Buddhists, thinks it nonsensical to talk of uncaused events 
or entities.  Further, pratītyasamutpāda itself rules out the possibility of absolute uncaused beginning.  This same 
argument must hold, thinks Nāgārjuna, for all phenomena and entities in all possible circumstances. 
196 MMK 7.33-34: 
utpādasthitibhaṅgānām asiddher nāsti saṃskṛtam / 
saṃskṛtasyāprasiddham ca kathaṃ setsyaty asaṃskṛtam //33// 
yathā māyā yathā svapno gandharvanagaraṃ yathā / 
tathotpādas tathā sthānaṃ tathā bhaṅga udāhṛtam //34// 
[With] origination, duration, and dissolution not established, the conditioned 
[does] not exist / 
And [with] the conditioned not established, what unconditioned [thing can be] 
proven? //33// 
Like an illusion, like a dream, like the city of the Gandharvas, 
thus origination, duration, dissolution [have been] declared //34// 
 
 
 
 
P a g e  | 256 
 
substratum, permanent, immutable, pure and so on cannot exist.  The very fact that there is 
change in the world precludes its existence.  Indeed, at MMK 7.17, Nāgārjuna asks how any non-
arisen entity (think of the ātman-Brahman here) can be said to come into being: 
yadi kaścid anutpanno bhāvaḥ saṃvidyate kvacit / 
utpadyeta sa kiṃ tasmin bhāva utpadyate ‘sati //17// 
If any non-arisen entity somewhere exists, [that would] arise / 
But [when such an entity] does not exist, how then [can an] 
existent arise? 
Siderits and Katsura point out that the idea at play here is that entities that have not yet 
arisen have some type of proto-existence where it ‘exists’ as an ‘as-yet-unoriginated entity’ 
(2013: 82); this is, of course, the sort of thing that the Sarvāstivādins believed as a result of their 
dharma theory.   Nāgārjuna wants to know how an entity in a state of existential limbo can truly 
be said to arise given that origination is the coming into existence of that which did not exist – in 
any state – before.  An action requires an existent thing, and so for something to arise in a real 
sense, it needs to already exist.  But we have seen that only something new that did not exist in 
any state previously can arise, and so Nāgārjuna thinks that we cannot conclude that any dharma 
really arises (he makes this clear at MMK 7.29).  It is important to realise that Nāgārjuna is not 
ever claiming that we do not experience origination, cessation and so on: he is instead disputing 
their ultimate existence.  The counter-intuitive conclusion is that the fact that change, 
origination, cessation and so on are all experienced in the world means that they cannot exist 
ultimately; they cannot exist with svabhāva. 
The Advaitin would respond that the ātman-Brahman does not come into existence.  It 
simply is existence.  I think that Nāgārjuna would find this sort of reasoning entirely 
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unsatisfactory: pratītyasamutpāda dictates that everything is subject to birth, decay, aging, and 
destruction, and we have seen that Nāgārjuna thinks that this holds from the top down and in 
every conceivable circumstance.  This is why he has such a problem with dharmas as conceived 
as having svabhāva.  We can deploy the argument from MMK 25.23 against the Advaitin Brahman 
view: given that Nāgārjuna has demonstrated that entities cannot exist ultimately, how can 
anything be described as eternal, non-eternal, both eternal and non-eternal, or neither?  The 
ātman-Brahman cannot be conceived of in any sense – it is incoherent.  Additionally, we saw 
Śaṅkara earlier claim that the existence of the ātman-Brahman is in the first instance attested by 
the Upaniṣads.  I think it uncontroversial to say that Nāgārjuna would not find this compelling: 
although there is recourse to Buddhist scripture in every Buddhist sect including Madhyamaka, 
we can see that the MMK is concerned not only with repeating Buddhist doctrine, but with 
reconciling it with experience.  The metaphysics that Nāgārjuna does engage in are based on  
experience: we see change, we can analyse causes and conditions and so on.  This is a shared 
factor with Yogācāra.  Nāgārjuna simply uses our experience of the world to demonstrate that 
clinging to metaphysical views (dṛṣṭi) is a source of duḥkha: this is the world, we are engaging 
with it in the wrong way when we impose all these metaphysical dogmas onto it. 
Śūnyatā is not an entity that exists ultimately: it is itself empty of intrinsic existence, it 
should not be reified, and it describes a privation (of svabhāva), not an existent thing: the lack of 
svabhāva is not some inverse type of permanent character, for this would be to reify emptiness 
as a svabhāva in all but name.  Reifying an empty concept is for Nāgārjuna still problematic insofar 
as doing so has the propensity to bring about insidious types of clinging (and thus dissatisfaction).  
It is clear to me that followed to its logical ends, Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka cannot in terms of the 
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conventional countenance the assertion of an immutable, necessary entity that is both the 
material and efficient cause of the world: it is simply an incoherence that tallies neither with 
experience nor with Buddhist doctrine.  In terms of the ultimate, such a question cannot arise 
because all reification – indeed all conceptualisation – has ended.  In such an instance, talk of an 
ultimately existent ātman-Brahman is obviously impossible.  Talk of an ultimate anything is 
impossible. 
Now to the final two kārikās of Chapter 27 of the MMK.  The context of this chapter 
generally is ‘An Analysis of Views’, the views in question being those concerning past and future 
existence.  Siderits and Katsura write that the thrust of the various arguments contained in the 
chapter are ‘meant to refute a wide variety of theories about the ultimate nature of reality.  In 
each case a key assumption of the theory under attack [is] that there are things with intrinsic 
natures [svabhāva]’ (2013: 335).  The outcome of the chapter appears to be the conclusion that 
emptiness precludes any ‘ultimate’ phenomena from existing.  What does Nāgārjuna have to say 
on this?  At MMK 27.29-30 we find: 
atha vā sarvabhāvānāṃ śūnyatvāc chāśvatādayaḥ / 
kva kasya katamāḥ kasmāt saṃbhaviṣyanti dṛṣṭayaḥ //29// 
sarvadṛṣṭiprahāṇāya yaḥ saddharmam adeśayat / 
anukampām upādāya taṃ namasyāmi gautamam //30// 
So, since all existents are empty, where, to whom, which, for what 
reason would views such as ‘the eternal’ occur? 
I pay homage to Gautama, who by means of compassion taught 
the true Dharma for the abandonment of all views. 
Given that all phenomena are empty of svabhāva, there can from an ultimate perspective 
be no place, person, or reason in which, to whom, or according to which views such as eternalism 
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arise.   Indeed, the views themselves are also impossible from an ultimate perspective.  Of course, 
the ‘ultimate perspective’ is itself a mere designation, indicative of an advanced position on the 
Buddhist path, but not of the final destination.  Holding that some sort of ultimate truth or 
ultimate reality is the outcome of the path would itself be a view, and as we see at 27.30, the 
Dharma necessitates the removal of all views.  This total removal must include the view that 
there is an ultimate truth or an ultimate reality, even if this ultimate view is the only view held 
by a given person.  Nāgārjuna’s aversion to asserting any sort of ultimate is, I think, well founded.  
If there is an ultimate mode of existence or some ultimate truth that liberates, it would need to 
be permanent.  It would, according to Nāgārjuna’s account of ultimacy, need to exist with 
svabhāva; an immutable, unoriginated thing detached from dependent origination and 
untouched by the very causes and conditions which account for all Buddhist causation.  This is 
precisely the sort of existence that is proposed for the ātman-Brahman.  Despite its ultimately 
being beyond conceptualisation and beyond attribution, it is in every circumstance 
acknowledged as the totality of existence.  It is literally responsible for everything, ‘ultimate’ in 
every sense of the word, and so despite being beyond conceptualisation and so on, it remains 
the ultimate ‘object’ of liberation.  Even in the final analysis, it is there: it is, in fact, all that is 
there.  I am not at all convinced that this is what Nāgārjuna was working toward when he wrote 
the MMK.  I earlier discussed how in the Vigrahavyāvartani, Nāgārjuna refuted the notion that 
pramāṇas can be ultimately established (and in turn establish some sort of ultimate knowledge) 
because nothing at all can be ultimately established: I think that the same thread is woven 
throughout the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, too.  There is one particularly telling kārikā at the end 
of MMK 10: 
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ātmanaś ca satattvaṃ ye bhāvānāṃ ca pṛthak pṛthak / 
nirdiśanti na tān manye śāsanasyārthakovidān //16// 
[Those who] proclaim the real nature of the ātman and separate 
entities / 
[we] do not consider experts in [the Buddha’s] teaching //16// 
This criticism is aimed in the MMK at the pudgalavādins, but I think that it can apply with 
equal force to those that would advance an ātmavāda (doctrine of ātman): is this not what 
Bhattacharya, Murti et al. are trying to do?  The Advaitin project is to give an account of the 
ātman and its ultimate identity as a microcosmic instantiation of the Brahman.  The vast majority 
of Advaitin literature is dedicated to orientating practitioners toward this truth or towards 
fleshing out the details regarding how they might best try to orientate practitioners towards this 
truth.197  Intuitive knowledge of this ultimate identity is the liberating factor.  Bhattacharya, as 
we have seen, thinks that a śūnyavāda (doctrine of emptiness) is equivalent in all but name to 
the ātmavāda of the Advaitins.  I hope that my arguments throughout this work illustrate why 
this need not be the case. 
 What is left after all this?  For Nāgārjuna we have seen that the end result needs to be  
the extinguishing of all cognition; the extinguishing of all reification.  This, as I have said, must 
include any notions around what is ‘ultimate’, be that in truth or in existence.  Once we have 
reached this point, talk of ultimate truths or ultimate existence are seen for what they are, mere 
prapañca, hindering the pursuit of liberation by providing an idea to cling to (vikalpa).  We must 
remove this final obstacle so that we might experience what Huntington (2018: 18) calls the 
                                                        
197 Even the dry philosophical discussions about pramāṇas and epistemological principles is geared toward 
providing reliable means by which a dedicated practitioner can analyse the world to come to know Brahman. 
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‘consequent immersion in a groundless state of non-abiding—what is referred to in the 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā as the “extinction of conceptual diffusion in emptiness”.’  I think that 
this is for Nāgārjuna as for Vasubandhu a state to be experienced in meditation.  The halting of 
cognition (which constitutes liberation) necessitates the abandonment of views regarding the 
ultimate precisely because we could feasibly hold no attachment at all other than the attachment 
to the ultimate truth (as we conceive of it).   This is still an attachment, and it still has the potential 
(or, I suggest, its inevitable consequence is) to breed the usual anxieties and duḥkha in the usual 
manners.  
Given what has been said above, we eventually need to jettison our concept of ultimacy, 
lest we find ourselves clinging to it, surreptitiously sating a reified enquiring ‘I’, the ‘I’ that we 
think holds this truth to be ultimate in the first place, and so we end up prolonging our own 
duḥkha.  For this reason, ‘ultimate truth’ must be a conventional construction.  It is undoubtedly 
a useful concept, but only up to the point where we no longer need it to distinguish better ideas 
from worse ideas.  When we reach that summit of practice where all ideas are to be eschewed 
and all discursive cognition is to be discarded, we have no place for any idea at all, not even of 
an ultimate truth.  To keep such an idea is to attach oneself to it, to identify with it, and thus to 
allow a more insidious dissatisfaction.  Nāgārjuna’s method must culminate in a disregarding of 
the concept of ultimacy, and with it, a disregarding of any notion of ātman-Brahman as our 
reality.  We should not concern ourselves with such pointless questions as ‘what is reality?’, we 
should instead just experience without grasping and without reification.  As such, ‘ultimate’ is a 
conventional designation; a useful fiction which can help our soteriological aim, but which is not 
sufficient to provide that same salvation.  It is a tool that, like the fabled raft, helps us across the 
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river, but prevents us from traversing the mountain.   It is my belief that Nāgārjuna recognised 
this, and that the method presented in the MMK is intended to deal with this most insidious of 
problems.  It is in this sense that I think we can stake the claim that – conventionally! – ‘the 
ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth’. 
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Concluding Remarks 
I have covered a lot of ground in this work – I nevertheless hope that I have maintained a 
common thread throughout.  I stated at the beginning that my intention was modest; simply to 
demonstrate that absolutism need not be a conclusion of Mahāyāna philosophy.  My arguments 
have been mostly small, but aimed at several smaller targets, each of them different aspects 
within the Buddhist corpus.  I think this reflects the nature of diversity within the field that we 
might broadly call ‘Buddhist philosophy’.  All of my small arguments nevertheless add up to one 
overarching point: Mahāyāna philosophy – or at least some of the greatest examples of it – need 
not result in some type of absolutism.  If I am wrong, then it is not an exaggeration to claim that 
2000 years of Buddhist praxis and philosophy has been significantly misguided.  The stakes are – 
in principle– rather high. 
I have not covered in detail the ways in which some Buddhists do indeed endorse and 
propagate absolutism.  There are a couple of reasons for this, the first being that I think we can 
take it for granted that this does happen, but not that it should happen.  Second, I fear that such 
a gargantuan task is just too large for me to have attempted here.  Instead, I have tried to 
maintain a relatively narrow focus on how we might avoid absolutism in the vein of Madhyamaka, 
Yogācāra, and even according to some prajñāpāramitā philosophy.   It is in any case true that 
some Buddhists do indeed buy into forms of absolutism, and if Bhattacharya had simply stated 
this and stopped there, then I would have been in full agreement with him.  The issue as I see it 
is that going by the arguments presented in the 2015 translation, Bhattacharya thinks that all 
Buddhists should endorse absolutism, and those that do not simply misunderstand the point of 
Buddhism!  I hope to have demonstrated within this work that Bhattacharya (and scholars that 
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follow his lead) are mistaken on some fundamental points.  Linguistic interpretations of awkward 
Sanskrit terms aside, I think that the bases of both Yogācāra and Madhyamaka are fundamentally 
opposed to the endorsement of an Absolute substratum.  This is what I would say constitutes the 
real backbone of this work. 
My main point, then, is that neither Vasubandhu nor Nāgārjuna would endorse the 
ultimate existence of the ātman-Brahman.  But there is more!  They would not argue for its 
ultimate non-existence, either.  This is because, I have argued, that questioning non-existence, 
existence, possible existence and so on is little more than an exercise in dissatisfaction.  For 
Nāgārjuna, our problems are – in the vast majority of cases – analysable down to belief in entities 
that are self-existent, or that have intrinsic nature.  It is a predilection to thinking that objects 
have svabhāva that is the nub of the problem.  This not only applies to Hindu thinkers like 
Śaṅkara, who would hold that the ātman-Brahman is the svabhāva of the universe and all it 
contains, but also to other Buddhists, who think of entities as conditioned, but conditioned by 
unconditioned, intrinsically existent atoms or dharmas.  To be intrinsically existent is to have a 
svabhāva, and to have a svabhāva is to exist ultimately.  Nāgārjuna thinks that all entities are 
empty (śūnyatā) of svabhāva, and so Nāgārjuna is thus concerned with denying the possibility of 
ultimacy from the very beginning.  We saw in the VV that contrary to Śaṅkara, Nāgārjuna does 
not think that any ultimate entity whatsoever can possibly be established.  
I have also interpreted the Yogācāra of Vasubandhu in a similar manner, arguing that 
despite formulating a trisvabhāva doctrine, he too views svabhāva as parikalpita.   This is, I argue, 
because the way in which Vasubandhu formulated the trisvabhāva doctrine precludes us from 
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taking svabhāva to be an ultimately existent thing.  That we must now understand svabhāva to 
be a tripartite, dependent concept proves that it cannot be the unitary, self-sufficient entity that 
it is sometimes taken to be.  It is necessarily dependent and is a simple conceptual imposition.   
Far from endorsing some permanent existent, then, I argue that Vasubandhu seeks to liberate 
the mind from conceptual proliferation in much the same way as Nāgārjuna: by providing a 
method that will allow the practitioner to see that there are no permanent, immutable self-
sufficient entities.  This clearly rules out the prospect of an ātman-Brahman, transcendent or not.  
Having disposed of the problematic issue of svabhāva (and with it, permanent, ultimate 
existence), I turned to non-existence.  For Nāgārjuna and for Vasubandhu, it is the case that 
staunchly preaching that x and y do not ultimately exist is equally as problematic as claiming that 
x and y do ultimately exist.  I propose that both must then jettison ultimate non-existence in the 
same way that they jettison ultimate existence.  What we are left with is a denial of ultimacy on 
either side, which I think constitutes Nāgārjuna’s ‘middle way’.  More than this, we have a total 
rejection of metaphysics, a point made most forcefully on the part of Nāgārjuna.  I suggest that 
both Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu share a distaste for ultimacy: Nāgārjuna to the point that he 
will not even talk about it, and wants to halt all conceptual proliferation, reification and grasping 
at the world.  For Vasubandhu, the point is realising the emptiness of the flux.  He is more 
comfortable speaking of metaphysics and metaphysical concepts, just as long as we realise that 
they are – when all is said and done – empty of intrinsic existence.  What is important is removing 
conceptualisation from consciousness, so that we might experience emptiness.  That is to say 
that Vasubandhu believes that in following the Yogācāra, we realise that our experiences are 
empty of intrinsic nature and of ultimate existence, non-existence and so on.  For the Yogācārin, 
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we ought to experience without grasping, without system building, and without imposing a 
metaphysic.  This is, I think, largely the same for the Mādhyamika.  The result then is a realisation 
that is all but identical in both cases.  The difference is the method used to achieve it.  What is 
clear in both cases is that there is no room for an ātman-Brahman and as such, that 
Bhattacharya’s thesis is – in these two cases – mistaken.   
Given that the initial claim made by Bhattacharya was that the Mahāyāna put things right 
in terms of reorientating Buddhist praxis back toward the ātman-Brahman, it is, I think, sufficient 
for me to demonstrate not that the entire Mahāyāna corpus runs contrary to Bhattacharya’s 
thesis, but only that parts of it do.  I hope that I have shown in the preceding chapters that the 
two significant Mahāyāna schools under discussion are those parts.  I have supplemented my 
arguments for this with some peripheral challenges to Bhattacharya’s choice of citations (the 
prajñāpāramitā literature, for example).  Whilst I believe that these aid my overall argument, 
they are but small additions.  My claim is then that Madhyamaka should not endorse absolutism, 
and Yogācāra need not endorse absolutism.  According to my interpretations of both 
Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, then, absolutism need not be a conclusion of Mahāyāna philosophy. 
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Thanissaro Bhikkhu, 2017. Aṅguttara Nikāya. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/ [Accessed 30 January 2017]. 
The Holy Bible: New King James Version, 1982. Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson. 
Tillemans, T.J.F., (forthcoming). Mādhyamikas Playing Bad Hands: The Case of Customary Truth. 
Journal of Indian Philosophy, Available at: 
https://www.academia.edu/30818518/M%C4%81dhyamikas_Playing_Bad_Hands_The_Case_of
_Customary_Truth [Accessed February 2017]. 
Tillemans, T.J.F., 1999. Scripture, Logic, Language: Essays on Dharmakīrti and His Tibetan 
Successors. Boston: Wisdom Publications. 
Triṃśikāvijñaptikārikāḥ, 2004. [Online] Available at: http://www.dsbcproject.org/canon-
text/content/337/1390 [Accessed August 2018]. 
P a g e  | 274 
 
Trivedi, S., 2005. Idealism and Yogacara Buddhism. Asian Philosophy, 15(3), pp.231-46. 
Vallée-Poussin, L.d.L., 1930. The Two Nirvāṇadhātus According to the Vibhāṣa. The Indian 
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